JUDGMENT Fakhruddin, J. and N.G. Karambelkar, J. 1. Nagar Panchayat, Jaura (District Morena) through its President and the Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Jaura, have preferred this appeal against an order dated November 3, 1997 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 2009/1996. 2. The respondents filed Writ Petition No. 2009 of 1996 alleging that they have been working for the last more than six years as daily wages employees on muster roll in Nagar Panchayat, Jaura, and they had continuously worked for more than 240 days in each year; yet by resolution dated September 30, 1996 (Annexure P/1) their services were terminated from October 1, 1996 and their names were struck off from muster roll from that date. Interim writ was prayed and by an interim order dated November 4, 1996 passed in the writ petition it was ordered that the petitioners' engagement on muster roll shall not be discontinued until further orders. The appellants opposed prayer and filed return inter alia contending that the writ petitioners were not appointed according to rules and regulations on any clear vacant posts. It was contended that no work was available for them from October 1, 1996. It was also contended that according to the policy decision/ instructions issued by the State Government, the Nagar Panchayat passed a resolution on September 30, 1996 that the services of those daily wages employees who were engaged on muster roll shall stand terminated from October 1, 1996 but pursuant to the writ Court's interim order dated November 4, 1996 the petitioners were allowed to continue. The writ Court allowed the writ petition and the petitioners were held entitled to reinstatement. As regards back wages, the writ Court observed that the question as to whether the petitioners were gainfully employed or not could not be gone into in writ proceedings and directed that the appellants shall decide at their own level as to whether the petitioners were entitled to any back wages or not. Against this the present appeal has been filed. 3. Shri M.C. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that the respondents were not appointed as per rules and regulations governing appointment to the Municipal Council, and they were also not appointed against any clear vacant posts. Against this the present appeal has been filed. 3. Shri M.C. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that the respondents were not appointed as per rules and regulations governing appointment to the Municipal Council, and they were also not appointed against any clear vacant posts. Jt is contended that the appointments of the respondents were not made under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968 where-under regularisation can be made when there is a clear vacancy, and as there were no clear vacancies the respondents could not have been regularised; yet the writ Court while considering similar cases relying on the earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court in Mukhtyar Singh v. Food Corporation of India and Ors., 1994-II-LLJ-488 (MP-DB), Mahesh Bhargava v. State of M. P. and Ors., 1994-I-LLJ-1113 (MP-DB) and Yogendra Kumar Parashar v. Municipal Council, Morena and Anr., 1998-II-LLJ-103 (MP-DB) disposed them of, namely, W.P. No. 1358/1997, Ashok Kewat v. State of M.P. and Ors., W.P. No. 1267/1997, Mukesh K. Gupta v. Shivpuri Development Authority and Ors., W.P. No. 1269/1997, Hart Om Sharma v. State of M.P. and Ors., W.P. No. 1270/1997, Jitendra Kumar Trivedi v. State of M.P. and Ors., W.P. No. 1292/1997, Kailash Shivhare v. State of M.P, and Ors., W.P. No. 1359/1997, Ramesh Kewat v. State of M.P. and Ors., W.P. No. 1360/1997, Harisingh Dangi v. State of M.P. and Ors., W.P. No. 1364/1997, Prakash Dravid v. State of M.P. and Ors., and 1424/1997. Mewaram Karare v. State of M.P. and Ors., decided on November 28, 1997 and W.P. No. 1476/1997 and W.P. No. 1620/1997, decided on November 10, 1997, with the following directions that: "In view of the above, the respondent-employers are directed to pass a speaking order which should indicate the period for which the petitioners have worked. If they had worked for more than 240 days, then they be afforded the benefits of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. If no vacancy is available then the petitioners would not be entitled to reinstatement" whereas the writ petition filed by the present respondents was allowed. 4. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in another bunch of cases, namely, W,P.Nos. If no vacancy is available then the petitioners would not be entitled to reinstatement" whereas the writ petition filed by the present respondents was allowed. 4. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in another bunch of cases, namely, W,P.Nos. 1477/1997, 1478/ 1997, 1744/1997, 1827/1997, 1828/1997 and MCC No. 579/1997, the writ Court passed an order to the same effect, as one of the reasons for passing such an order was that the Court should not unnecessarily burden itself with litigation which can be resolved by the Municipal Council or the State Authorities at its own level. Counsel also submitted that a Full Bench of this Court in case of Supdt. Engineer PWD and Anr. v. Dev Prakash Shrivas and Ors., 1999-II-LLJ-663 (MP-FB) has taken the view that for claiming regularisation and equal pay for equal work, existence of permanent vacancy is a must. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants also submitted that a similar view has been taken by this Court in L.P.A. Nos. 12/1998 Prakash v. State of M.P. and Ors., 19/1998 Harisingh Dangi v. State of M.P. and Ors., 49/1998 Jitendra v. State of M.P. and Ors. and 95/1998 Mukesh Kumar Gupta v. Shivpuri Development Authority and Ors. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the judgment on the ground that the writ Court relied on the Division Bench decisions of this Court in case of Mukhtyar Singh v. Food Corporation of India and Ors., Mahesh Bhargava v. State of M.P. and Ors. and Yogendra Kumar Parashar v. Municipal Council, Morena and Anr. (supra), and rightly allowed the writ petition. 7. In Supdt. Engineer, PWD and Anr. v. Dev Prakash Shrivas and Ors. and Yogendra Kumar Parashar v. Municipal Council, Morena and Anr. (supra), and rightly allowed the writ petition. 7. In Supdt. Engineer, PWD and Anr. v. Dev Prakash Shrivas and Ors. (supra) attention of the Full Bench which was dealing with a question of law on a reference made whether the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 will be applicable to the services which are governed by the Rules mentioned in Section 2(2) of the said Act and also to those employees where Recruitment Rules have been framed, was also drawn to the Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Vandana Singh v. Steel Authority of India, 1993 JLJ 55 where the questions were with regard to Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India and Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963 and where there was a difference of opinion between the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench; one of the members was of the view that the incumbent was entitled for regularisation and equal pay for equal work. The difference was on the point whether the incumbent is entitled for equal pay for equal work and regularisation when there was no permanent vacancy available. Another member of the Division Bench held that in absence of permanent vacancy, no relief with regard to equal pay for equal work could be given. The Full Bench after consideration of the aforesaid two views upheld the view expressed by another member of the Divisiqn Bench that in absence of permanent vacancy no relief for regularisation and equal pay for equal work could be granted, as this view was in accordance with Clause 2 of Standard Standing Order which provides, among other things, that there should exist a clear vacancy for regularisation. 8. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, in our opinion, the questions raised are disputed questions of fact. We have noted that the writ Court while considering the writ petitions mentioned in paras 3 and 4 above, decided on November 10, 1997 and November 28, 1997, declined to grant the relief to the petitioners therein and, instead, directed the respondent-employers to pass a speaking order which should indicate the period for which the petitioners had worked. We have noted that the writ Court while considering the writ petitions mentioned in paras 3 and 4 above, decided on November 10, 1997 and November 28, 1997, declined to grant the relief to the petitioners therein and, instead, directed the respondent-employers to pass a speaking order which should indicate the period for which the petitioners had worked. If they had worked for more than 240 days in a year, then they be afforded the benefits of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and if no vacancy was available then the petitioners would not be entitled to reinstatement. The grievance of the learned counsel for the appellant-Nagar Panchayat has a substance. Similarly situated persons have to be dealt alike as they are entitled for similar relief. The direction of the writ Court in the impugned order allowing the writ petition without considering the relevant questions, especially, the question whether the respondents could claim regularisation in absence of existence of any vacant post, is not justified. In Supdt. Engineer, PWD and Anr. v. Dev Prakash Shrivas and Ors. (supra), it has been held that for claiming regularisation and equal pay for equal work there should exist permanent vacancy. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants also drew our attention to the decision taken in similar writ petitions by the writ Court, namely, W.P. Nos. 1364/1996, 1360/1996, 1270/1996 and 1267/1996, against which L.P.As. Nos. 12/1998, 19/1998, 49/1998 and 95/1998 were respectively filed by the employees, and this Court took a similar view that in absence of clear permanent vacancy the employees would not be entitled to claim regularisation. 10. Since the respondents have raised disputed questions of fact regarding their appointment, the period for which they had worked, the alleged violation of the Rules for discontinuing their services it cannot be decided in this appeal. We have clearly asked the learned counsel for the respondents that for deciding the disputed questions regarding the appointment on clear vacant post, working for more than 240 days in a year so as to entitle them to the benefits of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the alleged violation of the Rules for discontinuing their services, whether they want to raise the dispute before the appellant Nagar Panchayat or before the Labour Court. Learned Counsel stated that it would be just and proper that the appellant-Nagar Panchayat itself should decide the matter in dispute. It was however submitted that since the respondents are continuing in service pursuant to the writ Court's order dated November 4, 1996 they should be allowed to continue till their representations are decided by the Nagar Panchayat. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellants does not oppose this submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondents. 12. Accordingly, the order passed by the writ Court dated November 3, 1997 is set aside. Instead, it is directed that the respondents-employees shall make a representation along with all documents on which they want to rely, to the appellant-Nagar Panchayat, who shall consider and decide the representation and pass a speaking order strictly in accordance with law, which should indicate the period for which the respondents had worked. If they had worked for more than 240 days in a year, then they be afforded the benefits of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. If no vacancy is available then the respondents would not be entitled to reinstatement. Till the order is passed by the appellant-Nagar Panchayat the respondents shall be allowed to continue. It is made clear that if any adverse order is passed against the respondents by the Nagar Panchayat, Jaura on their representation, the respondents shall be free to challenge the same before the appropriate forum in accordance with law. 13. Subject to the directions and observations made above, this Letters Patent Appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs.