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2000 DIGILAW 347 (AP)

Pennar Delta Ayacutdars Association v. Government Of A. P.

2000-05-12

M.S.LIBERHAN, V.V.S.RAO

body2000
V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) AS a prologue to this judgment, we may say that notwithstanding the doctrine of judicial Restraint and considerations of justiciability of the issues involved in this case, as a Constitutional court, entrusted with the solemn duty to prevent infringement of fundamental rights and human rights, we have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants for a considerable length of time. The reason is that, judicial activism propels us into the arena of prohibited area, though realszation is subliminal in judicial mind that our greatest weakness is our unbounded strength gushing out from Article 226 of the constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE unsuccessful petitioners in the writ petition are the appellants before us. The writ petition filed by them pro bono publico met the waterloo at the threshold. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition (reported in 2000 (3) ALD 182 ) taking a view that the situation on hand is not a judicially manageable one, and that the Court is not properly equipped to adjudicate the lis concerning the release of water from an irrigation project for the second Rabi crop mainly in Nellore District. Facts are not in dispute; but perceptions are. Hence, let us notice the facts to the extent necessary. ( 3 ) THE parties herein are referred to as per their status in the writ petition. The petitioners approached this Court praying for a declaration that the action of the respondents-Government of A. P. , District collector-cum-Chairman, Irrigation development Board, Nellore, Superintending engineer, Irrigation Circle, Nellore, superintending Engineer, Somasila Project, nellore, and Chief Engineer, Telugu Ganga project, Srikalahasthi, in deciding not to release water from Somasila Project for the second crop for the Pennar Delta Ayacutdars, as illegal, arbitrary, unjust apart from being violative of constitutional guarantees adumbrated in Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and for consequential directions, to forthwith release water for the second Rabi crop in Pennar Delta. ( 4 ) AS disclosed in the affidavit, accompanying the writ petition, it is the case of the petitioners that for stabilising the ayacut of Pennar Delta, comprising Nellore and Sangam ayacuts, the Somasila Project was conceived and completed in 1972. The project is designed for supplying irrigation water to 1,75,000 acres in Pennar Delta for first crop (Khariff), and 19,000 acres for second crop (Rabi ). The project is designed for supplying irrigation water to 1,75,000 acres in Pennar Delta for first crop (Khariff), and 19,000 acres for second crop (Rabi ). North Feeder Channel, kavali Canal, South Feeder Channel and kanpur Canal form part of the irrigation system under the Somasila Project, which is designed to have a storage capacity of 78 tmc (Trillion Cubic Meters ). As per the project report, the ayacutdars of Pennar delta are entitled for supply of water from august. However, water for Khariff season during 1999-2000 for the ayacutdars of pennar Delta was released only for 1,14,000 acres instead of 1,75,0000 acres on the ground that there is insufficient of water, that too from October, 1999. Due to unseasonal rain and flash floods during february, 2000, the farmers, who raised khariff crops suffered huge cumulative losses to the extent of Rs. 150-00 crores. The inaction on the part of the respondents in not releasing the water for Khariff crop as per schedule in August, 1999, contributed this. If water had been released in time, the crop would have been harvested by january, 2000, thereby avoiding the wrath of the nature. The State Government ought to have taken corrective steps having regard to the loss of Khariff crop, but the second respondent-Irrigation Development board took a decision as published in the newspaper the Hindu on 30-3-2000 that no second crop would be permitted under pennar Delta this year . This is contrary to the determined and established rights as the ayacutdars of the Pennar Delta are entitled to 3. 702 TMC of water for the second crop as a matter of right. Therefore, they filed the writ petition. ( 5 ) IT is the case of the petitioners, that the ayacutdars have a right to water for the second crop as per the project report and that though there is 17. 00 TMC of water, they are not releasing the water with an intention to supply drinking water to chennai, and that in the past, even when the storage in the reservoir was about 12. 00 or 8. 00 TMC of water, they are not releasing the water with an intention to supply drinking water to chennai, and that in the past, even when the storage in the reservoir was about 12. 00 or 8. 00 TMC, water was released for the second crop, and that when the Khariff crop failed due to untimely rains and when water is available in the reservoir as well as other irrigation canal systems, it is arbitrary and unreasonable on the part of the respondents not to release water for rabi crop. ( 6 ) THE fourth respondent filed a counter affidavit on behalf of respondents 2, 3 and 5 as follows: The first respondent issued orders in G. O. Ms. No. 90 Irrigation and CAD (Projects Wing TGP. I) Department dated 8-2-1990 constituting a committee to monitor release from Somasila Reservoir (hereinafter referred to as the Somasila irrigation Committee) to maximise the benefits under the reservoir. The said committee consists of Engineer-in-Chief and seven other members from Irrigation department from all regions. The committee makes recommendations every year for the release of water for second crop taking into consideration the availability of water during the season and crop requirement. The recommendations made by the District irrigation Advisory Board are also considered by the Government before issuing specific orders each year notifying the extent of irritable land and quantity of water to be released for the second crop. As there was adequate water in Somasila Reservoir during 1999, the Government issued G. O. Ms. No. 59 dated 17-4-1999 to release water to an extent of 15. 34 TMC for irrigating an extent of 1,23,505 acres. However, due to failure of southwest and northeast monsoons the inflows into the reservoir have been inadequate necessitating restricting water supply even for Khariff season of the year 1999-2000. Therefore, the District irrigation Advisory Board in its meeting on 28-11-1999 proposed Khariff ayacut as 1,35,457 acres only as against the developed ayacut of 3,04,100 acres. However, taking advantage of rains during the last week of November, 1999, additional extent of land was brought under cultivation transplanting in an extent of 2,04,706 acres. From 6-10-1999 to 12-3-2000, 25. 009 TMC of water was released for Khariff ayacut though the inflows received into the reservoir during the same period was 22. 149 TMC including 12. However, taking advantage of rains during the last week of November, 1999, additional extent of land was brought under cultivation transplanting in an extent of 2,04,706 acres. From 6-10-1999 to 12-3-2000, 25. 009 TMC of water was released for Khariff ayacut though the inflows received into the reservoir during the same period was 22. 149 TMC including 12. 42 TMC of Krishna water released from Srisailam Reservoir and let into Somasila reservoir from 6-10-1999 to save the crops under Somasila project. After releasing the water for Khariff ayacut, due to meagre inflows the available storage of water is 12. 640 TMC as on 12-3-2000. In view of this, the 3rd respondent convened a meeting of the District Irrigation Advisory board. The said body took into consideration the available storage, the balance demands to be met from the Somasila reservoir and determined that 10. 50 TMC of water is required to meet the compelling demands for Khariff crop under canal system under direct ayacut in Pennar Delta for seedbeds for Khariff 2000-2001, for drinking water for Nellore and Kavali towns and provision for evaporation losses. After determining the water required to meet these demands, the District Advisory Board in its meeting held on 12-3-2000 resolved not to permit second crop in Pennar Delta for the year 1999-2000 (Fasli 1409 ). The resolution was duly sent to the Government for consideration. ( 7 ) THE Committee constituted as per g. O. Ms. No. 99 dated 8-2-1990, after examining various aspects had recommended in 1996 that the minimum storage of 7. 5 tmc has to be maintained at Minimum drawn Down Level (MDDL) and, therefore, since 1996 the MDDL at 7. 5 TMC is being maintained in Somasila reservoir. The district Irrigation Advisory Board while passing the resolution on 12-3-2000 also took this into consideration. Therefore, there is no water available in Somasila reservoir for supply to Pennar Delta for Rabi Crop 1999-2000. The petitioners cannot claim release of water for second Rabi crop as equitable distribution of available water is a policy matter required to be decided by the Government. The respondents stoutly denied the allegations made by the petitioners that there is sufficient and adequate water available in Somasila reservoir for release for second crop in pennar Delta. ( 8 ) THE first respondent filed a separate counter-affidavit. The respondents stoutly denied the allegations made by the petitioners that there is sufficient and adequate water available in Somasila reservoir for release for second crop in pennar Delta. ( 8 ) THE first respondent filed a separate counter-affidavit. It is contended that no statutory rule or provision having statutory force has been violated and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The resolution-dated 12-3-2000 passed by the district Irrigation Advisory Board was placed before the Somasila Irrigation Committee. The Committee in its meeting held on 30-3-2000 examined the extent of water available as on 29-3-2000 and recommended that no area shall be permitted under Pennar delta for Rabi second crop, that 1. 5 TMC of water be released for Rabi Irrigation Dry crop (Rabi ID crop) under Somasila project canals from 1-4-2000 to 30-6-2000 as Rabi id crop is in uplands and unlike the Pennar delta it has only one crop, that water be released to seedbeds for ensuing Khariff crop only after the reservoir starts receiving appreciable inflows, so that water in the reservoir is not depleted much below the mddl and release water for drinking water supply to Nellore and Kavali towns and villages under Command Area of Somasila project. ( 9 ) THE Government considered the recommendations of the Somasila Irrigation committee. In view of the fact that there is acute shortage of water in Somasila reservoir on account of reduced inflows, the government decided to close the irrigation 2000 (3) FR-F-46 canals in Pennar Delta by 31-3-2000 and not to permit any area under Pennar Delta for Rabi second crop, to release 1. 5 TMC of water for Rabi ID crop under Somasila project canals and to make necessary arrangements for adequate drinking water supply for Nellore and Kavli towns and villages by releasing adequate water from somasila reservoir. The Government also decided not to release water in Survepally reservoir/tanks with a view to ensure completion of drainage works by 30-6-2000. Therefore, the first respondent prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. The Government also decided not to release water in Survepally reservoir/tanks with a view to ensure completion of drainage works by 30-6-2000. Therefore, the first respondent prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. ( 10 ) THE main contention of Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners before the learned single Judge was that the decision of the respondents in refusing to supply water is arbitrary and that non-supply would infringe the statutory rules as well as fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate general who appeared for the respondents contended that the decision taken by the respondents is, in fact in the interests of the farming community, that the decision making process is not vitiated by any error and that the decision is a collective decision taken by the technical experts having regard to various factors and ground realities obtaining at the project. ( 11 ) THE learned single Judge considered the fact that the committee of technical experts constituted as per G. O. Ms. No. 99 took a decision having regard to the total demands, the MDDL required and arrived at a conclusion that there will be no water available for second crop under Pennar delta and observed that the conclusion reached is a reasonable conclusion. The learned single Judge observed that unlimited quantity of water is not available in the reservoir and, therefore, it is for the State to decide as to how the existing available water may have to be utilised and managed. The Court of judicial review cannot interfere with such a policy decision taken by the state Government having regard to the various policy options, especially when such a policy decision is taken after careful scrutiny and examination of various factors. The learned single Judge relied on the dicta of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Vijayabahadur Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1234 , in support of the conclusion. The learned single Judge also held that when the situation on hand is not judicially manageable, the court cannot indulge in an act of nice balancing. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. The learned single Judge also held that when the situation on hand is not judicially manageable, the court cannot indulge in an act of nice balancing. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. ( 12 ) WHEN the matter came up for preliminary hearing as to the admission of this appeal under the Letters Patient, we heard the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Additional advocate-General for some time. At the request of the learned Additional Advocate general, the matter was adjourned to enable him to file a report of the Irrigation Engineers of Somasila Project depicting the latest position as to the water levels in the main reservoir as well as in the irrigation tanks, which are fed by the reservoir. The learned additional Advocate-General filed an affidavit of respondent No. 5 accompanied by the Report dated 24-4-2000 of the committee of Engineers. ( 13 ) BEFORE we formulate the points that arise for consideration, it is appropriate to notice the admitted as well as disputed factual matrix as culled out from pleadings, and various documents placed by the petitioners and respondents in evidence of the averments. ( 14 ) THE Somasila Project was conceived about three decades ago. The planning Commission approved the Project (Stage-I) in 1973 at an estimated cost of rs. 17. 20 crores, which now due to cost escalation stands at Rs. 415. 00 crores. The project envisaged the construction of a composite dam across the river Pennar near somasila village of Nellore District in andhra Pradesh, and building its canal system consisting of North Feeder Channel, south Feeder Channel and Kavali Canal. The avowed object was to stabilise the ayacut of 1,04,490 hectares under the existing delta and tanks system as well as to provide irrigation to 38,475 hectares of new area in nellore District. The Status Report for 1995, prepared by the Central Water Commission, government of India, (filed by the petitioners) gives the details of the ayacut under the project. The same is as under: ( 15 ) THE Status Report also mentions that Somasila reservoir will receive 15 TMC of Krishna water and divert it to Kandaleru reservoir for drinking water supply to chennai city as part of Telugu Ganga project a joint project of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu governments. The same is as under: ( 15 ) THE Status Report also mentions that Somasila reservoir will receive 15 TMC of Krishna water and divert it to Kandaleru reservoir for drinking water supply to chennai city as part of Telugu Ganga project a joint project of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu governments. It may be noticed that the Government appointed an expert committee to look into the irrigation, planning and other aspects. ( 16 ) THE Status Report of 1995 shows that in 20 years period, after commencement of the work, an expenditure of Rs. 235. 52 crores was spent, and it would take another 10 years for the entire project to be completed as the canal system and the project design has lined channels, and they are yet to be completed at certain portions, and if completed they will be in a position to carry their designed discharge and render the contemplated benefits. Be that as it may, it is not disputed that the wet ayacut in the second Rabi season of the agricultural year is contemplated only under the Somasila reservoir to an extent of 19,000 acres. Under the canal system - North Feeder Channel, south Feeder Channel and Kavali canal, what is contemplated is only Khariff irrigation, and Rabi wet irrigation is not contemplated. ( 17 ) THE report of the Committee of engineers, filed before this Court on 26-4-2000 adverts to the contemplated irrigation under the irrigation project and the ayacut developed in the respective canals in the Pennar Delta as under: ( 18 ) THE ayacut developed till now, far exceeded the ayacut contemplated as per the project report except the ayacut under canal system. Accordingly, the demand for water available for irrigation purposes, which was 48. 528 TMC for both Khariff wet Rabi wet as well as Rabi ID exceed, and if water for the entire developed ayacut, both for khariff and Rabi seasons is to be supplied, the demand for water stood at 39. 271 TMC. ( 19 ) THE learned senior Counsel for the petitioners made a passionate plea to this court to save the farmers of Pennar Delta from alleged starvation by ordering release of water from Somasila reservoir for the purpose of second Rabi crop. 271 TMC. ( 19 ) THE learned senior Counsel for the petitioners made a passionate plea to this court to save the farmers of Pennar Delta from alleged starvation by ordering release of water from Somasila reservoir for the purpose of second Rabi crop. The submission of the learned senior Counsel is that the decision of the respondents not to release water for Rabi crop 1999-2000 is not a policy decision. In any view of the matter, even if it is taken to be a policy decision, the same cannot be arbitrary in the teeth of the determined rights and fundamental rights when Somasila project itself was conceived and built for the benefit of ayacutdars of Pennar Delta. When there is water available, it is unreasonable for the authorities not to release water. Such a decision is capricious and arbitrary. ( 20 ) THE learned Additional Advocate- general, who appeared for the respondents submitted that there is no arbitrariness in the decision taken by the first respondent not to release the water for the second rabi crop during this year. The decision making process did not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness, and the decision is not arbitrary. ( 21 ) IN any event the learned Additional advocate-General would submit that the issue of release of water from Somasila project for Rabi second crop under Pennar delta is not justiciable as the question involves an element of administrative expertise and experience in the field of irrigation and water resources management which the Court for want of manageable standards would not be inclined to review such decisions. It is proper that we should notice the rival contentions in more detail. ( 22 ) THE petitioners submit that as on 14-3-2000, the net quantity of water available for second crop in Somasila reservoir as well as Sangam Delta tanks is 13. 75 TMC, and applying the thumb rule that 1 TMC of water can irrigate 10,000 acres of wet crop, if the respondents release 13. 75 TMC, an extent of 1,37,500 acres can be irrigated in the second Rabi crop season. While arriving at these figures, the petitioners say that transmission and evaporation losses are at 2. 75 TMC must be taken into consideration, but the petitioners ignored the demands standing Khariff crop and other demands, which the respondents contemplate. We will advert to this a little later. While arriving at these figures, the petitioners say that transmission and evaporation losses are at 2. 75 TMC must be taken into consideration, but the petitioners ignored the demands standing Khariff crop and other demands, which the respondents contemplate. We will advert to this a little later. Before the learned single Judge petitioners provided details of water available under Somasila Project as on 2-4-2000. ( 23 ) THE respondents provided the details of water available and the details of water required to meet the demands as on 29-3-2000. Before we deal with the details of water available as on 24-4-2000 as submitted by the learned Additional advocate-General based on the report of the committee of Engineers, we may again notice the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the details submitted by the respondents as to the quantity of water as on 29-3-2000 for the purpose of availability (and non-availability) are unreliable on the ground that the same are divorced from the ground realities and ignores the actual quantity of water available. The learned senior Counsel seriously disputes the figures submitted by the respondents. ( 24 ) INDEED, the minutes of the Somasila irrigation Committee held on 30-3-200. 0 critically examined the storages available as on 29-3-2000 and arrived the figures of storage and demands of Somalia Project as on 29-3-2000 as indicated above. The somasila Irrigation Committee noticed the water particulars as on 29-3-2000 as in the delta Tanks and Reservoirs under the somasila Project and arrived at the total net storage available at 1. 84 TMC in various tanks and reservoirs after providing for dead storage and evaporation losses at 1. 31 TMC. However, the irrigation committee did not consider the present storage capacity of 3. 15 TMC in the Delta Tanks and reservoirs for the purpose of release of water for second rabi Crop presumably because project did not contemplate wet irrigation for second rabi crop under Delta tanks and reservoirs. The learned senior Counsel submits that providing for the demands under the heads like seedbeds, drinking water needs of nellore, Kavali and other villages under the command of Somasila and for evaporation losses in the Reservoir are far in excess of the required demands and arbitrary and that those demands were arrived at in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. The learned senior Counsel submits that providing for the demands under the heads like seedbeds, drinking water needs of nellore, Kavali and other villages under the command of Somasila and for evaporation losses in the Reservoir are far in excess of the required demands and arbitrary and that those demands were arrived at in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. According to the learned senior Counsel, the Somasila irrigation Committee ought to have provided only 2 TMC towards seedbeds, 2 TMC towards drinking water needs and 1 TMC. for evaporation losses in the reservoir and ought to have kept the required demands at 6. 25 TMC instead of 9. 05 TMC in Somasila project (Reservoir ). Hence considering 3. 15 TMC of the stored water in Delta tanks and Reservoir, the total available water is more than 13 TMC in both the reservoir and tanks. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that the respondents should be directed to release about 5-6 TMC of water. ( 25 ) ALTERNATIVELY, it is submitted that when the Ayacutdars in Pennar Delta as well the canal system are facing misery, penury and starvation due to khariff crop failure due to untimely rains in February, 2000, there is no rational whatsoever in sticking to the unscientific decision to maintain the storage at MDDL (dead storage) at 7. 5 TMC in the reservoir and other dead storage in the tanks and reservoirs. The learned senior Counsel passionately attempted to make out a case of arbitrariness and irrationality on the part of the respondents alleging that any decision in a matter like this, which does not take in its fold the contemporaneous factors should be held as arbitrary and irrational. According to the learned Counsel, it is always within the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution while exercising the power of judicial review to take a different view from the view taken by the Government having regard to the right of the ayacutdars to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. In a nutshell, the learned senior Counsel would contend that this Court should ignore the demands as projected by the respondents, arrive at the total quantity of water at 14. 34 TMC (11. 19 + 3. In a nutshell, the learned senior Counsel would contend that this Court should ignore the demands as projected by the respondents, arrive at the total quantity of water at 14. 34 TMC (11. 19 + 3. 15 in reservoirs and tanks respectively) and should order release of about 5-6 TMC of water leaving the other quantity of water towards dead storage and other demands. The learned senior Counsel also submits that as the Somasila Irrigation Committee recommended to release water for seedbeds of Khariff crop after reservoir receives appreciable fresh inflows, taking the said demand into consideration is not warranted and is unreasonable. ( 26 ) THE learned senior Counsel has placed reliance on the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent and the minutes of the meeting of the Somasila Irrigation committee held on 30-3-2000. Reliance on certain other documents was also placed to show that there are number of instances in the past where the Government ordered release of water ignoring the minimum dead storage at 7. 5 TMC and the Government orders in G. O. Ms. No. 517 Irrigation and cad (Projects Wing TGP. I) Department), dated 5-7-1999 whereunder the Government ordered release of 1. 6 TMC of water from somasila Reservoir for the standing crop in rabi 1999 under Pennar Delta. A pointed reference was made by the learned Counsel to the letter addressed by the third respondent to the 2nd respondent in support of the submission that in a case of contingency resulting from compelling factors like "to save the standing Rabi crop", it is always permissible to draw water from the storage available below the MDDL. ( 27 ) THE learned Additional Advocate general in reply submits that the Somasila irrigation Committee was constituted in 1990 by G. O. Ms. No. 99 dated 8-2-1990. The said Committee, in its meeting held on 23-1-1996, examined various aspects and recommended to maintain minimum storage of 7. ( 27 ) THE learned Additional Advocate general in reply submits that the Somasila irrigation Committee was constituted in 1990 by G. O. Ms. No. 99 dated 8-2-1990. The said Committee, in its meeting held on 23-1-1996, examined various aspects and recommended to maintain minimum storage of 7. 5 TMC at MDDL, that such a policy decision was taken by the Government with the demands to be met from the storage available arrived at by the Somasila Project committee, having regard to the various scientific data, that when the committee consisting of Chief Engineers who are experts in irrigation system management have recommended and the decision not to release water is based on the experts opinion, this Court may not be inclined to undertake a nice balancing exercise and record a opinion contrary to the opinion of the experts. According to learned Additional Advocate general, such issues are not justiciable. The learned Additional Advocate-General also submits that from 1996 onwards, the dead storage was never allowed to go below the required MDDL at 5. 5 TMC and places reliance on the report dated 24-4-2000 of the engineers submitted to this Court on 26-4-2000. The learned Additional advocate-General also submitted that the letter dated 2-7-1999 addressed by the second respondent to the third respondent does not in any way support the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In any event, when basing on such ground realities and other irrigation parameters finding is recorded by the experts, the Court should accept such finding, especially when a policy decision is taken to maintain the mddl at 7. 5 TMC. The question whether the required demands are to be met from the storage available, whether the demands are determined properly or not and whether this Court is competent to take a different opinion than the opinion taken by the experts and the Government will be considered while we take up the second point for consideration. ( 28 ) THE pleadings, the various reports dealing with the subject and rival contentions, raise the following points for consideration in this writ appeal: (A) Whether it is within its scope to judicially review a decision in the realm of irrigation management systems administered by the respondents? and whether the issue raised in the present case is justiciable? ( 28 ) THE pleadings, the various reports dealing with the subject and rival contentions, raise the following points for consideration in this writ appeal: (A) Whether it is within its scope to judicially review a decision in the realm of irrigation management systems administered by the respondents? and whether the issue raised in the present case is justiciable? (B) Whether the decision taken by the first respondent not to release water from Somasila Project Irrigation system for Rabi second crop under pennar Delta is arbitrary and irrational violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India? (C) To what relief?in Re point-A: ( 29 ) HENRY J. Abraham, an acclaimed constitutional Law scholar pointed out that judicial review comprises the power of any court to hold unconstitutional, and hence unenforceable any law or any official action based upon a law or any other action by a public official that it deems to be in conflict with the basic law, and that the highly significant power of judicial review is possessed by every Court of record. Henry j Abraham judicial Process IV Edition oxford University Press, 1980. This definition of judicial review in the America context was quoted with approval by a seven Judge Constitutional Bench of the supreme Court in L Chandra Kumar v. The union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 = (1997) 3 SCC 261 . The Supreme Court held that subject to few modifications, the same definition is equally applicable to the concept as is understood in Indian Constitutional law. ( 30 ) THE various aspects of judicial review in the Indian context can be categorised as follows: (a) Judicial review of the constituent power of the Parliament to amend the constitution; (b) Judicial review of legislative action both of State Legislatures and the parliament as well as the judicial review of delegated legislation; (c) Judicial review of administrative action; (d) Judicial review of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative authorities; and (e) Judicial review of the decisions of the statutory Tribunals dealing with service cases and revenue cases. ( 31 ) IN this case, we are primarily concerned with the judicial review of administrative action. Whatever be the category of judicial review, it is to be remembered that while exercising the power the Court of judicial review does not act as a supervisory body in respect of all decisions. ( 31 ) IN this case, we are primarily concerned with the judicial review of administrative action. Whatever be the category of judicial review, it is to be remembered that while exercising the power the Court of judicial review does not act as a supervisory body in respect of all decisions. The Court is primarily concerned with the decisions of administrative authorities brought before it by the aggrieved persons. Judicial review, therefore, is the control of administrative action by the Court to see that impugned action is not within constitutional prohibition. ( 32 ) AS observed by Lord Diplock in council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of Civil Services, (1984) 3 All ER 935, (CCU case for brevity) every judicial review is a of decision made by some authority or refusal by such an authority to make a decision. To qualify as subject for judicial review, a decision must have consequences, which affect some person other than the decision maker. It must affect such other person either by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law or by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which he had in the past permitted by the decision maker to enjoy, and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue until it has been withdrawn. When the decision become susceptible to judicial review, it is useful to excerpt the. observations of Lord Diplock in CCCU case at Pp. 949-950. "for a decision to be susceptible to judicial review the decision maker must be empowered by public law (and not merely, as in arbitration, by agreement between private parties) to make decisions that, if validly made, will lead to administrative action or abstention from action by an authority empowered by law with executive powers, which have one or other of the consequences mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The ultimate source of the decision- making power is nearly always nowadays a statute or subordinate legislation made under the statute; but in the absence of any statute regulating the subject matter of the decision the source of the decision making power may still be the common law itself, i. e. , that part of the common law that is given by lawyers the label of the prerogative. . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 33 ) IT is now well accepted in the field of Administrative Law that administrative action is subject to control by judicial review under three grounds namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. (Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 sc 11 .) ( 34 ) ILLEGALITY, as a ground of judicial review connotes that the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates the decision making power and must give effect to it. It is always a justiciable matter whether the decision maker appreciated all the relevant facts and applied the correct law. Irrationality as a ground for judicial review deals with the question whether any sensible person, who had applied mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at the same conclusion. This came to be called as wednesbury unreasonableness following the doctrine developed in Associated Picture house v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 640. Lastly, if a decision is in violation of principles of natural justice and contrary to procedural fairness, such a decision suffers from procedural impropriety which is the third ground for judicial review. ( 35 ) THE exercise of power of judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution has limitations. For the purpose of this case, we need to notice only two such limitations. First, if the issue presented for adjudication is not justiciable, the Court would not venture to scrutinise the decision. Secondly, when there are serious disputed questions of fact or by the very nature of controversy, the administrator s/decision maker s choice based on facts is to be respected, the court would not tread into such area and would treat as final the decision of the administrator on facts. The first point for consideration deals with the first limitation and the second point with the second limitation insofar as this case is concerned. ( 36 ) TO put it simply, all decisions are not justiciable. All the same in all the jurisdictions it is now well accepted that there is no and there cannot be any unreviewable decision, be it the exercise of sovereign power, be it the exercise of prerogative power, be it the exercise of legislative powers or police powers or powers of Taxation. All decisions are susceptible for judicial review subject to limitations. All decisions are susceptible for judicial review subject to limitations. In the Indian context, having regard to the unique role assigned to the judiciary, and having regard to the Directive Principles of State Policy, no Court can shrug its shoulders and decline to scrutinise a decision, including a policy decision. A Constitutional court, of course may not be inclined to enquire in a roving manner into the circumstances leading to a decision. What is the minimum and maximum extent of scrutiny would depend on circumstances of each case. These principles are well settled in English Law, American Law and as well as Indian Law. In Shri Sachidanand pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1987 sc 1109 , the Supreme Court observed as under:"when the Court is called upon to give effect to the doctrine of Directive principle and the fundamental duty, the Court is not to shrug its shoulders and say that priorities are a matter of policy and so it is a matter for the policy making authority. The least that the court may do so is to examine whether appropriate considerations are borne in mind and irrelevances excluded. In appropriate cases, the Court go further, but how much further depend on the circumstances of the case. However, the court will not attempt to nicely balance relevant considerations. " ( 37 ) WE, however, hasten to add that all decisions of policy cannot be beyond the pale of controversy, and all controversial policy decisions, which require delicate balancing and consideration of complex social, economic and political parameters cannot be brought under judicial scrutiny, though judiciary is not myopic and not insensitive to vagaries of individual and national life. It has its own limitations, and therefore, it would not encroach upon the areas exclusively left by the Constitution to the legislative wisdom and Executive expediency. Prof. Bernard Schwartz in his celebrated book, administrative Law iii Edition Little Brown Company 1991, dealing with the present status of judicial review in American context, summarised as under: if the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little modern media for the transmission of cases to the Courts. That would destroy the follies of agencies, created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in the complicated fields. That would destroy the follies of agencies, created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in the complicated fields. At the same time, courts should not rubber-stamp the agencies; the scope of judicial enquiry must not be too restricted that it prevents full enquiry into the action of illegality. If that question cannot be properly explored by the Judge, right to review becomes meaningless. . . . . in the final analysis, the scope of review depends on the individual judges estimate of the justice of the case. ( 38 ) PROF. Clive Lewis in his book, judicial Remedies in Public Law 1992 edition At p. 294-295, summarised the present status of judicial review in English law as under: the Courts now recognise that the impact on the administration is relevant in the exercise of their remedial jurisdiction. . . . . . . Earlier cases took a robust line that the law has to be observed and the decision invalidated, whatever the administrative inconvenience caused. The Courts now-a-days recognise that such an approach is not always appropriate and may not be in the wider public interest. The effect on the administrative process is relevant to the Court s remedial discretion may prove decisive. They may also be influenced to the extent to which the illegality arises from the conduct of the administrative body itself, and their view of that conduct. ( 39 ) IT is pertinent to note that Prof. Bernard Schwartz s observations were quoted with approval by the Supreme court in Tata Cellular case (supra ). In para 89 of the same decision the Court held as follows:"observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercise to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the Court s ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. " (emphasis added) ( 40 ) AS pointed out by us under the constitutional scheme when allegations of grave violation of fundamental rights or blatant ignorance of Directive Principles of State Policy are brought before it, the least the Court can do is to examine whether all relevant considerations have been appreciated by the decision maker. " (emphasis added) ( 40 ) AS pointed out by us under the constitutional scheme when allegations of grave violation of fundamental rights or blatant ignorance of Directive Principles of State Policy are brought before it, the least the Court can do is to examine whether all relevant considerations have been appreciated by the decision maker. The court, however, is not equipped with expertise. The Court has no machinery to verify the facts presented to the Courts for the parties to the Us. Even in public law, the rival contestants seldom agree to the jurisdictional facts. In such circumstances, there are cases, which present complexities. What are the tests to be applied in such cases? ( 41 ) IN Chief Constable of the North wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All ER 141, the celebrated oft-quoted illuminating passage from the opinion of Lord Brightman is as under:"i turn secondly to the proper purpose of the remedy of judicial review, what it is and what it is not. In my opinion, the law was correctly stated in the speech of Lord Evershed (1963) 2 All ER 66 at 91, (1964) AC 40 at 96. His was a dissenting judgment but the dissent was not concerned with this point. Lord evershed referred to a danger of usurpation of power on the part of the courts. . . . . . under the pretext of having regard to the principles of natural justice. . . . . I do observe again that it is not the decision as such which is liable to review; it is only the circumstances in which the decision was reached, and particularly in such a case as the present the need for giving to the party dismissed an opportunity for putting his case. Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the Court is observed, the Court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the Court is observed, the Court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. " ( 42 ) IN State of U. P. v. Dharmander prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 , the Hon ble supreme Court quoted Lord Hailshan and lord Brightman in Evan s case (supra), with approval and held as under:"when the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors. " (emphasis added) ( 43 ) WE may now deal with the question of justiciability. In our judgment dated 18-4-2000 in WA Nos. 1468 and 1528 of 1999 (unreported) while referring to judicial Remedies in Public Law by Clive lewis, CCSU case (supra), S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918 , we observed as under:"it is not easy to precisely give the meaning of justiciability. Broadly speaking, an issue is not justiciable if the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on such issues either because the Court lacks expertise or there are no manageable standards to consider and appreciate the evidence placed before the Court. underlying the concept of justiciability is the idea that certain issues raise questions with which the judicial process is not equipped to deal. " ( 44 ) THEREFORE, as held by us, if there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising the material which is the basis for the decision and the Court is not equipped to deal with the situation presented before it such issues are not justiciable. " ( 44 ) THEREFORE, as held by us, if there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising the material which is the basis for the decision and the Court is not equipped to deal with the situation presented before it such issues are not justiciable. ( 45 ) IN this case, how much water is to be stored, how much water is to be released for Khariff crop, how much water is to be left for seedbeds and other demands and how much water is to be released for second Rabi crop and in case if it is released whether it has to be released for 19,000 acres as contemplated in the project report or to irrigate about 1,17,000 acres (as prayed by the petitioners), are issues which cannot be subjected to judicial review, for there are no manageable standards to appreciate the evidence further, the dispute about the release of water is unsuitable for judicial review because it requires expertise in irrigation Management System and water resources management in respect of which matters, there are always more than one opinion. The Government of the day is the best Judge, for the Government gathers information and material from various sources including the administrators assigned with duty to manage the irrigation system. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the issue raised in this case is not justiciable, though in an appropriate case, the judicial review cannot be ruled out. ( 46 ) IT is well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, we are more concerned with the decision making process than the decision itself. In doing so, it is often argued by the defender of the impugned decision that this Court is not competent to exercise its power when there are serious disputed questions of facts, when the decision of the Tribunal or the fact finding body or the arbitrator is given finality by the statute which governs a given situation or which by nature of the activity the decision maker s opinion on facts is final. But while examining and scrutinising the decision making process it becomes inevitable also to appreciate the facts of a given case as otherwise, in our considered opinion, the decision cannot be tested under the grounds of illegality, irrationality or impropriety. But while examining and scrutinising the decision making process it becomes inevitable also to appreciate the facts of a given case as otherwise, in our considered opinion, the decision cannot be tested under the grounds of illegality, irrationality or impropriety. How far the court of judicial review can reappreciate the findings of fact depends on the ground of judicial review. For example, if a decision is challenged as irrational, it would be well neigh impossible for this Court to record a finding whether a decision is rational or irrational without first evaluating the facts of the case and coming to the prima facie conclusion or plausible conclusion and then testing the decision of the authority on the touchstone of the tests laid down by the Court with special reference to a given case. This position is well settled in Indian administrative Law. ( 47 ) DEALING with the parameters of doctrine of irrationality the Hon ble supreme Court in Tata Cellular case (supra), laid down as under:"it is open to the Court to review the decision maker s evaluation of facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. (emphasis added) ( 48 ) THEREFORE, to a limited extent of scrutinising the decision making process, it is always open to the Court to review the evaluation of facts by the decision maker. ( 49 ) THE objection raised by the State and accepted by the learned single Judge is that the decision taken is a policy decision and, therefore, the enquiry by the court is not called for because the policy does not violate any constitutional mandate or statutory provision or the same is not tainted with mala fides. It is settled that generally the Court does not lightly interfere with the policy decision taken by the State in discharge of their executive function. The wisdom of the legislative policy may not be open to judicial review, but when the wisdom takes the concrete form of law, the same must stand the test of being in tune with the fundamental rights. The wisdom of the legislative policy may not be open to judicial review, but when the wisdom takes the concrete form of law, the same must stand the test of being in tune with the fundamental rights. If it trenches upon any of the fundamental rights, it is void as ordained by Article 13 of the constitution (See A. L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. , air 1984 SC 1361 ). In Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 537 , dealing with the challenge to the policy decision taken by the Government, the Hon ble supreme Court ruled thus:"it can no longer be doubted at this point of time that Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the Government even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. (See Ramana Dayaram shetty v. The International Airport authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jandk, AIR 1980 SC 1992 . In Col. A. S. Sangwan v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1545 , while the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by the statute or rule, was held to be wide, it was emphasised as imperative and implicit in Article 14 of the constitution that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. (emphasis added) ( 50 ) IN State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhya baggal, AIR 1998 SC 1703 , dealing with scope of review of Government policy, the supreme Court held as follows:"so far as questioning the validity of governmental policy is concerned in our view it is not normally within the domain of any Court to weigh the pros and cons of the policy or to scrutinise it and test the degree of the beneficial or equitable disposition for the purpose of varying, modifying or annulling it, based on howsoever sound and good reasoning, except where it is arbitrary or violative of any constitutional statutory or any other provisions of law. When government forms its policy, it is based on number of circumstances on facts, law, including constraints based on its resources. When government forms its policy, it is based on number of circumstances on facts, law, including constraints based on its resources. It is dangerous if Court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The Court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive. It is within this matrix that it is to be seen whether the new policy violates Article 21 when it restricts reimbursement on account of its financial constraints. (emphasis added) ( 51 ) TO the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in M. P. Oil corporation v. State of MP. , (1997) 7 SCC 592 . In T. Gopalan v. MCH, 1996 (1) ALD 1122 , this Court has held that the Court can interfere with a policy decision if it is irrational, illegal and unreasonable. ( 52 ) IN this case, the decision taken by the Somasila Irrigation Committee in 1996 and accepted by Government to maintain the dead storage (MDDL) at 7. 57 or 7. 50 tmc is a policy decision. The Government has now taken a decision to accept the recommendations of the committee-dated 30-3-2000 that the water available cannot be released having regard to the various demands to be met from the reservoir. As it is not seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the decision taken by the Government to earmark the water for dead storage and demands to be met is a policy decision, we need not further examine the issue. The petitioners as well as the respondents proceeded on the premise that the decision taken by the Government in 1996 to maintain MDDL at 7. 57 or 7. 50 tmc or the decision taken on 30-3-2000 not to release water for the second Rabi crop of 1999-2000 is a policy decision. Therefore, the question that requires examination is whether the policy decision is arbitrary. This question we will deal with while we consider the second point for consideration. In this context we may refer to the judgment of the division Bench dated 16-4-1999 in WA no. 590 of 1999 (unreported) to which one of us (the Hon ble the Chief Justice) is a member. This question we will deal with while we consider the second point for consideration. In this context we may refer to the judgment of the division Bench dated 16-4-1999 in WA no. 590 of 1999 (unreported) to which one of us (the Hon ble the Chief Justice) is a member. Dealing with the case of release of water in the jurisdiction of the third respondent herein, the Division bench held as under:"in our considered view, the appellants have got no legal right to compel the respondent-State to supply water or to procure extra water and supply the same to any zone, which is only a policy decision. No mandamus or injunction can be issued restraining the State from framing a policy or releasing a benefit to a particular locality. The State is at liberty to effect modification in the mode of supply, channel of supply, manner of supply and other working conditions of supply. The appellants right is only limited to the extent of quantity of water to be supplied as stipulated in the undertaking, which the State reiterates even before us that requisite water as stipulated in the undertaking would be supplied. . . . . . . " ( 53 ) WE, therefore, hold that the decision taken by the Somasila Irrigation Committee in 1996 to maintain dead storage (MDDL) at 7. 5 TMC in Somasila Reservoir is a policy decision, which cannot be held to be unconstitutional. We also hold that the issue whether the dead storage should be maintained at 7. 5 TMC and whether water can be released by maintaining the dead storage below the required level, are matters, which are not justiciable. Further, when the decision was taken not to release the water for Rabi second crop, the respondents have taken all the relevant facts and factors into consideration, and the decision-making process does not call for any judicial review. ( 54 ) FURTHER the reviewability , of discretionary power should be dependent upon the subject matter thereof, and not whether its source was statute or prerogative, and certain exercises of power by the very nature of subject matter might be less justiciable in certain situations (see CCCU s case ). ( 54 ) FURTHER the reviewability , of discretionary power should be dependent upon the subject matter thereof, and not whether its source was statute or prerogative, and certain exercises of power by the very nature of subject matter might be less justiciable in certain situations (see CCCU s case ). It should also be noted that if a decision is a result of whim and fancy of an executive, it is always open to this Court to subject the decision to curial evaluation even if ordinarily such a decision is not justiciable. Point A is answered accordingly. In Re Point-B: