Judgment : Tenant in R.C.O.P.No.15 of 1995 on the file of Rent Controller/District Munsif, Tenkasi is the revision petitioner. 2. Landlord filed eviction petition on the grounds that tenant has committed wilful default, for own occupation and also on the ground that tenant is causing nuisance to landlord and neighbours. 3. Only ground survives in this revision is whether tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of wilful default and bona fide own use. It may be stated that before Rent Controller eviction was ordered only on the ground of wilful default and in appeal, the claim for own occupation was allowed by appellate authority. 4. Material facts could be summarised thus: Revision petitioner was originally owner of the scheduled premises. He along with this wife sold the property to landlord and it is agreed that petitioner herein took the building on rental arrangement after the same. Rate of rent is Rs.300 per month. According to landlord. Tenant was not in the habit of paying rent regularly. There is only one water connection for th entire premises where there are other tenants also. Since petitioner was appropriating entire water other tenants began to object to the same and consequently tenant refused to talk with landlord. From the month of February, 1994 tenant used to send rent by money order and without objection, landlord used to receive the same. From July, 1994 no rent was paid. According to tenant since misunderstanding arose between parties he filed a suit as O.S.No.343 of 1994 and obtained injunction against landlord from forcibly evicting him. In that proceeding he is depositing rent and therefore he is not wilful defaulter. 5. Landlord further claimed eviction on the ground that building is required for his sons own occupation. The same was challenged by tenant on the ground that the claim is without any bona fide and few months before eviction petition was filed a building belong to landlord became vacant and the same was rented out to a person for higher rent. 6. I will first consider the question whether tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground that he has committed default and whether that is wilful default. 7. The statement of facts entered by appellate authority is not disputed by tenant. In the facts stated by appellate authority it is said that for the rent due for August, 1994. 6. I will first consider the question whether tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground that he has committed default and whether that is wilful default. 7. The statement of facts entered by appellate authority is not disputed by tenant. In the facts stated by appellate authority it is said that for the rent due for August, 1994. the same was deposited in O.S.No.343 of 1994 on 19. 1994. Rent for September, 1994 was deposited in the suit in February, 1995. Rent from October, 1994 till February, 1995 was deposited in the suit on 5. 1995. Rent for June, 1995 was deposited in court on 20.6.1995. Rent for August, 1995 was deposited on 9. 1995 and rent due for October, 1995 was deposited on 2. 1996 in the suit. Rent for November, 1995 was deposited open 12. 1995. The fact that these amounts are deposited in civil suit is not disputed. It could also be seen that these deposits are made not on the due dates but according to the convenience of tenants. 8. In this connection it may also be noted that the claim of landlord is that even though there is no contract to send rent by money order, he used to receive the same without objection and rent till June, 1994 was sent by money order. From July, 1994 rent was not paid. Deposits in civil court also starts from August, 1994 only. It could also be seen that when rent control appeal was pending before appellate authority, admitting that there is default for the month of July, 1994 the same was paid to landlords counsel on 17. 1999. The amount was received under protest. 9. The question arises for consideration is whether deposits made in civil court as well as long delay in payment of rent for the month of July, 1994 will exonerate petitioner from the consequence of being evicted. 10. O.S.No.343 of 1994 filed by tenant is only a suit for injunction. Even before suit was filed tenant was in the habit of sending rent through money order and landlord also used to receive the same. Why he deposited rent in civil court is not explained by him. It is not the case of tenant that landlord refused to receive rent. 11. Even before suit was filed tenant was in the habit of sending rent through money order and landlord also used to receive the same. Why he deposited rent in civil court is not explained by him. It is not the case of tenant that landlord refused to receive rent. 11. A tenant is entitled to deposit rent in court only if he satisfies the conditions of Sec.8 of the Act, i.e., When landlord refuses to receive rent or when refuses to issue receipt after having received rent, tenant has to issue a notice to has to issue a notice to name the bank in which rent has to be deposited. If landlord is not responding to the notice, tenant is permitted to send the amount by money order after deducting commission charges. If landlord still refuses to receive the rent then tenant can move the court under Sec.8(5) of the Act seeking assistance of the court to deposit the rent in court. Statute is very clear that unless those conditions are satisfied, tenant is not entitled to deposit rent in court and deposit must be made only in Rent Control Court and not in any other court where any suit is pending. 12. In Teegala Satyanarayana v. G.S. Bhagwan Teegala Satyanarayana v. G.S. Bhagwan Teegala Satyanarayana v. G.S. Bhagwan , (1994)3 S.C.C. (Supp.) 741, a case under Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, their Lordships held when a duty is cast on tenant to pay rent or tender the same due, by him in respect of the building within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or by the last date of month next following that for which the rent is payable. Their Lordships further went on and said thus: “…In case the landlord refuses to receive the rent, Sec.8 of the Act provides the procedure for payment thereof, namely, the tenant is under an obligation to issue a notice calling upon the landlord either to receive the rent or name of the bank in which the rent is to be deposited. On receipt of the notice, in case the landlord does not respond to or refuses to receive the rent, a right is given to make an application under Sec.8 in the Court of Rent Controller (District Munsif) seeking permission of the Controller to deposit the rent. On receipt of the notice, in case the landlord does not respond to or refuses to receive the rent, a right is given to make an application under Sec.8 in the Court of Rent Controller (District Munsif) seeking permission of the Controller to deposit the rent. After following the procedure, a direction would be given for deposit of the rent to the credit of the case…” I am relying on the above decision only to show that before tenant is permitted to deposit the rent in court certain statutory conditions are to be complied with. It may be noted that provisions of Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act is similar to that of our Act. 13. Under similar provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, the Honourable Supreme Court in Jagat Prasad v. District Judge, Kanpur , (1995)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 318, held thus: “.…Nevertheless, the defence of the appellant that he had deposited bona fide the rent in the civil proceeding that would ensure to the benefit of the rent control proceedings is unacceptable to us. Law prescribes the procedure as to the deposit under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, Such a procedure if complied with alone will be a valid defence to a petition for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. Therefore, even accepting the defence the ultimate order of eviction passed against the tenant will have to be upheld.…” [emphasis supplied] 14. Under similar provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, the same question was considered in the decision reported in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganapatlal , (1996)1 S.C.C. 243 . In that case without satisfying the conditions mentioned in that Act, tenant deposited rent before Rent Control Court itself. The question was whether deposit before Rent Control Court could be considered as valid tender and payment to landlord. Sec.19-A of Rajasthan Act is similar to Sec.8 of our Act. In para. 8 of the judgment, it is held thus: “In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail of the benefit of the legal fiction under Sec.19-A(4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. 8 of the judgment, it is held thus: “In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail of the benefit of the legal fiction under Sec.19-A(4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. (See: Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar , [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603) (S.C.R. at p.646). The appellant can avail of the benefit of Sec.19-A(4) if the deposit of Rs.3,600. made by him in the Court of Munsif (South), Udaipur, on 210. 1982, by way of rent for the months of May, 1982 to October, 1982, can be treated as a payment under Sec.19-A(3)(c) so as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of rent. Under Sec.19-A(3)(c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the court only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisfied in the present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in court on 210. 1982 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with clause (c) of Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.19-A and the appellant cannot avail of the protection of Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.19-A and he must be held to have committed default in payment of rent for the months of May, 1982 to October, 1982. This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant on account of default in payment of rent for the period of six months.” [Italics supplied] .15. In M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu , (1996)6 S.C.C. 228 , a case arising under Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act, Honourable Supreme Court held that if tenant is not invoking the provisions of Sec.8 that will be a ground which entitled landlord to claim eviction on the ground of wilful default. In para.4 of the judgment it is held thus: .“…Though parties are related, nonetheless when the appellant is staying in the premises as tenant, he has got an obligation to pay the rent regularly. If he does not do so, he commits wilful default. In para.4 of the judgment it is held thus: .“…Though parties are related, nonetheless when the appellant is staying in the premises as tenant, he has got an obligation to pay the rent regularly. If he does not do so, he commits wilful default. If he finds that the landlord is evading the payment of rent, procedure has been prescribed under Sec.8 of the Act to issue notice to the landlord to name the bank and if he does not name the bank, the tenant has to file an application before the Rent Controller, for permission to deposit the rent. The appellant did not avail of that remedy. The omission to avail of the procedure under Sec.11 does not disentitle the landlord to seek eviction for wilful default.” [Italics supplied] 16. From the above decisions it is clear that merely because amount is deposited in civil court that cannot be treated as valid tender. Even deepest made in civil court is not in due time. Amounts are being deposited only in lump sum. 17. Regarding payment of rent for the month of July, 1994, even though tenant alleged that he has paid rent, both courts have held that the case is false. In fact learned counsel also did not seriously urged this point especially in view of memo dated 17. 1999 wherein he has admitted that rent for July, 1994 was not paid. The facts stated above show that tenant is not in the habit of paying rent in time and he has also taken false contention to justify his claim. Finding of authorities below that tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of default and the default is wilful is only to be confirmed. .18. Further question arises for consideration is whether landlord is entitled to eviction on the ground of own occupation. Rent Controller found against the landlord but appellate authority reversed that finding. After hearing both sides I am of the view that the order or appellate authority ordering eviction on that ground is based on no evidence. .19. Landlord wanted the property for his sons occupation. When P.W.1 was examined he said that his son is married and is now residing with this father-in-law. This is not stated in eviction petition. Scheduled building is situated in Tenkasi far away from that place. Landlords son is running a taxi. .19. Landlord wanted the property for his sons occupation. When P.W.1 was examined he said that his son is married and is now residing with this father-in-law. This is not stated in eviction petition. Scheduled building is situated in Tenkasi far away from that place. Landlords son is running a taxi. It is admitted by landlord himself that three months before eviction petition was filed a residential portion on the ground floor became vacant and the same was let out to a tenant. Why that building was not suitable or could not be occupied by landlords son was not explained. Appellate authority after taking into consideration the same held thus: .This case is neither pleaded nor proved, but new case invented by appellate authority to order eviction. 20. Inthe result the order of eviction is confirmed. I hold that landlord is entitled to get eviction on the ground that petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent. Claim for eviction on the ground of bona fide own occupation is rejected. 21. The revision petition is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.17284 of 1999 is also dismissed.