A. KABIR, J. ( 1 ) THE private respondents in these four appeals purchased certain properties from one Pranab Prasad Roy against whom two big Raiyat cases, being S. R. Case Nos. 307 and 308 of 1967-68, were started under section 6 (5) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. In the said proceedings, several agricultural, non-agricultural and lands of others categories were vested to the State as they were found to be in excess of the ceiling prescribed under section 6 (1) of the said Act. ( 2 ) THE orders of vesting were challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution in C. R. No. 3387 (W) of 1968, and the said writ application was disposed of on 5th October, 1972, with a direction that in the event the writ petitioner filed a revised return in Form "b', the authority concerned would reconsider the matter, Pursuant thereto, Pranab Prasad Roy filed a fresh "b" Form on 4th December, 1972, and on 29th April, 1985, the big Raiyat cases were taken up for review. The matter was disposed of on 7th June, 1985, by allowing the raiyat to retain 148. 76 acres, including 111. 02 acres of tank fisheries. A quantum of 242. 90 acres of land were directed to vest to the State and on 17th June, 1985, consequential proceedings, being Case Nos. 45 and 46 of 1985, were started for correction of the Record-of-Rights. On 9th October, 1985, notices under section 10 (2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, were issued for taking over possession of the vested land. ( 3 ) CHALLENGING the said orders of vesting and the notices under section 10 (2) of the above Act, the said Pranab Prasad Roy moved two fresh writ petitions, being Civil Rule No. 17163 (W) of 1985 and C. O. No. 1703 (W) of 1986. The private respondents in these four appeals also filed separate writ applications, being C. O. Nos. 15349-15352 (W) of 1990, against the orders of vesting and the subsequent notices issued under section 10 (2) of the aforesaid Act. ( 4 ) ALL the said writ proceedings were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment on 12th April, 1991. 15349-15352 (W) of 1990, against the orders of vesting and the subsequent notices issued under section 10 (2) of the aforesaid Act. ( 4 ) ALL the said writ proceedings were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment on 12th April, 1991. The said judgment so far as it related to the writ petitions filed by Pranab Prasad Roy, namely, C. R. No. 17163 (W) of 1985 and C. O. No. 1703 (W) of 1986, reads as follows :-"mr. Ghosh for the petitioner, however, has produced a xerox copy of the judgment dated October, 4, 1988, passed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Order No. 16675 (W) of 1985 from which it clearly appears that His Lordship had quashed the orders of vesting passed in B. R. Case Nos. 307 and 308 of 1967 and also the subsequent 7a Case No. 265 under section 14t (3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, which facts have not been controverted by Mrs. Sukiran Biswas, learned Advocate for the State Respondents. Such being the position, the impugned orders of vesting passed in subsequent B. R. Case Nos. 45 and 46 of 1985, initiated and disposed of by the Revenue Officer, Jadavpur "c" Camp, being the consequential proceedings of the original B. R. Case Nos. 307-308 of 1967-68, initiated by the Revenue Officer, Tallygunge "c" Camp and also the impugned notices under section 10 (2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, cannot be sustained in law and the orders passed therein including the order of vesting and the impugned notice under section 10 (2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act are quashed. The Rule is made absolute. Let a Rule of Mandamus be issued accordingly. This order will also govern the other Civil Order No. 1703 (W) of 1986, arising out of another writ application, filed by the same writ petitioners and the impugned orders challenged in the said civil order are also quashed because of the reasons as above and the said Civil Order No 1703 (W) of 1986 is also made absolute. " ( 5 ) AS far as the writ petition filed by the private respondents in these four appeals are concerned, the learned judge observed as follows :-"so far as other writ petitions, namely, Nirala Properties (P) Ltd. ; Sontosh Kumar Moitra, Monishe Ch. " ( 5 ) AS far as the writ petition filed by the private respondents in these four appeals are concerned, the learned judge observed as follows :-"so far as other writ petitions, namely, Nirala Properties (P) Ltd. ; Sontosh Kumar Moitra, Monishe Ch. Moitra and Bulu Mondal are concerned, they are all admittedly subsequent purchasers of some of the alleged vested lands from Pranab Prasad Roy and they have moved their respective writ applications alleging that by the orders of vesting passed in the aforesaid B. R. Cases, their interests in their respective purchased lands have also been jeopardised. In view of the fact that the B. R. Cases being 307 and 308 of 1967-68 and the consequential B. R. Cases being 45 and 46 of 1985 having been quashed, all orders passed in any consequential proceedings concerning the said big raiyat cases and all actions done pursuant thereto including revision or correction of record-of-rights in respect of any of the lands forming subject matter of those big raiyat proceedings shall also stand quashed. If any correction or revision in respect of any such land has been made, such correction or revision now stands quashed and/or set aside. By this order, the concerned R. S. record-of-rights should be revised and/or corrected as it stood originally and such revision or correction should be made by the authority concerned positively within two months from the date of communication of this order. The said writ applications are also allowed to the extent as indicated above. " ( 6 ) ON the basis of an application for modification filed on 31st July, 1991, the aforesaid order of 12th April, 1991, was modified by the learned single Judge on 5th September, 1991, as follows :-"so far as revision or correction of the record-of-Rights as was directed to be made by my order dated 12th April, 1991, is concerned, that should first of all be corrected and/or revised in the names of the original owners and thereafter in the names of purchasers namely Nirala Properties (P) Ltd. , Santosh Kr Moitra, Manish Chandra Roy and Bulu Mondal. " ( 7 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the order of 5th September, 1991, was further modified on 29th January, 1992, in the following terms :-"so far as the order dated September, 5. " ( 7 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the order of 5th September, 1991, was further modified on 29th January, 1992, in the following terms :-"so far as the order dated September, 5. 1991, is concerned, the last part of the last sentence, starting from the words "and, thereafter, in the name of the purchasers" upto the end shall stand delated. " ( 8 ) IN this situation Pranab Prasad Roy filed an application for contempt of Court on 4th October, 1991, and the same was taken up for consideration by the learned single Judge on 27th March, 1992, and was disposed of on the Court being satisfied that the R. S. Record-of-Rights had been corrected in compliance with the orders dated 12th April, 1991 and 29th January, 1992. While disposing of the contempt application, the learned single Judge also directed as follows :-"so far as the other writ applications filed by the purchasers from the original raiyat which were also disposed of by my order dated 12th of April, 1991, are concerned, I make it clear that such purchasers will be at liberty to apply for mutating their names to the authority concerned in view of the said order dated 12th of April, 1991 and today's order but, in any case, they must apply within a fortnight from date along with the copies of the said orders dated 12th of April, 1991 and 29th of January, 1992 and also this order and the copies of their purchase deeds and the authority concerned shall pass necessary orders on such application considering the said documents and acting in pursuance thereof positively within three months from the date of receipt of such applications. I make it clear that the time limit so fixed is peremptory and mandatory. Till such disposal, the possession of the said purchasers so far as their purchased lands are concerned, should not be disturbed in any way. " ( 9 ) THEREAFTER, as no further steps were taken by the concerned respondents, the private respondents in these appeals, that is, the subsequent purchasers from Pranab Prasad Roy, filed separate applications on 14th July, 1992, complaining of the inaction of the respondents. The said application came up for hearing before the learned single Judge on 23rd July, 1992, when on behalf of the respondents it was contended that copies of the writ petitions in C. O. Nos. The said application came up for hearing before the learned single Judge on 23rd July, 1992, when on behalf of the respondents it was contended that copies of the writ petitions in C. O. Nos. 15349 (W) to 15352 (W) of 1990 had not been served on the respondents and that no application had also been made by the writ petitioner in the prescribed form for mutation of their names. The said contentions were rejected by the learned Judge who came to a finding that application had been made by the writ petitioners for mutation of their names through their learned advocate, Mrs. Soma Roychoudhury ( nee Laha) and relevant documents had also been forwarded and received by the authorities on 8th April, 1992. The application was accordingly disposed of with a direction upon the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer. Thakurpukur, Metiaburz Block, to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in each of the four applications dated 14th July, 1992, in respect of their purchased lands, treating the letter of their learned advocate dated 6th April, 1992, as applications for mutation in each case, positively within a fortnight from the date of the order and also to grant rent receipts in the names of the respective writ petitioners thereafter. ( 10 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the matters came up again before the learned single Judge by way of a contempt application which was disposed of on 15th March, 1996, with liberty to the writ petitioners to apply for mutation of their names in the prescribed form and with a direction to the respondent authority to mutate the names of the writ petitioners within a fortnight from the date of making of the applications, subject to the result of a writ petition which was said to be pending. ( 11 ) THIS was followed by another order dated 18th April, 1996, by which the order of 15th March, 1996, was modified and it was clarified that the petitioners would not be required to file any fresh application for mutation even on plain paper in view of the order dated 23rd July, 1992, by which the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer had been directed to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in each of the writ petitions which had been filed by the subsequent purchasers. The learned single Judge reiterated his earlier order and directed the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer to mutate the names of the said writ petitioners on the basis of the letters sent by their learned advocate, Mrs. Soma Roychoudhury (Laha) on 6th April, 1992, positively within four weeks from the date of communication of the order. ( 12 ) THE appellants in these four appeals preferred appeals under section 19 (1) (a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against the order of the learned single Judge dated 15th March, 1996, in the contempt proceedings. The said appeals were dismissed as being not maintainable, since the learned single Judge had held that no contempt had been committed, but without prejudice to the rights of the appellants to obtain relief, if available, under any provision other than section 19 (1) (a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. ( 13 ) THEREAFTER, these four regular appeals have been filed against the said order of 15th March, 1996, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, along with applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing such appeals. ( 14 ) APPEARING in support of these appeals, Mr. Sadhan Gupta firstly submitted that when the learned single Judge found that no contempt had been committed he should have dismissed the contempt application without giving fresh directions while disposing of the same. Mr. Gupta submitted that the learned single Judge passed different orders at different times which confused the officers who could not understand as to how they were required to proceed. Mr. Gupta submitted that even after passing the order impugned in these appeals, the learned single Judge passed an order which had the effect of substantially altering the earlier order. ( 15 ) MR. Gupta urged that having disposed of the contempt applications, the Court became functus officio and had no jurisdiction left to review its orders and give fresh directions in the disposed of matters without a proper application for review. In fact, according to Mr. Gupta orders had been passed which had not even been asked for by the writ petitioners and had the effect of reviewing the earlier orders. ( 16 ) IN support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Gupta relied on three decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1) Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Gupta orders had been passed which had not even been asked for by the writ petitioners and had the effect of reviewing the earlier orders. ( 16 ) IN support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Gupta relied on three decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1) Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Paulouse Athanasius and Ors. (AIR 1954 SC Page 526) (2) Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (AIR 1979 SC Page 1047) and (3) Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (AIR 1995 SC Page 455 ). Mr. Gupta submitted that the common thread which runs through these judgments is that even while reviewing its orders the Court should not act as an appellate Court. Even an error apparent on the face of the record means an error which strikes one on mere looking at the record and did not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there could be two opinions. ( 17 ) REFERENCE was also made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma (AIR 1987 SC Page 943) and a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Subhas Chandra Sarkar and Ors. v. Nirmal Kumar Jana and Ors. (1997 (2) CHN Page 172) wherein it was, inter alia, observed that once a writ petition is disposed of and the proceedings are terminated the same cannot be re-opened by a miscellaneous application. ( 18 ) MR. Gupta then referred to a decision of this Court in Ningha Colliery and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1993 (2) CLJ Page 418) wherein while dealing with a contempt application a learned Judge of this Court observed that in a contempt proceeding arising out of a writ matter the Court has to see whether any wilful and deliberate contempt had been committed by the contemnor and as to the quantum of punishment if the contemnor is found guilty and to see as to how the judgment or order can be implemented and/or executed. ( 19 ) MR. Gupta also contended that the subsequent purchasers from Pranab Prasab Roy having purchased their lands in 1989 they would have to show that they were not affected by the date of vesting under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. ( 20 ) MR. ( 19 ) MR. Gupta also contended that the subsequent purchasers from Pranab Prasab Roy having purchased their lands in 1989 they would have to show that they were not affected by the date of vesting under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. ( 20 ) MR. Gupta submitted that the order of the learned single Judge impugned in the appeal could not be sustained on any Count and was liable to be set aside upon the delay in filing the appeals being condoned since such delay was bonafide and had been caused on account of the earlier appeals having been filed in the contempt jurisdiction. ( 21 ) OPPOSING the appeals, as also the prayer for condonation of the delay in filing the appeals, Mr. Santimoy Panda submitted that the appeals were misconceived as the orders of vesting passed in B. R. Cases No. 307 and 308 of 1967-68 and in B. R. Cases No. 45 and 46 of 1985 had been quashed along with all consequential action taken on the basis thereof. Mr. Panda urged that since no appeal had been preferred against the orders dated 27th March, 1992 and 23rd July, 1992, whereby the respondents had been directed to mutate the names of the writ petitioners and to issue rent receipts in their names, the same had attained finality between the parties and by the subsequent orders only the name for giving effect to such directions were specified from time to time. Mr. Panda urged that the purport of the judgments had not been altered in any way. ( 22 ) MR. Panda submitted that the judgments had not also been reviewed as such, as contended on behalf of the appellants. In the contempt proceedings the learned single Judge gave various directions for implementing the directions contained in the judgments whereby the writ petitions were disposed of, hence the question of the learned Judge becoming functus officio did not arise. It was also submitted that the Court had inherent jurisdiction to implement its orders after the main matter was disposed of. ( 23 ) IN this regard, reference was made to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Idris and Anr. v. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji and Ors. It was also submitted that the Court had inherent jurisdiction to implement its orders after the main matter was disposed of. ( 23 ) IN this regard, reference was made to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Idris and Anr. v. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji and Ors. (AIR 1984 SC Page 1826) wherein the order of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court giving certain directions in addition to punishing the contemnors for contempt of Court, was upheld by the Supreme Court. ( 24 ) MR. Panda also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak and Anr. (AIR 1988 SC Page 1531) where the doctrine that no person should suffer by reason of any mistake of the Court was applied and it was observed that the Supreme Court was not powerless to correct its error which had the effect of depriving a citizen of his fundamental rights. It can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any pending proceeding before it without insisting on the formalities of a review application. It was observed further that powers of review can be exercised in a petition filed under Article 136 or Article 32 or under any other provision of the Constitution if the Court is satisfied that its directions have resulted in the deprivation of the fundamental rights of a citizen or any legal right of the petitioner. ( 25 ) MR. Panda submitted that, in any event, the order appealed against date 15th March, 1996, had merged with the subsequent order passed on 18th April, 1996, and the appeals had been filed against an order which was non-est in the eye of law and were not, therefore, maintainable and were liable to be dismissed on such score as well. ( 26 ) IN support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Panda referred to and relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Nibaran Chandra Sikdar v. Abdul Harkim and Ors. (AIR 1928 Calcutta Page 418) and a decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Local Committee of Gurdwaras, Lahore v. Sardul Singh and Anr. ( 26 ) IN support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Panda referred to and relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Nibaran Chandra Sikdar v. Abdul Harkim and Ors. (AIR 1928 Calcutta Page 418) and a decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Local Committee of Gurdwaras, Lahore v. Sardul Singh and Anr. (AIR 1938 Lahore Page 76) wherein it was observed that where an application for review of judgment is granted, no appeal is competent against the original decree as that decree must be deemed to be non-existent. ( 27 ) MR. Panda urged that the appeals were misconceived and even if the delay in filing the same was condoned, they were liable to be dismissed on merits. ( 28 ) BEFORE considering the appeals on merit we will first have to consider whether the delay in filing the appeals should be condoned. Admittedly, appeals had been preferred against the same order impugned in these appeals, in the contempt jurisdiction and the same were dismissed as being not maintainable. These appeals were, thereafter, filed as regular appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is, therefore, clear that the delay in filing these four appeals was on account of the fact that the appellants were pursuing their relief before the wrong forum. ( 29 ) IN our view, sufficient ground has been made out by the appellants for condoning the delay in filing the appeals and such delay is accordingly condoned. The applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the appeals are allowed. ( 30 ) ON merits, however, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. ( 31 ) THERE is no dispute that the B. R. Cases Nos. 307 and 308 of 1967-68 and the consequential B. R. Cases Nos. 45 and 46 of 1985 were quashed together with all orders passed in any consequential proceedings concerning the said Big Raiyat cases and all actions taken pursuant thereto, including revision or correction of the record-of-rights in respect of any land forming the subject matter of the said Big Raiyat proceedings. 45 and 46 of 1985 were quashed together with all orders passed in any consequential proceedings concerning the said Big Raiyat cases and all actions taken pursuant thereto, including revision or correction of the record-of-rights in respect of any land forming the subject matter of the said Big Raiyat proceedings. It is also not in dispute that the learned single Judge thereafter directed the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer, Thakurpukur, Metiaburz Block, to mutate the names of the petitioners, who were the purchasers from Shri Pranab Prasad Roy, in respect of the lands covered by their respective purchase deeds and to issue rent receipts in their names. Directions were also given to correct the record-of-rights accordingly. ( 32 ) THE several orders passed after the common judgment dated 12th April, 1991, merely indicated the procedure to be followed in implementing the directions contained in the said judgment. The substance of the judgment remained unaltered. The respondents were, therefore, under an obligation to give effect to the directions contained in the judgment of 12th April, 1991, without going into technicalities as to the method to be adopted in implementing the said directions. The changes and corrections in the relevant record-of-rights will have to be made in stages. The entries in the record-of-rights prior to the changes effected on account of the orders of vesting passed in B. R. Cases Nos. 307-308 of 1967-68 and in B. R. Case Nos. 45 and 46 of 1985, will first have to be restored and, thereafter, the entries relating to subsequent mutation will have to be incorporated. ( 33 ) THE various orders passed after the common judgment of 12th April, 1991, including the one passed on the contempt application on 15th March, 1996, and 18th April, 1996, will have to be considered in such context. It is true as submitted by Mr. Gupta, that once a matter is disposed of, the Courts do not normally, without a proper application for review, alter its earlier orders or pass fresh orders, but the facts of this case are a little different. In this case the original judgment of 12th April, 1991, was not being reviewed. What was being sought to be altered was the methodology in implementing the directions given in the said judgment. The judgments cited by Mr. Gupta do not help the case of the appellants. In this case the original judgment of 12th April, 1991, was not being reviewed. What was being sought to be altered was the methodology in implementing the directions given in the said judgment. The judgments cited by Mr. Gupta do not help the case of the appellants. ( 34 ) FURTHERMORE, the order appealed against was passed on 15th March, 1996, which merged with the subsequent order passed on 18th April, 1996. As pointed out by Mr. Santimoy Panda, these four appals have been filed against an order which no longer exists. In our view, Mr Panda's submissions have considerable force. These appeals, therefore, fail on all counts and are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. R. K. Mazundar, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.