Ram Chander v. State through Govt. Food Inspector, Bhiwani
2000-03-24
R.L.ANAND
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.L. Anand, J. (Oral) - This is a criminal revision filed by Ram Chander and has been directed against the order dated 8.11.1990 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bhiwani, who allowed the appeal of Ram Chander against the judgment and order dated 17.10.1989 and 21.10.1989 respectively passed by Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani and instead of acquitting the petitioner remanded the case for re-trial with the direction to the Magistrate to adopt the procedure proscribed for trial of summary cases. 2. Some facts can be noticed in the following manner :- On 29.7.1985 Food Inspector Abhey Ram visited the premises of the petitioner at 4.00 P.M. The petitioner had 100 bags of salt for sale with him. The Food Inspector purchased a sample of salt for the purpose of analysis. After the formalities, a sample was prepared. One portion of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst, who gave the report that the sample was adulterated. The complaint was filed. After recording the evidence of the complainant and the statement of the petitioner under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code the trial Court found the petitioner guilty and convicted him vide judgment dated 17.10.1989. He was sentenced vide order dated 21.10.1989 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine, the petitioner was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, petitioner Ram Chander filed appeal before the first Appellate Court, which rightly came to the conclusion as per para No. 3 of the judgment that trial against the petitioner has not been conducted by the trial Court in accordance with law and it will be appropriate for me to reproduce para No. 3 of the order of the first Appellate Court, as follows :- "3. After recording the evidence of complainant and the statement of accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code, the trial Court found the accused guilty and convicted him. Thus the finding of conviction is being challenged on various grounds. One ground alleged is that this offence was to be tried summarily as per provisions contained in Section 16-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and as procedure for trial of case summarily was not followed the proceedings stand vitiated.
Thus the finding of conviction is being challenged on various grounds. One ground alleged is that this offence was to be tried summarily as per provisions contained in Section 16-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and as procedure for trial of case summarily was not followed the proceedings stand vitiated. To support this contention reliance is being placed on Budh Ram v. State of Haryana, 1985(2) C.L.R. 29 and Brijpal v. State of Haryana, 1989(1) C.L.R. 568. In the above authorities it was held that in view of the provisions under Section 16-A the offences under the Act are to be tried in a summary manner; that the above provisions is mandatory and as the procedure was not followed so trial stands vitiated. The learned Public Prosecutor contended before me that this view be not accepted as no prejudice has been caused to the accused. It is no doubt true that no prejudice has been proved to have been caused to the caused but the view expressed in the authorities cited above of our own High Court are binding on this Court. So it is held that trial in the present case stands vitiated. So judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court cannot be upheld and are liable to be set aside and are set aside as such." For the reasons given in para No. 4 of the order dated 8.11.1990, the first Appellate Court thought it proper to remand the case because according to it the delay in concluding the trial was due to non-appearance of the petitioner-accused. The petitioner appeared in the trial Court on 5.3.1986 and from the said date it had taken about 3-1/2 years to conclude the trial. The reasons as contained in para No. 4 for remanding the case can be quoted as follows :- "4. Now the question arises whether proceedings be dropped or not. Counsel for the accused contended before me that as accused has already undergone agony of trial for five years so the complaint be quashed. I do not agree to his contention. Adulteration is a menace to the society. In such cases Courts should take a strict view. Accused should not be allowed to go merely on the fact that trial has taken long. In the present case much of the delay was due to the non-appearance of the accused.
I do not agree to his contention. Adulteration is a menace to the society. In such cases Courts should take a strict view. Accused should not be allowed to go merely on the fact that trial has taken long. In the present case much of the delay was due to the non-appearance of the accused. The accused appeared in the Court on 5.3.1986 and from 5.3.1986 till today trial has only lasted 2-1/2 years, so the request to quash the proceedings cannot be accepted." 3. Aggrieved by the order dated 8.11.1990, the present revision. 4. Nobody has appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Rajinder Singh, District Attorney, appeared on behalf of the respondent and with his assistance I have gone through the record of this case. 5. Section 16-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act lays down as follows :- "Notwithstanding antying contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 to 1974), all offences under sub-section (1) of Section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial :" A reading of the above would show that the proceedings under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are to be dealt in a summary manner and a special procedure has been prescribed according to law. This procedure was not adopted by the trial Court, as a result of that the first Appellate Court i.e. the Court of Sessions Judge, Bhiwani, allowed the appeal of the petitioner, but in its wisdom remanded the case. In my opinion, the reasons given by the first Appellate Court are not sustainable in the eyes of law, much less after a period of 15 years when this revision is being disposed of in the year 2000. Admittedly, the sample was taken in the year 1985. Section 16-A of the Act clearly lays down the procedure. If the proper procedure has not been adopted by the trial Court, the blame cannot shifted upon the petitioner.
Admittedly, the sample was taken in the year 1985. Section 16-A of the Act clearly lays down the procedure. If the proper procedure has not been adopted by the trial Court, the blame cannot shifted upon the petitioner. In spite of the fact that the petitioner contended before the first Appellate Court that he has already undergone the agony of the trial for five years, so the complaint should be quashed, the first Appellate Court did not agree with the contention of the petitioner on the plea that adulteration is a menace to the society and in such cases the Court should have taken a strict view. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent also submits that since no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, therefore the order dated 8.11.1990 should be affirmed. I am not in a position to subscribe to the view taken up by the learned counsel for the State. The legislature in its wisdom has treated this procedure in summary manner. Admittedly, the petitioner appeared before the trial Court on 5.3.1986 and the trial Court took 3-1/2 years to dispose of the matter. This is an inordinate delay and it has to be inferred that a prejudice has been caused to the present petitioner. If after a period of 15 years the petitioner is called upon to face the trial, it will further aggravate his miseries. 7. Resultantly, I do not concur with the reasons give by the first Appellate Court in para No. 4 of its judgment and those are hereby set aside. The revision is allowed, the order dated 8.11.1990 is hereby set aside and the petitioner stands acquitted of the charge framed against him. Revision allowed.