JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, J. (Oral).:- A short but interesting question of law has been raised in the present revision petition on interpretation of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). The petitioner is the original defendant in Civil Suit No. 1 of 2000, pending in the Court of District Judge, Una. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a suit for maintenance against the defendant under Sections 18 and 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. According to the plaintiffs, they were indigent persons and they had no sufficient means to pay necessary court fees on the plaint. They, therefore, made an application under Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIII of the Code and prayed to allow them to sue as indigent persons. 2. The learned District Judge, Una, passed an order on January 22, 2000, (sic) which reads as under: "The report of the collector has been received. As per the report of the Collector there is no property of the petitioner. The statement of the applicant also perused. In view of the statement of the plaintiff/applicant and report of the Collector, the application for permission to sue as an indigent person is allowed and the petitioner/plaintiff is allowed to sue as indulged person. The application stands disposed of. The suit be registered. Let the defendant be served for 15.3.2000.” 3. The said order is challenged by the petitioner defendant in the present revision. 4. I have heard Mr. Jagdish Thakur vice Mr. Naresh Thakur learned counsel for petitioner Mr. Ajay Singh Advocate General, for respondent No.5 - State. 5. Mr. Thakur, contended that the order passed by District Judge suffer from illegality and with material irregularity. The Court of District Judge, Una is a court subordinate to this Court, and si nee the order passed by it suffers from jurisdictional error, it is liable to be set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code. The Court of District Judge, Una is a court subordinate to this Court, and si nee the order passed by it suffers from jurisdictional error, it is liable to be set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code. He submitted that the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code have not been complied with and as no inquiry was held and no notice was issued to the petitioner - defendant, nor opportunity of hearing was afforded to hi m before granting the application of the applicants - plaintiffs and before permitting them to sue as indigent persons, the order is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code and the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 6. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for plaintiffs respondents 1 to 4, on the other hand, submitted that in the light or amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, and insertion of Rule 10-A in Order XXXIII, no further inquiry or notice to the defendant was necessary and it was open to the Court in exercise of power under Rule 1 -A to pass appropriate order. Such order has been made by the trial court which cannot be said to be illegal or contrary to law. When the order is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code, it cannot be urged that there was illegality or material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court which requires to be corrected in the revision by this court. He, therefore submitted that the petition’ deserves to be dismissed. 7. Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that even after insertion of Rule 1 -A in order XXXIII by the Amendment Act of 1976, an opportunity ought to have been afforded to the Government, as laid down in Rule 6 of Order XXXIII of the Code. Without issuing notice and hearing the government Pleader, no order could have been passed the trial court. The impugned order hence suffers from legal infirmity and deserves to be set aside. 8. Without issuing notice and hearing the government Pleader, no order could have been passed the trial court. The impugned order hence suffers from legal infirmity and deserves to be set aside. 8. The point for my consideration is whether before granting prayer of I applicants-plaintiffs to sue as indigent persons, provisions of Rule 6 of Order XXXIII ought to have been complied with by the Trial Court and opportunity I extended to the opposite party as well as to the. Government Pleader. 9. Now, let us consider the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code. The said Order enables a party, who does not possess sufficient means to pay the fees prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit to sue as an indigent person. Such person may make an application to the Court in the manner provided in Rule 3 containing particulars enumerated in Rule 2 of Order XXXIII. Rule 4 provides for examination of applicant. The Court may reject an application for permission to sue as an indigent person under the circumstances specified in Rule 5. Rule 6 speaks of notice and leading on evidence by the parties. It is material and may be reproduced; "6. Notice of day for receiving evidence of applicants indigence. -Where the Court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in Rule 5, it shall fix a day (of which at least ten days clear notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his indigence, and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof." 10. Rule 7 lays down procedure at hearing. 1 Rule 8 deals with cases where an application is granted by the Court. Rule 9 provides for withdrawal of permission to sue as an indigent person in certain cases. It is also material and may be quoted; "9. Withdrawal of permission to issue as a indigent person. Rule 7 lays down procedure at hearing. 1 Rule 8 deals with cases where an application is granted by the Court. Rule 9 provides for withdrawal of permission to sue as an indigent person in certain cases. It is also material and may be quoted; "9. Withdrawal of permission to issue as a indigent person. - The Court may, on the application of the defendant, or of the Government pleader of which seven days clear n< lice in writing has been given to the plaintiff, order that the permission granted to the plaintiff to sue as an indigent person be withdrawn- (a) if he is guilty of vexatious or improper conduct in the course of the suit; (b) If it appears that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as an indigent person; or (c) If he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject matter of the suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject-matter." 11. These were the provisions in the Code of 1908 before the Amendment Act of 1976. They are still operative and in force with minor variations. For expression pauper, expression indigent person has been substituted. After the amendment in the Code with effect from February 1, 1977 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, Rule 1-A came to be inserted on which heavy reliance was placed by Mr. Sharma. The said Rule reads thus; "1-A. Inquiry into the means of an indigent person.- Every inquiry into the question whether or not a person is an indigent person shall be made, in the first instance, by the chief ministerial officer of the Court, unless the court otherwise directs, and the Court may adopt the report of such officer as its own finding or may itself make an inquiry into the question." 12. The question which I am called upon to consider is whether insertion of Rule 1-A in Order XXXIII of the Code has effected any change so far as right to object as to so called indigence of the applicant by the Government Pleader or by the opposite party. 13. The question which I am called upon to consider is whether insertion of Rule 1-A in Order XXXIII of the Code has effected any change so far as right to object as to so called indigence of the applicant by the Government Pleader or by the opposite party. 13. Reading the relevant provisions of order XXXIII before the Amendment Act of 1976, it is abundantly clear that whenever any person intended to file a suit and was unable to pay requisite court fees, it was open to him to make an application for grant of permission to sue as pauper. Once an application in accordance with the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code was presented in the Court, the Court would consider and decide whether it could be granted. Rule 5 provided for rejection of application in certain circumstances specified therein. Where the application was not rejected, it was to be followed by inquiry under rule 6 which provided issuance of notice to the opposite party as well as to the Government Pleader, receiving of such evidence as the applicant might adduce in proof of pauperism by the applicant and in disproof thereof by the opposite party. It thus envisaged two stages; Initial stage under rule 5 of Order XXXIII. If the application was rejected on the ground enumerated in the said Rule, the matter would end there. But if the Court did not see any ground to reject the application under Rule 5, it would consider the application. on merits. In such case, the Court would grant the applicant a opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his pauperism. The applicant would adduce evidence and try to convince the Court that he is a pauper and he has no sufficient means to pay court fees and necessary permission should be granted by allowing him to sue as a pauper. Similarly, opportunity would be extended to Government Pleader as well as to the opposite party. Government Pleader is interested in getting requisite amount of court fees to which otherwise it is entitled. It can, therefore, contend that the applicant is not pauper, and no such permission should be granted lo the applicant without payment of court fees on the plaint. Similarly, an opportunity must be given to the opposite party. Government Pleader is interested in getting requisite amount of court fees to which otherwise it is entitled. It can, therefore, contend that the applicant is not pauper, and no such permission should be granted lo the applicant without payment of court fees on the plaint. Similarly, an opportunity must be given to the opposite party. Government Pleader is interested in getting requisite amount of court fees to which otherwise it is entitled. It can, therefore,-contend that the applicant is not pauper, and no such permission should be granted to the applicant without payment of Court fees on the plaint. Similarly, an opportunity must be given to the opposite party as he is also interested in the matter. He can also contend that the applicant is not pauper and he should not be allowed to prosecute suit in forma pauperism. The rule also provided at least ten days clear notice to the opposite party and to the Government Pleader. 14. At one time, there was cleavage of opinion whether the opposite party could also be said to be interested and entitled to notice. The point, however, had been set at rest by the leading decision of the Supreme Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapoor AIR 1972 SC 2379. In >hat case, an application to sue as a pauper was granted in favour of the plaintiff by the High Court. It was observed by the High Court that Rules 6 and 7 of Order XXXIII of the Code, which provided notice to the opposite party and to the Government and procedure of hearing was primarily a matter between the applicant and the State Government. The defendant, who was private party, could not be said to have interest in such inquiry. Accordingly, permission to sue in forma pauperis was granted in favour of the applicant. The aggrieved defendant took the matter to the Supreme Court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the opposite party was also interested in the matter of grant of permission to the applicant to sue as forma pauperis. 15. Accordingly, permission to sue in forma pauperis was granted in favour of the applicant. The aggrieved defendant took the matter to the Supreme Court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the opposite party was also interested in the matter of grant of permission to the applicant to sue as forma pauperis. 15. Considering the relevant provisions of Order XXXIII, upholding the objection and setting aside the order passed by the High Court, the Apex Court propounded; "We venture to think that the High Court was labouring under a mistake when it said that the enquiry into the question whether the respondent was a pauper was exclusively a matter between him and the State Government and that the appellant was not interested in establishing that the respondent was not a pauper. Order 33, Rule 6 provides that if the Court does not reject the application under R.5, the Court shall fix a day of which at least 10 days notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government pleader for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of pauperism and for hearing any evidence in disproof thereof. Under 0.33, Rule 9, it is open to the Court on the application of the defendant to dispauper the plaintiff on the grounds specified therein, one of them being that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper. An immunity from a litigation unless the requisite court fee is paid by the plaintiff is a valuable right for the defendant. And does it not follow as a corollary that the proceedings td establish that the applicant-plaintiff is a pauper, which will take away that immunity, is a proceeding in which the defendant is vitally interested? To what purpose does Order 33, Rule 6 confer the right on the opposite party to participate in the enquiry into the pauperism and adduce evidence to establish that the applicant i s not a pauper unless the opposite . party is interested in the question and entitled to avail himself of all the normal procedure to establish it. We can think of no reason why if the procedure for discovery is applicable to proceeding under Order 33, the appellant should not be entitled to avail himself of it." (Emphasis supplied) 16. party is interested in the question and entitled to avail himself of all the normal procedure to establish it. We can think of no reason why if the procedure for discovery is applicable to proceeding under Order 33, the appellant should not be entitled to avail himself of it." (Emphasis supplied) 16. My attention was also invited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to a decision of the High Court of Patna, in Radhika Prasad Lal and another v. Shyama Charanlal, AIR 1966 Pat 387, wherein it has been held that the provisions of Rule 6 of Order XXXIII and issuance of notice to the opposite party are mandatory and must be complied with. 17. In the instant case, the petitioner has asserted that neither notice was issued as required by Rule 6 of Order XXXfll, nor an opportunity to lead evidence in disproof of indigency of the applicants was afforded to him. From the order also, it does not appear that any such notice had been issued or opportunity of hearing afforded. Perusing the report of the Collector and in presence of learned Advocate for the plaintiffs, the order was passed. Such order in my opinion, cannot be said to legal, valid and in accordance with law. 18. It was strenuously argued b y Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 4 (original plaintiffs) that the legal position has been substantially altered after the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)Act, 1976. He submitted that M.L. Sethi governed situate n prior to insertion of Rule 1-A, in Order XXXIII. With a view to obviate lengthy inquiry and issuance of notice and opportunity of hearing to opposite party and to Government Pleader, Rule 1 -A,, an inquiry into the question whether a person is Or is not an indigent is now to be made by the Court through its Chief Ministerial Officer unless the Court otherwise directs. It also states that the Court may adopt the report of such officer as its own finding, i.e. the fit ding by the Court. It is, however, open to the Court to make an inquiry itself into the question. It also states that the Court may adopt the report of such officer as its own finding, i.e. the fit ding by the Court. It is, however, open to the Court to make an inquiry itself into the question. The counsel submitted that under the new provision, if it is not otherwise directed by the Court a question whether or not a person is an indigent person, an inquiry made by Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court and a finding recorded by such officer may be treated as if it were a finding by the Court itself. It was urged by the learned counsel that in spite of such inquiry and report, if requirement of Rule 6 is to be insisted, the object underlying insertion of Rule 1-A will be defeated. Rule 1-A makes an enabling provis on under which the Court makes an inquiry through its Chief Ministerial Officer and report of such officer as a finding of the Court itself. If even thereafter notice to the opposite party and to the Government Pleader is held imperative, there was no necessity for insertion of such provision. It was further submitted that even after the Court permits an applicant to sue as an indigent person, the opposite party or the Government Pleader as the case may be can challenge such decision and make prayer for withdrawal of such permission. Mr. Sharma, in this connection, invited my attention to Rule 9 of Order XXXIII. The said rule allows the defendant or Government Pleader for withdrawal of permission granted in favour of the applicant in certain cases. Reference was also made by the learned counsel to a decision of the Madras High Court in P.V. Chandrasekharan and others v. Thirumalai Chit funds and others, AIR 1989 Mad 30. In that case, it was indicated by the Court that the report of the officer of the Court as to pauperism is a question of fact which should be treated as final. 19. I am unable to uphold the contention of Mr. Sharma. Reading the provisions of Order XXXIII in the entirety, there is no doubt in my mind that they refer to two stages of the proceedings. 19. I am unable to uphold the contention of Mr. Sharma. Reading the provisions of Order XXXIII in the entirety, there is no doubt in my mind that they refer to two stages of the proceedings. The first stage is making of application by the applicant allowing him to sue as an indigent person, holding of inquiry by the Court, issuance of notice to the Government Pleader and the opposite part and a decision to be arrived at on the basis of such inquiry and hearing. If the court is satisfied that the applicant is an indigent person, such permission can be granted and the first stage will be over. Then, comes Rule 9 of Order XXXIII, which enable s the Government Pleader or the defendant to request the Court for withdrawal of permission to sue as an indigent person granted to the applicant. The provisions of Rule 9, in my judgment, can be invoked only after an order is passed by the Court and necessary permission is granted to the applicant to prosecute the suit as an indigent person. It has nothing to do with the first stage when enquiry is made by the Court and opportunity is to be afforded to the defendant and to Government Pleader. 20. The learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 4, therefore, in my opinion, is not right in submitting that in view of provisions of Rule 9, it is not necessary to follow procedure of rule 6 and it is not obligatory on the Court to issue notice to Government Pleader or to opposite party. In my considered opinion, Rule 9 is independent c f Rules 1 to 8. It does not speak of any inquiry prior to grant of such permission, but deals with situation wherein Government Pleader or defendant applies for withdrawal of permission granted to the applicant, inter alia, on the grounds that (i) he was guilty of vexatious or improper conduct in the course of the suit; or (ii) he had sufficient means and he ought not to continue to sue as an indigent person; or (iii) he had entered into an agreement with reference to subject matter of the suit under which any other person had obtained an interest in such subject matter. This, however, in my considered opinion, does not dispense with inquiry which ought to have been undertaken under rules 1 to 8 of Order XXXIII. Moreover, as already held by the Supreme court in M.L. Sethi, payment of court fees is not merely a matter between the plaintiff and the Government but the defendant has also vital interest in the matter. If submission of Mr. Sharma is upheld, notice to Government Pleader is also not necessary. Such a view, in my judgment will make the provisions of rule 6 nugatory and otiose. Unless compelled, the Court will not interpret a statute which makes any provision redundant or superfluous. Looking to the scheme also, no such view is called for. Rule 1 - A as inserted in Order XXXIII in 1977 must be read keeping intact the principles laid down in rule 6 and in consonance with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in M.L Sethi. 21. The phraseology used in Rule 1-A is also significant. It states that every inquiry into the question whether or not a person is an indigent person shall be made, in the first instance, by the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court unless the Court otherwise directs. Thus, it is the initial stage, which has been taken note of newly added provisions of Rule 1-A. 22. In clause 84 of the Objects and Reasons of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, it has been stated as under; "Clause 84 - Sub-clause (i v), New rule - IA provides for the initial inquriy into the means of the applicant by the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court but the power is given to the Court either to adopt such report or to make independent inquiry." (Emphasis supplied) 23. Thus, what Rule 1-A contemplates is the initial inquiry or inquiry in the first instance. In my opinion, therefore, submission of Mr. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, deserves acceptance, when he urged that ambit and scope of Rule 1-A is limited in seeing by the court as to whether prima facie the applicant appears to be an indigent person. For that purpose, unless otherwise directed, the Court will make an inquiry through Chief Ministerial officer of the Court. If the report of such officer is against the applicant, the matter need not proceed further and will come to an end. For that purpose, unless otherwise directed, the Court will make an inquiry through Chief Ministerial officer of the Court. If the report of such officer is against the applicant, the matter need not proceed further and will come to an end. But if initial inquiry is in his favour, further proceedings will follow. They will include issuance of notice to the opposite party as well as to the Government Pleader; giving of time, hearing of objections, if any; and coming to a conclusion whether an application should be granted. Since both Government and defendant are interested in the proceedings wherein applicant can be permitted to sue as an indigent person, they will have to be afforded opportunity of hearing and appropriate order will be passed. It, therefore, cannot be said that by insertion of Rule 1-A in Order XXXIII, notice as required by Rule 6 to the opposite party or to Government has been dispensed with. The contention cannot be upheld, as it is contrary to the scheme of Order XXXIII. 24. The ratio laid down by the High Court of Madras in P. V. Chandrasekhran is not relevant to the issue raised in the present revision, inasmuch as it deals with appellate stage, which is governed by Rule 3 of Order LXTV of the Code. It declares that when an applicant was allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, no further inquiry in respect of the question whether or not he is an indigent person is necessary if the applicant has made an affidavit stating that he has not ceased to be an indigent person since the date of the decree appealed from. The obvious intention of the Legislature is that once a person is held to be an indigent person after holding necessary inquiry and recording a finding as contemplated by Order XXXHI, no further inquiry would be necessary in an appeal filed by him if he files an affidavit that he continued to be an indigent person from the date of the decree appealed from. But even in such cases, the Government Pleader or the respondent may dispute the truth of the statement made in the affidavit. The decision of the Madras High Court, therefore, cannot help the case of respondents. 25. But even in such cases, the Government Pleader or the respondent may dispute the truth of the statement made in the affidavit. The decision of the Madras High Court, therefore, cannot help the case of respondents. 25. In the case on hand, it is not even the case of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 that notice was issued to the petitioner or opportunity was afforded to him. Hence, the order cannot be held to be legal, valid and in accordance with law. Since the procedure, under rule 6 of Order XXXIII has not been followed, there is illegality and material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. If such order is allowed to stand, it would occasion failure of justice and would also cause prejudice to the petitioner, who had right of hearing before such order is made. It, therefore, deserves to be corrected in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court and the petition deserves to be allowed. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by the trial court on January 22, 2000, in Civil Misc. Application No. 3 of 1999 is quashed and set aside. The trial court will now issue notice to the Government Pleader and also to the defendant (petitioner herein) as required by Rule 6 of Order XXXIII and will pass an appropriate order. I may, however, state that I may not be understood to have expressed any opinion on merits of the matter or indigency of the applicants and as and when the matter will be placed for hearing before the court, it will be decided on its own merits, without being inhibited by the observations made hereinabove. 27. The petition is, accordingly, allowed. No costs. -