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Rajasthan High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 343 (RAJ)

Jaipur Vyapar Mahasangh v. State of Rajasthan

2000-03-11

R.R.YADAV

body2000
Honble YADAV, J.–The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners, for quashing the impugned order dated 23.11.92, Annexure-4 to the writ petition, passed by the Committee constituted under Section 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as ``the Act No. 38 of 1959), with a direction to decide the issue of encroachments and demolition, afresh. It is further prayed that the notification dated 17.7.54, be declared void and inoperative. Alternatively, it is prayed that this Court may issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which this Court may deem proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to protect the rights and interests of the petitioners. (2). The present writ petition is disposed of finally, at admission stage, without delineating the averments made in the writ petition on the basis of facts, which are not disputed before me. (3). Indisputably the Civil Writ Petition (1), was filed before this Court, by one Prakash Chand Shukla against the State of Rajasthan and others, in which petition, the petitioner No.2 was arrayed as respondent No.6, whereas, respondent No.5 was arrayed as respondent No.5, in the array of respondents, in representative capacity, in which, subject-matter of dispute involved in the present writ petition was issued directly and substantially involved. In abundant caution, in the aforesaid writ petition, the Court directed the Office of Registry, to get the public notice published in `Rajasthan Patrika about the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, inviting participation by general public, if so interested. A photostat copy of the judgment, rendered by the learned Single Judge, on 23.7.86, in the aforesaid writ petition, is filed by the petitioners, which is marked as Annexure-4/A to the writ petition. (4). It is borne out from the perusal of the aforesaid decision, Annexure-4/A to the writ petition, on which the petitioners are placing reliance in support of their claim that on 28.2.85, the following ad interim stay order was passed on the stay application, which is reproduced for ready-reference:- ``Heard learned counsel for the parties. None put appearance on behalf of the State. Mr. Tiwari Puts in appearance on behalf of the Municipal Council. It is obligatory duty of the Municipal Council to remove encroachments especially on the public thoroughfare. The Municipal Council is directed to remove the encroachments immediately in accordance with the provisions of law. (5). None put appearance on behalf of the State. Mr. Tiwari Puts in appearance on behalf of the Municipal Council. It is obligatory duty of the Municipal Council to remove encroachments especially on the public thoroughfare. The Municipal Council is directed to remove the encroachments immediately in accordance with the provisions of law. (5). A close scrutiny of the aforesaid judgment, Annexure-4/A reveals that since encroachments were not removed in pursuant to ad interim stay order dated 28.2.85, by the Municipal Council, the petitioner in the aforesaid writ petition moved an application for contempt, upon which, notice was issued. On the contempt application, the learned Single Judge, Honble Mr. Justice D.L. Mehta, the then Judge of this Court, passed the following order:- ``The controversy is in respect of the encroachments, if any, made on the thoroughfare it is the duty of the concerned authority to determine whether there is any encroachments or not. At the same time if there is an encroachments the encroachments should be removed and the order of the court should be complied with. The Court while passing an order has specifically mentioned in accordance with the provisions of law and that order is very specific if the Municipal Authority cannot determine whether there is encroachments or not. If the authorities are silent spectators and they are not fulfilling their duty the court is bound to issue mandamus and take necessary action in the matter. The court cannot shut its eyes where there is public interest litigation. (6). A perusal of the aforesaid judgment, Annexure-4/A, upon which the learned counsel for the petitioners is placing reliance, reveals that in three orders, passed by Honble D.L. Mehta, J., on 28.2.85, 9.10.1985 and 11.12.1985, the petitioner in that writ petition namely Prakash Chand Shukla (supra) had achieved what was his prayer in the said main writ petition. The order passed by Honble the then M.B. Sharma, J., on 11.4.1986 is also relevant in this regard. (7). In case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra), the Court had emphasized that statutory duties must be performed by the State and the Municipal Council, by following the rule of law in this regard. The order passed by Honble the then M.B. Sharma, J., on 11.4.1986 is also relevant in this regard. (7). In case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra), the Court had emphasized that statutory duties must be performed by the State and the Municipal Council, by following the rule of law in this regard. It is held in the aforesaid judgment, Annexure-4/A to the writ petition that it is a primary duty of the Municipal Council, to remove the encroachments under the statute and the Municipal Council was found performing its statutory duties by passing order under Section 203 of Act No. 38 of 1959, after affording opportunity of hearing by giving individual and public notices. It was further found that State Government is also taking sincere efforts to remove encroachments from disputed Verandahs constructed on Municipal land connecting the footpaths by issuing notification in exercise of its powers under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959 published in the Rajasthan Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 1.7.1986, constituting a Committee to decide revisions against the orders passed under Section 203 of the said Act. The aforesaid notification issued by State Government in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959 is reproduced hereinbelow:- ``In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act No. 38 of 1959), the State Govt. hereby authorises the following Committee as authority to call for the record under the provisions of the aforesaid section for the purpose of being satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed or purporting to have been passed regarding re-moval of encroachments of verandas in various markets of Jaipur, by or on behalf of Municipal Council, Jaipur, its Chairman, Vice Chairman, any member or officer and to pass final orders in this respect:- (1) Shri G.K. Bhanot (IAS Retired) -Chairman. (2) Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, LSG Department. -Member. (3) Law Secretary, Government of Rajasthan. -Member. The State Government further orders that no other authority except the above Committee shall pass orders under the said section regarding removal of encroachments of verandas in various markets of Jaipur and all cases pending in this respect with them shall be transferred to the above Committee for decision. By order of the Governor, Sd/-K.L. Pareek Dy. Secretary to the Govt. (8). By order of the Governor, Sd/-K.L. Pareek Dy. Secretary to the Govt. (8). It is borne out from the perusal of the order passed in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra) that the learned Single Judge was satisfied that the State Government by issuing notification in exercise of its power under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, is performing its statutory duty to remove the encroachments over the public land and the Municipal Council is also taking sincere efforts in this direction. The learned Single Judge expressed his view that after constitution of Committee, under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, by the State Government, which is a quasi-judicial Tribunal, the revisions relating to encroachments of verandahs connecting footpaths constructed on Municipal land which are meant for use of public at large are to be decided by the said Committee, against the orders passed under Section 203 of the aforesaid Act. The learned Single Judge, in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra), declined to issue mandamus after recording a finding to the effect that since against the orders, passed under Section 203 of Act No. 38 of 1959, directing removal of encroachments over the verandahs, connecting footpaths, revisions are made maintainable before a Committee constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, so, he did not think it proper to dictate to the said quasi-judicial Committee, in what manner, it had to decide the dispute relating to encroachments. It was so held by the learned Single Judge, as according to him, the Committee, constituted under the aforesaid Section by State Government, was found to be a quasi-judicial Tribunal of a judicial character. (9). Indisputably, after hearing the aggrieved persons, who had filed revisions against the orders passed under Section 203 of Act No. 38 of 1959 before the aforesaid Committee constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, had decided all the revisions by a composite order dated 23.11.1992, Annexure-4 to the writ petition, holding encroachments over the verandahs, connecting footpaths constructed over the Municipal land meant for use of public at large to be illegal by the Traders who alleged themselves to be members of petitioners union. (10). (10). I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri P.S. Asopa on the preliminary objections raised by Shri S.M. Mehta, the learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of respondent No.1; Shri N.K. Joshi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2; and Shri Shyam Arya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3, Shri N.K. Joshi and Shri Shyam Arya, appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, have adopted the preliminary objections raised by the learned Advocate General, to the maintainability of the present writ petition. (11). The learned Advocate General while raising preliminary objections to the maintainability of the instant writ petition submitted that by filing the present petition on 10.3.2000, the petitioners question the legality and validity of the composite revisional order passed on 23.11.1992 by the Committee, constituted under Section 300 of Act, No. 38 of 1959, after inordinate delay of more than 7 years whereas notification dated 17.7.1954 is questioned after about 46 years. (12). It is further submitted by him that there is no explanation, whatsoever, in the writ petition, which prevented the petitioners to file the present writ petition within a reasonable time, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. It is next contended by him that whenever and wherever public interest is pitted against individual interest, it is public interest, which is to be preferred by courts of law. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision rendered by Supreme Court, in case of Olga Tellis and others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others (2). Lastly, it is submitted by him that no prerogative writ can be issued prohibiting the respondents from removing of encroachments from the verandahs constructed on the Municipal land connecting the footpaths meant for use of public at large, in execution of the orders passed under Section 203 and revisional orders dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Committee constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959. (13). The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Shri P.S. Asopa, was called upon to reply to the aforesaid preliminary objections, raised by the learned Advocate General, to the maintainability of the present writ petition. (13). The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Shri P.S. Asopa, was called upon to reply to the aforesaid preliminary objections, raised by the learned Advocate General, to the maintainability of the present writ petition. In reply, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners placed reliance on the decision, rendered by the learned Single Judge, in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra) and he also placed reliance on the decision, rendered by Supreme Court, in case of Olga Tellis (supra). It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that indisputably, petitioner No.2 and respondent No.5 were impleaded as respondents Nos. 6 and 5 respectively, in representative capacity in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra). The learned Single Judge, in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra), directed the Committee, to decide the revisions, after giving opportunity of hearing to petitioner No. 2 and respondent No.5, but the Committee, constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, in breach of the directions given by the learned Single Judge, in the aforesaid case, proceeded to decide the revision, without giving opportunity of hearing to them. Since the revision petitions had been decided by the Statutory Committee, constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner No.2 and respondent No.5, who were impleaded as parties in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra), therefore, the revisional order dated 23.11.92, Annexure-4 to the writ petition, is per se illegal and without jurisdiction. According to Shri P.S. Asopa, in such a situation, where there is violation of principles of natural justice, denying opportunity of hearing to petitioner No.2 and respondent No.5, in such cases, writ petition cannot be thrown and dismissed on ground of laches. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri P.S. Asopa that violation of principles of natural justice itself is sufficient to set aside the revisional order dated 23.11.92, Annexure-4 to the writ petition. As regards quashing of the notification dated 17.7.54, it is submitted with feeble voice that it is to be quashed, as it is void ab initio. As regards other two preliminary objections raised to the maintainability of the instant petition, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Asopa that law relating to removal of encroachments must be fair, just and reasonal. As regards other two preliminary objections raised to the maintainability of the instant petition, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Asopa that law relating to removal of encroachments must be fair, just and reasonal. According to him unreasonableness vitiates law and procedure alike. In support of his aforesaid argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on paragraphs 39 and 40 of the decision rendered by Supreme Court in case of Olga Tellis (supra). (14). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, raised at the Bar. In my considered opinion, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds discussed hereinbelow. (15). Indisputably, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition, for quashing of the notification dated 17.7.54 and the revisional order dated 23.11.92, passed by the Committee, constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, by issuing a prerogative writ of certiorari, without explaining the inordinate delay of about 46 years and more than seven years respectively. There is no whisper as to why the petitioners did not file the present writ petition, for quashing the notification dated 17.7.54 and the revisional order dated 23.11.92, within a reasonable time. It is true that there is no limitation prescribed for issuing a prerogative writ of certiorari yet it is to be filed within reasonable time. As discussed hereinabove, I do not find even a whisper, explaining the inordinate delay in the averments made in the body of present writ petition. If the limitation is computed from the date of revisional order, i.e. 23.11.92, then, the present writ petition is presented after more than seven years, whereas, the present writ petition has been presented against the notification dated 17.7.54, approximately after about 46 years. (16). Indisputably, some of the traders who are alleged to be members of the petitioners union had submitted to the orders passed under Section 203 of Act No. 38 of 1959 and they did not prefer revisions before the quasi-judicial committee constituted under Section 300 of the said Act by State Government published in Rajasthan Gazette (Extraordinary) on 1.7.1986, against orders of removal of encroachments passed against them, under Section 203 of the said Act. Some of them aggrieved against the orders of removal of encroachments passed against them, under section 203 of the said Act, filed revisions which were decided by the said committee on 23.11.1992, after giving opportunity of hearing to them and also after giving public notices to all, in this regard. Thus, the orders of removal of encroachments passed under Section 203 of Act No. 38 of 1959 and composite revisional order, passed by Committee constituted under Section 300 of the said Act on 23.11.1992 had attained finality long back. Now it is too late to challenge the same without explaining the inordinate delay. In my considered opinion, filing of the present writ petition by the petitioners union before this court is a desperate attempt to put the cart before the horse when statutory authorities empowered under the statute to remove encroachments gathered strong will-power to execute orders passed long back for removal of encroachments from the verandahs constructed over the Municipal lands connected with footpaths meant for use of public at large. As regards the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, to the effect that in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra), decided by the learned Single Judge, petitioner No.2 and respondent No.5 were ordered to be given an opportunity of hearing, is not borne out from the aforesaid decision. The learned counsel for the petitioners fails to demonstrate, in which paragraph of the aforesaid judgments, the learned Single Judge directed the Committee, constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, to give opportunity of hearing, to petitioner No. 2 and respondent No.5. A careful scrutiny of the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge, in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra) goes a long way to show that the Committee was directed to give opportunity of hearing, only to Prakash Chand Shukla petitioner, and not to petitioner No.2 and respondent No.5, and the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, explaining the delay only on the aforesaid ground, is based on non-existent ground. I am satisfied that the petitioners are guilty of laches in approaching to this Court, for issue of a writ of certiorari, after such a long interval, without explaining the delay. I am satisfied that the petitioners are guilty of laches in approaching to this Court, for issue of a writ of certiorari, after such a long interval, without explaining the delay. The first preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General succeeds and it is held that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on ground on laches, without further caremony. (17). Coming to the next preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General, to the effect that whenever and wherever public interest is pitted against individual interest, it is public interest which is to be preferred by courts of law. The aforesaid preliminary objection raised by learned Advocate General is fortified from the decision rendered by Apex Court in case of Olga Tellis (supra), which reads thus:- ``In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter. No one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose without the requisite authorisation and, therefore, it is erroneous to contend that the pavement dewellers have the right to encroach upon pavements by constructing dwellings thereon. Public streets, of which pavements form a part, are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and, even the pedestrians have but the limited right of using pavements for the purpose of passing and repassing. So long as a person does not transgress the limited purpose for which pavements are made, his use thereof is legitimate and lawful. Public streets, of which pavements form a part, are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and, even the pedestrians have but the limited right of using pavements for the purpose of passing and repassing. So long as a person does not transgress the limited purpose for which pavements are made, his use thereof is legitimate and lawful. But, if a person puts any public property to a use for which it is not intended and is not authorised so to use it, he becomes a trespasser. (18). As regards last preliminary objection raised by learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 to the effect that no prerogative writ can be issued to prohibit respondents Nos. 1 to 4, to execute the orders of removal of encroachments passed under Section 203 and 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, it is held that there is substance in the aforesaid arguments of the learned Advocate General. (19). In my humble opinion, equitable prerogative writ of certiorari can be invoked with clean hands to prevent injustice and to advance justice between man and man, between citizen and citizen, between citizen and State, and between citizen and instrumentalities of State which fall within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution or vice-versa to inculcate amongst them the supremacy of rule of law in a democratic country like ours. To my mind, equitable prerogative writ of certiorari cannot be invoked to advance grammar of anarchy putting social order at ransom at the behest of those who have no regard for public morality and have no respect for rule of law. Here in the present case, the traders who are claiming themselves to be members of petitioners union have no legitimate right to commit trespass over the verandahs constructed on Municipal land connecting footpaths meant for use of public at large leading to traffic hazards. (20). On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, I decline to issue an equitable, discretionary, prerogative writ of certiorari, making the notification dated 17.7.54 and the revisional order dated 23.11.92, passed by the Committee, constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, to perpetuate the illegal encroachments made by the traders who are claiming themselves to be members of the petitioners union over the verandahs constructed on Municipal land connecting footpaths, which are meant for public use at large. I decline to issue a writ of certiorari permitting public property to be used for a purpose, for which it is not intended. The petitioners have not approached to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with clean hands. The petitioners, who are seeking justice before this Court, must be prepared to do justice to others and learn to respect public morality and also learn to edify supremacy of rule of law, upon which our democratic polity is founded. (21). As regards the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, based on the decision, rendered by Supreme Court, in case of Olga Tellis (supra), in reply to aforesaid preliminary objection is concerned, it relates to vires of an enactment which is not challenged in the present petition. Suffice it to say that paragraphs 39 and 40, upon which the learned counsel for the petitioners, has placed reliance, relate to vires of Act of Bombay Municipal Corporation. The proposition, propounded by their Lordships in the aforesaid paragraphs, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, in as much as in the present petition vires of Act No. 38 of 1959 are not challenged before me. No foundation is laid in the present petition that procedure prescribed for removal of encroachments under Section 203 or under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959 are unfair, unjust and unreasonable. The learned counsel for petitioners candidly conceded before me that petitioners are not challenging the vires of Section 203 and Section 300 of the said Act, prescribing proceedings for removal of encroachments made on the verandahs constructed on Municipal land connecting the footpaths meant for use of public at large. As a matter of fact, the proposition of law propounded by their Lordships, in paragraph 43 of the aforesaid decision, is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances, of the present case, and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable. (22). The second limb of the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, before me, is that the traders, who have made encroachments over the Verandahs constructed on Municipal land connecting the footpaths meant for use of the public at large have been given only two days time to remove their encroachments, is unreasonable, unjust and unfair. (22). The second limb of the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, before me, is that the traders, who have made encroachments over the Verandahs constructed on Municipal land connecting the footpaths meant for use of the public at large have been given only two days time to remove their encroachments, is unreasonable, unjust and unfair. A pointed question was asked to the learned counsel for the petitioners, under which section of Act No. 38 of 1959, the respondents No. 1 to 4 are required to give notice at the stage of execution to the trespassers who continue to maintain encroachments upon the public land even after the order of removal of encroachments passed under Section 203 of the said Act which are affirmed in revision by a Committee of quasi judicial character constituted under Section 300 of Act of 1959. The learned counsel for the petitioners fails to demonstrate any section in Act No. 38 of 1959 which requires giving of notice to the trespassers found guilty of encroachments over the footpaths, meant for pedestrians ensuring its use for their daily affairs with reasonable measure of traffic safety and security under Section 203 and under Section 300 of the said Act by a quasi judicial Tribunal, in exercise of its revisional powers. Admittedly, the petitioners have not challenged the vires of giving notice to them under any section of Act No. 38 of 1959 at the stage of execution by respondents No.1 to 4. (23). I am of the view that if the petitioners have not challenged vires of any section of Act No. 38 of 1959 laying foundation in their writ petition to the effect that two days time given by respondents to them in the said section, is unjust, unreasonable and unfair, then, in the garb of equity or in the garb of interpretation of principle of natural justice, this Court cannot afford to legislate and prescribe a particular period of notice to be given to the trespassers of footpaths at the stage of execution by respondents to circumvent the orders of removal of encroachments, passed under Section 203 of Act No. 38 of 1959 and affirmed by a quasi-judicial Tribunal constituted under Section 300 of the said Act in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Legislation in garb of interpretation by Courts of law is an anathema to our constitutional philosophy, which is impermissible. Legislation in garb of interpretation by Courts of law is an anathema to our constitutional philosophy, which is impermissible. In the present case, orders of removal of encroachments under Section 203 of the said Act, was passed against the members of petitioners union long back and these orders were affirmed by a quasi-judicial Tribunal on 23.11.1992. The aforesaid orders attained finality, therefore, at the stage of execution, it is too late to submit that the trespassers over footpaths were not given reasonal notice to remove the encroachments themselves. In my considered opinion, if notice to the trespassers, who commit trespass over public land at the time of execution is interpreted on the principle of natural justice, as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner, then, such interpretation will partake the shape of unnatural justice in the facts and circumstances of the present case hoodwinking the legitimate right of use of footpaths by pedestrians in various markets of Jaipur city, in their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security to traffic hazard. (24). As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the instant petition is dismissed in limine and I decline to issue an equitable, discretionary, extraordinary, prerogative writ of certiorari, making the notification dated 17.7.54 and the revisional order dated 23.11.92 passed by the Committee, constituted under Section 300 of Act No. 38 of 1959, to be inoperative and ineffective, to perpetuate illegal encroachments made by the members of petitioners union. (25). After dismissal of the writ petition in open Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri P.S. Asopa, made an oral prayer, to grant leave to the petitioners, to file a special appeal under the Rules of this Court. No question of general importance is involved, prohibiting respondents Nos. 1 to 4, to execute the orders passed by the statutory authorities, relating to removal of encroachments over the verandahs, constructed on Municipal land connecting footpaths which are meant for public use causing traffic hazards, which stems from the various orders passed by the learned Judges of this Court, sitting singly, from time to time, in the writ petition, filed by Prakash Chand Shukla (supra). The oral prayer of Shri Asopa, for grant of leave to the petitioners, to file special appeal under the Rules of this Court, is hereby rejected. (26). The oral prayer of Shri Asopa, for grant of leave to the petitioners, to file special appeal under the Rules of this Court, is hereby rejected. (26). Before parting with the order, I would like to observe that it is stated at Bar that in pursuant to the decision, rendered in case of Prakash Chand Shukla (supra), a civil suit has been filed by the petitioners union, in civil court, objecting to removal of encroachments of lkdhalias. It is made clear that removal of encroachments over the Ikdhalias, will depend upon the result of the civil suit. The statutory authorities, respondents No.1 to 4 are hereby directed to verify the aforesaid fact and if it is found to be true then, they are hereby restrained from removing encroachments from lkdhalias by adopting coercive methods till the final decision of civil suit.