Judgment S.B. Sinha, J. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 13.4.1999 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby and where under the said learned Judge refused to quash a First Information Report lodged by the concerned respondent. 2. Certain facts are admitted. The petitioners are exporters. They allegedly export non-basmati rice to Bangladesh and for the said purpose they were required to store the same at Bhatpara, Cossimbazar. Allegedly, they obtained a temporary permission therefore from the District Magistrate. A raid was conducted in the godown of one Surendra Maloo where the said rice had been kept and it was alleged, "On inspection, it is ascertained that on 27.1.99 M/s. Ramanand Raj Kumar got permission from APEDA under RCAC Nos. 8613 and 8614 to export total 430 M.T. of non-basmati rice from the ports of Changrabada/Hilly/Mehedipur to the port of Bangladesh. The firm purchased 878.4 M.T. (Eight hundred seventy eight metric tone approx) from M/s. Anil Trading Co., a commission agent from Firozpur, Punjab under bill No. 10623 dt.28.01.99 and brought rice to Cossimbazar Railway Yard, Murshidabad, West Bengal on railway wagons vide R.R. No. 94 Don 17195. Similarly, M/s. Bharat Exports got permission from BPEDA an order of 1706.6 M.T. of non-basmati rice from the port of Mehedipur to the port of Bangladesh firm also purchased 1466.5 (One thousand four hundred sixty six) metric ton approx. of rice from M/s. Anil Trading Co., as mentioned above from Firozpur, Punjab on 28.1.99 arid brought the rice to Cossimbazar Railway Yard in railway wagons vide R.R. No. 17196. Both M/s. Ramanand Raj Kumar and M/s. Bharat Exports got temporary permission from the District Magistrate, Murshidabad vide Memo No. 40(2) EC dated 03.02.99 for storing the rice brought by them from Firozpur, Punjab in the godown of one Surendra Maloo at Bhatpara, Cossimbazar, P.S. Berhampur, District Murshidabad. The firm jointly stored 1772 M.T. of rice in the god own while the remaining 568.4 M.T. of rice is stock lying in 9 wagons of Kuldanga Railway Yard on way to Cossimbazar. The firm jointly stored 1772 M.T. of rice in the god own while the remaining 568.4 M.T. of rice is stock lying in 9 wagons of Kuldanga Railway Yard on way to Cossimbazar. On further probe in the matter it is ascertained that both the exporters and their representatives jointly stored the rice in the godown and no declaration of stocks which is required the West Bengal Essential Foodstuffs (Declaration of Stocks by Inspector and Godown Keepers) Order, 1972 and the W.B. Declaration of stocks and same in the joint godown of the firms for the purpose of export. The representatives also failed to produce any letter/documents indicating the sending of intimation to the Director, DDPS regarding the source of purchase of rice for export or to the District Magistrate, Murshidabad regarding the daily report on the stock position and also the arrival report of the stock of rice and thus violated the provisions of the West Bengal Rice and Paddy (Control) Order, 1997." 3. The allegations shortly stated related to violation of paragraph 3 of the West Bengal Declaration of Stocks and Prices of Essential Commodities Order, West Bengal Essential Foodstuffs (Declaration of Stocks by Inspector and Godown Keeper) Order, 1972 and West Bengal Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1997. The learned trial Judge held that the search and seizure of non-basmati rice stored therein was bad in law and directed release of the seized goods on furnishing bond. However, relying on or on the basis of submissions made by the respondents herein to the effect that an application for amendment of the First Information Report had been filed before the Competent Court the learned Judge held that it is not a fit case where the First Information Report should be directed to be quashed. 4. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, inter alia, submitted relying on the basis of the Apex Court decisions in State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors., reported in AIR 1982 SC 949 , K.L. Subhayya vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 1979 SC 711 and State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , that search and seizure having been found to be bad the First Information Report ought to have been quashed. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , that search and seizure having been found to be bad the First Information Report ought to have been quashed. It was further submitted that in any event, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for amendment of the First Information Report. The learned counsel contends that no offence had been made out in relation to 1973 Order and furthermore, paragraph 3 of the West Bengal Declaration of Stocks and Prices of Essential Commodities Order cannot be said to have any application in the facts and circumstances of this case. 5. Mr. Kar Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, has drawn our attention to the application filed by the appellants before the learned Special Judge. 6. It is now a well settled principle of law in view of several decisions of the Apex Court including the decision cited by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the court normally does not interfere with an investigation. The court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot quash a First Information Report as thereby no purpose is served although it is found that such prayers are made and granted by this court. The court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can only quash an investigation. Such investigation can be quashed, inter alia, on the ground whether the First Information Report even if taken into consideration in its entirety does not disclose any cognizable offence or where investigation is mala fide or violative of any statutory provision. It is not in dispute that when the First Information Report was lodged the provision of West Bengal Rice and Paddy Control Order existed. Clauses 9 and 10 had subsequently been declared ultra vires in Veejay International vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1999(2) CHN 53 . The said decision is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. It, therefore, cannot be said at this stage that the lodging of First Information Report itself was illegal from the very beginning. It may be true as has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the court would interfere where entertainment of the First Information Report itself was illegal. It, therefore, cannot be said at this stage that the lodging of First Information Report itself was illegal from the very beginning. It may be true as has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the court would interfere where entertainment of the First Information Report itself was illegal. But Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that if during such investigation further facts have been found out on the basis whereof, the accused person can be said to have committed other offences, the High Court being a court of equity may not exercise its discretion. Investigation on such hyper technical ground may not be interfered by a court of equity particularly when allegation of forgery had been made out. Although a First Information Report may not be amended but there does not exist any restriction of bringing certain other development and adding certain new offence in the charge-sheet which had been found during the investigation. The court as is well known takes cognizance of the offence and not of the offender. If during the investigation certain other offences are found to have been committed by the accused persons, the investigating officer may add those offences also and the court taking cognizance of the matter may take note thereof. 7. In K.L. Subhayya vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 1979 SC 711 , the court was concerned with a conviction which was made in violation of the provisions of section 54 of the Mysore Excise Act which provided for recording the ground of belief before a search and seizure could be made. No such provision exists in respect of making search and seizure either under Essential Commodities Act or under the Indian Penal Code. Reasons under the aforementioned provisions are not required to be recorded. In State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajanlal and Ors., reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , the Apex Court, inter alia, held - "Be it noted that in section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression 'information' without qualifying the same as in section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, 'reasonable complaint' and 'credible information' are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word 'information' in section 154(1) unlike in section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word 'information' without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer-in-charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by section 112 of the Code of1872 (Act X of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint' preferred to an officer-in-charge of a police station shall be reduced into writing. The word 'complaint' which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word 'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1955 which word is now used in sections 154, 155, 157 and 190 (c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act II of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a First Information Report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer-in-charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information." 8. Apart from the fact that the said decision in the instant case does not come to the assistance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, we are further of the opinion that the question raised in this appeal did not fall for consideration before the Apex Court therein. In State of West Bengal vs. Swapan Kumar Guha, reported in AIR 1982 SC 949 , the Apex Court has merely stated that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed in the First Information Report, but it is also a well settled principle of law that while issuing a writ the court is not only required to consider the allegations made in the First Information Report, but also materials which might have been brought on record by reason of any investigation carried out by the authorities in terms of the said First Information Report. If it is found on the basis of the materials which have been brought on record subsequently that the petitioners can be said to have prima facie committed an offence which is cognizable in nature the court will not exercise its discretion. The court at this stage is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the allegations inasmuch as the said question can be canvassed before an appropriate court at an appropriate stage. 9. In Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2000(3) SCC 269 , it was held :- "Be it noted that in the matter of exercise of the High Court's inherent power, the only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceeding would be a total abuse of the process of court. The Criminal Procedure Code contains a detailed procedure for investigation, charge and trial, and in the event, the High Court is desirous of putting a stop to the known procedure of law, the High Court must use a proper circumspection and as noticed above, very great care and caution to quash the complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Recently, this Court in Trisurs Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal, reported in 1999(8) SCC 686 : 2000 SOC (Cri.) 47: 1999(5) Scale 609 , observed: (SCC pp. 689-90, Paras 5-9) :- '5. The respondent's counsel in the High Court put forward mainly two contentions. Recently, this Court in Trisurs Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal, reported in 1999(8) SCC 686 : 2000 SOC (Cri.) 47: 1999(5) Scale 609 , observed: (SCC pp. 689-90, Paras 5-9) :- '5. The respondent's counsel in the High Court put forward mainly two contentions. The first was that the dispute is purely of a civil nature and hence no prosecution should have been permitted, and the second was that the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Gandhidham has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Learned Single Judge has approved both the contentions and quashed the complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate thereon. 6. On the first count learned Single Judge pointed out that there was a specific clause in the memorandum of understanding arrived at between the parties that disputes, if any, arising between them in respect of any transaction can be resolved through arbitration. The High Court made the following observation: "Besides supplies of processed soyabean were received by the complainant Company without any objection and the same have been exported by the complainant Company. The question whether the complainant Company did suffer the loss as alleged by it are matters to be adjudicated by the civil court and cannot be the subject-matter of criminal prosecution." 7. Time and again this Court has been pointing out that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions vide State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lat, reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426, and Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi, reported in 1999 (3) SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri.) 401. 8. In the last referred case this Court also pointed out that merely because an Act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. We quote the following observations: (SCC p. 263, Para 10). "10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions." 9. "10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions." 9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Preemption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal. 10. In K. Karunakaran vs. State of Kerala & Anr., reported in 2000(3) SCC 761 , the Apex Court held :- "The menace of corruption cannot be permitted to be hidden under the carpet of legal technicalities. In such matters probes conducted are required to be determined on facts and in accordance with law. The allegations of mala fides were, admittedly, not the basis for challenging the registration of the FIR in the High Court. If during the conduct of a preliminary inquiry the commission of an offence comes to light on the basis of new materials, the respondent officials were obliged to register case and present it in a competent court of jurisdiction for holding of trial and adjudication. The Government Order (Annexure-B-1) is not shown to have been used against the appellant in any way." 11. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that having regard to the expiry of the Essential Commodities Temporary Provisions Act, 1981, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. 12. The Government Order (Annexure-B-1) is not shown to have been used against the appellant in any way." 11. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that having regard to the expiry of the Essential Commodities Temporary Provisions Act, 1981, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. 12. We do not enter into the aforementioned contention inasmuch as even if that be so in terms of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, offences committed by the appellants, if any, are not wiped off and the Special Judge may transfer the records to the court having appropriate jurisdiction to try the offences. 13. For the above reasons, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed, but in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. 14. Before parting with this case, however, we may record that we have not gone into the merit of this case and thus it will be open to the appellants herein to raise their contentions before an appropriate court at the appropriate stage. H. Banerji, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed