Ex.A-1, the order of assignment. According to the plaintiff, it is his absolute property and the defendants are not entitled to any right over the same. It is a Government poramboke land. The reason for filing the suit is, the defendants put forward a claim over the said property as if it belongs to all of them. According to the plaintiff, since he has taken he assignment, defendants are not entitled to any right over the same and the property does not belong to the joint family. 4. As against the said contention, defendants contended that the property was being enjoyed by their father as a kudiwaram holder and in the settlement enquiry, father asked the Government to assign the land in favour of the plaintiff to avoid the land being taken over by the Government under the provisions of Land Ceiling Act. According to them, it is a joint family property and the assignment enquiries to the benefit of joint family. An additional written statement, was also filed by the 1st defendant, wherein it was contended that there was a family panchayat in February, 1996, wherein the plaint property was divided into two equal halves, one half was taken by the plaintiff and other half was taken by the defendants, They prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 5. On the above pleadings, the parties went on trial. Exs.A-1 to A-7 were marked on the side of the plaintiff. Exs.B-1 was marked on the side of the defendants and Ex.X-1 was produced by a witness. Oral evidence consists of P.Ws.1 and 2 and D.Ws.1 to 3. 6. After evaluating the entire evidence, the trial court held that Ex.X-1 cannot be used for any purpose and defendants cannot claim any right over the plaint property on the basis of Ex.X-1. It further held that on the basis of Ex.A-1 assignment, the plaint property absolutely belong to the plaintiff and the same is in his exclusive possession, which is proved by Exs.A-2 to A-7. The contention that the property belong to the joint family was negatived and decree was granted as prayed for. 7. It further held that on the basis of Ex.A-1 assignment, the plaint property absolutely belong to the plaintiff and the same is in his exclusive possession, which is proved by Exs.A-2 to A-7. The contention that the property belong to the joint family was negatived and decree was granted as prayed for. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment, defendants preferred A.S.No.84 of 1998 on the file of Principal District Judge, Thanjavur, The lower appellate court re-considered the entire matter and confirmed the view expressed by the trial court in holding that Ex.X-1 cannot be used for any purpose and the defendants also cannot claim any right over the plaint property on the basis of Ex.X-1. At the same time, lower appellate court held that the plaint property was enjoyed by plaintiff's father and the assignment goes to the benefit of the family. The suit was therefore dismissed. 8. It is against the said judgment, plaintiff has preferred this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: Whether the lower appellate court is correct in law in holding that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide title even in respect of land assigned by the Government to the plaintiff by placing reliance on decision relating to patta granted under Indian Abolition Actse Is not the grant of patta on assignment conclusive proof of title in respect of the land assigned and whether the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the assignment patta and decide against the samee 9. Respondents have also entered appearance by filing caveat and I heard the second appeal itself at the stage of admission. Both the questions of law could be considered together. 10. Ex.A-1 is the assignment patta in favour of the plaintiff. It could be seen therefrom that patta has been granted as per Standing Order No.15. Admittedly, poramboke property belong to the Government. It could also be seen from Ex.A-1 that it was on plaintiff's application, the assignment was given in his favour. 11. Plaintiff's father late Ramaswamy Pillai died on 13.11.1978 and Ex.A-1 is dated 19.1.1978 i.e., before the death of his father. Defendants 1 and 2 are the elder brothers of the plaintiff. 12. Admittedly, poramboke property belong to the Government. It could also be seen from Ex.A-1 that it was on plaintiff's application, the assignment was given in his favour. 11. Plaintiff's father late Ramaswamy Pillai died on 13.11.1978 and Ex.A-1 is dated 19.1.1978 i.e., before the death of his father. Defendants 1 and 2 are the elder brothers of the plaintiff. 12. The scope of the Standing Order No.15 is stated thus: “This Standing Order applies to land at the disposal of Government other than building sites in town and villages (See Standing Order No.21), Valuable relinquished land on which there are arrears of revenue (See Standing Order No.33(5), land sold for arrears of revenue and bought in by Government (See Standing Order No.45(2) and land acquired by Government for Public purposes but no longer required (See Standing Order No.90(32). B.P.10, d.28.2.22. Lands may be disposed of under this Standing Order only for private purposes whether to individuals, firms or societies and whether the grant is free or is made on payment of the full or a concessional value for the land, Assignments for industrial, commercial or co-operative purposes will in addition to the usual conditions of assignment be subject to the conditions on the lines of those prescribed in paragraph 6 of Standing Order No.24, mutatis mutandis, the conditions in sub-paragraph (ii) of that paragraph being followed in cases in which the full market value of the land is paid by the assignee and those in sub-paragraph (i) in other cases. The disposal of land for public purposes is governed by Standing Order No.24.” 13. It is clear therefrom that if there is a Government land, that could be assigned to any person, who did not have any antecedent title. Why I am stating so is, the lower appellate court has relied on certain decision under Inam Abolition Act and it is only on the basis of those decisions, it held that the family has got right over the property, If it is a poramboke land belonging to the Government, whether the assignment is in favour of the individual or to the family, depends upon the terms and conditions of the grant on which it is made. It is true that the plaintiff while he was examined as P.W.1 has stated that even before assignment, his father and himself were in possession of the property. It is true that the plaintiff while he was examined as P.W.1 has stated that even before assignment, his father and himself were in possession of the property. That possession can only be that of trespassers of poramboke land belonging to the Government and one of the general conditions of the assignment is stated in para.23 of the Standing Order No.15, which says that: “No land belonging to Government shall be assigned or sold under this Standing Order to any person other than a British Subject or a subject of an Indian State, except by the Collector or the Board and with the previous permission of Government. Every assignment or sale made under this Standing Order shall be subject to the condition, that, if the land is alienated without the sanction of Government in favour of any person other than a British subject or a subject of an Indian State, the grant shall thereupon become null and void.” [Italics supplied] 14. This paragraph also make it clear only land belong to the Government is to be assigned. If it is a land belonging to the Government and the same was given to the plaintiff as grant, the law presumes that it is a self-acquisition in whose favour the grant is made. Sir Hari Singh Gour's Hindu Code, 6th Edition, 1992, Volume, at page 283, the learned Author says thus: “Property acquired from a grant form Government is unquestionably self-acquired, unless it was merely restoration of a confiscated grant intended to be for the benefit of the family or is a grant made in consideration of the services rendered by the family or at its expense. But a party cannot sue Government for the modification of its grant. For specific instances see under mentioned cases. The question whether a Government grant was personal to the grantee or to him and his family is one of construction and intention to be inferred from the terms of the grant and its surrounding circumstances. It may be that the grant is personal. Even then it is open to the grantee to treat it as a joint family asset and it becomes so if the grantee constitutes himself as trustee for his family or by a family arrangement or by a family custom.” [Italics supplied] 15. It may be that the grant is personal. Even then it is open to the grantee to treat it as a joint family asset and it becomes so if the grantee constitutes himself as trustee for his family or by a family arrangement or by a family custom.” [Italics supplied] 15. N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law, 1999 Edition at page 222, has also considered this question that: “Where the Government grants an estate in the exercise of its sovereign power, the estate becomes the self-acquired property of the grantee, whether it is a new grant or the restoration of an estate previously confiscated by the Government unless the grant is intended to be for the benefit of the family, or a contrary intention appears from the grant or it was treated as joint family property by the donee and the members of his family.” The learned Author further says that: “Whether a Government grant, ensued to the grantee as his separate property or as his joint family property is one of construction of the grant with reference to its terms and the surrounding circumstances.” It is further said by the learned Author that: “Prima facie a gift to a member of a joint family is his separate property and will only become joint family property either when it descends to his sons, or he himself has thrown it into the common stock.” But, the learned Author further says that, if the grant is made in favour of a managing member, it could be presumed that the beneficiary is entire family. 16. In Mayne's Hindu Law & Usage 1996 Edition at page 648, it is said thus: “Estate conferred by Government in the exercise of their Sovereign power become the self-acquired property of the doness, whether such gifts are absolutely new grants, or only the restoration to one member of the family of property previously held by another but confiscated, unless some contrary intention appears from the grant, or the conduct of the donee and the other members of his family shows that they treated it as joint family property.” 17. In Dr. Paras Diwan's Book on Hindu law, 1995 Edition at pabe 223, it is said thus: “If property, movable or immovable is granted to a co-parcenar by the Government for his personal merit in any field, it will be his separate property, unless specifically given as joint family property.” 18. In Dr. Paras Diwan's Book on Hindu law, 1995 Edition at pabe 223, it is said thus: “If property, movable or immovable is granted to a co-parcenar by the Government for his personal merit in any field, it will be his separate property, unless specifically given as joint family property.” 18. In one of the earlier decisions of the Privy Council reported in Katama Natchiar v. S. Rajah Moottoo Vijaya Raganadha B.G. Taver Katama Natchiar v. S. Rajah Moottoo Vijaya Raganadha B.G. Taver Katama Natchiar v. S.Rajah Moottoo Vijaya Raganadha B.G. Taver . 9 M.I.A. 539 at 607: 2 I.R. 1131 it was said thus: “The second question their Lordships have no hesitation in answering in the affirmative. Every court that has dealt with the question has treated the Zemindary as the self-acquired property of Gowery Vallabha Taver. Their Lordships conceive that this is the necessary conclusion from the terms of the grant, and the circumstances in which it was made. The mere fact that the grantee selected by Government was a remote Kinsman of the Zemindars of the former line does not, their Lordships apprehend, bring this case within the rule cited from Strange's “Hindu Law” by Sir Hugh Cairns.” 19. The mere fact that the grantee selected by Government was a remote Kinsman of the Zemindars of the former line does not, their Lordships apprehend, bring this case within the rule cited from Strange's “Hindu Law” by Sir Hugh Cairns.” 19. In Baboo Beer Peratab Sahee v. Maharajah Rajender Pertab Sahee Baboo Beer Peratab Sahee v. Maharajah Rajender Pertab Sahee Baboo Beer Peratab Sahee v. Maharajah Rajender Pertab Sahee , 12 M.I.A. 2: 3 I.R. 339 it was held thus: “On these facts, it is at least clear, that there was a virtual confiscation of the interest of Rajah Futteh Sahee and his descendants in the property, and the assertion of full dominion over it, on the part of the East India Company, The Government has not only persistently treated the estate of Rajah Futteh Sahee as forfeited, and refused to recognize any claim on the part of his descendants; it has for more than twenty years applied the revenue to its own purposes; it held itself at liberty either to reject (as it ultimately rejected) the applications of Mohesh Dutt, or to make a fresh grant of the estate to him, imposing new conditions upon the tenure; it held itself at liberty in 1790 to dispose of the property by sale, though as a matter of grace and favour it finally conferred it on chutterdharee sahee.” “Their Lordships are, therefore, unable to see the force of the argument which the Judges of the High Court, and in particular Mr. Justice Levinge, have founded upon the supposed obligation of the East Indian Company to governed the provinces which they held under the Mogul Emperor by virtue of the grant of the Dewanny according to Mahomedan Law, and upon the doctrine of that law which denies to the ruling power the right to confiscate the property of a rebel. Such an argument might, perhaps, have been plausibly urged in the suit which the Great-grandson of Rajah Futteh Sahee brought against Chutter Dharee Sahee and the Government, if that had ever come to a hearing. Such an argument might, perhaps, have been plausibly urged in the suit which the Great-grandson of Rajah Futteh Sahee brought against Chutter Dharee Sahee and the Government, if that had ever come to a hearing. In this suit, however, both parties claim under Chutterdharee Sahee; and as between them, and for the purposes of this suit, it must be taken for granted that he derived his title (Whatever may have bene the nature of his estate, or the incidents to it) by grant from the East India Company, which had full dominion over the estate, and, therefore, the power to grant it.” and finally, their Lordships held thus: “One consequence from this conclusion (and it has a material hearing on the question of testamentary power) is, that the estate must be taken to have been the separate and self-acquired property of Chutterdharee Sahee-. [Italics supplied] 20. In Mt. Bahu Rani v. Rajendra Baksh Mt. Bahu Rani v. Rajendra Baksh Mt. Bahu Rani v. Rajendra Baksh , A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 72 a grant was made to two brothers and the question that arose for consideration before the Privy Council was, whether the grant is taken by the two brothers as joint tenants or as tenants in common. At page 75 of the reports, it was held thus: “Prima facie a gift to a member of a joint Hindu family is his separate property and will only become joint family property when it descends to his sons, unless he himself has made it joint family property by throwing it into the common stock. There is nothing in the terms of these maintenance grants to these two brothers to suggest that the Government intended to make a grant to a joint family.” [Italics supplied] 21. In Dattatraya Sitaram v. Shankar Mahadji Dattatraya Sitaram v. Shankar Mahadji Dattatraya Sitaram v. Shankar Mahadji , A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 250; at 251 their Lordships relied on, 9 M.I.A. 539 and held thus: “It is well-established that there is nothing to prevent a member of a joint family from obtaining a grant form Government for his own benefit: Katama Natchiar's case, 9 M.I.A. 539. Whether such a grant ensures for the benefit of the family of which he is a member must, as their Lordships of the Privy Council have held, depend upon the terms of the grant; 25 I.A. 195. Whether such a grant ensures for the benefit of the family of which he is a member must, as their Lordships of the Privy Council have held, depend upon the terms of the grant; 25 I.A. 195. It is also open to such a person to treat, what initially was his separate property, as joint family property; and it is equally possible for the family to prove that the consideration paid to Government for the grant originally proceeded from the family funds. In either of these case though initially the grant was the separate property of the grantee, the property would acquire the character of joint family property in which according Hindu Law, the other coparceners would be equally interested.” [Italics supplied] 22. From the above decisions, it is clear that prima facie, plaintiff is the absolute owner of the property and the document does not disclose that it is intended for the benefit of the joint family. As stated earlier, plaintiff is the youngest son of late Ramaswamy Pillai. The only reason that is mentioned in the written statement to get patta in the name of the plaintiff is that their father asked the Government to assign the land in favour of the plaintiff to avoid the land being taken over by the Government under the provisions of Land Ceiling Act. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the family had any property in excess of the ceiling area and how the assignment in favour of the plaintiff will help the family to get away from the clutches of Land Ceiling Act if they had excess land. While D.W.1 was examined, he said thus: So, the version of D.W.1 is entirely different from what he has stated in the written statement. 23. It is true that plaintiff has admitted that before assignment, father and all members in the family were in the possession of the property. That capacity is only as trespassers of the Government land. Merely because, the trespassers belong to one family and one trespasser is getting an assignment, it cannot go to the benefit of the family unless the terms of the grant show that it is intended for the benefit of the family. That contention also cannot hold good since it is admitted that the family had properties. According to D.W.1 assignment will be given only to landless person. That contention also cannot hold good since it is admitted that the family had properties. According to D.W.1 assignment will be given only to landless person. Government is the absolute owner of the property and it can issue patta to any person of its choice provided the procedure is followed. There is also nothing in evidence to show that any detriment was caused to the family for acquiring this assert. Neither D.W.1 nor any person on the defendants side speak that the consideration of any for getting assignment, was paid out of family funds or by the family. 24. Lower appellate court relied on certain decisions, which have no application to the facts of this case. In all those decisions, the family antecedent title, but the title is taken away by some enactment and thereafter, the land is assigned to a member of the family. So far as the present case is concerned, the family did not have any antecedent title and there is also nothing to show that the family spent any amount for getting any assignment. 25. Para.9 of the Standing Order No.15, further says that, ‘Joint assignment in the names of more than one person should not be made in any circumstances’ (See page 50 of the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue - Volume I). That also shows that the assignment can be only in the name of individual. As stated earlier, in the written statement, their case was that their father was kudiwaram holder and in the settlement enquiry, on the request of father, the assignment was given in the name of plaintiff. It was given a go by during evidence. Defendants have no case that the plaintiff has applied for assignment, making use of his possession as co-owner and they have also no case that the principle of Sec.90 of Trust Act, will apply in this case, In fact, there is no pleading or proof in that regard. 26. The order of assignment says that the plaintiff is the beneficiary and assignment is given to him as an individual. I do not think the lower appellate court will be justified in holding that it enures to the benefit of the family. It will amount to re-writing the order of assignment itself. 27. In the result, both the substantial questions of law are found in favour of the appellant. I do not think the lower appellate court will be justified in holding that it enures to the benefit of the family. It will amount to re-writing the order of assignment itself. 27. In the result, both the substantial questions of law are found in favour of the appellant. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court in A.S.No.84 of 1998 is set aside and that of the trial court in O.S.No.132 of 1997 on the file of District Munsif, Court, Thiruvaiyaru is restored. The suit O.S.No.132 of 1997 is decreed as prayed for. The second appeal is allowed. however, without any order as to costs. C.M.P.No.3593 of 2000 is closed. S.S.-----Second appeal allowed.