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2000 DIGILAW 358 (PAT)

S. M. Haque v. High Court Of Patna

2000-03-03

D.P.S.CHOUDHARY, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

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Judgment S.J.Mukhopadhaya, J. 1. The writ petition has been preferred by a member of Superior Judicial Service against the decision of the Patna High Court, as communicated by the Registrar General of Patna High Court, vide letter dated 21st July, 1999, whereby and whereunder, the High Court refused to allow the benefit of enhancement of retirement age in favour of petitioner from 58 years to 60 years. 2. To appreciate the case of petitioner, apart from the relevant facts, the stand of the petitioner to be taken into consideration, as shown in the synopsis, and recorded hereunder. "Petitioner is constrained to approach this Honble Court, despite the judgment of the Honble Supreme court in the case of "All India Judges Association & Ors. vs. Union of India & ors", reported in (1992) 1 SCC 119 , Government of Bihar has failed to frame appropriate Service Rules in respect of the Judicial Officers working in the State of Bihar and has failed to enhance the retirement age of the Judicial Officers to 60 years. Petitioner has been denied the benefit of retirement age of 60 years on the basis of alleged assessment and evaluation of his service by a letter dated 21.7.1999, when merely four months prior to the impugned order, the petitioner was promoted to the coveted and most responsible post of District & Sessions Judge and without there being any adverse remarks against the petitioner subsequent to his appointment as District & Sessions Judge, the petitioner has been denied the benefit of enhancement of the retirement age in most arbitrary manner. Petitioner further submits that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the Governor and the petitioner can be compulsorily retired from the service only by the order of the Governor. Therefore, the order of Honble High Court compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service at the age of 58 years is without jurisdiction and not sustainable in the eyes of law." 3. The case of the petitioner is that he topped in the 13th Bihar Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Examination held in 1971 and appointed as Probationary Munsif for two years. Subsequently, he was confirmed to the said post and then promoted to the post of Additional Subordinate Judge in June, 1983. The case of the petitioner is that he topped in the 13th Bihar Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Examination held in 1971 and appointed as Probationary Munsif for two years. Subsequently, he was confirmed to the said post and then promoted to the post of Additional Subordinate Judge in June, 1983. The petitioner was confirmed as Subordinate Judge with effect from 21st June, 1987 and then promoted to the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge (A.D.J.) in November, 1989. He was also confirmed in Bihar Superior Judicial Service with effect from 1-6-1991 and granted promotion to Second Level Need Based Post on 25th July, 1996. Just before three months of the issuance of the impugned order refusing enhancement of retirement age, he was appointed to the post of District & Sessions Judge, the topmost post in the higher Judicial Service, on 20th March, 1999. 4. According to him, the track record of petitioner has been extremely good and there had been no adverse remarks against him since 1986. In fact, the Inspecting Honble Judges found his work satisfactory and good in different period including 1996 and 1997. The confidential report relating to disposal of cases was also found satisfactory, fair and good, even upto the last quarter of 1997. 5. According to the counsel for the petitioner, 60 years is the age of retirement of a member of Bihar Superior Judicial Service, in terms with the decision of Supreme Court in the case of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India and others, as reported in (1992)1 SCC 119 , as reiterated in the case of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India and others, while reviewing the aforesaid case, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 288 . Reliance was placed on the following observations, made by the Supreme Court : (1992) 1 SCC 119 "63. We would now briefly indicate the directions we have given in the judgment : (i) An All India Judicial Service should be set up and the Union of India should take appropriate steps in this regard. (ii) Steps should be taken to bring about uniformity in designation of officers both in civil and the criminal side by March 31, 1993. (iii) Retirement age of judicial officers be raised to 60 years and appropriate steps are to be taken by December 31, 1992. (ii) Steps should be taken to bring about uniformity in designation of officers both in civil and the criminal side by March 31, 1993. (iii) Retirement age of judicial officers be raised to 60 years and appropriate steps are to be taken by December 31, 1992. (iv) As and when the Pay Commissions /Committees are set up in the States and Union territories, the question of appropriate pay scales of judicial officers be specifically referred and considered. (v) A working library at the residence of every judicial officer has to be provided by June 30, 1992. Provision for sumptuary allowance as stated has to be made. (vi) Residential accommodation to every judicial officer has to be provided and until State accommodation is available, government should provide requisitioned accommodation for them in the manner indicated by December 31, 1992. In providing residential accommodation, availability of an office room should be kept in view. (vii) Every District Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate should have a State vehicle, judicial officers in sets of five should have a pool vehicle and others would be entitled to suitable loans to acquire two wheeler automobiles within different time limits as specified. (viii) In-service Institute should be set up within one year at the Central and State or Union territory level." (1993) 4 SCC 288 "25. (iii) Superannuation Age : The objection to the direction for enhancement of the superannuation age of all the subordinate judicial officers up to 60 years, is firstly on the ground that the determination of the superannuation age is a matter of policy of the executive and hence the said direction is in violation of the basic structure of the Constitution which envisages separation of powers between the three organs of the State. The further objection is that the distinction made between the members of the judicial service and those of the other services on the ground of the late entry into the service and the sedentary nature of the work of the former is an error on the face of the record ......." "26. This argument misses the point that the longer period required for acquiring the necessary academic qualification is only one of the ground on which the enhancement of the superannuation age is directed. This argument misses the point that the longer period required for acquiring the necessary academic qualification is only one of the ground on which the enhancement of the superannuation age is directed. Even after the acquisition of the relevant academic qualification, a minimum practice at the Bar is in most of the States, a pre-requisite for recruitment to the post of the Judge even at the lowest level. There is no such waiting period for the candidates of the other services after the acquisition of the academic qualifications. Thus the judicial officer enters the servide at a relatively higher age than the member of the other services. Secondly, as observed by the Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report, the judicial service stands by itself in the matter of the age of retirement by reason of the great importance of a long experience and a mature mind in the judicial office. The recognition of such importance has led most countries to prescribe a much higher age for the retirement of judicial personnel as compared with that of the personnel in other services....." 6. It was submitted that the age of retirement being 60 years, in retiring a person earlier to the same at the age of 58 years, the procedure of compulsory retirement to be followed. The petitioner having appointed as District & Sessions Judge on 20th March, 1999, adverse remarks prior to the said date, cannot be taken into consideration, nor the petitioner could have been compulsorily retired from service at the age of 58 years on the basis of the service record, prior to that of March 1999. 7. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Courts decision in the case of Dr. Ramaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 510 , in support of aforesaid submission. 8. The counsel also placed reliance on Supreme Courts decision in the case of Madan Mohan Choudhary vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1999 BLJ 525, wherein the Supreme Court observed that compulsory retirement under Rule 74 cannot be made on the basis of an order passed in the judicial capacity (an order passed in anticipatory bail in the said case). It further held that the remarks of three years recorded at one go, should not have taken into consideration to form opinion for compulsory retirement, having not recorded in normal course. It further held that the remarks of three years recorded at one go, should not have taken into consideration to form opinion for compulsory retirement, having not recorded in normal course. The advice or opinion given by the High Court must be supported by materials on record and cannot be arbitrary. An order passed in judicial side by Judicial officer might be wrong, but being based on judicial side in all bonafide, cannot be a ground for compulsory retirement. 9. The other submission made by the counsel for the petitioner is that the High Court has no jurisdiction to compuisorily retire the petitioner, as formal order is to be passed by the appointing authority i.e. State of Bihar, by the order of Governor; it was submitted that no such formal order was issued by the order of Governor of Bihar/State in the present case. 10. Reliance was placed on a Supreme Courts decision in the case of Registrar (Administration), High Court of Ortssa vs. Sisir Kanta Satapathy, as reported in AIR 1999 SC 3265 . In the said case, the Supreme Court held that though the High Court alone is entitled to initiate to hold equuiry and to take decision in respect of dismissal, removal, reduction in the rank or termination from service, but the formal order to give effect to such a decision has to be passed only by the State Governor on the recommendation of the High Court. The recommending authority cannot itself pass such an order. 11. The question arises is as to whether the order, in question, disallowing the petitioner to continue upto 60 years amounts to compulsory retirement, as stipulated under Rule 74 of Bihar Service Code (commonly known as dead wood theory) or amounts to refusal of extension of service beyond the period of superannuation. 12. The Bihar Superior Judicial Service Officers are governed by general conditions of service as laid down under the Bihar Service Code, 1952 . They are also guided by Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1935. While "compulsory retirement" is one of the punishments under Rule 49 of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules and Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the premature retirement (also commonly known as "compulsory retirement"), because of inefficiency or mis-conduct and in public interest is stipulated under Rule 74 (a) & (b) of Bihar Service Code. 13. While "compulsory retirement" is one of the punishments under Rule 49 of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules and Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the premature retirement (also commonly known as "compulsory retirement"), because of inefficiency or mis-conduct and in public interest is stipulated under Rule 74 (a) & (b) of Bihar Service Code. 13. The normal age of superannuation of a State Govt. employee, including Bihar Superior Judicial Service Officers is 58 years of age, as stipulated under Rule 73 of Bihar Service Code. Such age of superannuation has also been prescribed as "compulsory retirement" from service under the said Rule. Thus, while no record of service is required to be looked into for "compulsory retirement" on attaining the age of superannuation under Rule 73 of Bihar Service Code; to inflict "compulsory retirement", as a measure of punishment; a fullfledged enquiry is to be conducted giving opportunity to the incumbent in terms with Rule 55 of Bihar Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The State/appointing authority has also power to retire a person prematurely, after certain age and year of service, because of inefficiency or conduct or in public interest, as prescribed under Rule 74 of Bihar Service Code, which is also known as "compulsory retirement" for such reason. Not only, three months notice or salary in lieu of such notice is to be given for retirement in public interest under Rule 74 (b), to retire a person on the basis of inefficiency or misconduct, a procedure is to be followed taking into consideration the service record, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ramaswamy, (1982) 1 SCC 510 . 14. As stated above, the age fixed for superannuation/compulsory retirement from the services of the State of Bihar is 58 years under Rule 73 of Bihar Service Code. The same Rule permits, retention of a service even after the date of superannuation /compulsory retirement with the sanction of the State Government, to be recorded in writing. The said Rule has not yet been amended and the age of superannuation /compulsory retirement has not yet been extended to 60 years. 15. The same Rule permits, retention of a service even after the date of superannuation /compulsory retirement with the sanction of the State Government, to be recorded in writing. The said Rule has not yet been amended and the age of superannuation /compulsory retirement has not yet been extended to 60 years. 15. In the case of All India Judges Association, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 119 , at Paragraph No. 63, when the Supreme Court issued direction on the State, under clause (iii) therein, it was ordered to raise the retirement age to 60 years. Subsequently, review application was preferred in the case of All India Judges Association and others, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 288 , wherein the Supreme Court upheld the earlier direction for enhancement of superannuation age to 60 years, but modified the main judgment with following observations : "There is, however, one aspect we should emphasise here. To that extent the direction contained in the main judgment under review shall stand modified. The benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years, shall not be available automatically to all judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and evience of their continued utility to the judicial system. The benefit will be available to those who, in the opinion of the respective High Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committees of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the judicial officers past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters." 16. From the aforesaid finding, it will be evident that the age of superannuation may be enhanced to 60 years and not made automatically available to all Judicial Officers, subject to opinion of the respective High Courts. At Paragraph 31 therein, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court should undertake and complete the exercise in case of officers about to attain the age of 58 years well within time by following the procedure for compulsory retirement, as laid down in the respective Service Rules. 17. At Paragraph 31 therein, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court should undertake and complete the exercise in case of officers about to attain the age of 58 years well within time by following the procedure for compulsory retirement, as laid down in the respective Service Rules. 17. Thereby, while enhancement of superannuation age to 60 years is not automatic, for such enhancement procedure for compulsory retirement is to be followed. Therefore, while procedure for compulsory retirement is to be followed in such cases, non-enhancement of age of retirement to 60 years, does not amount to "compulsory retirement", as stipulated under Rule 74 of Bihar Service Code or "compulsory retirement" by way of punishment, as stipulated under Rule 49 of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India, but amounts to "compulsory retirement", as stipulated under Rule 73 of Bihar Service Code, commonly known as superannuation from service. 18. The aforesaid fact will be evident from the Supreme Courts decision in the case of Rajat Baran Roy vs. State of West Bengal and others, as reported in AIR 1999 SC 1661 . In the said case, taking into consideration that the age of retirement of West Bengal Higher Judicial Service was raised to 60 years under the Rule Supreme Court held that the decision of Supreme Court in the case reported in (1993) 4 SCC 288 is not applicable, having ceased to exist, as quoted hereunder : AIR 1999 SC 1661 : "12. By virtue of the Government order of the State of West Bengal dated 20.6.1992 when the State Government applied the change in service conditions as per the Office Memorandum dated 15.5.1998 to the members of its services automatically the said change in the age of retirement became applicable to the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service also. In other words, when the retirement age of the officers of the Indian Administrative Service stood extended from 58 years to 60 years, the retirement age of the members of the West Bengal Judicial Service also automatically got extended from 58 to 60 years. Therefore, on and from the above date, the age of superannuation of a member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service came to be governed by the above rules. Therefore, on and from the above date, the age of superannuation of a member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service came to be governed by the above rules. Consequently, the directions including the rider thereon issued by this Court in the 1993 case ceases to operate. Therefore, in our opinion, the contention of the respondents that the rights of the petitioners to continue in service till the age of 60 years is derived from the directions issued by this Court in the 1993 case, cannot be accepted, and we hold that so far as the members of the West Bengal Higher judicial Service are concernced, their age of superannuation is 60 years, as contemplated in the Official Memorandum of the Government of West Bengal dated 15-5-1998 as made applicable to the Higher Judicial Service of West Bengal in its order dated 26- 6-1992 and the said office Memorandum and the Government order having not fixed any pre-retirement assessment at the age of 58 years, it was not open to the High Court to have recommended the compulsory retirement of the petitioners, following directions of this Court which had ceased to exist." 19. Thus, in a case where in terms of Supreme Courts direction, the age of superannuation/retirement has already been raised by the concerned State Government to 60 years, there the Supreme Courts decision in the case, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 288 , is not applicable and, except under Rule 74 of Bihar Service Code or Article 311 of Constitution of India, no person can be compulsorily retired prior to 60 years of age. On the other hand, where the rule of superannuation has not been modified and enhanced to 60 years, the law and guideline laid down by the Supreme Court in the case, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 288 , to be followed, to grant benefit of increase in retirement age to 60 years. 20. Admittedly, to grant benefit of increase of the retirement age to 60 years, the High Court is to undertake and follow the procedure for compulsory retirement, but the ground and the basis of assessment, may differ. 20. Admittedly, to grant benefit of increase of the retirement age to 60 years, the High Court is to undertake and follow the procedure for compulsory retirement, but the ground and the basis of assessment, may differ. For compulsory retirement/premature retirement under Rule 74(a) of Bihar Service Code,while "efficiency" and "conduct" are the factors to be assessed, for such retirement under Rule 74 (b), not only three months notice or amount equal to three months pay to be paid, the retirement should be in "public interest". As in the case of Judicial Service where the age of retirement of 60 years not fixed, but the benefit of increase of retirement age to 60 years could be given by the High Court in terms of Supreme Courts decision, it is not only "efficiency" or "conduct" or "public interest" to be seen, but the other factors like "potential" for continued "useful" service, as observed by the Supreme Court, and quoted hereunder : "........it is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committees of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the judicial officers past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters." 21. Thus, while procedure for compulsory retirement to be followed, the assessment to be made on the basis of service record, the grounds for refusal to increase the age of retirement may be different than the ground for compulsory retirement, under Rule 74 of Bihar Service Code. While the "conduct", "efficiency" and "public interest" are the only factors to be seen for compulsory retirement under Rule 74 (a) and (b), for increase of age of retirement to 60 years, in terms of Supreme Courts decision, not only the integrity and efficiency are to be seen, but also the reputation and potential for continued useful service are also to be adjudged on the basis of service records; character rolls; quality of judgments and other relevant materials. Those who will not be found fit and eligible by that standard, are not to be given benefit of increase in retirement age and will automatically retire at the age of 58 years, which amounts to normal superannuation on attaining the age of 58 years. Thereby, while compulsory retirement under Article 311 of the Constitution of India; Discipline & Appeal Rules; and the compulsory retirement under Rule 74, are punitive in nature, amounts to reduction in the age of retirement, the compulsory retirement on attaining 58 years of age, is neither punitive nor amounts to reduction in such age of retirement. The benefit to continue upto 60 years, in terms of Supreme Courts decision, on the other hand, amounts to increase of age of retirement. 22. For the reasons aforesaid, I hold that while for enhancement of age of retirement, a formal order is required, to be passed, if the High Court refuses to increase the age of retirement to 60 years to a Judicial Officer, he is to superannuate on attaining the age of 58 years under Rule 73 of Bihar Service Code and for that no formal order is required to be passed by the State of Bihar. The case of Sisir Kanta Satapathy ( AIR 1999 SC 3265 ) is not applicable in such cases, as the said case related to an order of compulsory retirement, amounting to termination of service, attracting the provisions of Article 311 of Constitution of India and not a case of superannuation/compulsory retirement on attaining the age of 58 years. 23. Now to determine the question as to whether the impugned letter dated 21st July, 1999 (Annexure-18) is illegal being based on no evidence and without jurisdiction or not. it is necessary to look into the records, as were placed before the Evaluation Committee and the Full Court, as extracted hereunder : "Sri Syed Masudul Haque District & Sessions Judge, Gopalganj. Joined Judicial Service as Munsif 28.3.1972. Confirmed in the post of Munsif 23.12.1976. Promoted to the rank of Sub-Judge 12.7.1982. Confirmed in the post of Sub-Judge 21.6.1987. Promoted to the Superior Judicial Service27.11.1989. Confirmed in the post of Superior Judicial Service1.6.1991. Appointed as District & Sessions Judge7.4.1999." "Sri Haque was superseded in the matter of confirmation in the post of Sub-Judge as also in the matter of appointment as District & Sessions Judge. Promoted to the rank of Sub-Judge 12.7.1982. Confirmed in the post of Sub-Judge 21.6.1987. Promoted to the Superior Judicial Service27.11.1989. Confirmed in the post of Superior Judicial Service1.6.1991. Appointed as District & Sessions Judge7.4.1999." "Sri Haque was superseded in the matter of confirmation in the post of Sub-Judge as also in the matter of appointment as District & Sessions Judge. From perusal of his C.R., it appears that he was adversely commented upon regarding his inadequate outturn for the years 1973, 1974, 1977 by the Court." "The Honble Court has been pleased to disapprove his manner of leaving Station without prior permission for which he was warned to remain careful in future in the year 1983. He was further adversely commented upon by the then District Judge, Purnea for his performance for the year 1979-80, which is as follows : "An Officer of average merit. Not to be trusted." "The then District Judge, Sasaram has not passed any comment regarding his integrity for the year 1984-85. But the adverse report for the year 1984-85 indicates that his disposal was found to be poor, while judging his performance it was recorded that "about 6 (six) transfer petitions have been filed during the relevant period against him making allegations against his honesty and impartiality supported by affidavits. It further goes to show that "some of senior lawyers of both section of community including Hindu and Muslim, have spoken verbally about his questioned honestly and impartiality; he has been keeping his family at Sasaram, the previous place of posting and is also maintaining his establishment at this place in a rented house of a Muslim lawyer." and thus he leaves the Station of his posting very frequently, this also affects his disposal. Lacks punctuality in attending the Court even while remaining at the station or returning from leave. "The Officer does not enjoy clear reputation and good image about his integrity. Similarly, for the year 1985-86, he has been given adverse remarks, as follows : "Did not enjoy clear reputation and good image about his integrity. In improvement during his period. Lacks punctuality in attending the Court even while remaining at the station or returning from leave. "The Officer does not enjoy clear reputation and good image about his integrity. Similarly, for the year 1985-86, he has been given adverse remarks, as follows : "Did not enjoy clear reputation and good image about his integrity. In improvement during his period. Not sincerely concentrated towards disposal of case." Again for the year 1988-89 the then District Judge, Chaibasa has recorded that "he should improve his knowledge of law and procedure." "After his promotion to the Superior Judicial Service his work and performance has been assessed by the Standing Committee for the year from 1989-90 to 1993-94 and the grade B+ has been awarded to him for all the aforesaid years and B for the year 1996-97 and again B+ for the year 1997-98. Vigilance Cell has reported that allegation File No. XXI-23-94, Part File Mo. XXI-3-94 and XXIII-48-88 were opened against Sri Haque on the basis of certain allegation petitions which are dealt with as under : XXI-23-94 An allegation petition from Gauri Shankar Ojha of Bhagaipur was received directed against Sri Haque regarding granting of bail in Sessions Trial No. 314/94 and report of Vigilance Cell in this regard goes to show that J.C., Ranch was directed to transfer the case to some other competent Court. Part File No. XXI-23-94 goes to show that an allegation petition was received from one Naz Parveen of Madhepura regarding grant of bail in Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 21/98 under section 438 of Cr. P.C. to the accused of Complaint Case No. 663/C/97 u/Ss. 323, 380, 307, 304, 120B and 498A, I.P.C. and u/S 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Sri Haque heard the Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 21/98 as Incharge of the District Judge on 3.3.1998 and refused the prayer of Anticipatory bail. But the allegation further goes that on the same facts again a petition of anticipatory bail of the same accused in the petition No. 29/98 was again heard by Sri Haque on 9.3.98 and the bail was granted. So allegation is that previous order was reversed just after a few days though the facts were the same. But the allegation further goes that on the same facts again a petition of anticipatory bail of the same accused in the petition No. 29/98 was again heard by Sri Haque on 9.3.98 and the bail was granted. So allegation is that previous order was reversed just after a few days though the facts were the same. ...........It appears that 9 accused persons presented their applications for grant of Anticipatory bail in A.B.P. No. 21/98 on 3.3.98, but it was rejected by Sri Haque on the consideration of the fact that the offence was of heinous nature. Subsequently, the lady accused of the same case again prayed for anticipatory bail vide A.B.P. No. 29/98, which was moved by another lawyer and Sri Haque again reconsidered the matter and status of lady accused and distinguishing their case from other accused persons granted anticipatory bail. It appears that while deciding the bail petition on two occasions the evidence on record had remained the same.......... The explanation of Sri S.M. Haque has been considered by the Standing Committee at its meeting dated 7.8.1998 and the Standing Committee have been pleased to warn Sri Haque to be careful in future." 24. Thus, it cannot be stated that the decision is not based on records. 25. In the case of Anirudh Prasad Choudhary vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1996 (1) PLJR 633 , an Special Bench consisting of five Honble Judges of this Court held that High Court would neither be justified in examining for itself the service records of the officers, as an Appellate Court, nor this Court can substitute its decision for that of the Expert Body, like the Full Court on administrative side. The scope of judicial review is very narrow and cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court. The judicial review cannot be made against the decision, but the decision making process only. 26. In the present case, the total procedure for compulsory retirement was followed. The records of service; judgments; complaints; and decision thereon after notice to the concerned party were placed before the Evaluation Committee consisting of nine Honbie Judges under the guidance of the Honble the Chief Justice. After its recommendation, the matter along with relevant records of petitioner was placed before the Full Court, in its administrative side, which took unanimous decision, disallowing the increase in the age of superannuation of petitioner. After its recommendation, the matter along with relevant records of petitioner was placed before the Full Court, in its administrative side, which took unanimous decision, disallowing the increase in the age of superannuation of petitioner. Such finding having arrived, following the procedure and being based on records, this Court in Judicial side cannot review the same, nor can reappraise the records to give a finding in favour of petitioner. Thereby, the decision of the Full Court cannot be held to be illegal or perverse. As refusal by High Court to increase the age of retirement does not amount to punishment and as the same is not punitive, on such decision, the petitioner stands superannuated on attaining the age of 58 years and for that there requires no order from the State of Bihar. 27. Thus, I hold that the decision, as communicated vide letter dated 21st July, 1999 (Annexure-18) is legal and well within the jurisdiction of the High Court to refuse increase of age of retirement. 28. For the reasons aforesaid and there being no merit in the case, the writ petition is dismissed. D.P.S.Choudhary, J. 29 I agree.