Honble PATIL, CJ.–A Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 27.10.1998 passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 893/98 referred the following questions to a Larger Bench for consideration and decisions:- ``(i) Whether the fact that a candidate was prosecuted or subjected to investigation on a criminal charge is a material fact, suppression of which would entitle an employer to deny employment to a candidate on that ground? (ii) Whether the ultimate acquittal of a candidate who was prosecuted on a criminal charge would condone or wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact that he was prosecuted? (iii) Whether the suppression of the material fact would not by itself disentitle a candidate from being appointed in service? (2). Hence, this appeal and other connected appeals have come up before us sitting in the Full Bench. (3). Since the facts are similar in all these appeals and common questions arise for consideration, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. The facts to the extent they are relevant for answering the reference are taken from D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 893/98. (4). The appellant had applied for the post of Constable in the State Police Service, in response to the Notification dated 16.9.1997 inviting applications for recruitment to the posts of Police Constables. He was successful in the written examination and the Physical Efficiency Test. Thereafter, he was called upon to submit the original documents in the office of the Superintendent of Police, Churu. He accordingly, submitted the documents on 19.2.1998. However, he was not given appointment order. On enquiry, he was informed that he was not giving appointment order as he had suppressed the information that an FIR was lodged against him for the offence under sections 323 and 341 IPC and that he had not disclosed this fact in his application form. Thus, he was denied employment on the ground of suppression of material information in his application form. In this situation, the appellant filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2247/98 seeking direction to the respondents to provide appointment to him on the post of Constable from the date from which his juniors had been given appointment. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by the order dated 27.7.1998 following his judgment delivered in similar case of Girdhari Singh vs. Inspector General & Ors.(1). The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by the order dated 27.7.1998 following his judgment delivered in similar case of Girdhari Singh vs. Inspector General & Ors.(1). The learned Single Judge was of the view that the State was within its right to deny employment to the appellant on the ground of concealment of information that a criminal case was lodged against him and that is would be immaterial whether the prosecution resulted in acquittal. Aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, this appeal is filed. (5). The Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 27.10.1998 agreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge, but in view of the two other decisions of the different Division Benches of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Khalid Ahmed (2), and State of Rajasthan vs. Rajendra Singh (3), taking a contrary view, while admitting the appeal, referred the questions aforementioned, to a Larger Bench for decision. (6). The learned counsel for the appellants contended that there was no deliberate suppression or concealment of any material information by the appellants while submitting their application forms, pursuant to the Notification dated 16.9.1997; when there was no deliberate suppression or concealment of material information, the learned Single Judge ought to have granted relief to the appellants; the subsequent acquittal in criminal case ought to have been taken into consideration and the appointment ought to have been given; the authority should have examined that the offences said to have been committed by the appellants did not relate to moral turpitude; and that an opportunity ought to have been given before refusing appointment to the appellants. In support of these submissions, the learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on few decisions. (7). The learned counsel for the respondents argued supporting the order of the learned Single Judge; they pointed out to Rules 13 and 15 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 (for short `the Rules) and Column No. 17 of the application. In support of these submissions, the learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on few decisions. (7). The learned counsel for the respondents argued supporting the order of the learned Single Judge; they pointed out to Rules 13 and 15 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 (for short `the Rules) and Column No. 17 of the application. They contended that the information required in Column No. 17 of the application form was material for the purpose of adjudicating the conduct/character of a candidate seeking entry in the Police Department; in case of suppression of such information, he shall be disentitled for employment in the Police Department; further, the learned counsel also drew our attention to the Circular No. 5(1)P.F./Const./95/1687 dated 29.4.1995 issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur, explaining what amounts to moral turpitude; according to the said Circular, wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) about the candidate etc. would be covered under ``moral turpitude; a candidate, who secures appointment by suppressing material fact of involvement in a criminal case or prosecution against him, amounts to obtaining appointment by fraud; the learned counsel further submitted that in view of Rule 15 of the Rules, the respondents were justified in denying appointment to the appellant; they added that a mere acquittal in a criminal case shall not wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact of either involvement in a criminal case or prosecution; material suppression of information indicates about the doubtful conduct of a candidate which impinges his character and further indicates his working of mind to obtain the benefits, going to any extent; hence, the questions referred are to be answered against the appellants; they are not entitled to get relief, having suppressed the material information, which was required to be given specifically in Column No. 17 of the application form. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, having regard to Rules 13 and 15 of the Rules, information required to be given in Column No.17 of the application form read with the Circular dated 29.4.1995, the respondents are fully justified in not giving appointment to the appellants. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, having regard to Rules 13 and 15 of the Rules, information required to be given in Column No.17 of the application form read with the Circular dated 29.4.1995, the respondents are fully justified in not giving appointment to the appellants. They cited few decisions in support of these submissions, clarifying that the decisions cited on behalf of the appellant are not on the points that are to be answered in the reference and that those decisions have not dealt with specifically with regard to Rules 13 and 15 of the Rules, column No.17 of the application form and the Circular dated 29.4.1995 covering the questions raised. (8). We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. (9). In order to appreciate the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties on their relative merits and to answer the questions referred for our consideration and decision, we think it appropriate to reproduce the Rules 13 and 15 of the Rules of 1989, Column No. 17 of the application form and the relevant portion of the Circular dated 29.4.1995. ``Rule 13. Character. The character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the Principal Academic Officer of the University or College or School in which he was last educated and two such certificates, written not more than six months prior to the date of application, from two responsible persons not connected with his School or College or University and not related to him. Notes.-(1) A conviction by a Court of Law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement, which has its object to overthrow by violent means a Government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as disqualification. (2) Ex-Prisoners, who by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated on grounds of the previous conviction, for purposes of employment in the service. (2) Ex-Prisoners, who by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated on grounds of the previous conviction, for purposes of employment in the service. Those who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent. After-care Home or if there are no such homes in a particular district, from the Superintendent of Police of that district. Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent, After-care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they proved to completely reformed by their disciplined life while in Prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After-care Home. Rule 15 Employment of Irregular or Improper Means.-A candidate who is or has been declared by the Recruitment Board/Commission or the Appointing Authority guilty of impersonation or of submitting fabricated documents, which have been tempered with or suppressing material information or of using attempting to use unfair means in the examination or interview or otherwise resorting to any other irregular or improper means for obtaining admission to the examination or interview may, in addition to rendering himself liable to criminal prosecution be debarred either permanently or for a specified period:- (a) by the Recruitment Board/Commission or the Appointing Authority for admission to any examination or appearance at any interview to be held under the provisions of these Rules, and (b) by Government from employment under the Government. ``Column No. 17. <span class="Hfont">izkFkhZ ;fn vijkf/kd izdj.k esa lEc) jgk gks] dk fooj.k % ¼d½ D;k izkFkhZ fdlh vijkf/kd eqdnesa esa fyIr gS ;k jgk gS -------------------------¼;fn gka rks fooj.k nsaosa½ ---------------------------- ¼[k½ D;k izkFkhZ fdlh eqdnesa esa fxjQ~rkj gqvk gS ---------------------------------¼;fn gka rks fooj.k nsaosa½ ---------------------------------- ¼x½ D;k izkFkhZ fdlh eqdnesa esa ltk gqbZ gS --------------------------------------¼;fn gka rks fooj.k nsaosa½ ----------------------------- Relevant portion of Circular dt. 29.4.1995 ``Any act which indicates malafide mental conduct such as theft or criminal misconduct towards the woman or forgery or wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) about the candidate etc. would be covered under ``moral turpitude. Cases involving attrocities on Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes and Woman (dowry cases) would, also, fall under this category. (10). 29.4.1995 ``Any act which indicates malafide mental conduct such as theft or criminal misconduct towards the woman or forgery or wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) about the candidate etc. would be covered under ``moral turpitude. Cases involving attrocities on Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes and Woman (dowry cases) would, also, fall under this category. (10). Rule 13 of the Rules relates to character of a candidate for direct recruitment and the character must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. Note (1) to the said Rule indicates that conviction by a Court of Law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character; the circumstances of conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence etc., the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. Note (2) to the said Rule speaks of subsequent conduct even in relation to ex-prisoners, who by their disciplined life, while in prison, have proved to be completely reformed. But, Rule 15 of the Rules is a specific Rule dealing with employment of irregular or improper means for securing appointment and the consequences that follow. As can be seen from the said Rule, suppression of material information is considered as one of such means; for suppression of material information, a candidate could be debarred either permanently or for a specified period by the Recruitment Board/Commission or Appointing Authority for admission to any examination or appearance at any interview to be held under the provisions of the Rules and by the Government from employment under the Government, in addition to rendering him liable for criminal prosecution. (11). It is not disputed that the appellants in the appeals on hand have not only failed to give information about their involvement in a criminal case, but made a specific statement in column No.17 of the application form in the negative thereby leading the authorities to believe that they were not involved in the criminal case; they were not arrested in any case; and they were not given any punishment in any case. (12). The circular dated 29.4.1995, relevant portion of which is already extracted above, clarifies that a wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) would be covered under `moral turpitude. (13). (12). The circular dated 29.4.1995, relevant portion of which is already extracted above, clarifies that a wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) would be covered under `moral turpitude. (13). Column No.17 of the application form make it mandatory for the application to furnish information in relation to his involvement in criminal case. In the light of Rule 15 of the Rules and Circular dated 29.4.1995, it is clear that in relation to recruitment as constable in the police Department, which is a disciplined force, in order to judge suitability and desirability of a candidate for recruitment, such information is vital. From the information so furnished, it would be possible for the Appointing Authority to judge the suitability of a candidate. If the material information specifically required in column No.17 of the form is not furnished or wrongly furnished to mislead the authorities, that would only show the mental make up or frame of mind of the candidate, who in case is appointed, will have onerous responsibilities and duties to perform in the public interest. The nature of duties, a police constable has to perform, include maintenance of law and order, conduct of investigations, protection of life and property of citizens etc. Such duties can be entrusted safely to disciplined and honest persons. A person who does not furnish the material information which if furnished goes against him, exhibits his dishonest intention or his nature and mental condition. The Appointing Authority could trust such a person to entrust onerous and responsible duties that too in the police department. Having regard to the plain language of Rule 15 and the consequences of suppression of information read with the Circular which says that wilful suppression of information adverse to candidate comes within the purview of moral turpitude, it cannot be said that information sought in Column No.17 of the application form is not material. (14). In this view, suppression of material information or furnishing it wrongly in column No. 17 of the form is a vital factor, which goes against the candidate. Rule 15 of the Rules empowers the authorities to deny appointment or debar such candidate for admission to any examination or appearance at any interview either permanently or for specified period. (14). In this view, suppression of material information or furnishing it wrongly in column No. 17 of the form is a vital factor, which goes against the candidate. Rule 15 of the Rules empowers the authorities to deny appointment or debar such candidate for admission to any examination or appearance at any interview either permanently or for specified period. A careful reading of Rule 15 shows that suppressing material information is itself sufficient to deny employment without anything more; in other words, it is not required that suppression of material should be deliberate or wilful. Further, by the combined reading of Rules 13, 15 and the Circular dated 29.4.1995, there can be no doubt that appointment could be denied on the ground of suppression of material information, which was otherwise required for judging the suitability and desirability of a candidate for direct recruitment in the police department. The information relating to involvement of a candidate in criminal case is specifically sought in column No.17 of the application form. If it is not furnished, the candidate takes the consequences of denial of appointment to him. (15). The Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 726/97 State of Rajasthan vs. Khalid Ahmed (supra), though referred to Rule 15 of the Rules, took a view that two criminal cases in which the applicant was facing trial were not the offences involving any moral turpitude. With respect, we must say that for the purpose of Rule 15, whether offences involved moral turpitude or not is not at all required to be considered as is evident from the said Rule itself. Reference to moral turpitude arises only under Rule 13. As already stated above, Rules 13 and 15 have different purposes to serve. (16). In D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 310/98 State of Rajasthan vs. Rajendra Singh (supra), it is stated that the applicant was tried under sections 147 and 323 IPC; he was acquitted of the said charges; hence, he was not required to submit information required in column No.17 of the application form as the offences did not relate to moral turpitude. The Division Bench did not take into consideration the effect of Rule 15 of the Rules and the Circular referred to above, in deciding the case, but referring to Division Bench judgment of this Court in Khalid Ahmeds case aforementioned, held that non-furnishing of information in column No.17 did not amount to suppression of material facts. (17). In the order of reference dated 27.10.1998, the Bench took note of these two decisions and found that the order of the learned Single Judge under appeal has taken a view contrary to the said two decisions. In this view, as already stated above, reference was made to a Larger Bench. (18). The learned Single Judge of this Court in a well considered and elaborate judgment in Hanumana Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (4), has referred to Rules 13 and 15, Column No. 17 of the application form and the Circular dated 29.4.1995 and has relied on various decisions of the Apex Court in dismissing the writ petition. (19). The Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Administration vs. Sushil Kumar (5), in para No.3 of the judgment has stated thus: This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi made on 6.9.1995 in OA No. 1756 of 1991. The admitted position is that the respondent appeared for recruitment as a Constable in Delhi Police Services in the year 1989-90 with Roll No. 65790. Though he was found physically fit through endurance test, written test and interview and was selected provisionally, his selection was subject to verification of character and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that his appointment to the post of Constable was not found desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. Aggrieved by proceedings dated 18.12.1990 culminating in cancellation of his provisional selection, he filed OA in the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal in the impugned order allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under section 304 IPC, under section 324 read with section 34 IPC and under section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The question is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? The question is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing Authority, therefore, has rightly focussed this aspect and found it not desirable to appoint him to the services (20). As is clear from the above judgment of the Honble Supreme Court, though a candidate may be found physically fit, passed the written test and was provisionally selected, appointment could be denied by the Appointing Authority to him, if it is found not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force and that denial of appointment on that ground cannot be said to be unwarranted on unjustified. From the same judgment, it follows that acquittal or discharge of the criminal offences, has nothing to do with the question and that what would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a Service and not the actual result of a criminal case. From the same judgment, it follows that acquittal or discharge of the criminal offences, has nothing to do with the question and that what would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a Service and not the actual result of a criminal case. All the more, in the cases on hand, Rule 15 of the Rules specifically provides that suppression of material information is considered as one of the means as irregular or improper and it enables the Authority to debar a candidate either permanently or for a specified period for admission to any examination or appearance at any interview and to deny employment to him and in addition makes him liable for criminal prosecution. The Circular dated 29.4.1995, already referred to above, clearly states that wilful suppression of information, particularly adverse information, comes within the purview of moral turpitude. (21). A Division Bench of this Court in Bhagirath vs. State of Rajasthan and others (6), passed the following order:- ``We have gone through the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner. We are in complete agreement with the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge and the view taken by him. When the petitioner has suppressed the fact that he was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 325, 341 IPC etc. then obviously he should not have been appointed on the post of Police Constable. He was supposed to disclose the fact that he was convicted and he was found guilty and given benefit of probation. In this view of the matter, we do not find any substance in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed. (22). The Decision in Brijendra Singh Meena vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (7), relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants does not advance their case, as the court in that case was dealing with the appointment of Junior Marketing Officer, not a police constable. In that case, scope of Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Service (Recruitment & other Conditions) Rules, 1960 was considered. In the case on hand, Rules 13, 15, Column No. 17 of the application form and Circular dated 29.4.1995 clearly support the case of the respondents. (23). The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Collector of Customs vs. Tin Plate Co. In the case on hand, Rules 13, 15, Column No. 17 of the application form and Circular dated 29.4.1995 clearly support the case of the respondents. (23). The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Collector of Customs vs. Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. (8), also does not help the appellants. In that case, the Apex Court was dealing with Section 28(1) proviso of Customs Act, 1962 and on the facts of that case, held that omission on the part of the importer to submit the bill of entry for reassessment, when not established by the Department to be deliberate and conscious and Department being aware of the arrival of goods after the exemption period, did not by itself amount to suppression of facts. (24). The learned Single Judge in Hanumana Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and others (supra), referring to the decisions in (i) S.P. Changulvaraiha Naidu vs. Jagannathn and others (9) and (ii) Lazarus Estate Ltd. vs. Besalay (10), has held that where an applicant gets the appointment by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such appointment cannot be sustained and that misrepresentation or fraud cannot be allowed to be sustained. Dealing with the argument that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not given before denying appointment to the applicant, the learned Judge has stated that where an order is obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, the principles of natural justice are not attracted to rectify the mistake which the Authority had committed because of the fraud played by the applicant. For this view, he took the support from the decisions of the Apex Court in U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee vs. B. Shital Nandwani (11) and Krishna Yadav vs. State of Haryana (12). The learned Single Judge dealing with the aspect of moral turpitude in relation to Rule 13 of the Rules, has stated that the term `moral turpitude has not been defined anywhere. The learned Judge has referred to the decisions in Lachuram vs. Inderlal (13), Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (14), and Allahabad Bank and another vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola (15). Apart from the ratio of the said cases in dealing with and considering as to what amounts to moral turpitude, the Circular dated 29.4.1995 in the absence of definition of moral turpitude, clarifies the position consistent with the Rules. Apart from the ratio of the said cases in dealing with and considering as to what amounts to moral turpitude, the Circular dated 29.4.1995 in the absence of definition of moral turpitude, clarifies the position consistent with the Rules. As already discussed above, if the Rules 13, 15 and the said Circular are read together, no doubt would be left whatsoever in arriving at the conclusion that suppression of material information required, for finding desirability, antecedents and character of a candidate to be inducted in police force, entitles an employer to deny appointment. (25). In our view, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1493/98 Girdhari Singh vs. Inspector General of Police & Ors. (supra) and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 893/99 Hanumana Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and others (supra), is a correct view and we have every good reason to agree with it. (26). In the light of the facts stated and the discussion made above, we answer the questions 1 to 3 aforementioned as follows:- 1. That a candidate was prosecuted or subjected to investigation on a criminal charge is a material fact, suppression of which, would entitle an employer to deny employment to a candidate on that ground. 2. That ultimate acquittal of a candidate, who was prosecuted on a criminal charge, would not condone or wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact that he was prosecuted. 3. That suppression of material fact would by itself disentitles a candidate from being appointed in service. (27). Since the facts are not in dispute, we do not think it necessary to place these appeals before the Division Bench for disposal. (28). Hence, in view of our answers to the questions referred, these appeals are liable to be dismissed and accordingly, they are dismissed. No costs. As per Honble A.K. Singh, J. (29). On 12.11.1999 arguments were heard in all the five D.B. Civil Special Appeals (writ) against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge. The facts of the D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 956/98. Om Prakash Sirvi vs. State & Ors. No costs. As per Honble A.K. Singh, J. (29). On 12.11.1999 arguments were heard in all the five D.B. Civil Special Appeals (writ) against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge. The facts of the D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 956/98. Om Prakash Sirvi vs. State & Ors. are different from the facts of other four appeals in as much as in the case of Shri Om Prakash Sirvi, appointment to the post of Constable was denied on the ground that the petitioner had been convicted in two criminal cases under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, he was found unsuitable for appointment whereas in the other four appeals filed by Girdhari Singh, Dharmpal Singh, Girish Kumar and Sanjay Kumar, appointment to the post of Constable was denied on the ground that they had omitted to give information about their involvement in criminal case/cases while filling in Columns No. 17 and 18 of the prescribed form. (30). It appears that the Special Appeal of Girdhari Singh vs. Inspector General of Police and others (supra), was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by detailed order dated 27.7.98. Other three appeals, viz., the appeals filed by Dharmpal Singh, Girish Kumar and Sanjay Kumar were dismissed in view of the order dated 27.7.98 passed in appeal filed by Girdhari Singh. All the five appeals have been referred to the Larger Bench but questions of decision have been formulated by the Division Bench in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 893/98 Dharampal Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., only and in other appeals questions for decision have not been formulated by the Division Bench while passing the order of reference to the Larger Bench. The detailed judgment has been delivered by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by Girdhari Singh, it would, therefore, be in the fitness of things if the facts of the case of Girdhari Singh are taken into consideration for the purpose of formulating the questions arising for decision (because in the order of reference passed in Girdhari Singhs appeal, the questions to be decided have not been formulated by the Division Bench. Facts of the case of Girdhari Singh (31). On 14.10.1997, an advertisement was issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur inviting applications for appointment to the post of constables in several districts of Rajasthan. Facts of the case of Girdhari Singh (31). On 14.10.1997, an advertisement was issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur inviting applications for appointment to the post of constables in several districts of Rajasthan. The prescribed form in which the applications were to be submitted by candidates desirous to be appointed as Constables was also published. Column No. 17 of the application, required the applicant to furnish information about three things, (a) whether the applicant was or is involved in any criminal case. If so, particulars thereof should be given, (b) whether the applicant had been arrested in any case. If so, particulars be given, and (c) whether the applicant had been sentenced in any case. If so, particulars should be given. The appellant Girdhari Singh, submitted his application for appointment to the post of Constable-Driver in District Churu. He was allotted Roll No. 24. He was permitted to appear in the written examination after scrutiny of his application. In the written examination he was successful. He appeared in the physical efficiency test and in the test he was successful. He appeared in the interview and was selected for the post of Constable-Driver by the selecting committee. By letter dated 23.03.1998 he was called for giving him appointment on the post of Constable-Driver. In pursuance of the letter dated 23.03.1998, he appeared before the respondent on 24.03.1998. On 24.03.1998, the appointment letter was not given to him and he was informed that he had concealed the fact that a criminal case had been registered against him and he did not disclose this fact in Column No. 17 of the application and, therefore, he could not be given appointment. On 31.3.1998, a letter (Annx. 3) was sent to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, Hanumangarh informating him that his name was removed from the list of selected candidates because he had concealed the information required by Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application and Columns No.8 and 9 of the prescribed form of verification roll. Girdhari Singh challenged the order dated 31.3.1998 by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1493/98 Girdhari Singh vs. Inspector General of Police & Ors. (supra). Girdhari Singh challenged the order dated 31.3.1998 by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1493/98 Girdhari Singh vs. Inspector General of Police & Ors. (supra). The order dated 31.3.1998 was challenged on two grounds, (1) that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order and (2) that the offences which were alleged against the petitioner were not relating to moral turpitude and the proceedings have been dropped against the petitioner by the court by the order dated 9.2.1998 and, therefore, the petitioner could not be denied appointment simply on the ground that he did not disclose this fact in his application form and the denial of appointment to him contravenes Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution because persons who were juniors to the petitioner in the list of selected candidates had been given appointment whereas the petitioner was denied appointment. (32). The learned Single Judge after issuing notice to the respondents and hearing arguments, dismissed the writ petition by order dated 27.7.1998. The learned Single Judge, arrived at following conclusions:- (1) The advertisement for the post was made on 14.10.1997 and on that day the petitioner was facing trial for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 341 and 336 of the Indian Penal Code. (2) The petitioner, admittedly, did not furnish correct information in Column No. 17 and suppressed the material facts regarding pendency of the criminal case pending against him. (3) The criminal case was decided on 9.2.98 and the last date for submitting the application form had been 24.11.1997 and on the date of filling up the application form, the petitioner had no reason to believe that he would be acquitted in the criminal case. (4) As the petitioner did not produce the copy of First Information Report or the judgment dated 9.2.1998, it is not possible to ascertain whether the petitioner had been acquitted for want of evidence, or by giving him benefit of doubt or by compounding the offences. (5) The judgments of this Court, which have been relied upon by Mr. Sidhu, are not applicable in the instant case as what has been held therein is that if a person has been subjected to criminal trial only for the offence involving moral turpitude, he would be ineligible for employment. (5) The judgments of this Court, which have been relied upon by Mr. Sidhu, are not applicable in the instant case as what has been held therein is that if a person has been subjected to criminal trial only for the offence involving moral turpitude, he would be ineligible for employment. In the instant case, petitioner is guilty of suppressing the material information of pendency of the trial at the time of filling-up the form which itself amounts to moral turpitude as per the circular dated 29.4.1995 and (6) The petitioner has not averred in the writ petition that suppression of the factum of pendency of the criminal trial, while filling-up the form, was not wilful or deliberate and thus inference is that he wanted to obtain employment by misrepresentation. (33). In view of the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge, the writ petition filed by the petitioner Girdhari Singh was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27.7.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, Girdhari Singh filed D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 948/98. (34). The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant Girdhari Singh was prosecuted in the criminal court for offences punishable under Sections 147 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the P.D.P. Act and these offences did not involve moral turpitude and, in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Rajendra Singh. (supra), decided on 2.7.1998 at Jaipur Bench, unless the offences alleged against the appellant involve moral turpitude, the information about them is not required to be given in Column No. 17 of the prosecuted application form and, therefore, the appellant is not guilty of suppressing any material information as required by Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application. It is also submitted by him that the appellant Girdhari Singh was acquitted by the criminal court by judgment dated 9.2.98 on all the counts and, in view of the acquittal of the appellant, it cannot be said that his antecedents are such as to disqualify him for appointment as Constable Driver. The learned counsel for the appellant has, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed. (35). The learned counsel for the appellant has, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed. (35). The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the appellant Girdhari Singh was required to furnish complete and correct information in various columns of the prescribed form of application and, therefore, he was duty bound to furnish information about the criminal case pending against him in Column No. 17 of the application which information he did not furnish and, it was during police verification of his antecedents that it was revealed that a criminal case was pending against him on the date of presentation of the application. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, omission on the part of the appellant to give information in Column No. 17 of the application form about pendency of the criminal case against him was deliberate and amounted to suppression of material fact and the act of suppressing a material fact, by itself, amounts to moral turpitude within the meaning of rule 15 of the relevant Rules applicable to the appellant. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the conduct of not furnishing information about pendency of criminal case against him while filling the application form, is by itself sufficient to disentitle the appellant for appointment on the post of Constable-Driver. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on rules 13 and 15 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 and the memorandum dated 29.4.1995 issued by the Director General of Police, Jaipur. (36). In this appeal following questions arise for determination: (1) Whether Column No. 17 of the application form does not require information about offences not relating to ``moral turpitude? (2) Whether omission on the part of the appellant to furnish information in Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application about criminal case pending against him amounts to ``fraud? (3) Whether omission in question, is sufficient to attract the provisions of Rule 15 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989? (4) Whether the omission in question, amounts to ``moral turpitude? (5) Whether the appellant was legally duty bound to respond the questions given in the prescribed form of application and furnish correct information, even if the offences for which he was prosecuted and tried did not relate to moral turpitude? (4) Whether the omission in question, amounts to ``moral turpitude? (5) Whether the appellant was legally duty bound to respond the questions given in the prescribed form of application and furnish correct information, even if the offences for which he was prosecuted and tried did not relate to moral turpitude? (6) Whether the omission in question is index of such deficiency in character of the appellant as may be said to disentitle the appellant for appointment in view of rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989? In re Question No.1 (37). The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision given by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Rajendra Singh (supra), decided on 2.7.98, to support his argument that since the offences for which the appellant Girdhari Singh was being tried did not involve moral turpitude, the information about the criminal case pending against the appellant was not required to be given in Column No. 17 of the application. The facts of that case were similar to the facts of the present case. The petitioner-respondent Rajendra Singh, applied for the post of Constable in pursuance to the advertisement inviting applications. The application was to be submitted in the prescribed form. The petitioner was called for interview and was selected but he was not given appointment to the post of Constable. By letter dated 14.11.1995 the petitioner was informed that he had not correctly supplied the information required vide Columns No.17 and 18 of the application form regarding his involvement in the cognizable offence and, therefore, he could not be given appointment. The order denying the appointment was challenged before the learned Single Judge. The criminal case in which the petitioner was an accused, ended in acquittal. The learned Single Judge took the view that the offence in which the petitioner was involved did not relate to moral turpitude and the petitioner had been acquitted by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, Bharatpur. Therefore, denial for appointment to him was not legal. The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge. The State challenged the order of the learned Single Judge by Special Appeal before the Division Bench. Therefore, denial for appointment to him was not legal. The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge. The State challenged the order of the learned Single Judge by Special Appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench held that Columns No. 17 and 18 of the prescribed form of application required information in respect of those offences only which were related to moral turpitude and since offences under Sections 147 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code for which the petitioner was tried were not related to moral turpitude, omission to give information regarding them in the application form did not amount to suppression of a material fact. The Division Bench further took note of the fact that the petitioner had been acquitted on both counts by the criminal court and there was no justification for denying him appointment. In view of the aforesaid conclusions, the appeal filed by the State was dismissed. (38). I have carefully considered the decision given by the Division Bench in State of Rajasthan vs. Rajendra Singh (supra). In my opinion, in view of the words used in Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application, no distinction can be made between the offences involving moral turpitude and the offences not involving moral turpitude because the words used in Column No.17 of the prescribed form of applications do not permit such a distinction. Column No.17 of the prescribed form of application required the applicant to furnish information about three things, (a) whether the applicant was or is involved in any criminal case. If so, particulars thereof should be given, (b) whether the applicant had been arrested in any case. If so, particulars be given and (c) whether the applicant had been sentenced in any case. If so, particulars should be given. (39). Thus the authority which prescribed the form of application did not make any distinction between offences/cases involving moral turpitude and offences/cases not involving moral turpitude. The information which was solicited from the offence was in respect of all kinds of offences/cases in respect of questions whether they were, or were not related to moral turpitude. I, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the language used in Column No.17 of the prescribed form of application did not justify the making of any distinction between offences/cases relating to moral turpitude and offences/cases not relating to turpitude. I, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the language used in Column No.17 of the prescribed form of application did not justify the making of any distinction between offences/cases relating to moral turpitude and offences/cases not relating to turpitude. I am aware that in appropriate cases, the court may lay down the limits of any provision of law or the directions issued by any executive authority, if the court is of the opinion that beyond such limits, the particular provision or the direction would be ineffective or injurious to the interest of any person, in an unjust manner or, would be violative of any provision of law. The very object of prescribing the form of application was to collect such information from the candidates as was necessary for the purpose of considering their eligibility as well as suitability for the post of the Constable in the Police Department. The aforesaid object, required that complete information about the offences/cases in which the candidate was involved and the information about his arrest as well as the sentence imposed on him should be made available to the department. It is difficult to say that information which was required from the candidate in Column No. 17 of the application form was in respect of only those offences which were related to moral turpitude. Suitability for a post, has several dimensions. Even if an offence is not related to moral turpitude, the motive behind commission of offence, the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the matter of commission of offence, the consequences arising from commission of the offence, may be relevant for the purpose of assessing the suitability of the candidate for a post. In my considered opinion, the Division Bench was not justified in coming to the conclusion that non-submission of the material facts in Columns No. 17 and 18 would be suppression of the relevant material for an offence of which the person is alleged to have been committed is relating to moral turpitude only. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application did not require the applicant to furnish information about his involvement in the case under Sections 147 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the P.P. Act. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application did not require the applicant to furnish information about his involvement in the case under Sections 147 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the P.P. Act. In re Question No. 2 (40). The second question to be decided in this is whether omission on the part of the appellant to furnish information in Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application, regarding his involvement in the criminal case, amounts to ``fraud. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted before us photo-stat copy of the application of Girdhari Singh. A perusal of photo-stat copy of the application shows that in Column No.17, the appellant did not give any information about his involvement in any criminal case. He simply crossed it as if Column No.17 of the prescribed form of application was not applicable to his case. He is, therefore, guilty of ``suppressio veri, because he did not give in Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application the information about his involvement in the criminal case. He did not give any false information and, therefore, no case for ``suggestio falsi is made out. (41). In Brooms Legal Maxims 10th Edition, at page 315, following observation has been made about ``fraud:- ``of fraud itself it has been said that it is ``infinite in variety; sometimes it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue and then it is modest and retiring, it would be honesty itself if it could only afford it. But fraud is fraud all the same; and it is the fraud, not the manner of it, which calls for interposition of the Courts. (per Ld. Macnoghten in Reddaway vs. Banham (1896) A.C. 199, at P.221). (42). The above observation is sufficient to indicate that there are many variations of fraud and, therefore, it is not possible to give list of various forms of conduct by which fraud may be committed. What even be the manner, it must be established that fraud has been committed. (43). In Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley (supra), of the reports it has been observed: ``No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he obtained by fraud. What even be the manner, it must be established that fraud has been committed. (43). In Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley (supra), of the reports it has been observed: ``No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever; see, as to deeds, Collins vs. Blantern (2) (1967) (2 Wils. I.B. 342), as to judgments, Duchess of Kingstons Case (3) (1776) (1 Leach 146) and, as to contracts, Master vs. Miller (4) (1791) (4 Term Rep. 320). So here I am of opinion that, if this declaration is proved to have been false and fraudulent, it is a nullity and void and the landlords cannot recover any increase of rent by virtue of it. (44). The above observations clearly indicate that the court should be careful not to find fraud unless it is clearly established before it. (45). In S.P. Chengalvarya Naidu (dead) by vs. LRs. vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and others (supra), the Honble Supreme Court defines the word ``fraud in the following words: ``A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by anothers loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (46). The above observations clearly show that in order an act or omission may amount to ``fraud, it must be shown that the act or omission was deliberate and designed to practice deception on another person with an object of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another so as to gain by anothers loss. Unless these necessary characteristics of fraud are established, the court must be slow in coming to the conclusion that the act or omission under consideration amounts to fraud. This explains why the courts have to be slow in giving a finding on ``fraud unless fraud is satisfactorily established. (47). Unless these necessary characteristics of fraud are established, the court must be slow in coming to the conclusion that the act or omission under consideration amounts to fraud. This explains why the courts have to be slow in giving a finding on ``fraud unless fraud is satisfactorily established. (47). In the instant case, the only allegation against the appellant Girdhari Singh is that on the date of the filing of the application in prescribed form, a criminal case under Sections 147, 341 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the P.D.P. Act was pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Nokha and he did not furnish information about this fact in Column No. 17. His guilt is in the nature of ``Suppressio veri. There is not even the slightest allegation that he committed any act amounting to suggestio falsi. Pendency of a criminal case in a criminal court, or conviction in any criminal case, does not disentitle a person from applying for the post of Constable in the police department. Therefore, even if information about the pending case were given in Column No.17 of the application form, the application filed by the appellant could not have been rejected on the ground of non-eligibility. The pendency of the case, did not disqualify the appellant from appearing in the written examination, the physical efficiency test or in the interview, nor it adversely affects the appellant in any manner at the time of preparation of the merit list on the basis of written examination and interview. Therefore, the appellant did not obtain any undue benefit by the alleged omission, so far as his eligibility to apply, to appear in the written examination, to appear in the interview and to appear in the physical efficiency test are concerned. The offences for which he was being tried were under Sections 147 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the P.D.P. Act. Mere involvement in the criminal case, is not sufficient to disqualify any person from appointment. The offences for which the appellant was being tried were neither well established against him nor they were related to any moral turpitude. Mere involvement in the criminal case, is not sufficient to disqualify any person from appointment. The offences for which the appellant was being tried were neither well established against him nor they were related to any moral turpitude. In these circumstances, it is difficult to say that the alleged omission on the part of the appellant to give information about the pending criminal case, in Column No.17 of the prescribed form of application amounted to committing fraud against the respondents. The Question No.2 is decided accordingly. In re Question No.3 (48). The third question to be decided in the case is whether the alleged omission to furnish information about the pending case, attracts rule 15 of the Rules of 1989. The learned counsel for the respondents had submitted that omission committed by the appellant amounts to suppression of material fact within the meaning of the rule 15 of the Rules of 1989. Rule 15 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 reads: ``Rule 15. Employment of Irregular or Improper Means.-A candidate who is or has been declared by the Recruitment Board/Commission or the Appointing Authority guilty of impersonation or of submitting fabricated documents, which have been tempered with or suppressing material information or of using or attempting to use unfair means in the examination or interview or otherwise resorting to any other irregular or improper means for obtaining admission to the examination or interview may, in addition to rendering himself liable to criminal prosecution be debarred either permanently or for a specified period:- (a) by the Recruitment Board/Commission or the Appointing Authority for admission to any examination or appearance at any interview to be held under the provisions of these Rules, and (b) by Government from employment under the Government. (49). A bare perusal of the rule shows that the object behind rule 15 is to empower the Recruitment Board/Commission or the Appointing Authority and the Government to debar candidates using such irregular or improper means as are mentioned in the rule for admission in examination or appearance at any interview or for employment under the Government. But for the power conferred by rule 15, neither the Government nor the Recruitment Board/Commission or the Appointing Authority would be competent to debar any candidate for admission to any examination or appearance at a interview or for employment under the Government. The object behind enacting rule 15 is obvious. But for the power conferred by rule 15, neither the Government nor the Recruitment Board/Commission or the Appointing Authority would be competent to debar any candidate for admission to any examination or appearance at a interview or for employment under the Government. The object behind enacting rule 15 is obvious. Every citizen of India is entitled to equality before law and, therefore, if he is otherwise eligible for applying for any post, he is not only entitled to apply for that post for which applications are invited, he is also entitled for the consideration of his candidature for employment. The right to apply as well as right to be considered for appointment to any post under the State is guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution subject to the condition that persons similarly situated are given such a right. Equality of opportunity has been described as one of the four basic objectives of the India Constitution. In absence of law, neither the Government nor the Appointing Authority would have any power to debar any candidate so as to deny him equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. This viewed, the object of rule 15 is primarily to confer upon the authorities mentioned in the rule the power to debar candidates who are guilty of such irregular and improper conduct as mentioned in the rule itself. (50). A bare reading of rule 15 shows that in order the power conferred by this rule may be exercised, three things are necessary; (1) a candidate must be proved to have been guilty of (i) impersonation or (ii) submitting fabricated documents which have been tempered with or (iii) suppression of material information or (iv) of using or attempting to use unfair means in the examination or interview or (v) otherwise resorting to any other irregular or improper means for obtaining admission to the examination or interview, (2) the improper means must have been used for obtaining admission to the examination or interview and (3) the candidate must have been declared by the Recruitment Board/Commission or Appointing Authority of using the unfair or improper means for the purpose mentioned in the rule. Unless all the three conditions are satisfied, the power to debar a candidate for employment under the Government or for any examination or appearance at any interview cannot be exercised. Unless all the three conditions are satisfied, the power to debar a candidate for employment under the Government or for any examination or appearance at any interview cannot be exercised. In none of the five appeals which are proposed to be disposed of by this judgment, there is any allegation by the respondent that any candidate used irregular or improper means for the purpose of obtaining admission to the examination or interview. (51). It is well established that penal provisions must be construed strictly. Liberal interpretation of penal provisions is always likely to result in injustice. The provisions contained in rule 15 are penal in the sense that they empower the Government as well as the authorities mentioned in the rule to debar a candidate for future employment under the Government or for any examination or interview, by way of punishment for using irregular or improper means. Rule 15, is not attracted for each and every act involving use of irregular or improper means. The provisions of rule 15 are attracted only when the regular or improper means are used for obtaining admission to the examination or interview. Therefore, unless it is proved that any irregular or improper means as described in rule 15 was used for obtaining admission to the examination or interview, the power conferred by rule 15 cannot be exercised. Any other interpretation would render the words ``for obtaining admission to the examination and interview as redundant and it would be impermissible to render these words redundant. In the absence of anything to show that admission to the written examination or the interview had been obtained by omitting to give information in Column No.17 of the application about the case pending against the appellant, it cannot be said that the object behind the alleged omission was to obtain admission to the written examination or the interview. I, therefore, have no option except to hold that even if omission to give information about the pending criminal case, amounted to using unfair or irregular means, the provisions of rule 15 are not attracted because the object behind the omission had nothing to do with obtaining admission to the examination and the interview, the appellant was eligible for appearing in the examination and he was also eligible for appearing in the interview because he had qualified in the written examination and his name was in the list of successful candidates. Rule 15 deliberately refers to a limited number of irregular or improper means for the purpose of exercise of power to debar candidates for employment or examination and interview. It is true that ``suppression of material information has been mentioned as one of the irregular and improper means in this rule but it is not each and every act of suppressing any material information which attracts the application of rule 15. In other words, if the suppression of information was for any purpose other than for obtaining admission to the examination and interview then such suppression of information would not be covered by rule 15. I am, therefore, of the view that unless it is shown that suppression of any information was for the purpose of obtaining admission to the examination or interview, rule 15 would not be attracted. There is nothing to show that the appellant suppressed information about the criminal case pending against him, for the purpose of obtaining admission to written examination or the interview, held for the post of Constables, and therefore rule 15 has no application to his case. I, therefore, find no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that rule 15 of the Rules of 1989 is attracted to the case of the appellant and that the question whether he was rightly denied appointment should be decided in the light of rule 15. In re Question No. 4 (52). The fourth question to be decided in the appeal is whether the omission in question alleged to have been committed by the appellant amounts to moral turpitude. (53). In Allahabad Bank vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola (supra), after considering the judgment given in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (supra), approved the following observations of the Allahabad High Court in Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate and Collector (16): ``The expression `moral turpitude is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honestly, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man. (54). In Lachhu Ram vs. Inder Lal and another (supra), a Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether a person who was convicted under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act could be regarded as a person convicted for offences relating to moral turpitude. The Division Bench observed: ``To begin with the first point, it may be observed that the term `moral turpitude has not been clearly defined and, therefore, a certain amount of vagueness is attached to it. Notices about morals and morality differ in certain respects from country to country and they have also been varying from time to time. This term is, therefore, capable of being given different meanings in different countries or at different times in different contexts. Yet, inspite of its capability of being given diverse meanings, the term `moral turpitude has generally be taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, good character and morals, or contrary to what a man owes to a fellow-man or to society in general. There are a number of cases in which this term has been interpreted by eminent Judges in the context of different facts and circumstances. (55). The Division Bench considered the dictionary meaning of the terms `turpitude and `moral turpitude and observed: ``It would appear from the above that the meanings given to the terms `turpitude and `moral turpitude indicate almost same type of failing in a mans character or moral make-up. (55). The Division Bench considered the dictionary meaning of the terms `turpitude and `moral turpitude and observed: ``It would appear from the above that the meanings given to the terms `turpitude and `moral turpitude indicate almost same type of failing in a mans character or moral make-up. In our view, no absolute standard or no hard and fast rule can be laid down for deciding whether a particular act should be considered as one involving moral turpitude, because it would mostly depend on the facts and circumstances in which the act or omission is committed whether it involves moral turpitude or not. (56). It was contended before the Division Bench that the offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act does not necessarily involve moral turpitude as in the case of theft, criminal misappropriation etc. and hence the Election Tribunal ought not to have looked into other circumstances. Their Lordships made the following observations: ``It is thus clear that the arguments raised by the respondents learned counsel does not find support from the majority view of the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court. We agree with the learned counsel to the extent that there are certain offences like theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, cheating, rape etc. and if a person is convicted of any one or more of them, the natural presumption, unless it is rebutted, would be that the offence involved moral turpitude. It may be possible to make two lists and say generally that certain offences would involve moral turpitude, but such a list cannot hold good in all circumstances. For instance, as pointed out by Sharma, J, in Buddha Pitai vs. S.D.O. Malihabad ( AIR 1963 All 527 ), referred to above, an offence of theft would normally involve moral turpitude, but if a social worker finds that certain persons are dying of hunger and he takes the courage of stealing or even looting some bags of wheat from a hoarders or misers shop and distributes that stuff to the starving people to save them for death, then although the person may be technically guilty of that offence, yet it would be difficult to hold that the offence involved moral turpitude. Conversely, a person may be convicted of a technical offence not involving moral turpitude, but if it is found later on that he is repeating such offence and has no regard for law on account of baseness of character, it may be held that it involves moral turpitude. An offence is an act or omission punishable by law. Every offence certainly does not involve moral turpitude and the question whether a particular offence involves moral turpitude will have to be judged by the circumstances in which it is committed. (57). I respectfully agree with the observations made by their Lordships of the Division Bench. Every act or omission, whether punishable or not, by itself, does not amount to moral turpitude. In the case of acts and omission punishable by law, in order the alleged act or omission may be said to be an index of moral turpitude. In the case of acts and omission punishable by law, in order the alleged act or omission may be said to be an index of moral turpitude, it will have to be shown that the act or omission complained of is not merely punishable under some law but is of such a character and has been committed in such circumstances as discloses such deficiency of character and conduct as is indicated by the term moral turpitude. In Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate and Collector (supra), their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court took pains to make it clear that every false statement made by a person may not involve moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in doing of any private or social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or the society in general. I am, therefore, of the opinion that unless it can be shown that the omission to give information about pending case, is proved to be designed and calculated to deceive the appointing authority with a view to obtain unlawful advantage of any kind to which the appellant was not entitled, and the circumstances in which the alleged act or omission was committed, justify the conclusion that the appellant was acting with vileness or depravity in doing any duty in private or to the society in general, his act cannot amount to moral turpitude. The learned Single Judge has nowhere said that in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court and this Court, the alleged omission on the part of the appellant amounts to moral turpitude. In fact the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the Circular No.5(1)/PF/const./95/1687 dated 29.4.95 issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the alleged omission of the appellant amounts to moral turpitude. I have carefully considered the Circular dated 29.4.1995. It would be useful to reproduced this Circular in extenso:- OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, RAJASTHAN, JAIPUR. No. 5(1) P.F./Const/95/1687 Dated, April 29, 1995. MEMORANDUM Character Certificate of Candidates for Direct Recruitment in the Police-Rule 13 of the RPSSR, 1989 Clarification Regarding. The work of the Police is vital to the society as it is connected with the protection of life and property of citizens. Action of the police often impinge on the liberty of people. It is hence necessary that persons with upright and sterling character are recruited to the force. 2. Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules 1989 relating the CHARACTER states that: ``The character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the service. He must produce a Certificate of Good Character from the Principal Academic Officer of the University or College or School in which he was last educated and two such certificates, written not more than six months prior to the date of application, from two responsible persons not connected with his School or College or University and not related to him. NOTES:- (1) A conviction by a Court of Law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement, which has its object to overthrow by violent means a Government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. (2) Ex-Prisoners, who by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated on grounds of the previous conviction, for purposes of employment in the service. (2) Ex-Prisoners, who by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated on grounds of the previous conviction, for purposes of employment in the service. Those who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent. After-Care Home or if there are no such homes in a particular district, from the Superintendent of Police of that district. Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent, After-care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they proved to be completely reformed by their subsequent good conduct in an After care Home. 3. In the application form for the recruitment of Constables and other ranks in the Police hence information is sought specifically whether the applicant had been involved in any criminal act, or had been ever arrested/released on bail, or had been convicted by any court. It has been found that often candidates suppress such information by not filling these columns, or give vague or wrong answers. 4. If a candidate/applicant is guilty of or involved in any act of moral turpitude or crime of violence he is not suitable or fit to be taken in the Police Service. Moral Turpitude Any act which indicates malafide mental conduct such as theft, or criminal mis-conduct towards a woman, or forgery or wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) about the candidate etc., would be covered under moral turpitude. Cases involving atrocities on Scheduled Caste/Tribe, and Women (Dowry cases) would also fall under this category. Violence Crime of violence include assault (Sec. 323, 325, 326 etc. IPC) rioting (Section 147, 148 etc. IPC), and more serious offences like Section 307, 302 IPC etc. Hence, a candidate/applicant involved in any such case is not eligible for Police Service. 5. A point is raised as to what should be done where a criminal case has been registered against a candidate or challaned in a court but judgment has not been given. In such cases also the candidates cannot be taken into police. Hence, a candidate/applicant involved in any such case is not eligible for Police Service. 5. A point is raised as to what should be done where a criminal case has been registered against a candidate or challaned in a court but judgment has not been given. In such cases also the candidates cannot be taken into police. But if after the trial the candidate is acquitted honourably then the candidate may be considered for recruitment into Police by taking the approval of the next higher officer to the appointing authority. But as candidates who are very aged are not suitable for induction in the Police department need not wait indefinitely. If the honourable acquittal is produced within 3 years of the date of application, such a candidate may be so considered. 6. As per Govt. Order of D.O.P. (Personnel) (ka-2) Circular F.7(1) DOP/ka-2/77 dated 31.8.77 and No. F.2(22) Personnel/ka-2/87 dated 11.10.89 only those persons whose Character Certificate have been found to be in order should be considered for appointment. These instructions should be kept in mind and strictly complied with. All such cases may be decided in the light of these clarification. Sd/- (K.N. Thakur) Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur. (58). A bare perusal of the circular shows that it has been issued for the purpose of providing guidelines in the matter of character certificate of candidates for direct recruitment in the police. Para No. 1 of the circular merely points out the importance of the police force and their duties. Para No. 2 of the circular refers to rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. In para No.3 it is mentioned that some times the applicants involved in any criminal case are arrested/released on bail or convicted by any court suppress the information by not filling the columns (of the application form) or they give vague or wrong answers. In para No.4 it is pointed out if the candidate or applicant is guilty of or involved in any act or moral turpitude or a crime of violence he is not suitable or fit to be taken in the police service. In para No.4, the Director General has given his own definitions of `moral turpitude and `violence. In para No.4 it is pointed out if the candidate or applicant is guilty of or involved in any act or moral turpitude or a crime of violence he is not suitable or fit to be taken in the police service. In para No.4, the Director General has given his own definitions of `moral turpitude and `violence. A bare perusal of the definitions of `moral turpitude and `violence given in para No.4 of the circular shows, that the Director General of Police was acting as if he was a rule making authority and had the legislative power to give his own definitions of these terms, superseding the rules and ignoring all the rulings of the Supreme Court and the High Courts which are binding on him. This circular neither purports to have been issued under any rule of the Rules of 1989 nor it could have been issued by the Director General of Police under any Rules of 1989. Being the Head of the Police Department, he was undoubtedly possessed of the executive powers including powers, to take appropriate steps himself or, to authorise officers under him to take steps in accordance with the Rules for appointment of police constable and officers of other ranks but he had no power to legislate by giving the definition of the expression `moral turpitude and `violence. No executive authority can indulge in any act of legislation unless power to legislate in the matter has been delegated to it. (59). In Hamdard Dawakhana and another vs. Union of India (17), while dealing with the distinction between `conditional legislation and `delegated legislation, the Supreme Court observed: ``The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is this that in the former the delegates power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective. Hampton & Co. vs. United States, (1927) 276 US 394, and the latter involves delegation of rule making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. Hampton & Co. vs. United States, (1927) 276 US 394, and the latter involves delegation of rule making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislature into effect as also the determination of area to which it is to extend; The Queen vs. Burah, (1878) 3 AC 889; Charles Russell vs. The Queen, (1882) 7 AC 829 at p. 835, Emperor vs. Benoarilal Sharma, 72 Ind App 57; (AIR 1945 PC 48); Inder Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1957) SCR 605; (S) AIR 1957 SC 510 ). Thus when the delegate is given the power of making rules and regulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and subserve the purposes of the legislation the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met and the rights therein created to be enjoyed it is an exercise of delegated legislation. But when the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation. (60). It is needless to refer to other authorities. It is well established that unless an executive authority has been delegated the power to legislate in a particular sphere or on a particular matter, such authority cannot exercise and legislative power. The Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989 do not delegate any legislative power to the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur, so as to empower him to give statutory definitions of the terms `moral turpitude and `violence. The circular issued by the Director General of Police, therefore, does not have the force of law as it is neither a rule of law nor a circular issued in exercise of delegated powers to legislate. (61). The circular issued by the Director General of Police, therefore, does not have the force of law as it is neither a rule of law nor a circular issued in exercise of delegated powers to legislate. (61). In my humble opinion, the learned Single Judge fell in error by treating the circular in question issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur as if it contained a rule of law. In fact, the definition given in para 4 of the circular are at best, the opinion expressed by the Director General of Police. It is well established that the opinions of executive officers or of experts and even the opinions of the person who might be party to a legislation are completely irrelevant under Section 45 of the Evidence Act so far as the law of the land is concerned. It would be useful to recall the following observations from the judgment given in Russell vs. Ledsam, 14 M & W 574 (18) wherein it was observed: ``The province of the legislature is not to construe but to enact, and their opinion, not expressed in the form of law as a declaretory provisions would be, is not binding on Courts, whose duty there is to expound the statute they have enacted. (62). For the reasons mentioned above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the definition `moral turpitude and `violence given in para No.4 of the circular in question issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur, at best, contains the opinion of the Director General and the circular issued by him does not amount to the law and, therefore, the learned Single Judge was in error in relying upon the definitions given in para No. 4 of the circular for coming to the conclusion that omission on the part of the candidate to give information about a pending case amounts to `moral turpitude. In my opinion, the Director General of Police ought not to have given his definitions of the expression `moral turpitude and `violence because these definitions run counter to the Rules of 1989 as well as to the binding judicial precedents of the Supreme Court and the High Court. I, therefore, quash the circular in question issued by the Director General of Police as improper and misleading. (63). I, therefore, quash the circular in question issued by the Director General of Police as improper and misleading. (63). Before concluding with the answer to Question No.4, it may be pointed out that all penal provisions, according to the established rule of interpretation are required to be construed strictly. The reason is not difficult to find out. The penal provisions visit the party who is punished with an stigma on his character and unpleasant consequences including fine and imprisonment. Both these consequences, do have tendency of persuading the people to shirk all those persons, transactions, situations and circumstances in which they may be likely to be accused of committing a penal wrong. When people starts avoiding transactions with fellow beings, company of fellow beings and such situations and circumstances, not only the individual, the whole of the society is likely to suffer because the aforesaid avoidance of men, transactions, company, situations etc. not only prevent the commission of the act for which penalty is provided, many good actions are also nipped in the bud and excessively liberal interpretation of penal provisions with a view to bring within the purview, all matters including those which on strict interpretation would not be within their purview, is most likely to create a chaos in the society by stopping of almost all those transactions between man and man which are necessary for perpetuation, and well being of the society as a whole. Liberal interpretation of penal provisions is, therefore, avoided and the rule of strict construction is applied to them so that people may not hesitate in taking part in those transactions which do not fall within the purview of penal provisions. I am afraid if every omission to give any information, is regarded as an act amounting to moral turpitude, very few persons would be honestly in a position to say that they have not committed the offence of moral turpitude by omitting to give some information or the other to public authority or to a fellow being at some time in their lives. The Question No.4 is decided accordingly. In re Question No. 5 (64). The Question No.4 is decided accordingly. In re Question No. 5 (64). The fifth question to be decided in this appeal is whether the appellant was legally duty bound to respond to the questions given in the prescribed form of application and furnish correct information, even if the offences for which he was prosecuted and tried did not relate to moral turpitude. (65). One of the most important faculties of mind possessed by man is the faculty of will by which he can decide whether he should or should not act in the matter and in case he selects to act in the matter, to further decide whether he should act one way or the other. This faculty is so obvious that it needs no proof to establish its existence. It is by the exercise of faculty of will that a man guides himself in all matters. The faculty of will is, therefore, an integral part of the personal liberty of every man and woman. The right to act in such manner as a man considers fit, being an integral part of personal liberty, is given the status of fundamental right and protected by the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees that no such person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. When a person is asked a question, it is for him to decide whether he should or should not answer the question and in case he selects to answer the question, it is for him to decide whether he should answer it truthfully or falsely. Religious books repeatedly sermonise that every one should speak the truth while furnishing any information to another person or while making any statement, by words or by gestures, before any person. But it is a common fault of these sermons which preach that every one should speak the truth, that they do not point out the limits of the principle. Not only this, some times, confusion is created when in some books or from the same sources which preach the doctrine of speaking the truth, it is heard that some times it is good not to speak at all or to give a false answer. Not only this, some times, confusion is created when in some books or from the same sources which preach the doctrine of speaking the truth, it is heard that some times it is good not to speak at all or to give a false answer. This state of confusion as well as various temptations, which may persuade a man to refrain from speaking the truth or to give false answers, is responsible for the adoption of path of silence or of falsehood. As a result, in all walks of life, such persons can be found who consider it an act of wisdom to remain silent and thereby avoid giving correct information or give false information when called upon to furnish information on any matter. When confusion prevails, people do not find it easy to decide when to speak truth; when to keep silence and when to give a false answer and they may adopt easy course of adopting that path which in their opinion is most likely to serve their interest or the interest of some one in whom they are interested. Those who have not acquired the strength of character as well as those who lack determination to abide by the norms of good conduct, fall easy prey to the temptation to conceal the truth or make false assertion whether by preparing documents or by making oral statements or by their gestures or their conduct. Legislation, in these circumstances, becomes necessary but the problem which arises in the process of making/declaring law is to find out such limits of law as may render beneficial service to the society as well as the individual without causing harm. Because of this difficulty, the legislature has not imposed any legal duty to speak the truth in absolute terms in any Act or the Rules. Duty to speak the truth has been imposed by the legislature in cases where it was considered necessary to do so. Sub-section (2) of Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, provides that any person who has been examined under sub-section (1) of Section 161 by a police officer making investigation, shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to the case put to him by the officer, other than the questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. (66). (66). Chapter X of the Indian Penal Code deals with offences involving contempt of the lawful authority of public servants. Omission to give notice or information to public servant by a person legally bound to give is made punishable under Section 176. Furnishing false information on any subject to public servant is made punishable under Section 177. Refusing to answer public servant authorised to question has been made punishable under Section 179. Section 181 provides punishment to those who give false statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person authorised to administer an oath or affirmation. Section 182 prescribes punishment for those who give false information with an intent to cause public servant to use him lawful power to the injury of another person. Section 191 to 211 of the Indian Penal Code form part of Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code which deals with false evidence and offences against public justice. Chapter X and XI of the Indian Penal Code, provide punishment when the offence of omission to give information about certain matters is committed or the act of giving false information about certain matters is committed in relation to public servant and authorities. Cheating has been defined in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code and made punishable by Sections 417 to 424 of the Indian Penal Code. (67). A bare perusal of these provisions indicates that in some cases the legislature has, expressly imposed a legal duty to furnish information correctly. In some cases, the act amounting to omission to furnish information or the act of giving false information has been declared as an offence and is made punishable by law. In these circumstances, penal provisions, by necessary implication, impose a duty not to conceal information which is required to be furnished to a public servant and to refrain from giving false information as the act of giving false information is charged as an offence and is made punishable by law. Under the Transfer of Property Act, the parties to transactions of lease and sale, are required to furnish prescribed information to the other party. The Contract Act, expressly as well as by necessary implication, imposes duty on the parties to the contract as well as on the representatives and agents of the parties to disclose relevant information to the other party so as to avoid mistake of fact. The Contract Act, expressly as well as by necessary implication, imposes duty on the parties to the contract as well as on the representatives and agents of the parties to disclose relevant information to the other party so as to avoid mistake of fact. Mistake of fact renders a contract voidable and where the mistake is deliberate and fraudulent, fraud has been regarded as sufficient not only to upset a contract, even a judicial verdict can be upset it has been obtained by fraud. The provisions of Indian Penal Code, Transfer of Property Act, Contract Act and other laws, by necessary implication impose legal duty on certain persons, in certain matters, in prescribed circumstances to furnish correct information. If a particular act or omission squarely falls within the purview of any of these provisions, there is no difficulty in inferring that the statute, by necessary implication, imposes a legal duty to furnish correct information to the other party. The difficulty arises when the alleged act or omission, is not squarely covered by any provision of the statutory law from which the duties may be inferred by necessary implication. The case of the applicants who apply for the appointment to the post of constables, under the Rules of 1989, falls in the latter category. These rules have been made by the Governor of Rajasthan under Article 309 of the Constitution. My attention has not been drawn to any rule of the Rules of 1989 to show that a legal duty has been imposed on the candidates desirous for appointment to the police force, to furnish information correctly to the appointing authority or to some other person. Hence the crucial question is whether there is any basis for inferring a legal duty to furnish correct information to the appointing authority when the Rules of 1989 are silent about such a duty. If it had been proved that the alleged omission on the part of the appellant amounted to commission of fraud, a legal duty to furnish information would have been easy to be inferred from the penal consequences arising from the detection of the fraud. (68). Similarly, if an act or omission can be legitimately said to be related to moral turpitude, it may be said without any hesitation that there is a legal duty not to indulge in such act or omission. (68). Similarly, if an act or omission can be legitimately said to be related to moral turpitude, it may be said without any hesitation that there is a legal duty not to indulge in such act or omission. In such cases, the legal duty may be inferred by necessary implication, from the stigma of social disapproval and legal consequences arising from the detection of moral turpitude. Thus a legal duty may be inferred from statutory provisions when such duty is expressly indicated by statute or can be inferred by necessary implication. In both the cases, the basis for inferring the legal duty would be to conclude that the legislature intends to impose such a duty. (69). In the instant case, Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989, do not contain any provision which may be said to expressly or by necessary implication, imposes a legal duty on the candidates applying for any post to respond to the questions put to them and answer them correctly. Rule 15 no doubt, by necessary implication, imposes a duty to give correct information. But if such information, has no bearing on eligibility to appear in the written examination or the interview then rule 15 is not attracted. The question is whether there is no other law or a just or lawful ground to infer that the candidates applying for the post of police constable applying for the post of police constable were under a legal duty to respond to the questions a legal duty to respond to the questions put to them by various columns of the application form and to answer correctly? I have given considered thought to this question and, I am of the opinion, that a legal duty may be inferred not only when legislature by enacting any law, imposes a legal duty to do any act, either expressly or by necessary implication, but also in those cases where the performance of a legal duty, is absolutely necessary for the purpose of complying with any provisions of law or a valid direction, or for fulfilling a legally valid object, if such duty is not ruled out, expressly or by necessary implication. In other words, a legal duty may be inferred by application of the doctrine of necessity. The legislature is under no legal or constitutional obligation to enact or codify all the legal duties of the citizens. In other words, a legal duty may be inferred by application of the doctrine of necessity. The legislature is under no legal or constitutional obligation to enact or codify all the legal duties of the citizens. The legislature may in its wisdom, avoid making any law in any matter and leave it to the people, to themselves find out what is necessary to be done by the people who were concerned with the matter. The doctrine of necessity is well established. Whatever is necessary to be done for doing a lawful act, is deemed to be permitted to be done unless such act is prohibited, expressly or by necessary implication and where the law makes it mandatory to accomplish an object, whatever is absolutely necessary for accomplishing such object should be regarded as a legal duty unless it is prohibited or is impermissible either expressly or by necessary implication. Legal duties may, therefore, be inferred in appropriate cases by application of doctrine of necessity even if the statute is silent about it. The necessity which may justify the inference about a legal duty, must be real and substantial. If there is no real and substantial necessity of indulging in any act or omission, the doctrine of necessity would not be applicable. The doctrine of necessity would also not be applicable, if the act or omission in question, is expressly or by necessary implication, prohibited or impermissible. (70). In Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate & Collector (supra), their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court, referred to ``any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellow man or to the society in general and pointed out that a false statement made by a person would amount to moral turpitude if it discloses violence or depravity in doing of aforesaid duty. The Apex Court has approved the observations of the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, it must be held that the law laid down by their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court Baleshwar Singhs case (supra), lays down the correct law. From the observations made by the Allahabad High Court, it is obvious that the citizens may be under legal obligation to perform private and social duties to their fellow man or to the society in general. From the observations made by the Allahabad High Court, it is obvious that the citizens may be under legal obligation to perform private and social duties to their fellow man or to the society in general. Hence even in cases in which duties are not imposed by the legislature, expressly or by necessary implication, such duties may be inferred by application of the doctrine of necessity. (71). All the laws which may be enacted by the legislature or authorities exercising legislative powers, are subject to provisions of Indian Constitution and the source of legislative power is the Constitution of India. The Constitution itself is the supreme law of the land and, therefore, every part of it is important and indicative of the aspiration of the people and the means provided by the Constitution for fulfilling them. Preamble to the Indian Constitution points out four basic aspirations of the people. These are, ``justice, `liberty, `equality and `fraternity. The first three terms, `justice, `liberty and `equality, have been dealt with at several places. The fourth aspiration, namely, `fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and the integrity of the Nation has been paid least attention. The expression `fraternity has not been defined in the Constitution. What it means and how fraternity can be created, preserved and protected has also not been defined by the Constitution or by the General Clauses Act. The reason for not defining `fraternity and for not dealing with it, is not that it is a worthless aspiration but the real reason appears to be that it is an aspiration of such a deep origin, and so comprehensive that it is incapable of being defined fully in few words. According to the preamble, fraternity, is related to the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation. In my humble opinion, fraternity, comprehends within it all those human relationships and human bonds (by which a human being is related to his fellow beings), which are necessary for constituting a human society in general and every individual unit, big or small, of the human society in particular. The bonds of human relationships, may be of various kinds but they appear to be absolutely necessary for fraternity in every unit of the human society. The bonds of human relationships, may be of various kinds but they appear to be absolutely necessary for fraternity in every unit of the human society. The unity among two or more persons constituting an unit and dignity of the individual, appears to depend on these bonds of human relationship. In some respects the bonds of human relationships are similar. They, produce a greater amount of proximity in some respects and thereby enable the parties to interact to a great degree, qualitatively as well as quantitatively than the amount of interaction which they can produce when not related by such bonds. The benefit of these bonds of human relationships is three fold; (1) they unit, (2) they enable the parties to the bonds to secure greater interaction, qualitatively and qualitatively and (3) to regulate their interactions by regulating their roles vis-a-vis to each other, because of the mutuality which is created between them, by the presence of the bonds of relationships. By use of their faculty of will, the parties to the bond, not only interact with each other, they can establish consensus among them and by such consensus they unite and cooperate to achieve a common object by playing their respective roles. These bonds of fraternity, are absolutely necessary for unity. Higher degree of interaction, consensus, distribution of work and allocation of responsibilities and the roles among the parties. This enables the parties to the bond to succeed in getting rid of the handicaps which do not allow the inferior species to rise at the level of animal existence and, to rise to higher level of human existence and reap all those benefits which human beings in particular and humanity in general have achieved. It would be no exaggeration to say that when these bonds of fraternity come into existence, ground is paved for the ascendence of the individual to the higher level of humanity and if he, rises to the high level of humanity, and plays his role by discharging his responsibilities to his fellow beings in accordance with the norms set out by his fraternity, he enjoys the benefits which may be available to him as a member of the human society. The cost of elevation to the higher plane of the humanity is voluntary acceptance of such restrictions as are necessary, on the personal liberty of the individual and obedience to the norms of conduct, as are considered necessary. Every one who wants to be a member of the human society, or any unit thereof and desires to reap the benefits of such human society, must accept certain restraint on his personal liberty. (72). All civilised human societies have recognised the necessity of adherence to truth by its members, save in exceptional circumstances where disclosure of truth is likely to adversely affect the interest of the State or violate the right to privacy or contravene the norms of decency or otherwise produce an undesirable consequence. The general rule to be followed by all the members of fraternity is to ``adherence to truth while dealing with one and other, subject to just exceptions which must be few and well established. Culture, sport, exercises necessary for learning and training, do permit some degree of falsehood but precaution is taken that the falsehood does not cause any damage, either to the individual or to the society as a whole. In respect of those who are not members of the society, no obligation to adhere to truth has been imposed by the ancient societies. Therefore, duty to speak the truth was restricted, when addressing any member of the fraternity and was not obligatory when dealing with strangers and enemies. In ancient times, fraternity was created between few persons but as the humanity marched onwards, narrow boundaries of fraternity were broadened and from friendship, man advanced to families : from families to clans, from clans to cast and religious groups and from religious groups, the boundaries have been so wonded as to encircle the entire globe. The boundaries of human fraternity, have now reached to almost all those regions where human beings is reside except some pockets of those jungles and mountains which have not been reached by modern men. The duty to speak the truth has thus been considered necessary for every civilised human society, the members of which were united by bonds of human relationship. The duty to speak the truth has thus been considered necessary for every civilised human society, the members of which were united by bonds of human relationship. It is, therefore, proper to infer that there is a intimate relationship between the duty to speak the truth and the bond of human relation ship/bond of fraternity which is one of the four objectives of the Indian Constitution and on which the unity of the people as well as of the Nation depends. Since bonds of human relationship, produce greater degree of proximity between the parties, such increased proximity must, according to the law of space and time enable the parties to know the truth about each other. The knowledge of truth about each other is thus in direct proportion to the proximity between the parties. Nearer to each other the parties to a human relationship are, the more they expect truthful discloser from the other party. Adherence to truth, because of its intimate relationship with the bonds of fraternity, appears to be absolutely necessary for creation as well as preservation of the bond of fraternity. It is well known that cause and effect are inter changeable. What is an effect, can be used as a cause, subject of course to some limits. Proximate bonds between two or more parties, produce the phenomenon of adherence to truth by them and, in turn, when the parties adhere to truth by dealing with each other, they become more proximate and may develop a proximate bond between them. On the other hand, speaking the lies, is both the result as well as the cause of ignorance. Ignorant people resort to lies and when a person speak lies, he produces ignorance. This creates distances between the parties and destroys bonds of human relationship between them. It is, therefore, proper to conclude that whenever any proximate bond of human relationship is intended to be created and preserved, the parties to such bond, must speak the truth to each other. (73). The bonds of fraternity among human beings may not be of similar distances. Those who are more proximately related to each other interact to a greater degree and, therefore, they know more about one another. Therefore, quantitatively there may be differences between the parties who are more intimately related than those who are distantly related. (73). The bonds of fraternity among human beings may not be of similar distances. Those who are more proximately related to each other interact to a greater degree and, therefore, they know more about one another. Therefore, quantitatively there may be differences between the parties who are more intimately related than those who are distantly related. But qualitatively there does not appear to be any difference and, therefore, the quality of disclosure of truth in all bonds of fraternity must be the same. The parties must disclose the truth, which means that they should not commit ``suppressio veri nor they should commit ``suggestio falsi while interacting with each other. Since acts and omissions are the means by which invisible bonds of fraternity are created, preserved and destroyed, proper action is absolutely necessary for creation and preservation of the bonds of fraternity. Proper conduct is the means by which bonds of fraternity are created and preserved and improper conduct is the means by which bonds of fraternity are diluted or destroyed. Speaking the truth appears to have been used by the mankind for creating and preserving the bonds of fraternity between man and man or between man and the society. Speaking lies may, therefore, be regarded as a means for destroying the bonds of fraternity and the human relationships. It, therefore, appears necessary that if unity, human relationships and fraternity among two or more human beings, is to be created and preserved, quality of interaction between the parties must be characterised by adherence to truth. Quantitatively, in what matters the truth is to be disclosed, may be determined by the degree of proximity between the parties. The bonds between distantly related parties may admit the right to silence in respect of certain matters which are not relevant for their relationships. Qualitatively speaking, there is no difference between those intimately related and those who are distantly related. (74). The bonds between distantly related parties may admit the right to silence in respect of certain matters which are not relevant for their relationships. Qualitatively speaking, there is no difference between those intimately related and those who are distantly related. (74). For above reasons, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that unity, human relationships and fraternity, necessitate the speaking of truth by the parties to one another and, therefore, by application of doctrine of necessity, a duty to speak the truth may be inferred, if the parties are under legal obligation to create and preserve a bond of fraternity between them, subject of course to right to silence which may be available to them, having regard to the degree of proximity between them. No civilised human society permits and compromise with the quality of disclosure of truth. Therefore, if any person wants to give information about a matter, in any state of fraternity/human relationship/unity, it is considered to be his duty to speak whole truth without committing ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi. In case, the particular fraternity, in relation to which he is interacting, permits him to exercise ``right to silence in respect of a particular matter which is not relevant in any manner for his relationship or human bond of fraternity, then in place of committing ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi, he may exercise the right to silence and may decline to give the answer to a question put to him or to disclose any information in respect of certain matter. If the disclosure of truth, is prohibited by any law or is against the norms of decency or is likely to cause such injury as is impermissible, or for any other good reason the disclosure must not be made, the reason for not disclosing the fact in question must be disclosed, if there is duty imposed by the bond of fraternity to speak the truth in the matter. (75). Some times, a question is asked why a person should speak the truth, if by suppressing the truth or speaking a lie, his interest can be served in a better way. Those who do not appreciate that `humanity substantially depends on unity, human relations and bonds of fraternity, fail to perceive the nexus between the unity, human relationships and fraternity on the one hand and the duty to speak the truth on the other. Those who do not appreciate that `humanity substantially depends on unity, human relations and bonds of fraternity, fail to perceive the nexus between the unity, human relationships and fraternity on the one hand and the duty to speak the truth on the other. In these cases mistake is likely to be committed by saying that there is no duty to speak the truth. (76). In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (dead) By LRs and others (supra), predecessor-in-interest of the respondents-plaintiffs filed application for final decree for partition and separate possession of the plaint-properties and for mesne profits. The application was contested by the defendants on the ground that the preliminary decree, which was sought to be made final, was obtained by fraud and, as such, the application was liable to be dismissed. The trial judge accepted the contention of the defendants and dismissed the application for grant of final decree. In appeal the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, allowed the appeal against the decree of dismissal of the application by the trial Judge. The reason for allowing the appeal was that their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court were of the opinion that no legal duty was cast on the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence except in proceedings for probate and similar proceedings. Their Lordships observed: ``From this decision it follows that except proceedings for probate and other proceedings where a duty is cast upon a party litigant to disclose all the facts, in all other cases, there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence. (77). The view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court that except in probate proceedings, there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to the Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence was disapproved by their Lordships of the Apex Court. At page 5 of the report, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: ``The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly preserve. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly preserve. We do not agree with the High Court that ``there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence. The principle of ``finality of litigation cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous person from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whos case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. (78). Again in the same judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: ``a litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. (79). In our society, the sovereign is neither super-human being, nor a sub-human being, but is always regarded as human being possessing all the qualities and attributes of human being. The unity of the Nation depends on the bond of human relationship and fraternity between the sovereign and the subject and, therefore, it is necessary for both of them, to adhere to truth while interacting in relation to each other. The courts of law, exercise sovereign powers to administer justice to the people. The unity of the Nation depends on the bond of human relationship and fraternity between the sovereign and the subject and, therefore, it is necessary for both of them, to adhere to truth while interacting in relation to each other. The courts of law, exercise sovereign powers to administer justice to the people. The courts share the bond of fraternity which exists between the sovereign and subject and, therefore, every person who comes to the court, whether as a plaintiff or as a defendant, is under an obligation to adhere to truth while making a statement in the court, or while giving evidence before the court. Therefore, it cannot be said that a person appearing before the court has no legal duty to speak the truth. The legal duty to speak the truth before the court is thus necessitated by the bond of fraternity and one who suppresses the truth or speaks lies, by his conduct destroys the aforesaid bond of fraternity and becomes disentitled for any relief in the court. Therefore, as soon as it is found that at any stage any party has committed ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi, his case is liable to be thrown away as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. (80). In Sujan Singh vs. R.S.R.T.C. & Ors. (19), decided on August 12, 1997, a Division Bench, to which I was a party, the Division Bench observed: ``It is true that every one, who is accused of having committed a mis-conduct, is entitled to defend himself. But the right to defend himself does not include the right to speak lies or set up false defences or to deny the truth in any manner. No one has a right to defend himself against the valid laws of the land or against the truth. The reason being that in a society, which is governed by the rule of law, laws cannot be allowed to be eclipsed, dis-obeyed and shattered by any person and since justice is founded on truth, no one can be allowed to eclipse justice by setting up false cases whether he is a plaintiff or a defendant. Even those who are accused of offences and are entitled to guarantee against testimonial compulsion u/Article 20(3) of the Constitution are not permitted to make false statements. Even those who are accused of offences and are entitled to guarantee against testimonial compulsion u/Article 20(3) of the Constitution are not permitted to make false statements. They are entitled to remain silent if they so desire, but in case, they want to say something, the obligation to speak truth is there and even those who are accused of offences, are required to speak the truth before the public servants conducting investigation, inquiry or trial. No civilised society and much less our society permits any person to speak the lies in any proceedings. The evil consequences arising from the disclosure of truth, do not operate as an excuse for speaking lies. In other countries also no one is permitted to speak a lie. In United State of America vs. James Knox. 1965-24 Law 2 d. 275; AIR 1970 (V 57 C-11), the Supreme Court of United States of America held that a tax-payer has no privilege under his constitutional right against self incrimination to file a false return when faced with the choice of prosecution for failure to file a return or for incriminating statements in a truthful return. The position of law in India is not different from the law in force in United States of America so far as the duty to speak the truth is concerned. (81). After referring to the observations made by the Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalavaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (supra), the Divisions Bench observed:- ``The observations of their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court clearly lay down that all those persons who set up false cases in any capacity are the persons who cannot be said to come to the court with clean hands and in the matter of equitable reliefs, they are not entitled to any relief and their cases deserve to be thrown away at the earliest instance. (82). In Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & anr. (33), the Supreme Court refused to entertain the Special Leave to Appeal on the ground that the appellant-petitioner was guilty of suppression of material fact which would weight with any employer in giving him employment. (82). In Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & anr. (33), the Supreme Court refused to entertain the Special Leave to Appeal on the ground that the appellant-petitioner was guilty of suppression of material fact which would weight with any employer in giving him employment. The Supreme Court observed: ``The petitioner is shown to be guilty of suppression of a material fact which would weigh with any employer in giving him employment and, therefore, the case of the petitioner does not merit consideration under Article 136 of the Constitution and his petition for Special Leave to Appeal against the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Special Application No. 4549/1981 dated November 28, 1983 must accordingly fail.... (83). The facts of the case of Rasiklal, may be briefly stated here. The petitioner Rasiklal was recruited in the Sales Tax Department in the year 1950 and was working as Sales Tax Inspector. In 1964, he was removed from service on the ground that the charge of misconduct involving gross negligence and gross impropriety and demanding illegal gratification was established. After his removal from the Sales Tax Department, the petitioner joined service in a college on May 15, 1964. While he was continuing in service in college, he applied on January 13, 1968 for the post of Head Clerk with Municipal Corporation. The application form that had to be made in the prescribed form, Column No. 14 of which requires the appellant to state whether the applicant had been removed from service and, if so, reasons for removal and if the appellant had voluntarily left the service, reasons for leaving the service should be stated. While answering Column No.14 of the prescribed application form, the petitioner stated that he has served in the Sales Tax Department from September 39, 1950 to January 31, 1964 and that he resigned from service due to transfer. By concealing that he had been removed on the ground of misconduct, he committed suppressio veri and by stating that he left the service voluntarily he committed suggestio falsi. On account of suppression of truth and false statement made in the application, the petitioner succeeded in getting service with the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. Ultimately when the true facts came to light, he was charge-sheeted and removed from service. On account of suppression of truth and false statement made in the application, the petitioner succeeded in getting service with the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. Ultimately when the true facts came to light, he was charge-sheeted and removed from service. Against the order of removal, the petitioner approached the labour court which rejected the petition on the ground that the misconduct was proved. The Supreme Court held that suppression of material fact in making of false statement did not constitute any misconduct as such conduct was not enumerated as misconduct in the relevant service regulation. The High Court took the view that even if the allegation of misconduct does not constitute misconduct amongst those enumerated in the relevant service regulation yet the employer can attribute what would otherwise per se be a misconduct though not enumerated and punish him. The Supreme Court disapproved the view taken by the High Court. The case of Rasiklal is an authority for the proposition that even if the omission to speak the truth or making the false statement does not amount to any ``misconduct, as defined in the relevant rules/regulations, these acts of omission and commission in form of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi would be sufficient to deny him any relief by the court. (84). In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court, they duty to speak the truth before a court, independently of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, may be inferred without any hesitation. The existence of bond of fraternity (human relationship) between the sovereign and the subject as well as between one subject and the other necessarily create various human rights and human duties of the concerned parties; and the administration of justice and the operation of rule of law, depends on the preservation of the aforesaid bond of fraternity and due observance of the norms of conduct which are necessary for preserving the bond. It is because of this bond that every citizen has been given the right to approach the court and to give evidence which may be in his possession and power. It is because of this bond that every citizen has been given the right to approach the court and to give evidence which may be in his possession and power. It is because of this bond that when a party comes to a court, with a complaint showing a grievance of any civil or criminal nature, the court places reliance on the statement made before it by the party and entertains that application, complaint or petition with a view to exercise its power. It is because of this bond of relationship between the sovereign and subject that a witness is permitted to give evidence before the court in relation to matters about which the court has to adjudicate and, the court presumes the evidence to be reliable and trustworthy if it is otherwise relevant and admissible and not shaken in the cross-examination, if any. The court expects from every person who comes before it or communicates in any matter, to act honestly and truthfully. Under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, every court has, wide powers to put any questions to any person regarding any matter and no party has a right to object to put any such question whether relevant or irrelevant. The norms of conduct, which a party to the litigation, the witnesses and the Judges, are required to observe, are necessary for the human relationship between the sovereign and subject/as well as the citizen and the court and are necessary for efficient administration of justice by the court. Deviation from above norms of conduct by a party or a witness amounts to contempt of court and superior courts have inherent power to punish for such contempts and the powers to punish for such contempt is independent of any other law made by the legislature. The prosecution of a party or witness making a false statement before the court, by taking recourse to Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not the only remedy to curb the evil of falsehood and as pointed out by the Supreme Court, if any person is shown to have been involved in falsehood at any stage of the proceedings, his case deserves to be thrown away and he is not entitled for relief. Falsehood destroys the human bonds of, unity and fraternity, on which human rights and human duties depend and, therefore, as soon as a person indulges in falsehood, he destroys the bond between him and the person before whom he makes the false statement. In a peaceful society in which citizens and institutions are united by the bonds of human relationship/fraternity, ways of the jungle, viz., use of animal power, falsehood and deceit are completely impermissible. Human rights which are available to persons and institutions, do not depend upon the possession and use of animal powers nor they depend on the practice of deceit and falsehood. ``Human rights available to a citizen, depend on the human relationship, the bond of fraternity and the rules/norms governing the conduct of the parties to the bond. Since the aforesaid human relationships, necessarily require, adherence to truth, qualitatively in respect of such interactions, which are related to such bonds, those who want to enforce any human right must take care that they adhere to truth and do not destroys the very fountain which gives them human rights and benefits attached thereto. What is true in relation to the courts is equally true in relation to all those persons and institutions with whom a citizen is related, by some bond of unity and fraternity and, therefore, by application of doctrine of necessity, he is duty bound to adhere to truth. The acts of ``suppressio veri and ``suggestio falsi are, therefore, impermissible. (85). Since I have come to the conclusion that duty to speak the truth, is made mandatory by the necessity of creating and maintaining human relationship and bonds of unity and fraternity, it is possible to say that in relation to persons and beings with whom there is no human relationship, the duty to speak the truth may not be inferred. No duty to speak the truth would arise when a human being is dealing with inanimate objects including the ``Robots and machines or with beings other than human beings. In the case of human beings too, those who are complete savages, totally unrelated to humanity or are real enemies, no duty to speak the truth can arise because in such cases there would be no bond of human relationship. In the case of human beings too, those who are complete savages, totally unrelated to humanity or are real enemies, no duty to speak the truth can arise because in such cases there would be no bond of human relationship. The duty to speak the truth may not be inferred, if the nature of the human relationship does not make it necessary that truth must be disclosed by a party to such relationship, in one or more specified matter. But in such cases, it is the right to silence which alone would be available to the party not desirous to tell the truth and there would be neither the right to commit ``suppressio veri nor there would be the right to commit ``suggestio falsi. For these reasons, I hold that every man and woman who is related to the sovereign and other subjects by the kind of bonds of human relationship, unity and fraternity, must be regarded as duty bound to adhere to truth while dealing with the sovereign and its various agencies as well as with other subjects and to maintain the quality of truthfulness without any dilution, which means that no amount of ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi be practised and, if in any case, the nature of the bond makes it irrelevant to disclose the truth in certain matter, or there be a right to silence or the disclosure of truth be contrary to the norms of decency or public order or be prohibited by law the reason for non-disclosure of truth must be communicated for the sake of the bond of human relationship, unity and fraternity. The right to silence, if it is intended to be exercised must be pleaded and established before it is exercised and if the disclosure of any act is withheld without pleading or proof of the right to silence, the act of withholding of truth would necessarily have to be placed in the category of acts amounting to ``suppressio veri. (86). The human relationship of various kinds including the human relationship between the sovereign and subject, form part of the rich heritage of culture in every country. (86). The human relationship of various kinds including the human relationship between the sovereign and subject, form part of the rich heritage of culture in every country. Since these human relationships, are absolutely necessary for unity, fraternity and all those good things which humanity has produced, the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution included fraternity amongst the four basic objects of the Indian Constitution and Article 51-A(f) of the Indian Constitution makes it fundamental duty of every citizen to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture. I am, therefore, of the opinion that duty to adhere to truth, may be inferred, wherever necessary from Article 51-A(f) of the Constitution which prescribes the fundamental duties. (87). For the reasons given above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that every person who approaches the court, is under a legal obligation to speak the truth before the court, on account of the bond of fraternity between such person and the sovereign. If in respect of any matter any person is entitled to claim the right to silence, he may, after satisfying the court that he has such right to silence, exercise the same and in all other cases he must disclose the truth before the court and must not commit `suppressio veri or `suggestio falsi by any act or omission. (88). The appellant was desirous to be appointed on the post of constable in the police department. Bond of unity, human relationship and fraternity is necessary for every public employment because the relation between the master and servant is a human relationship and it depends on the creation and preservation of the necessary bonds between them. All those persons who desire employment under the State must, therefore, be deemed to be under a legal duty to speak the truth to the employer not only while applying for the post but also when appearing in the written examination or during the interview or at any time thereafter. The appellant was, therefore, duty bound to respond to the questions contained in the prescribed form of application and to answer them truly, if he really desired to be appointed to the post of the constable in the police department. It is not as if, he was absolutely free to take a decision whether he should or should not give information in various columns of the application form. It is not as if, he was absolutely free to take a decision whether he should or should not give information in various columns of the application form. The Question No.5 is decided accordingly. In re Question No.6 (89). The sixth question to be decided in this appeal is whether omission in question committed by the appellant is index of such deficiency in character of the appellant as may be said to disentitle the appellant for appointment, under rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989. (90). Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 reads:- ``Rule 13. Character-The character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the Principal Academic Officer of the University, College or School in which he was last educated and two such certificates written not more than six months prior to the date of application from two responsible persons not connected with his college or university and not related to him. Note 1. -A conviction by a court of law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement which has as its object the overthrow by violent means of Governments as by law established, mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. Note. 2-Ex-prisoners who by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed should not be discriminated against on grounds of the previous conviction for purposes of employment in the Service. Those who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent, After Care Home or if there are no such Homes in a particular district, from the Superintendent of Police of that district. Those who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent, After Care Home or if there are no such Homes in a particular district, from the Superintendent of Police of that district. Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent, After Care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they have proved to be completely reformed by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After Care Home. (91). A bare reading of rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 shows that this rule requires that the character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the service and for the purpose of ascertainment of the good character, every candidate is required to produce a certificate of good character from the Principal Academic Officer of the University or College or School in which he was last educated, and two certificates from two responsible persons not connected with the University or College or School and not related to him and not more than six months old on the date of submission. Notes 1 and 2 are explanatory. Note 1 deal with conviction by a court of Law and explains that mere conviction by Court of Laws should not be regarded as sufficient ground for refusal of a certificate of good character and the circumstances of conviction should be taken into account and if they do not involve moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement, which has its object to overthrow by violent means a Government as established by law, then mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification for appointment to the post. Note 2 deals with ex-convicts who have undergone the sentence awarded to them. In their case Note 2 explains that even Ex-prisoners who have undergone sentence awarded to them should not be discriminated vis-a-vis candidates if by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct are shows to have been fully reformed and previous conviction should not be taken as sufficient ground for denying employment in the service. In their case Note 2 explains that even Ex-prisoners who have undergone sentence awarded to them should not be discriminated vis-a-vis candidates if by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct are shows to have been fully reformed and previous conviction should not be taken as sufficient ground for denying employment in the service. Note 2 makes a distinction between persons convicted for offences involving moral turpitude and those convicted for offences not involving moral turpitude. Note 2 provides that those who are convicted for offences not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of report to that effect from the Superintendent, After-care Home or from the Superintendent of Police of the district. It is also made clear by Note 2 that even the persons convicted for offences involving moral turpitude, no discrimination shall be made between them and other candidates if it is shown by production of a certificate from the Superintendent. After-care Home, endorsed by the Inspector General of Prison to the effect that they are suitable for appointment as they proved to be completely reformed by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After-care Home. (92). In Brijendra Singh Meena vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court considered the provisions of rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. After considering rule 13, the learned Single Judge observed: ``A bare perusal of the above rule makes the position amply clear that even conviction of the candidate by a court of law may not be regarded as a disqualification for his appointment. Note 2 goes even further providing that persons convicted of offence after sometime of their conviction can also be considered for recruitment. The Rules no where provide pendency of a criminal case against a candidate to disqualify him for his entry into the service. The reason for this is obvious. Pendency of a criminal case cannot lead to the conclusion of committing the offence by the accused. Presumption is otherwise. No person is presumed to be guilty of an offence unless convicted by a competent court after trial. It is also our common experience that trial of a criminal case consumes much time and ultimately the accused may be acquitted therein. Presumption is otherwise. No person is presumed to be guilty of an offence unless convicted by a competent court after trial. It is also our common experience that trial of a criminal case consumes much time and ultimately the accused may be acquitted therein. Refusal of appointment on the ground of pendency of a criminal case would, therefore, result in miscarriage of justice to the candidate because even on his ultimate acquittal he cannot enter into service. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has rightly thought it proper by omitting to include a provision in the Rules providing pendency of a criminal case to be taken as a disqualification for entering into the service. The language deployed in Rule 13 only requires that a character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to fit him for public service. It also makes clear that conviction by a court of law need not by its be regarded sufficient for refusal of the certificate of good conduct. By saying so it should not be misunderstood that conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude cannot be regarded as a disqualification. (93). The expression ``good character as used in rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 has not been defined any where in the Rules. In D.Rama Subba Reddy vs. P.V.S. Rama Das (21), it was observed that the expression ``character is of very wide import which takes in all the traits, special and particular qualities impressed by nature or habit which serve as an index to the essential intrinsic nature of a person. Character also includes reputation, but character and reputation are not synonymous. According to Websters New International Dictionary, ``character means ``an attribute, quality, esp. a trait or characteristic which serves as an index to the essential or intrinsic nature of a person, ``reputation, repute; as a mans character for truth and veracity, a description, delineation, or detailed account of the qualities or pecularities of a person. In Venkataramaiyas Law Lexicon (1991 Vol. I), following note is given: ``According to Law Lexicon of British India, ``character means ``estimation of a person by his community; particular qualities impressed by nature or habit on a person which distinguish him from others. Character lies in the man, it is the mark of what he is, it shows itself on all occasions, reputation depends upon others; and it is what they think of him. Character lies in the man, it is the mark of what he is, it shows itself on all occasions, reputation depends upon others; and it is what they think of him. According to Oxford Dictionary ``character means ``collective pecularities, sort, style, reputation, description of persons qualities, testimonial, status. The Model Code of Evidence defines character as the ``aggregate of a persons traits including those relating to care and skill and their opposites. Just as cause of means a bundle of facts, character is an expression of very wide import which takes in all the traits, special and particular qualities, impressed by nature or habit which serve as an index to the essential intrinsic nature of a person. Character also includes reputation, but character and reputation are not synonymous-D. Rama Subba Reddy vs. P.V.S. Rama Das, (1970) 1 Cr. L.J. 83. (94). It is not necessary to quote definitions of character from other books. Suffice it to say that the term ``character is of very wide import and it comprehends all those traits, dispositions, habits, ways of acting and interacting in certain situations which give an idea of the personality and enable others to form an opinion and a reasonable degree of expectations as to how the person would conduct himself in the situation in respect of which his characteristics are visible or otherwise known. In R. vs. Wood (22) and R. vs. Coltress (23), it was pointed out that if the accused puts his character in issue, the whole of his record is involved. It is immaterial that the offences which give the accused his bad character are committed after the offence for which he is being tried at the time he puts his character in issue. His character is viewed as a whole at the time of the trial (emphasis supplied by lining). In Habeeb Mohammad vs. State of Hyderabad (24), the Apex Court held that a mans character is often a matter of importance in explaining his conduct and in judging his innocence or criminality. (95). In view of the meaning and import of the term ``character, it is not difficult to find out why the necessity of good character has been emphasised by rule 13 of Rules of 1989. (95). In view of the meaning and import of the term ``character, it is not difficult to find out why the necessity of good character has been emphasised by rule 13 of Rules of 1989. A person who is to be appointed to any post in police force must be a person of good character so that if may be reasonably expected from him that after his appointment, he will conduct himself in a manner befitting the duties and responsibilities of his office as a police officer. ``Character is thus, a bundle of all those characteristics habits, ways of acting and interacting in different situations; values, ideals and such mental and physical dispositions, as can give an idea of how the person would conduct himself in different situations calling for the display of his volition and mental and physical faculties. In other words, the future conduct of a person may be anticipated on the basis of the character which he is proved to possess and this explains why good character is necessary under rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 for appointment as an officer in the police force. Character and conduct both are interrelated except in exceptional circumstances, where a person conducts himself contrary to the well established traits of his character. Therefore, ordinarily the conduct of a person, is deemed sufficient to give an idea of his character. In exceptional circumstances, conduct may not be a reliable evidence of real character of a person. (96). A single act or omission may not be sufficient to indicate real character of a person if such conduct is unintentional, accidental or caused on account of any compulsion or circumstances over which the person had no control. It is, therefore, necessary to take into consideration all the circumstances in which a certain act or omission was committed by a person before any inference is drawn from such act or omission. (97). In Lachuram vs. Inderlal & Anr. (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, decided the questions whether the commission of offences punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act involved ``moral turpitude. After taking into consideration the definition of ``turpitude and ``moral turpitude, the Division Bench observed:- ``It would appear from the above that the meaning given to the terms `turpitude and `moral turpitude indicate almost the same type of failing in a mans character or moral make-up. After taking into consideration the definition of ``turpitude and ``moral turpitude, the Division Bench observed:- ``It would appear from the above that the meaning given to the terms `turpitude and `moral turpitude indicate almost the same type of failing in a mans character or moral make-up. In our view, no absolute standard or no hard and fast rule can be laid down for deciding whether a particular act should be considered as one involving moral turpitude, because it would mostly depend on the facts and circumstances in which the act or omission is committed whether it involves moral turpitude or not. (98). After considering the decisions given by the Allahabad High Court in Buddha Pitai vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Malihabad, Lucknow (25), and the decision given in Mangali vs. Chhakkital (26), the Division Bench observed:- ``We agree with the learned counsel to the extent that there are certain offences like theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, cheating, rape, etc. and if a person is convicted of any one or more of them, the natural presumption, unless it is rebutted, would be that the offence involved moral turpitude. It may be possible to make two lists and say generally that certain offences would involve moral turpitude, while others will not involve moral turpitude, but such a list cannot hold good in all circumstances. For instance, as pointed out by Sharma, J. in Buddha Patai vs. S.D.O. Malihabad (supra), referred to above, an offence of theft would normally involve moral turpitude, but if a social worker finds that certain persons are dying of hunger and he takes the courage of stealing or even looting some bags of wheat from a hoarders or misers shop and distributes that stuff to the starving people to save them from death, then although the person may be technically guilty of that offence, yet it would be difficult to hold that the offence involved moral turpitude. Conversely, a person may be convicted of a technical offence not involving moral turpitude, but if it is found later on that he is repeating such offence and has no regard for law on account of baseness of character, it may be held that it involves moral turpitude. An offence is an act or omission punishable by law. Conversely, a person may be convicted of a technical offence not involving moral turpitude, but if it is found later on that he is repeating such offence and has no regard for law on account of baseness of character, it may be held that it involves moral turpitude. An offence is an act or omission punishable by law. Every offence certainly does not involve moral turpitude and the question whether a particular offence involves moral turpitude, will have to be judged by the circumstances in which it is committed. (99). I respectfully agree with the observations made by their Lordships of the Division Bench. In my opinion, conduct of a man should normally be treated as indicative of character of that person if having regard to the circumstances in which the act or omission was committed, it is possible to infer that the particular conduct was the result of a trait of character or disposition, constituting the personality of the person committing the act, and was neither unintentional nor accidental nor the result of any coercion or such compelling circumstances over which the person had no control. Subject to above condition, the conduct of a man may be treated as an index of his character. I, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to conclusion that for the purpose of rule 13 of the Rules of 1989, inference about the character of a candidate who applies for any post can be legitimately made from his conduct as well as his reputation as certified by other responsible persons not related to him and having reasonable opportunity of knowing his character and also from the previous record of various acts and omissions, provided they are well established and such acts and omissions may also include the acts and omissions for which an investigation or trial was commenced and is/was pending at any time whether before or after the submission of the application in the prescribed form. (100). The appointing authority, in a vast country like ours, cannot have personal knowledge of character and antecedents of all the candidates who may apply for appointment to any post. Therefore, the appointing authority, requires sufficient information about the candidates who desire to be appointed on a vacant post; so as to satisfy itself that the candidate is not only eligible for appointment but is also fit for being appointed on the post in question. Therefore, the appointing authority, requires sufficient information about the candidates who desire to be appointed on a vacant post; so as to satisfy itself that the candidate is not only eligible for appointment but is also fit for being appointed on the post in question. The information which the appointing authority requires may be available from three sources, (a) personal knowledge of the appointing authority, (b) from the candidate himself and (c) from other sources. The easiest way of collecting the required information is to ask the candidates to submit the required information to the appointing authority in such manner as may be prescribed. The appointing authority may, therefore, prescribe form of application to be filled in by the candidates and in various columns of the application form the appointing authority may, by putting up questions or otherwise, solicit relevant information from the candidates filling the application form. It is true that the right of appointing authority to collect information from the candidates is neither absolute nor unlimited but so long the appointing authority does not contravene any fundamental right or any provision of law or any norms of decency and good behaviuors, there is nothing to prevent the appointing authority from requiring the prospective candidate to furnish such information, by filling up the application form or otherwise as may be considered relevant for assessing their suitability for the post. By adoption of this course, the appointing authority, by depending on the candidates, may collect necessary information. When such information is collected, from the candidate himself, it is obvious that the appointing authority, reposes faith in the accuracy of the statement made by the candidate while submitting the information to the appointing authority. The verification by the candidate that what he stated in the application form is true is intended to emphasise that the candidate is required to furnish true and correct information to the appointing authority. The persons who are eligible, qualified and possess good character have nothing to fear by correctly replying the questions put to them by the appointing authority. The candidates who are not eligible or who do not possess good character, for fear of being rejected may be tempted to give incorrect information about themselves. If they yield to such temptation, they may give false information about their character and conduct. The candidates who are not eligible or who do not possess good character, for fear of being rejected may be tempted to give incorrect information about themselves. If they yield to such temptation, they may give false information about their character and conduct. A deliberate omission to give information amounts to ``suppressio veri and the act of giving incorrect information amounts to ``suggestio falsi. The object behind the former is to prevent the appointing authority from knowing any fact which casts reflection on the eligibility or suitability of the candidate. The object of the latter is to deceive the appointing authority into believing that the candidate is eligible and suitable and is not suffering from any such disqualification or deficiency in character as renders him unfit for appointment. If the information which is suppressed or falsehood which is suggested, in fact, has a material bearing on the suitability of the applicant, and either or both these acts are shown to be deliberate on the part of the applicant, it may be said without any hesitation that the applicant is guilty of committing fraud by ``suppressio veri and ``suggestio falsi and that he thereby attempts to cheat the appointing authority. There is a third category of persons, who may in fact be eligible for the post and may not be suffering from any such deficiency of character as may render them unfit for the post and who have not been involved in the commission of such conduct as may be treated as index of their bad character and yet they may be tempted to conceal the information about registration of a criminal case against them at the police station or involvement in such offence as does not involve moral turpitude or such trait or character, as they might wrongly assume, may be treated as handicap for their appointment to the post or, an allegation which might have been made against them by some person. Candidates belonging to this category have nothing much to fear because the information which they may be required to give to the appointing authority neither renders them ineligible for appointment nor is sufficient to disqualify them for appointment. Candidates belonging to this category have nothing much to fear because the information which they may be required to give to the appointing authority neither renders them ineligible for appointment nor is sufficient to disqualify them for appointment. If the correct information is furnished by such candidates to the appointing authority, in all probability, the appointing authority is expected to consider the facts impartially in light of Notes 1 and 2 given in rule 13 and other relevant rules and may come to the conclusion that the candidate is eligible and fit for appointment. If such candidates, for fear of rejection, yield to the temptation to suppress information or make false suggestions by committing ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi, they would be committing the breach of trust reposed in them by the appointing authority. In such cases, as these, the information which is suppressed by the candidate or the fact which is suggested may have no bearing on the eligibility or the suitability of the candidate but the conduct of suppressing a fact which ought to be told to the appointing authority or of stating a fact which did not exist, would amount to breach of trust reposed in the candidate by the appointing authority. (101). Suppression of any fact, or giving of false information even by candidates belonging to third category, as pointed out above, may by itself, have no bearing on their initial eligibility to apply for the post or their suitability, so far as their skills, qualifications and physical fitness are concerned, yet the very act of suppression of information or giving false information by the candidates may be treated as an index of the character because suppression of information as well as giving of false information, both suggest that the person indulging in these acts, does not possess the strength of character necessary for adhering to truth which is absolutely necessary for creating and maintaining the human relationships as well as for performing the duties imposed on him. The term ``good character is not identical to ``instincts, ``emotions, Propensities, ``needs or such natural inclinations as are created by nature. Instincts, emotions and the like which are created by nature, bind the man as if he were slave to them and thereby deprive him of his ability to act according to the best of his judgment. The term ``good character is not identical to ``instincts, ``emotions, Propensities, ``needs or such natural inclinations as are created by nature. Instincts, emotions and the like which are created by nature, bind the man as if he were slave to them and thereby deprive him of his ability to act according to the best of his judgment. If a person is capable of doing nothing else except to follow the dictate of his instincts, emotions etc., which are the creation of the nature, he cannot be said to possess the character required by humanity. A person who is slave to nature and conducts himself in the same manner in which inferior species would act, is regarded as base, and inhuman in his conduct and character. Such base character is generally regarded as ``bad character. A person whose character is base, is considered unfit for all those relationships, jobs and responsibilities which necessarily, involve display as well as the use of such strength of will as can defy the commands of instincts; overwhelming torrents of emotions; the pulling and pushing of needs etc. Presence of a strong faculty of will, with the help of which a man can keep his head high and perform the responsibility given to him, even in the face of hostile circumstances, as well as in the face of the most powerful instincts, emotions, needs, propensities etc, which mercilessly tempt him to follow the easy path of deviating from his duties, rather than facing the unpleasant consequences, is necessary for a reliable human character. Once it is shown that a person possesses a strong faculty of will and with the help of such faculty he can, adhere to what he believes to be his duty, information about his ideals, values of life, modus operendi, aspirations and promises and past conduct may be used as an index of the characteristics of his personality and these characteristics are then included in the expression ``character. Every one, in our civilised society is taught from the cradle to the grave that subject to just exceptions, it is the duty of every person to speak the truth; to maintain fraternity; to perform his duties and to protect the rights of others. Every one, in our civilised society is taught from the cradle to the grave that subject to just exceptions, it is the duty of every person to speak the truth; to maintain fraternity; to perform his duties and to protect the rights of others. If any person does not have such strength of character, as is required for adherence to truth and he yields to the temptation of concealing truth or making false statement, either for obtaining an advantage or for avoiding a disadvantage, real or imaginary, and there be no satisfactory excuse, then it may be inferred that he does not possess such a character as is required for any important human relationship or for appointment to any important post or, for entrusting him any responsible job or, placing reliance on him in any important matter. The circumstances, in which omission to give information may not be treated as an index of real character, may include the cases in which the person committed suppressio veri inadvertently, in spite of having taken necessary steps to ensure that correct information be given by him. The characteristic of instances of such inadvertence would be, complete absence of the intention to conceal, on the part of the person omitting to furnish the information and his inability to furnish the information in spite of bonafide efforts on his part. The circumstances in which omission on the part of a person to furnish information may not be treated as an index of his character, in spite of deliberate intention not to withhold the information, would be those where a right to silence is pleaded and is established or it is shown that giving of information would amount to invasion of the right to privacy or would be against the norms of decency or for any other reason the withholding of information would be justifiable in the facts and circumstances of the case. All omissions amounting to ``suppressio veri would not be the index of a weakness or deficiency of the character and in the cases mentioned above, the omission to give information, may not be treated as an index of any deficiency of character. (102). All omissions amounting to ``suppressio veri would not be the index of a weakness or deficiency of the character and in the cases mentioned above, the omission to give information, may not be treated as an index of any deficiency of character. (102). So far as the act amounting to ``suggestio falsi is concerned, the only circumstances in which such an act may not be treated as an index of character would be where the person giving the wrong information, in spite of his best efforts, bonafide believed that the information which he was giving was true or that he was acting under such compulsion, as could persuade even a man of strong will, to furnish false information in the facts and circumstances of the case. The act of giving false information is difficult to be excused as it has the inevitable tendency to deceive the other party. (103). In the instant appeal, the conduct from which an inference against the suitability of the appellant for appointment to the post of constable has been drawn by the respondents, is in the nature of `omission to give information about a pending criminal case. This conduct apparently amounts to suppression of fact. (103). In the instant appeal, the conduct from which an inference against the suitability of the appellant for appointment to the post of constable has been drawn by the respondents, is in the nature of `omission to give information about a pending criminal case. This conduct apparently amounts to suppression of fact. The inference which be drawn from the above conduct of the appellant may be, (1) that he does not consider him self under any obligation to respond to the questions put by others and, therefore, he did not care to respond to question mentioned in Column No.17 of the prescribed form of application, (2) that he does not consider himself under any legal, moral or social obligation to speak the truth and, therefore, he has, avoided giving information in Column No. 17 of the application form about the pending of criminal case against him by not responding to the question given in the column, (3) that the appellant does not have the courage to face the consequences arising from speaking the truth and he has avoided giving information in Column No. 17 of the application form because he apprehended, that such information, may be taken into consideration while assessing his suitability for the post of constable and (4) that the appellant, (i) avoids responding to question put to him and (ii) suppresses information either because he is wanting in such strength of character as is necessary for adherence to truth or his character in respect of above traits is the result of such schooling and training under parents, relatives, teachers, companions, as did not set before him ``adherence to truth as a value and advised him to follow the easy path of omission to respond or suppress the truth according to his convenience. The aforesaid inferences which may be drawn from the act of suppressing information, render him unsuitable for the post of constable in the police force. Human relations, unity and fraternity, impose two important obligations, (a) to respond and (b) to respond truly. Exceptional circumstances in which there may not be the duty to respond or to answer truly have already been dealt with. In the instant case, the appellant submitted the application in the prescribed form and appeared in subsequent test, with a view to be selected for appointment to the post of constable. Exceptional circumstances in which there may not be the duty to respond or to answer truly have already been dealt with. In the instant case, the appellant submitted the application in the prescribed form and appeared in subsequent test, with a view to be selected for appointment to the post of constable. The post of constable is a post under the State and it is obvious that functioning on the post of constable, depends on the bond of human relationship between the employer and the employee. Besides, the functions which a constable may be required to perform are such functions as are necessary for the protection and enforcement of the human rights of the citizens. There is a human relationship and bond of fraternity between every citizen and the State and, therefore, there is a relationship between citizens whose rights are to be protected and enforced and the officers and the servants of the State whose duty it is to enforce the rights of the citizens. Both the relationships, make it obligatory on the part of the employees of the State to respond when any question is put to them and to respond truly, without suppressing the truth and without making any false statement. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that a person who is desirous to be appointed on the post of constable, must consider it his duty to respond and to answer truly without committing ``suppressio veri and ``suggestio falsi while dealing with the employer or with the subjects. In a small number of cases, the police constable may be empowered to exercise the right to silence and, in such cases, he may declined to give an information about a matter, if law empowers him to do so. A person who is wanting in such strength of character, as is necessary for responding truly even if the information to be disclosed may produce unpleasant consequences, cannot be said to be fit for employment under the State or for employment for the benefit of the public. If a person possesses the strength of character but has not been taught that it is necessary for him not only to respond but, to respond by speaking the truth while dealing with the employer and other persons (subject to just exceptions), can also not be said to be possessed of such character as is required for proper functions of a police constable. A person who possesses sufficient strength of character and has been taught by parents, teachers and the companions that it is necessary for him not only to respond but also to respond by speaking the truth in the aforesaid circumstances and yet has adopted the easy path of not responding or responding by suppression of information or responding by giving false information, will also be regarded as a person who is wanting in such character as is necessary for the appointment to the post of constable, in view of provisions of rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989. (104). Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989, by requiring that the candidates must possess such character as to qualify him for employment in the service, prescribes, good character, as a condition precedent for being eligible to any post in the service. The expression ``good character used in rule 13 is neither vague nor irrelevant for the purpose of considering the suitability of the candidate. (105). For the reasons mentioned above, such good character as may qualify a candidate for appointment to the post of constable, is absolutely essential for selection. It is, therefore, obvious that in order to be able to continue on the post of constable and to be able to perform his duties of that post, it is necessary for the candidate to be responsive as well as to respond truthfully whenever called upon to do so and these two traits must be so well established in the values, ideals, habits and norms of conduct and traits learnt by conditioning or otherwise that the candidate should spontaneously manifest these traits as and when occasion arises, subject of course to the exercise of proper discretion, in exceptional cases. Even if there be no law imposing a legal duty to respond truthfully, there is nothing to prevent the employer from insisting that the candidates seeking employment under him must possess the character trait of responsiveness and truthfulness because they are necessary for creation and preservation of the relationship of master and servant; proper discipline and due performance of the duties by the master and servants. It is also in the interest of general public that public servants must be responsive and truthful in the dealings with the State as well as in the dealings with the common man. It is also in the interest of general public that public servants must be responsive and truthful in the dealings with the State as well as in the dealings with the common man. Son long, it is not established that responsiveness and truthfulness are completely irrelevant for the relationship of master and servants, discipline, performance of duties by the servant and for public good, no fault can be found with the respondent, if they reject a candidate who, by his conduct, has shown that he does not care to respond to the questions put to him by his master or, suppresses information required by the master whether by committing ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi. (106). In Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court refused to grant any relief under Article 136 of the Constitution, in spite of the conclusion that suppression of material information did not amount to misconduct. The ground on which the relief was denied was that the appellant had concealed material information about his removal on the ground of misconduct and falsely suggested that he had resigned from the service (on an earlier occasion) on account of transfer. (107). In Kesha Ram vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (supra) the petitioner was appointed temporarily on the post of constable. He was prosecuted and convicted on charges under Section 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code by a judicial court before his appointment. The trial court awarded imprisonment as well as fine but in appeal, his conviction and sentence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code was set aside; conviction under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code was maintained and, in place of the sentence awarded by the trial court, the petitioner was given the benefit of release on probation of good conduct. While filling of application form, Column No.8 required the petitioner to state whether he had been prosecuted or convicted on a criminal charge. He not only suppressed information but made a false suggestions to the effect that he had never been prosecuted and convicted, by writing `No against Column No.8. On account of suppression of material fact and making of false suggestions, as above, the petitioner succeeded in getting temporary appointment to the post of constable. He not only suppressed information but made a false suggestions to the effect that he had never been prosecuted and convicted, by writing `No against Column No.8. On account of suppression of material fact and making of false suggestions, as above, the petitioner succeeded in getting temporary appointment to the post of constable. When the Commandant came to know of his prosecution and conviction by a criminal court, he called upon the petitioner to explain his position. The petitioner did not submit any reply. Thereafter, the petitioner was discharged by order dated 21.2.86. The ground on which he was discharged was that he had suppressed the material information and gave false information against Column No. 8 of the application form and did not explain this acts of omission and commission. The order of discharge from service was challenged before the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition. In appeal the Division Bench, dismissed the appeal and declined to interfere with the order of discharge. (108). In Hanumana Ram vs. The State of Raj. (supra), the petitioner applied for the post of constable-driver. Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application required him to furnish information about his involvement in any criminal case. He suppressed the material information and made false suggestion by giving answer in negative. At the state of verification of his character, the appointing authority, came to know that the information given in Column No. 17 of the application form were incorrect. The petitioner was found to have been involved in criminal case No.102/92 under Sections 457 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code and he had, in fact, been tried before the Judicial Magistrate, Ossian on the above charges. The trial resulted in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. In view of the facts revealed at the stage of character verification, the petitioner was denied appointment to the post of constable-driver. He approached this court by filing a writ petition No. 893/99. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitioner on the ground that suppression of information by the petitioner amounted to moral turpitude. (109). In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 347/98, a similar question arose. In that case the petitioner suppressed the fact of his conviction for the offences under Sections 323, 325 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code while giving information about himself to the employer. (109). In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 347/98, a similar question arose. In that case the petitioner suppressed the fact of his conviction for the offences under Sections 323, 325 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code while giving information about himself to the employer. After his selection he was required to submit original certificates which he submitted but the appointment was not given to him. When he made enquiry why he was not given appointment, he was told that on verification it was found that he had been punished in a criminal case. In para No. 6 of the writ petition, it was stated that ``the petitioner submitted all the original certificates in the office of respondent No.3. The petitioner enquired from the office of respondent No.3 about his candidature. The petitioner came to know that the respondent had found on verification that the petitioner was punished in the case, therefore, the petitioner cannot be issued appointment letter. The petitioner represented his case before respondent No.3 that he had not been prosecuted for the moral turpitude and there is no bar for the appointment under rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989. In view of the averment made in the writ petition, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of suppression of fact by the petitioner. In appeal, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. A review petition was filed by the petitioner and it was heard by the Division Bench to which I was a member. By order dated 9.7.99, the Division Bench observed:- ``From the averments made in para 6 of the writ petition, it appeared to us that at the time of filling of the form, the petitioner had not disclosed the fact of he having been prosecuted, convicted and released on probation. According to the averment made in para 6 itself, it is clear that on verification it was found that he was punished in criminal case, therefore, he was not given appointment. Thereupon, the petitioner represented before the respondent No.3 that he was not prosecuted for moral turpitude and there is no bar for the appointment under rule 13 of the 1989 Rules. This fact itself shows that the petitioner had not disclosed the fact of his conviction and being released on probation. (110). Thereupon, the petitioner represented before the respondent No.3 that he was not prosecuted for moral turpitude and there is no bar for the appointment under rule 13 of the 1989 Rules. This fact itself shows that the petitioner had not disclosed the fact of his conviction and being released on probation. (110). The petitioner was given an opportunity to explain his conduct but he failed to do so and, therefore, review petition was also dismissed by the Division Bench. (111). The decisions given in the above mentioned cases support my view that omission to respond, or suppression of material fact, may if there is no satisfactory explanation for the omission, be taken as an index of such deficiency in character as would disentitle a candidate for appointment to a post under the Government. (112). The learned counsel for the respondents, has drawn my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court given in Shri Matedeen Garg vs. State of Raj. & Another (27) (arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 15234/88) decided on 12.7.91. In that case the petitioner was a candidate for selection to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. After interview his name was recommended for appointment but later on the recommendation was withdrawn on the ground that he has concealed certain particulars which he ought to have disclosed in his application form. In the application form he was required to state whether he at any time figured as an accused or a complainant. He did not state that he figured as an accused in the criminal case. It was later discovered that he did figure as an accused in a criminal case. Since the petitioner did not disclose the information about his involvement in a criminal case in the application submitted by him in the prescribed form, the Rajasthan High Court took a view that he was not suitable for appointment to the Judicial post. Consequently, the recommendation was withdrawn. The petitioner challenged the withdrawal of the recommendation before the High Court but the writ petition was rejected. He filed a Special Leave to Appeal before the Supreme Court which was allowed. The Supreme Court observed:- ``In a case like this, one will have to explain whether there was intentional concealment of information or it was only by inadvertence. The petitioner challenged the withdrawal of the recommendation before the High Court but the writ petition was rejected. He filed a Special Leave to Appeal before the Supreme Court which was allowed. The Supreme Court observed:- ``In a case like this, one will have to explain whether there was intentional concealment of information or it was only by inadvertence. It is true that the appellant was involved in a case arising under the Essential Commodities Act for contravention of the provisions of Rajasthan Foodgrain (Prevention of Hoarding) Order 1973. The appellant was not trading in any foodgrains. His premises were used for storing foodgrains by another person who was also an accused in that case. It is not in dispute that the appellant was acquitted in that case and in fact both the accused were acquitted. The acquittal was recorded in 1979 and the appellant applied to the post in 1986. It is indeed a stale matter and is not as if the appellant did not disclose it at all. In the writ petition before the High Court he has specifically stated that he has produced a copy of the judgment in the criminal case before the Committee which interviewed him. The committee consisted of four senior Judges of the High Court. The fact that he produced the copy of the judgment in the criminal case before the interview committee has been reiterated in his rejoinder statement filed before the High Court. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, we consider that there seems to be no intentional suppression of the information, and the High Court ought not to have recalled the appellants recommendation for appointment to the Judicial Service of the State. (113). The appeal was allowed. (114). A careful perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court shows that there was no intentional suppression of the fact that the petitioner was involved in a criminal case. At the time of interview, the petitioner had submitted a copy of the judgment delivered in the criminal case, before the committee of four Honble Judges of this Court. No doubt, the decision of the Supreme Court is an authority for the legal proposition that in a case of alleged suppression of information, it must be considered whether the suppression was intentional or unintentional and, if it is unintentional, no adverse inference should be drawn against the suitability of the candidate. No doubt, the decision of the Supreme Court is an authority for the legal proposition that in a case of alleged suppression of information, it must be considered whether the suppression was intentional or unintentional and, if it is unintentional, no adverse inference should be drawn against the suitability of the candidate. The view which I have taken is in consonance with the ratio of the decision given in Shri Matadeens case. (115). In the instant case, there is no explanation at all for committing the omission in question. Therefore, in the case of the appellant, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of committing ``suppressio veri. (116). By way of caution, I deem it necessary to point out that fraud may be committed even by omission amounting to ``suppressio veri, if suppression by material information, deception of any kind results. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (supra), Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunnilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunnilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed in favour of Chunnilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunnilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the petitioner of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunnilal Sowcar. The Supreme Court made the following observations laying down the law:- ``Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial tantamounts to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellant-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Exhibit B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. (117). The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court is clearly this that if by suppression of a material fact the consequence is suggesting of a falsehood then even the suppression of fact may amount to commission of fraud. (117). The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court is clearly this that if by suppression of a material fact the consequence is suggesting of a falsehood then even the suppression of fact may amount to commission of fraud. It is necessary to point out that fraud in a large number of cases is committed by suppression of such material information as is necessary for disclosing real state of things and the suppression of such information, by necessary implication, suggests a state of things which does not exist. Commission of fraud by practising ``suppressio veri has many facets. Some times people remain silent and though in fact they do not say even a single word. The very act of silence on their part, results in misrepresentation and fraud is committed. Some times persons who are entrusted with the duties of preparing record of events or who are required to give evidence, pretend to practice the rule of brevity but in fact they omit every material fact with the object of playing deception. Thus fraud is committed by suppression of material facts and the commission of fraud is sought to be justified or concealed by pleading necessity of brevity. This category of fraud often goes undetected and in the interest of the society, it is necessary that fraud of this category must be carefully detected and the persons committing them should be brought to trial. Unscrupulous witnesses giving evidence in the court are often found concealing material facts with a view to play fraud in court. Persons entrusted with the duty of preparing record, if unscrupulous and of base character, play fraud by omitting material facts in the record which they prepare, whether such record is the report, statement or any other document. Even the most desirable thing is capable of being misusing. Brevity is no exception to this rule. Brevity is commendable when what is suppressed is immaterial and unnecessary but brevity is the most potent tool of committing fraud, when that which is suppressed/omitted is a material act and the omission of this material fact is likely to suggest a false state of thing. In my considered opinion, omission amounting to ``suppressio veri would be liable to be regarded as an act of ``suggestio falsi if it is likely to result in commission of fraud. (118). In my considered opinion, omission amounting to ``suppressio veri would be liable to be regarded as an act of ``suggestio falsi if it is likely to result in commission of fraud. (118). All acts of ``suggestio falsi may not be an index of deficiency of character, in all cases. If the person who made a false statement did not know that what he was stating was false and bonafide believed the information to be true and it is shown that he had taken every possible steps to obtain correct information about the matter in question and did not commit any negligence in this regard, the act of giving false information may be regarded as unintentional and a bonafide mistake caused by the factors beyond the control of the man. The exceptional cases in which the act of giving false information may be excused must be very few because it is the duty of every man to develop not only such mental ability as to be able to know the nature and consequences of his act but to further collect such experience as is necessary for forming correct opinion and it is also necessary for him to collect sufficient material before an opinion is formed. It is, therefore, necessary for every person, to take care that whatever is stated by him is absolutely true and no compromise with the quality of his statement would be permissible. If for any reason, he is unable to ascertain the fact in question, he must express his inability to say anything in the matter. It is impermissible for him to indulge in speculation and form hazardous opinion for the purpose of giving information to others. (119). Viewed in above light, the omission on the part of the appellant Girdhari Singh to furnish information in Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application about the criminal case pending against him, may be legitimately treated as an index of his character because he has neither pleaded not established any such circumstance which may show that the alleged omission was excusable in the circumstances of his case. Question No.6 is answered accordingly. (120). In light of the above reasons, I find no force in the appeal filed by Girdhari Singh and the same deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. (2) Dharampal Singh vs. State of Raj. & Ors. Question No.6 is answered accordingly. (120). In light of the above reasons, I find no force in the appeal filed by Girdhari Singh and the same deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. (2) Dharampal Singh vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 893/98 (121). In this appeal, the Division Bench by order dated 27.10.98 formulated the following questions for decision by the Larger Bench:- (1) Whether the fact that a candidate was prosecuted or subjected to investigation on a criminal charge is a material fact, suppression of which would entitle an employer to deny employment to a candidate on that ground? (2) Whether the ultimate acquittal of a candidate who was prosecuted on a criminal charge would condone or wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact that he was prosecuted? (3) Whether the suppression of the material fact would not by itself disentitle a candidate from being appointed in service? (122). In light of the six questions formulated in the appeal filed by Girdhari Singh and the answers thereof, I would answer the three questions framed by the Division Bench in the following manner: Question No. 1 (123). The fact that if a candidate was prosecuted on a criminal charge, is a material fact, suppression of which would entitle an employer to deny employment to the candidate on the ground that such suppression of fact, is an index of such character as is not suitable for appointment, provided there is no valid explanation for committing ``suppressio veri. So far as investigations are concerned, if a person has been arrested by the police on a criminal charge and was remanded to judicial custody or released on bail, it may be inferred that he was informed about the grounds of arrest (including the charge) for which he was arrested. In such cases, pendency of investigation by the police in respect of an offence punishable by law, would be a material fact. In other cases, the pendency of an investigation would be a material fact in relation to a candidate only when in the first information report, the candidate was named as an accused and candidate is shown to have received information about the registration of a criminal case and commencement of investigation against him. Question No.2 (124). Question No.2 is answered in the negative. Question No.2 (124). Question No.2 is answered in the negative. Ultimate acquittal of a candidate who was prosecuted on a criminal charge, would not be sufficient to condone or wash out the consequences of, omission to respond to the questions put by the employer or the suppression of material facts or making of false statement regarding any material fact. Question No.3 (125). Normally suppression of material fact, would by itself be sufficient to disentitle a candidate from being appointed in the service, on the ground that such suppression of material fact, with or without making of a false statement about a material fact, is an index of such deficiency in character as disentitles him for appointment provided that if the alleged suppression of fact, is unintentional, or in exercise of right to silence duly pleaded and established or is motivated by fear of invasion of another persons right to privacy or norms of public decency or for any other good cause, the suppression is shown to be justified, then suppression of fact would not by itself be sufficient to disentitle the candidate for appointment. (126). The learned counsel for the respondents has produced before the court the photo-stat copy of the application submitted by the appellant Dharampal. A bare perusal of this application shows that while filling Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application, the petitioner not only suppressed the material fact, he made a false statement by writing `No against all the three sub-columns of Column No. 17. He has, therefore, guilty of ``suppressio veri as well as ``suggestio falsi. In the ground of appeal, it is stated that on the date of registration of the first information report in 1995, the appellant was a minor and he was acquitted by the criminal court which tried him and, on the date of filling of the application, no case was pending against him and the appellant was under a bonafide impression that since he had been acquitted by the competent criminal court and no criminal case was pending against him on the date of filling of the application, it was not necessary to disclose there to mention the fact regarding the first information report and the trial of the criminal case. In my opinion, the explanation which has been offered is completely unsatisfactory. In my opinion, the explanation which has been offered is completely unsatisfactory. By committing the act of suppression of information about the criminal case in which the appellant was involved and making a false suggestion that he had not been involved in any criminal case, the appellant has committed both ``suppressio veri and ``suggestio falsi. He is, therefore, guilty of committing fraud. The fact that he was a minor on the date of registration of the first information report or the trial of the case, is of no assistance to the appellant. Minority can be pleaded as an excuse for a wrongful act, in cases of persons below the age of seven years because the law presumes that such persons are incapable of knowing the nature and consequences of their acts (vide Section 82 of the Indian Penal Code). Persons of the age between seven to twelve may be excused if it can be shown that they did not possess the ability to know the nature and consequences of their act. In the case of persons above the age of 12 years, the law presumes that such persons possess the ability to know the nature and consequences of their act and omission. Therefore, in the case of persons above the age of seven years, unless it is shown that they are below age of 12 years, minority cannot be pleaded as an excuse for committing fraud whether by ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi or both as the case may be and unless in addition it must be shown that the person committing these acts did not possess the ability to know the nature and consequences of his act. In the case of persons above the age of 12 years, minority cannot be pleaded at all as an excuse for the suppression of fact or making of a false statement. The explanation given by the appellant in the grounds of appeal is completely unsatisfactory and, therefore, it cannot be said that the acts of omission and commission attributed to the appellant, were the result of inadvertence or were innocent in character. In my considered opinion, the conduct of the appellant, is indicative of such character as, does not entitle him for appointment to the force in view of rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. In my considered opinion, the conduct of the appellant, is indicative of such character as, does not entitle him for appointment to the force in view of rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. (3) Sanjay Kumar vs. The State of Raj. & Ors. (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 895/98) (127). In this case, the appellant-petitioner Sanjay Kumar applied for appointment to the post of constable in District, Churu in pursuance of the Notification dated 16.9.97 (Annx.1). The application was submitted in the prescribed form. Roll No. 501 was assigned to the appellant. He was admitted to the written examination in which he qualified. He appeared in the physical efficiency test in which he was declared successful. Medical examination was also conducted and his name was included in the list of selected candidates. He was asked to submit original documents, which he submitted but he was not appointed. When the appellant-petitioner approached the Superintendent of Police, Churu, he was informed that appointment was not given to him because in the application form he did not disclose that the first information report had been lodged against him. The appellants case is that he has been acquitted by a criminal court before submission of the application form and, therefor, he thought that it was not necessary for him to furnish information about a criminal case in Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application and as such there was no deliberate concealment on the part of the appellant. The reply filed by the respondents shows that, on police verification, it was found that the petitioner was tried by a criminal court in the year 1994 for the offences under Sections 323, 341 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code and was convicted on the said charges but he was released on probation by order dated 6.3.95 passed by the Children Court. (128). The case of the appellant-petitioner is similar to the case of Dharampal Singh and, in view of the answers of Questions No. 1 to 6, there is no merit in the appeal and it deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. (4) Girish Kumar vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1025/98) (129). In this appeal, the facts are that the appellant-petitioner applied for the post of constable (reserve). (4) Girish Kumar vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1025/98) (129). In this appeal, the facts are that the appellant-petitioner applied for the post of constable (reserve). He was selected but by letter dated 21.12.96 he was informed by the respondent that a criminal case No. 236/92 under Sections 147, 149, 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against him and, therefore, was denied appointment. It was also mentioned in the letter dated 21.12.96 that offences under Sections 147, 149, 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code were related to moral turpitude and, in case he is acquitted of these offences within the period of three years, he should approach the respondent No.2 and then his case will be referred to higher authorities. On or about 5.4.1997, the appellant received another letter dated 29.3.97. By this letter he was informed that in case he has already been acquitted by the criminal court, he should report to the office of the respondent No.2 upto 31.3.97 along with the decision of the acquittal of the court, failing which, after 31.3.97, he will not be appointed in the government service and, therefore, validity of the list comes to an end automatically. It is submitted by the appellant-petitioner that a criminal case No. 861/92 arising out of F.I.R. No. 236/92 registered at the Police Station, Ganeshpura, is pending against him in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate and the trial has not reached the stage of conclusion. The petitioner, in the writ petition, pleaded that offences under Sections 147, 149, 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code are not in the nature of moral turpitude and, therefore, the appointment cannot be denied to him. In the reply, filed on behalf of the respondents, it was stated that in the application form there was a specific column at S.No. 17 which relates to pendency/involvement in criminal case and the petitioner, while submitting his application in the prescribed form, had wrote `No and, as such, he suppressed material information about the pen-ding case and also furnishes false information in Column No. 17 of the application in the prescribed form. In the reply filed by the respondents, it was further stated that a criminal case No. 236/92 u/Sec. 147, 149, 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code was registered at the Police Station, Ganeshpura and in the application form, the petitioner wrote `No and thereby gave false information. The respondents filed photo-stat copy of application form (Annx.R/1) as well as photo-stat copy of verification sheet (Annx.R /2). A bare perusal of these documents shows that the appellant-petitioner did not respond to the questions given in Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application and he thereby suppressed material information by omitting to respond to the questions contained in Column No. 17. In the verification sheet (Annx. R/2), he categorically denied by writing the word `No. (130). The appellant-petitioner Girish Kumar is, therefore, guilty of suppressing material fact as well making false statement by writing the word `no so as to suggest that he had never been figured as an accused in any criminal case. No satisfactory explanation has been given by the appellant-petitioner and, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the acts involving omission to respond and thereby suppressing material information as well as the giving a false information about the pending case, may legitimately be treated as an index of his character and in absence of any adequate explanation, the respondents could legitimately infer that the petitioner is not possessed of such good character as is necessary for giving him appointment to the post of constable. (131). The appeal has, therefore, no merit and it deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. (5) Om Prakash Sirvi vs. State of Raj & Anr. (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 956/98) (132). The facts of this case are that the appellant-petitioner Om Prakash Sirvi, submitted his application in the prescribed form for appointment to the post of constable in District, Sikar in pursuance of the advertisement No.19. He was permitted to appear in the written test conducted by respondent No.2 and he qualified in that test. He was required to appear in the physical efficiency test in which he was declared qualified. He was selected by the Board and recommended for appointment. In the merit list prepared by the selection board, his name was figured at S.No.17. The total number of vacancies for which the Board selected the candidates was 19. He was required to appear in the physical efficiency test in which he was declared qualified. He was selected by the Board and recommended for appointment. In the merit list prepared by the selection board, his name was figured at S.No.17. The total number of vacancies for which the Board selected the candidates was 19. In spite of being selected, he was not given appointment and, on enquiry, he was informed that the appointment was denied to him because of registration of criminal cases against him. He submits his representation. By communication dated 26.5.98 issued by respondent No.2, the petitioner was informed that the appointment order could not be issued in his favour because some criminal cases were registered against him and they were shown in the order itself. The copy of the order has been filed by the appellant. It has been marked as Annx. P.3. The petitioners case is that Criminal Case No. 164/95 under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against him at the Police Station, Bilara and in that case he was given the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act and was also directed to deposit Rs. 50/-as costs under Section 5 of the Act. Regarding second case No. 204/95 under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners case is that the case was decided on 16.12.96 and he was given the benefit of release on probation and was bound down to keep good conduct for a period of two years. Regarding the third case No. 296/95 registered under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioner has submitted that the case was disposed on 25.9.96 and he was acquitted of the allegations levelled against him. Thus, the petitioner has admitted that in two cases mentioned at S.No.1 and 2 in letter Annex. P. 3 he was convicted under Section 389 of the Indian Penal Code and was given the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. Regarding the third case mentioned at S.No. 3 in Annex. P.3, petitioners case is that in this case he had been acquitted on the charges made against him. According to Annx. P. 3 he was convicted under Section 389 of the Indian Penal Code and was given the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. Regarding the third case mentioned at S.No. 3 in Annex. P.3, petitioners case is that in this case he had been acquitted on the charges made against him. According to Annx. P.3, in the third case, viz., Criminal Case No. 296/96 under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioner had been convicted under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code and was released on Probation under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act and was bound down to be of good behaviour for a period of two years. (133). In the letter Annx. P.3, there is no allegation that by submitting application in the prescribed form, the petitioner suppressed any material information or he made any false statement regarding the criminal cases in which he was figured as an accused. (134). A perusal of the record shows that the order of dismissal of the writ petition was filed before issuing notice to the respondents and this explains why the respondent did not file their reply. Since there is nothing on record of this case to justify the conclusion that the appellant-petitioner Om Prakash suppressed any material information or made any false statement, at the time of filling the application in the prescribed form, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner has committed any act of ``suppressio veri or ``suggestio falsi. The answers to the six questions formulated while deciding the appeal filed by Girdhari Singh, therefore, do not apply to the case of appellant Om Prakash. The learned Singh Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for which the petitioner was convicted twice, involves moral turpitude and, therefore, the respondents were justified in denying appointment to him. (135). The only question to be decided in this appeal is whether the commission of offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code can be treated as an index of such deficiency of character as may disentitle the petitioner for appointment to the post of constable. (136). (135). The only question to be decided in this appeal is whether the commission of offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code can be treated as an index of such deficiency of character as may disentitle the petitioner for appointment to the post of constable. (136). The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for which the appellant was convicted twice by the criminal court was committed by the petitioner before he attained the age of 18 years and the criminal courts, in place of sentencing the petitioner to any term of imprisonment or fine, deem it fit to give benefit of Probation of Offenders Act and, therefore, involvement of the appellant in the criminal cases under Sections 379 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be just ground for denying him appointment. (137). The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision given by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Sheesh Ram vs. The State of Raj. & Ors. (28). In that case the petitioner Sheesh Ram was involved in a Criminal Case No. 72/90 under Sections 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and, on conviction, he was released after giving benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. In another case which was pending against the petitioner was under Sections 147, 427 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Single Judge held that so far as criminal case No. 72/96 under Sections 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code was concerned, the petitioner had been admonished under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act and the offences for which he was convicted did not involve moral turpitude. Regarding the second case No. 144/93 under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, the learned Single Judge held that no doubt the second case involves moral turpitude but the petitioner had been acquitted. Therefore, the appointment could not be denied to the petitioner. In reply, the respondent had taken plea that besides involvement in two criminal cases, the appellant has suppressed information about the criminal cases while filling the application form and, therefore, he was not entitled to appointment but the argument based on alleged suppression of information did not find favour with the learned Single Judge because in the communication dated 27.12.95 (Annx. 5) it was not mentioned that the appointment was denied on ground of suppression of material information. (138). After carefully going through the judgment given by the learned Single Judge, this decision does not help the petitioner in any manner. The learned Single Judge has held that the second case (under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code) necessarily involves moral turpitude but since the petitioner had been acquitted of the charge under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, mere prosecution on the charge under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code was not found sufficient for denying appointment. I respectfully, concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The offences under Sections 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code ordinarily do not involve any moral turpitude. These offences may be committed not only at the spur of moment on account of sudden reaction to an offence in certain provocation, but also in an honest attempt to exercise the right to self-defence. Ordinarily these offences do not involve moral turpitude though moral turpitude may be involved if offences are committed, in furtherance of any such object or intention as is related to moral turpitude. Denial of appointment merely on the ground of conviction under Section 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, was, therefore, unjustified. I further agree with the learned Single Judge that acquittal by competent court on charge under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code is prima facie evidence of his innocence. The fact that a first information report alleging the commission of an offence has been made against a person and that he has been prosecuted on a charge by a competent criminal court, are not by itself sufficient to prove, either moral turpitude or any such deficiency of character, as may disentitle the candidate for appointment. Every one who is acquainted with the administration of law and justice, knows that a first information report may be registered at the police station if the Station House Officer of the Police Station, has reason to suspect that the cognizable offence has been committed. Proved beyond reasonable doubt is not a condition precedent for registration of the first information report. Hence mere registration of the first information report against any person in respect of any offence, is by itself not sufficient to, visit with him disqualification or stigma. Proved beyond reasonable doubt is not a condition precedent for registration of the first information report. Hence mere registration of the first information report against any person in respect of any offence, is by itself not sufficient to, visit with him disqualification or stigma. Many complaints and witnesses make false allegations partly or wholly and there is no want of such unscrupulous complainants and the witnesses who may go to any extent, by making allegations or by giving false statements in order to cause harassment or harm to any person. Therefore, mere fact that persons have made statement against person alleging commission of offence is also by itself is not sufficient to disqualify that person. Submission of chargesheet or the final report, is a function of the Station House Officer of the Police Officer and at the time of forming his opinion all that he is to consider is whether there is a case for forwarding the case to the Magistrate competent to take cognizance (vide Section 176 read with Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973). As the law stands, proved beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary for submitting a chargesheet against any person. Therefore, mere fact that a chargesheet has been submitted against any person in respect of any offence is by itself not sufficient to disqualify that person. A charge in respect of any offence may be framed against person even on the ground of there being reasonable suspicion of his having been involved in commission of the offence. Therefore, the framing of charge and commencement of trial is, by itself, not sufficient to prove that the person being tried by the criminal court is in fact guilty. The inference of guilt must weight to the final verdict given by the competent court. Once the criminal court has given a cerdict of not guilty, after taking into consideration the evidence produced before it, the verdict of acquittal, is ordinarily sufficient to hold that the allegations made against the accused were untrue. It is true that the finding by the criminal court, is completely irrelevant under Section 43 of the Evidence Act, in any other proceeding and, therefore, the finding of acquittal, neither prevents the civil court for conducting enquiry into the alleged offence nor the departmental enquiry is prohibited. It is true that the finding by the criminal court, is completely irrelevant under Section 43 of the Evidence Act, in any other proceeding and, therefore, the finding of acquittal, neither prevents the civil court for conducting enquiry into the alleged offence nor the departmental enquiry is prohibited. But if any civil court or the enquiry officer, wants to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed an offence, it must be in a position to justify his conclusion on the basis of sufficient and relevant evidence. Mere institution and prosecution of a criminal case, resulting in acquittal would not be sufficient to disqualify any person. I, therefore, respectfully agree with the learned Single Judge that on account of the acquittal of the petitioner in the case, the appointment could not be denied to him though the allegations were in respect of an offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code which is related to moral turpitude. (139). In this appeal, the appellant Om Prakash was tried by a criminal court in two criminal cases and he was convicted under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. In both the cases, the verdict of guilty by the court of competent jurisdiction is sufficient to show that the appellant Om Prakash was involved in offences relating to moral turpitude. The fact that he had been released on probation in place of being sentenced to any term of imprisonment, does not, in any matter, mitigate the quality of his offence nor it is sufficient to wash away or remove the deficiency of character which is indicated by his involvement in an offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. The decision cited by the learned counsel does not help the appellant in any manner. (140). My attention has also been drawn to the decision given by two Division Benches at Jaipur. The first decision was delivered on May 18, 1998 in State of Raj vs. Khalid Ahmed (D.B. Civil (Writ) No. 726/97 (supra). The second decision was delivered on 2.7.98 in State of Raj. vs. Rajendra Singh (D.B. Civil (Writ) 310/97 (supra). In State of Raj. The first decision was delivered on May 18, 1998 in State of Raj vs. Khalid Ahmed (D.B. Civil (Writ) No. 726/97 (supra). The second decision was delivered on 2.7.98 in State of Raj. vs. Rajendra Singh (D.B. Civil (Writ) 310/97 (supra). In State of Raj. vs. Khalid Ahmed (supra), Khalid Ahmed was involved in two criminal cases, (1) FIR No. 59/91 under Sections 336, 324 and 323, IPC and (2) FIR No. 147/94 under Sections 324 and 334, IPC and in both the cases he was facing trial in the court. It was alleged that he suppressed the information about his involvement by the two criminal cases by submitting application in the prescribed form. Their Lordships of the Division Bench, held that the offences under Sections 336, 324 and 323, IPC do not involve moral turpitude. I respectfully agree with the view taken by their Lordships of the Division Bench that ordinarily such offences do not involve moral turpitude. Regarding the suppression of information, the Division Bench held that non-mentioning of involvement in the two criminal cases, was not fatal and did not disqualify the petitioner from appointment to the post of constable. It is obvious from the reasons given by the Division Bench that their Lordships were of the view that unless in a case in which a candidate has been figured as an accused, involved moral turpitude, it was not necessary for him to furnish information. In the second decision given in State of Raj. vs. Rajendra Singh (supra), the Division Bench held that Column No. 17 of the prescribed form of application did not require information about offences not involving moral turpitude. I have dealt with these decisions while deciding questions No.1 to 6 formulated in the appeal of Girdhari Singh. In my humble opinion, the view that Column No.17 of the prescribed form of application does not require information about offences not involving moral turpitude is not correct. (141). For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal filed by Om Prakash has no merit. It deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.