ORDER Arun Mishra, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner aggrieved by the orders passed by Sub Divisional Officer Harda as contained in Annexure-C and affirmed by the Collector in appeal as contained in Annexure-D under the provisions of the Act called 'The Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi-Dharakon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 whereby sale deed in favour of the petitioner executed by one Gopiji, husband of respondent No. 1 Gangabai was declared null and void. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are as follows: Agricultural land comprised in Survey No. 58/1 area 11.50 acres and Survey No. 183 area 0.15 acre situated in village Dhangaon Tahsil Harda was allegedly purchased by Seth Ratilal from one Gopiji son of Kasturji who was husband of respondent No. 1 Smt. Gangabai. The property further exchanged hands. The land was transferred in the year 1978 to respondent No. 2 Gajadhar by Seth Ratilal and respondent No. 2. Gajadhar in turn further transferred the land to respondent No. 3 Komalram vide sale deed dated 30th April, 1980. 2-A. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Gangabai had filed an application under the aforesaid Act of 1976 (Act No. 3 of 1977-hereinafter referred to as "the Act") before the competent authority, Sub Divisional Officer, for declaration that the sale deed dated 3-4-1965, was null and void being prohibited transaction as contemplated under the Act. It was alleged that husband of the respondent No. 1 was suffering from mental ailment which had seriously affected his power of judicious thinking. Taking advantage of the same, Seth Ratilal initially entered into an agreement dated 24-2-1965 with respect to land comprised in Survey Nos. 58/1 and 183/1 - total area 11.65 acres and two houses built on survey No. 183/1 situated at village Dhangaon, Tahsil Harda. A sale deed was got executed for a sum of Rs. 1000/- only on 3-4-1965 for lesser than the value mentioned in the agreement. The sale deed was a collateral security for loan and on repayment of the amount property was to be returned. 3. Seth Ratilal, the petitioner, submitted a reply before the S.D.O. and contended that a Civil Suit bearing No. 104-A/1978 was filed in respect of the same property by Smt. Gangabai and her suit was dismissed by the Civil Court as barred by limitation. 3. Seth Ratilal, the petitioner, submitted a reply before the S.D.O. and contended that a Civil Suit bearing No. 104-A/1978 was filed in respect of the same property by Smt. Gangabai and her suit was dismissed by the Civil Court as barred by limitation. The subject matter of the said Civil Suit and the present application is the same and, therefore, the matter cannot be reagitated under the provisions of the Act. Respondent No. 1 Gangabai examined herself and two other witnesses, namely, Ramgir and Shrikishan, before the S.D.O. Witnesses were also examined on behalf of the petitioner. 4. The S.D.O. vide order dated 9-7-1982, on the basis of material placed before him, came to the conclusion that the impugned transaction took place on 3-4-1965 and was subsisting on the appointed date i.e. 1st of January, 1971. Thus the transaction was within the purview of the Act as per section 4 of the Act. It was held that the order of the Civil Court was not on merits but on the basis of jurisdiction and limitation and, therefore, the S.D.O. had jurisdiction with respect to the proceedings, hence the application was not barred by res judicata. The land in question was purchased by Gangabai's husband Gopiji for a sum of Rs. 2750/-. The same could not be sold for a paltry sum of Rs. 1000/- in addition to the houses. The S.D.O. came to the conclusion that in the year 1961 the price of the land was Rs. 2800/- and it could not be sold after four years for the alleged consideration of Rs. 1000/-as the price in 1965 was much more. Another sale deed which was filed to show the price of the land at the relevant time was held misleading for the reason that situation of the land involved in the said sale deed was not made clear and there was difference in the quality of the land. Consideration of sale under the impugned sale deed was woefully inadequate and version of Gangabai was relied that as a matter of fact her husband had taken a loan of Rs. 1000/- from the petitioner and the sale deed was executed for repayment of the said loan. The S.D.O. came to the conclusion in favour of Gangabai that the transaction in question was that of loan and not that of an out and out sale. 1000/- from the petitioner and the sale deed was executed for repayment of the said loan. The S.D.O. came to the conclusion in favour of Gangabai that the transaction in question was that of loan and not that of an out and out sale. The transaction was, therefore, declared null and void under section 7(i)(ii)(a) of the Act and restoration of possession of the land was directed to be made in favour of Gangabai. 5. Seth Ratilal, the present petitioner, filed an appeal under section 8 of the Act before the Collector, Hoshangabad. The Collector expressed general agreement with the findings recorded by the S.D.O. It was also held that the objection raised on behalf of the appellant that the application filed before the S.D.O. was barred by limitation was not genuine as the government had extended limitation for filing application for setting aside the subsisting transaction on the appointed date till 31st January 1982. The application in question was filed on 8-4-1980 and thus was within limitation. 6. Shri S.L. Kochar, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the present application was not maintainable being barred by res judicata. It was not a case of prohibited transaction of loan. His further submission is that it was a case of stray transaction, hence as it has not been proved that the petitioner was a money lender the transaction in question does not fall within the purview of prohibited transaction. The Learned Counsel has taken this Court through various documents on record and also cited various cases which would be adverted to hereinafter. 7. The submission of the learned counsel is that the person should be money lender and it must be proved by evidence that he was lending loan and obtaining collateral security in the form of execution of sale deed. Until and unless such modus operandi in general is not proved, a singular transaction would not be covered under the protective umbrella provided by the Act. 8. "Lender of money" has been defined in section 2, sub-section (d) of the Act. The Act has contra-distinction between money lender under the M.P. Money Lenders Act, 1934 and lender of money which simply means a person advancing loan to a holder of agricultural land. 8. "Lender of money" has been defined in section 2, sub-section (d) of the Act. The Act has contra-distinction between money lender under the M.P. Money Lenders Act, 1934 and lender of money which simply means a person advancing loan to a holder of agricultural land. What is required under the Act of 3 of 1977 is that a person should have lent money to a 'holder of agricultural land' as mentioned in section 2(c) of the Act, in the weaker sections of the people which means a holder of land used for purposes of Agriculture not exceeding eight hectares of unirrigated land or four hectares of irrigated land within the State whether as a Bhumiswami or an occupancy tenant or a Government lessee, either in any one or all of the capacities together within the meaning of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. It is not in dispute the respondent No. 1 was holder of the land as contemplated in section 2(c) of the Act and his total holding did not exceed the prescribed limit. The view canvassed was adopted by this Court in two Division Bench decisions. In the case of Narbada Shakar vs. Collector Dhar and others, AIR 1985 M.P. 115 : 1985 MPLJ 444 , indeed it was held that a stray transaction would not come within the provisions of the Act unless and until it is proved that the person who had lent money is a money-lender. Another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bodhanlal vs. Additional Collector, Bilaspur, 1989 MPLJ 58 : 1989 JLJ 245 , also followed the above view as to a lender of money and it was held that stray transaction of loan by a person does not make him lender of money and such transaction would not be prohibited transaction of loan as defined in section 2(f) of the Act. Section 2(f) of the Act reads thus: (f). Section 2(f) of the Act reads thus: (f). 'prohibited transaction of loan' means a transaction in which a lender of money advances loan to a holder of agricultural land against security of his interest in land, whether at the time of advancing the loan or at any time thereafter during the currency of the loan in any of the following modes, namely:- (i) agreement to sell land with or without delivery of possession; (ii) outright sale of land with or without delivery of possession accompanied by separate agreement to re-sell it; (iii) outright sale of land with or without delivery of possession with a distinct oral understanding that the sale shall not be acted upon if the loan is repaid; (iv) outright sale of land with or without delivery of possession with a condition incorporated in the sale deed to resell it on repayment of the loan; (v) transaction in any modes other than those specified in clauses (i) to (iv) affecting interest in land including a fraudulent transaction or a transaction designed to defeat the provisions of any law regulating money lending or interest, for the time being in force, and includes all those transactions in which a lender of money has, after the appointed day but on or before the date of publication of this Act in the Gazette, obtained possession of land of the holder of agricultural land through Court or by force or otherwise or obtained a decree for such possession towards satisfaction of loan. The view propounded in the cases of Narmadashankar vs. Collector and Bodhanlal vs. Additional Collector, Bilaspur (supra) was overruled by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Imrat and others vs. Lanjua and others, 1991 MPLJ 164 : AIR 1991 MP 135 and interpretation of 'lender of money' as defined in section 2(b) of the Adhiniyam was held to include a single and solitary transaction if that transaction is a prohibited transaction of loan within the purview of section 2(f) of the Act No. 3 of 1977. Intendment of the legislature is to bring within the purview of the Act all persons who had lent money and contracted a prohibitory transaction of loan irrespective of his business. It is irrelevant whether he was a money-lender or not as contemplated in M.P. Money Lenders Act. Intendment of the legislature is to bring within the purview of the Act all persons who had lent money and contracted a prohibitory transaction of loan irrespective of his business. It is irrelevant whether he was a money-lender or not as contemplated in M.P. Money Lenders Act. A person may not be in regular business of money-lending but if the transaction is a prohibited transaction of loan, it would be entitled for protection of the Act. There is difference between lender of money and a money-lender. In view of the Full Bench decision, the view canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of substance. 9. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the present application filed under the Act was barred by the principle of res judicata as Civil Suit No. 104-A/1978 was filed for cancellation of the sale deed before the Civil Judge Class II, Harda but the same was dismissed on 3-12-1979. The suit was dismissed on preliminary issue that it was barred by limitation as the land in question was transferred in the year 1965 and the suit was presented on 27-9-1978. Another issue was posed for consideration by the Civil Court whether the Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Submission of the present petitioner was that the suit ought to have been valued at Rs. 17,000/- as sale was made by Seth Ratilal in favour of Gajadhar and Nathuram for a sum of Rs. 17,000/-. The trial Court did not decide the question of jurisdiction as it held that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court in support of the submission in regard to res judicata - (i) Mohanlal vs. State of M.P., 1998 (2) MPLJ 638 and Division Bench decision in Keshar Singh vs. Bhav Singh, 1994 MPLJ 268 . 10. In order to examine the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the aims and objects of the Act may be noted. The Act aims to better economic condition of holders of agricultural land in the weaker sections of the people by providing further relief from agricultural indebtedness by nullifying the land grabbing designs resorted to in many a form by lenders of money. The Act aims to better economic condition of holders of agricultural land in the weaker sections of the people by providing further relief from agricultural indebtedness by nullifying the land grabbing designs resorted to in many a form by lenders of money. The intendment of the Act to nullify such past transactions of loan as also to put a stop to such transactions. The Act received the assent of the President on 22nd January, 1977 and was published in the M. P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 31st January, 1977. Clause (a) of section 2 of the Act defines "appointed day" to mean 1st day of January, 1971. Section 3 of the Act contains a non-obstante clause. Section 3 reads as under: 3. Act to override other laws.- The provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law or any custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a. Court or other authority. Section 3 takes into its ambit any decree or order of a Court or other authority. Section 14 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court after the enforcement of the Act subject to provisions of section 11. Thus, the only pending Civil Suit or the pending proceedings in a Court of law as per section 11 of the Act which could be subject matter of enquiry by S.D.O. under this Act shall be decided by the Court in accordance with the provisions of this Act notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in law for the time being in force. Thus, what was saved is a pending Civil Suit on the date of enforcement of the Act and not all proceedings in a Court of law. Section 14, subject to the saving of pending proceedings as mentioned in section 11, has excluded jurisdiction of Civil Court to settle or decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the S.D.O. or the Collector. Section 14, subject to the saving of pending proceedings as mentioned in section 11, has excluded jurisdiction of Civil Court to settle or decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the S.D.O. or the Collector. Thus, it is clear that after the Act came in force, the Civil Court ceased to have jurisdiction in a proceeding instituted thereafter to decide whether a transaction is a prohibited transaction of loan and holder is one contemplated under the Act No. 3 of 1977. In the present case, the suit was filed in September, 1978 when Act No. 3 of 1977 was operative and the bar created under section 14 was clearly attracted. Thus, it is clear that the Civil Suit could not be entertained with respect to the transaction in question by a Civil Court. Section 4 of the Act provides a protection to all the subsisting transactions on the appointed date. The transaction was subsisting on the appointed date i.e. 1st day of January, 1971 or order by that time, nor was wiped off under any law for the time being in force on 1st day of January 1971, the appointed date. Section 4 of the Act provided a protection to such transaction. Section 4 reads thus: 4. All prohibited transactions of loan to be subject to protection and relief under this Act.- It is hereby declared that all claims in relation to a prohibited transaction of loan subsisting on the appointed day or entered into thereafter but on or before the date of publication of this Act in the Gazette shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other enactment for the time being in force or any decree or order, if any, of any Court or authority be subject to protection and relief in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 4 again provides that provisions of this Act shall apply notwithstanding anything contained in the Land Revenue Code, 1959 or any enactment for the time being in force or any decree or order of any Court or Authority. The transaction shall be subjected to protection and relief in accordance with the provisions of this Act if the prohibitory transaction or loan was subsisting on the appointed day or was entered into thereafter. 11. The transaction shall be subjected to protection and relief in accordance with the provisions of this Act if the prohibitory transaction or loan was subsisting on the appointed day or was entered into thereafter. 11. The factual matrix obtaining in the present case indicates that suit was filed in the year 1978 when the Court was having no jurisdiction to decide whether the transaction was prohibited transaction of loan. The question could be decided by the S.D.O. under Act No. 3 of 1977. Section 14 bars the entertaining of the suit by Civil Court. It was not a pending proceeding saved under section 11 and in case it was a prohibited transaction of loan as found by the S.D.O., only the S.D.O. had the jurisdiction. Thus, dismissal of the suit filed after the commencement of the Act would not bar the application for seeking protection of the Act. This view finds further support from sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The Civil Suit was not given a trial by the Civil Court and was dismissed on the ground of limitation without considering whether it was having pecuniary jurisdiction to give a trial to the suit. Thereafter, the present proceedings were filed. 12. It may be seen that limitation to file proceedings seeking protection under Act No. 3 of 1977 was extended time to time and the present proceedings was filed for protection under the Act by the respondent No. 1 within that period. The limitation was extended to file application to declare the transaction null and void upto 31st January 1982 vide Notification No. 577-6-/7/81 dated 21st February 1981 and the application in question seeking protection of the Act was filed on 8-4-1980. Thus, it is held that dismissal of the suit on the ground of limitation did not bar the presentation of the application under the Act No. 3 of 1977 and the present application was not barred by principle of res judicata. 13. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner may now be adverted to. In the case of Keshar Singh vs. Bhav Singh, 1994 MPLJ 268 sale deed was executed on 27-6-1960. Proceedings were taken before the Debt Relief Court. The Debt Relief Court vide order dated 9-1-1978 had found that the transaction was not of loan or mortgage but sale of land outright. In the case of Keshar Singh vs. Bhav Singh, 1994 MPLJ 268 sale deed was executed on 27-6-1960. Proceedings were taken before the Debt Relief Court. The Debt Relief Court vide order dated 9-1-1978 had found that the transaction was not of loan or mortgage but sale of land outright. A revision was filed before the Additional Collector against the said order which was also dismissed on 17-7-1978. Thereafter, an application dated 31-8-1981 under section 8 of the Act No. 3/1977 was filed. The S.D.O. had initially dismissed the application, but after remand by this Court allowed the application on 11-2-1986 and directed restoration of possession treating the transaction as transaction of loan. The appeal against the said order was dismissed. Thereafter, the matter again came to this Court. This Court has held in para 22 of its order as under:- It is an admitted fact that earlier an application was filed by applicant-respondent before the Debt Relief Court and that has ultimately been decided against applicant-respondent. It is thus, apparent that an enquiry in the case about its being a transaction of sale or mortgage was already done by competent authority. There was a clear finding in favour of petitioner, non-applicant and as against the respondent-applicant, and in such a situation the principle of res judicata would be attracted otherwise there will be no finality in the matter and purchaser of land would be subject to harassment all the time and whenever fresh application to that effect is made. In the case of Keshar Singh (supra) the Debt Relief Court had already gone into the question and the competent authority had already held an enquiry. In that background the Division Bench of this Court has held that principles of res judicata would be attracted. That is not the situation obtaining in the present case. No proceedings were filed before the competent authority at earlier point of time and when Civil Suit was filed the Civil Court jurisdiction was barred under section 14. 14. The other decision relied upon by the petitioner is Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mohanlal vs. State of M.P., 1998 (2) MPLJ 638 . The facts of the said case indicate that on 23-10-1969 a registered sale deed was executed. Yet another sale deed dated 17-9-1970 was also executed. 14. The other decision relied upon by the petitioner is Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mohanlal vs. State of M.P., 1998 (2) MPLJ 638 . The facts of the said case indicate that on 23-10-1969 a registered sale deed was executed. Yet another sale deed dated 17-9-1970 was also executed. An application was moved by one Rama before the Debt Relief Court which was registered as Case No. 36/1975. The competent Court vide order dated 8-7-1976 held that it was not a loan or mortgage transaction but was an out and out sale. The application filed was rejected. Thereafter proceedings under section 145 Criminal Procedure Code was resorted to as dispute as to possession continued. An application for restoration of possession was also moved by the wife of Rama before Tahsildar. The said application was rejected. A suit was also filed being C.S. No. 60-A/1997. The Civil Judge Class II Mhow by judgment dated 17-5-1997 found that the suit property was purchased by the plaintiff under valid sale deed from Rama and was in possession since 25-5-1968. Thereafter an application under section 5 of Act No. 3/1977 was filed which was allowed and it was found that the transaction was a prohibited transaction of loan. An appeal was filed which was dismissed. These orders were challenged in Writ Petition filed before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed on the decision of Keshar Singh (supra) so as to find that application filed was barred by principles res judicata. This Court came to the conclusion in para 15 of its order in Mohanlal (supra) as under:- True, it is, that irrespective of the decree or order of a Court or authority, the Sub Divisional Officer can proceed with the matter, but the law does not say that the findings recorded by a competent Court of law have to be ignored absolutely, and would have no weight before a Revenue Officer. In the case of Mohanlal (supra), the impact of Civil Suit No. 60/71 was considered in which it was held by the Court that the transaction was a genuine transaction of sale and not a prohibited transaction of loan, therefore, in the subsequent proceedings such finding is entitled to respect. In the case of Mohanlal (supra), the impact of Civil Suit No. 60/71 was considered in which it was held by the Court that the transaction was a genuine transaction of sale and not a prohibited transaction of loan, therefore, in the subsequent proceedings such finding is entitled to respect. As a matter of fact, the said Civil Suit was a pending proceeding and was clearly saved by virtue of provisions of section 11 of the Act itself. Not only that, finding of Debt Relief Court was also against the applicant, which was also a competent Court. In that context it was held that section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code would come into effect at this stage. Thus, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from that of Mohanlal (supra) as in the said case the pending Civil Suit was saved and that was decided, and in addition, the competent Debt Relief Court had also decided the issue. The case of Mohanlal and Keshar Singh (supra) are clearly distinguishable on facts. In Mohanlal in paragraphs 15 and 16 it was held that findings of Civil Court are entitled to weight, but here in the present case no finding was recorded by the Civil Court no trial was given, and Civil Court was having no jurisdiction to give a trial to the question of prohibited transaction of loan as the only competent forum at the relevant time was the S.D.O. 15. This Court in Jahar Singh and another vs. Collector Shivpuri ( AIR 1988 MP 311 ), held as under:- 5. An overall view of the remaining provisions of the Adhiniyam would be also rewarding. Section 1 speaks of short title and commencement only. Section 2 embraces the definition clause and clause (a) thereof speaks of "appointed day" to mean the first date of January 1971 which, according to section 1(2), is also the date of commencement of the Adhiniyam. Section 3 contemplates that the provisions of the Adhiniyam shall have overriding effect. Section 1 speaks of short title and commencement only. Section 2 embraces the definition clause and clause (a) thereof speaks of "appointed day" to mean the first date of January 1971 which, according to section 1(2), is also the date of commencement of the Adhiniyam. Section 3 contemplates that the provisions of the Adhiniyam shall have overriding effect. Section 4 is relied on by Shri Arun Mishra and it may, therefore, be quoted in extenso: It is hereby declared that all claims in relation to a prohibited transaction of loan subsisting on the appointed day or entered into there after but on or before the date of publication of this Act in the Gazette shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other enactment for the time being in force or any decree or order, if any, of any Court or authority, be subject to protection and relief in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 5 provides, "A holder of agricultural land who is a party to any transaction of land subsisting on the appointed day or entered into thereafter may apply to the Sub Divisional Officer within such time, and in such form and manner as may be prescribed for protection and relief under this Act." (Emphasis added). Section 6 is also of signal relevance, because it confers power on the Sub-Divisional Officer to act "on his own motion in any transaction of loan" beside acting "on receipt of an application under section 5". Section 7 contemplates holding of enquiry by the Sub-Divisional Officer, to declare the transaction of loan to be void and pass an order "setting aside the transfer of land to the lender of money and consequently restoring the possession to the holder of agricultural land." The proviso to section 7(1) keeps alive the "right to recover the loan advanced by him (money-lender), to the holder of agricultural land under such transaction by due process of law within a period of three months from the date of final declaration of prohibited transaction of loan." Section 14 bars jurisdiction of Civil Courts expressly to "settle, decide or deal with any question" required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Sub Divisional Officer or Collector (in appeal under section 8) in accordance with the Adhiniyam. 6. Some other provisions which have a material hearing on the controversy may now be noted. 6. Some other provisions which have a material hearing on the controversy may now be noted. Section 12 also clearly expresses intention of the Legislature that the Adhiniyam was enacted as a permanent measure as it prohibits money lenders from entering into a prohibited transaction of loan on any future date after commencement of the Adhiniyam. Indeed, Sub-section (2) thereof contemplates that any transaction completed "in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be absolutely null and void and no Court shall entertain any application or suit to enforce any claim of lender of money arising out of prohibited transaction of loan." Section 15 makes void transfer by a money-lender of any land which may be subject-matter of a prohibited transaction of a loan by envisaging that "such transfer shall be deemed to have been made to defeat the provisions of this Act and be null and void". Another provision of crucial significance is Section 16 which empowers the State Government to remove "any doubt or difficulty (which arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act)" by making such provisions not inconsistent "with the purpose of the Act" as may be necessary or expedient for removing the doubt or difficulty. Section 18 is the ultimate provision conferring power on State Government to make rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act for providing for such matters among others as "the time within which and forum and manner in which application shall be made under section 5. 16. The S.D.O. has found that consideration was highly inadequate. The agreement itself was for Rs. 3700/- and sale deed was executed for Rs. 1000/- on 3-4-1965, and subsequently, vide sale deed dated 28-6-1977 the petitioner had sold the land to Gajadhar and Nathulal for a sum of Rs. 17,000/-. The finding which has been given in respect of inadequacy of the consideration of sale deed is based on appreciation of evidence and cannot be questioned in writ jurisdiction. We find no infirmity in the finding recorded by the S.D.O. 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Namdeo vs. Collector, East Nimar, AIR 1996 SC 973 , in view of the inadequacy of consideration has held that the sale was within the prohibited period and finding was recorded under section 7(i)(a) of the Act. We find no infirmity in the finding recorded by the S.D.O. 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Namdeo vs. Collector, East Nimar, AIR 1996 SC 973 , in view of the inadequacy of consideration has held that the sale was within the prohibited period and finding was recorded under section 7(i)(a) of the Act. Consequently, it was not necessary to consider the enquiry contemplated under Clause (b) of section 7(i)(ii) read with Clause (h) of section 6. In the present case, under section 7(i)(a) of the Act evidence was recorded and it was found by the S.D.O. that the consideration was inadequate and the transaction was prohibited transaction of loan. Consideration has been held to be woefully inadequate. There is categoric statement of the applicant that her husband had taken the loan. In view of the facts and circumstances, the transaction was declared null and void and possession was ordered to be restored. Since the initial transaction has fallen down, the subsequent sales cannot survive and cannot come in the way of restoration of possession in favour of respondent No. 1 Gangabai. She is entitled to obtain possession free from all incumbrances. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.