JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C J. (oral:- These petitions are filed for quashing and setting aside orders passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Shimla, on July 14, 1999 in ENF/PN/4150 and confirmed by the Presiding officer, Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal on December 15,1999 in Cases No. ATA/17 (4) 99 and ATA/17(5) 99. 2. The case of the petitioner was that it is a Corporation which came into existence from April 1, 1974. It was a company registered under the Companies Act and it is instrumentality of the State. It appears that the proceedings were initiated under the provisions of Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred as the Act) by issuing notice under Section 7-A of the Act for determination of amount due from the employer. The said notice is annexed as Annexure P-t dated 12.12.1998. It stated: "Whereas information had been laid before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and on consideration whereas the Regional Prdvident fund Commissioner had reason to believe that provisions of the Act were applicable to the Corporation, the benefits have not been extended in favour of the employees and as to why appropriate proceedings should not be initiated against the Corporation". The petitioners) was, therefore, called upon to attend the inquiry before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, failing which inquiry would be initiated in the absence of Corporation and appropriate order in accordance with law would be passed. 3. The Corporation submitted its reply through its Divisional Manager, inter alia, contending that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the Corporation inasmuch as the Corporation could not be said to be an Industrial Establishment as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 nor under Section 25 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was also stated that Establishment had not been defined in the Act. It was contended that the Forest Working Division was not covered under the provisions of the Act. Moreover, there was no relationship of employer and employees between the Forest Working Division and workers engaged by the contractor, and hence, they were not entitled to benefits under the Act. A plea was also raised that no inquiry could have been undertaken by Regional Fund Commissioner. Moreover, there was no relationship of employer and employees between the Forest Working Division and workers engaged by the contractor, and hence, they were not entitled to benefits under the Act. A plea was also raised that no inquiry could have been undertaken by Regional Fund Commissioner. It was also averred that the Forest Corporation could not be said to be a Factory carrying on manufacturing process and hence, was not covered by the Act. Provisions of Section 7-A of the Act were not applicable to the Corporation, and no proceedings could have been initiated. 4. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner considered the material on record and he was satisfied that the establishment was covered under the Act from May 1, 1976. In fact, Provident Fund Code No. PN/4150 was also allotted to the establishment on receipt of the application for voluntary coverage vide Notification under Section 1 (4) of the Act vide Provident Fund Office letter No.PN/4150/ENF-l/5921 dated 3.6.1976. In view of notification No.S.35019/386/76-PF.II (i) dated 27.10.76 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi; the Establishment started complying with the provisions of the Act and scheme framed thereunder. In the light of the said circumstance, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner concluded; "in view of these facts there is no doubt that the establishment is covered under the Act under Section 1 (4) of the said Act". 5. The next question which arose for consideration before the Regional Provident Fund commissioner was whether the employees employed by the contractor could be said to be employees of the Corporation, and hence, they were entitled to benefits under the provisions of the Act. On that question, the Commissioner observed that the establishment had admitted that it is engaged in the extraction and conversion of the standing wood into logs and scants and extraction of resin. On the basis of the material on record, the Commissioner observed that looking to the definition of employer and employee under the Act, it was not necessary that there must be direct relationship of employer and employee so as to enable the employees to get the benefits under the Act. In his opinion, the persons employed by the contractor (Labour Supply Mates) were employees under the Act. In his opinion, the persons employed by the contractor (Labour Supply Mates) were employees under the Act. For that, reliance was placed on the adjudication in C.W.P. No. 411 of 1998 titled Jeet Ram v. State ofHimachal Pradesh & Others and it was held that the establishment of the petitioner was covered under the Act and it was liable to pay benefits to the employees. 6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner under Section 7-A of the Act, an appeal was preferred before the Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, constituted by the Central Government. There also similar contentions were raised which were raised before the Commissioner. It was argued that there was no relationship between the Corporation and employees/labourers employed by the Contractor, and hence, the Corporation cannot he held liable. Negativing the contention, the Tribunal observed that final control was with the Corporation. For such finding, Clause 10 of the agreement was relied upon by the Tribunal. The said Clause reads as under: "10. That the labour supply mate(s) shall furnish to the Divisional Manager a written statement of the names and full particulars of his agents/servants/labourers whom he/they proposes/proposed to employ within the meaning of this agreement before they are so employed and the Divisional Manager shall be at liberty to forbid the employment or to order the removal during the progress of work of any person who he may consider undesirable". 7. From the above clause, in the opinion of the Tribunal, final control was with the corporation, and hence, it could be said to be "employer" under Section 2 (e) of the Act and labourers employed by the Contractor were "employees" of the Corporation, and hence, provisions of the Act were not applicable. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Against the said order, the Corporation has approached this Court. 9. The points which were raised before the authorities below were also raised before us. It was submitted that no suo motu action could have been initiated by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, and hence, the same was without jurisdiction. It was also urged that there is no relationship of employer and employee between the Corporation and the Labourers of the Contractor and on that ground also provisions of the Act could not apply. It was submitted that no suo motu action could have been initiated by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, and hence, the same was without jurisdiction. It was also urged that there is no relationship of employer and employee between the Corporation and the Labourers of the Contractor and on that ground also provisions of the Act could not apply. Na report on which reliance was placed was supplied to the petitioner and the action was in violation of principles of natural justice and fair play. It was also argued that the labourers employed by the contractor were casual labourers, not entitled to the benefits under the Act. Finally, it was submitted that the Corporation is established by the Government and as per the notification dated 29th October, 2000 (Annexure P-6), the provisions of the Act do not apply to such Corporation. 10. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the order passed by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and confirmed by the Tribunal was in accordance with law and no interference is called for. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, it cannot be said that any illegality was committed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or by the Appellate Authority. So far as the applicability of the Act is concerned, it was not in dispute that the provisions of the Act were and are applicable to the Corporation. In fact, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner has observed in the order that the provisions of the Act were applicable to the Corporation and Code number has also been given. -The question before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was whether the labourers employed by the contractor for the purpose of doing work of Corporation were covered under the Act or not. It was contended by the Corporation that labourers employed by the contractor on casual basis could not be said to be employees of the Corporation and hence, the Act was not applicable to them. 12. Now, we may refer to the definition of "employer" and "employee" under clauses 2 (e) and (f) of the Act. It was contended by the Corporation that labourers employed by the contractor on casual basis could not be said to be employees of the Corporation and hence, the Act was not applicable to them. 12. Now, we may refer to the definition of "employer" and "employee" under clauses 2 (e) and (f) of the Act. They are as under: 2 (e) employer means - (i) in relation to an establishment which is a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory, including the agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier and, where a person has been named as a manager of the factory under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948, the person so named; and (ii) in relation to any other establishment, the person who, or the authority which has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment, and where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agent, .such manager, managing director or managing agent; (f) employee means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person- (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of establishment; (ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961, or under the standing orders of the establishment." 13. Reading Section 2 (e) (ii) of the Act, it is clear that "employer" means, "in relation to any other establishment", "the person who, or the authority which has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment". On the basis of evidence and material on record, the authorities under the Act held that the final control was with the Corporation. By reading Clause 10, extracted herein above, it is clear that the final control was with the Corporation. Clause 10 of the agreement mandates the contractor not only to inform the Corporation in writing about full particulars of his agents/servants/labourers to whom he proposes/proposed to employ but the Divisional Manager of the Corporation was authorised to forbid the employment or to order the removal during the progress of work of any person whom he may consider undesirable. Clause 10 of the agreement mandates the contractor not only to inform the Corporation in writing about full particulars of his agents/servants/labourers to whom he proposes/proposed to employ but the Divisional Manager of the Corporation was authorised to forbid the employment or to order the removal during the progress of work of any person whom he may consider undesirable. Thus, it is not a case where there were two agreements; one between the corporation and contractor and another between contractor and employees, independent of &ach other. On the contrary, whenever contractor was to employ agents/servants/labourers, he was bound to inform in writing about those agents/servants/laborers to the Corporation and the final control was with the Corporation and the Divisional Manager was authorised to order the removal during the progress of work of any person. 14. On the basis of the said agreement, it was held by the Tribunal that the final control was with the Corporation and hence the case was covered by Section 2(e)(ii) of the Act and the Corporation was "employer". So far as employee is concerned, the term is very widely defined in under clause (f) which states that an "employee" means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment. 15. Looking to both the orders, it does not appear to be the case of the Corporation that the employees were casual in nature. The contention, however, was that they were not directly employed by the Corporation and hence they could not be said to be employees of the Corporation and the corporation could not be said to be the employer. When on the basis of material on record, the authorities held that there was relationship of employer and employee under the provisions of the Act, obviously they were entitled to the benefits and the Corporation was liable under the Act. 16. Our attention was, no doubt, invited by the learned counsel to a decision of the Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. Union of India and others 1998(6) SCC 436. There the contention of the Corporation was that it could not be said to be employer within the meaning of the Act and was, therefore, not liable to pay benefits under the Act to the employees who were wrongly held to be employees by the authorities. There the contention of the Corporation was that it could not be said to be employer within the meaning of the Act and was, therefore, not liable to pay benefits under the Act to the employees who were wrongly held to be employees by the authorities. It was also contended that without there being any material on record and without supplying copy of the Inspector report, a decision was taken which was not in consonance with law. Upholding the contention and setting aside the order, the matter was remanded by the Supreme Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Learned counsel submitted that the point is directly concluded in Food Corporation of India and the present petition also deserves to be allowed. 17. We are afraid; the ratio laid down in Food Corporation of India does not assist the petitioner-Corporation in the instant case. In that case, a copy of the report was not furnished and opportunity was not afforded to the Corporation. Moreover, it was contended before the authorities that the employees were not employees of the Corporation and without evidence/material on record; the authorities held that they were covered by the provisions of the Act. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the decision which had been arrived at was based on inference rather than materials and evidence on record. Obviously such a decision could not be said to be a decision in the eye of law. 18. In the instant case, as observed by the Tribunal, an agreement was on record and the Tribunal heavily placed reliance on Clause 10. In our opinion, The Tribunal was wholly right and perfectly justified in placing reliance on the said clause. It was a clinching circumstance showing ultimate control with the corporation. If it is so, it cannot be said that the reasoning given or the conclusion arrived at by Tribunal is faulty or erroneous. 19. Regarding notification of October 1999, we express no opinion one way old the other as in the instant case, we are concerned with the period prior to 29th October, 1999. 20. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, no error of law or of jurisdiction can be said to have been committed either by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or by the Tribunal. The petitions, therefore, deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. Notices discharged. No costs. 20. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, no error of law or of jurisdiction can be said to have been committed either by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or by the Tribunal. The petitions, therefore, deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. Notices discharged. No costs. CMP No. 578 of 2000 in CWP No. 330 of 2000 AND CMP No. 516 of 2000 in CWP No. 293 of 2000 In view of the disposal of the writ petitions these applications do not survive and stand disposed of accordingly. Petition dismissed