R. S. SODH,j. ( 1 ) THE petitioner by way of this writ petition challenges the judgment of the Centraladministrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (for short the Tribunal ) dated 13/05/1998 in O. A. No. 99 of 1993 wherein he had challenged the issuance ofcharge-sheet dated 11/11/1991 and the disciplinary authority s orderdated 13/03/1992 dismissing him from the police service as also challengesthe appellate authority s order dated 18/09/1992 rejecting his appeal. ( 2 ) THE case before the Tribunal was that the petitioner was departmentallyproceeded against on the charge that he proceeded to avail three days medical restwith effect from 31/01/1990 and was due back on 2/02/1990 whenhe again produced another certificate for seven days further medical rest andproceeded to avail of the same with effect from 9/02/1990. He was due backon 16/02/1990 but did not resume duties, as such was marked absent on 17/02/1990. It is further stated in the charge-sheet that inspite of absenteenotice served at his home address vide office letter dated 28/03/1990, heneither reported for duty nor sent any intimation. The Enquiry Officer s report statedthat he was sent summons but inspite of reminders at his office and home address,he did not join departmental inquiry. Thereafter, summons of allegations along withlist of witnesses and documents were sent to his home address through specialmessenger, which he acknowledged receipt of, but did not submit reply to thesummary of allegations and also did not join the departmental inquiry proceedings. After obtaining permission from Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police to takeex parte proceedings against the petitioner, ex parte proceedings were commencedagainst him and despite giving him full opportunity to participate in the proceedings,the petitioner did not do so. The Enquiry Officer examined various witnesses andreturned a finding that the charge of unauthorised absence against the petitioner wasestablished beyond any shadow of doubt. The findings of the Enquiry Officer wereconveyed to the petitioner on 5/01/1992 and reply thereto was submitted byhim on 10/02/1992. ( 3 ) AFTER considering his reply and going through the material on record thedisciplinary authority accepted the Enquiry Officer s report holding the petitioner tobe an incorrigible type of person, whose presence in police force would affectdiscipline in the force and instigate other members of the force to be indisciplined. ( 3 ) AFTER considering his reply and going through the material on record thedisciplinary authority accepted the Enquiry Officer s report holding the petitioner tobe an incorrigible type of person, whose presence in police force would affectdiscipline in the force and instigate other members of the force to be indisciplined. The disciplinary authority dismissed the petitioner from service vide order dated 1 3/02/1992 and further directed that the period of absence from 17/02/1990 till 13/03/1992 betreated as "leave without pay". The petitioner filed anappeal against the order of the, disciplinary authority where he was granted apersonal hearing, but, despite two opportunities did not avail of the same. Theappellate authority considering the grounds taken in the appeal, rejected the appealby order dated 18/09/1992. Before the Tribunal when the case came upfor hearing on various occasions none appeared for the petitioner. Consequently, thetribunal proceeded to dispose of the matter after hearing proxy counsel and perusingthe material on record. ( 4 ) THE first ground taken before the Tribunal was the competence of the authority toterminate his services, inasmuch as, the petitioner was appointed by Commandantof Police who, according to Delhi Police Act, 1930, is equivalent in rank to Deputycommissioner of Police whereas the impugned order was passed by the Additionaldeputy Commissioner of Police. This contention was rejected by the Tribunal whichheld that the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police is not subordinate to Deputycommissioner of Police and that there is division of work amongst the two and assuch the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Policy looks after the administrativematters while the Deputy Commissioner of Police is incharge of law and ordersituation, further, that their was nothing on record to establish that the Additionaldeputy Commissioner of Police was subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner ofpolice. ( 5 ) THE next ground taken was that the period of absence having been treated as"leave without pay" could not be treated as a ground for dismissal. The Tribunalrelying upon its earlier order dated 4/08/1993 in 0. A. No. 1344 of 1990,hariram Vs. Delhi Administration held that the impugned order was to be read asa whole and harmoniously construed to ascertain the real intention of the impugnedorder. Merely because in the last line of the order the disciplinary authority hasdirected the absence period to be treated as "leave without pay" cannot be read tomean that the disciplinary authority intended that the petitioner should be continued inservice. Merely because in the last line of the order the disciplinary authority hasdirected the absence period to be treated as "leave without pay" cannot be read tomean that the disciplinary authority intended that the petitioner should be continued inservice. Hence, rejected this ground. The other ground taken also did not find favourwith the Tribunal which, therefore, dismissed the original application by its orderdated 13/05/1998. Aggrieved thereof the petitioner challenges the same by wayof the instant writ petition. ( 6 ) THE only ground pressed before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner isthat his case is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjaband others Vs. Bakshish Singh JT 1998 (7) SC 142 and that the period ofabsence having been regularised as "leave without pay" would automatically set atnaught the order of dismissal. He further contends that the judgment of the Supremecourt in the State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Harihar Gopal 1969 SLR 274 isdeemed to have been overruled and, if not, certainly distinguished. Learned counselalso relies upon Satya Pal Yadav Vs. Union of India and Ors. 71 (1998) DLT 68which in turn has followed a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holdingthat the period of absence having been treated as "leave without pay" wouldautomatically set at naught the order of dismissal. ( 7 ) WE have given our careful consideration to the contention raised by parties andgone through the material on record. The Supreme Court in State of M. P. Vs. Harihar Gopal, 1969 SLR 274 in no uncertain terms, held that:- "the order granting leave was made after the order terminating employmentand it was made only for the purpose of maintaining of correct record of theduration of service and adjustments of leave due to the respondent and forregularising his absence from duty. Out attention has not been invited to anyrules governing the respondent s service conditions under which an orderregularising the absence from duty subsequent to termination of employmenthas the effect of invalidating the termination",the Court further held: "we are unable to hold that the authority after terminating the employment ofthe respondent intended to pass an order invalidating the earlier order bysanctioning leave so that the respondent was to be deemed not to haveremained absent from duty without leave duly granted". ( 8 ) THIS judgment is by three Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court in contrast to thedecision of two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bakshish Singh s case (supra) and, therefore, learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 submitted that itought to be followed. As against this, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted thatthe Tribunal in a large number of cases relied upon the judgment of the Supremecourt in State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Bakshish Singh (supra) as it overruled itsearlier judgment in Harihar Gopal s case. We have noted the submission of thelearned counsel and have carefully gone through the precedents cited. ( 9 ) BAKSHISH Singh s case arose from a suit filed before the Sub-Judge, Jalandhar,for a declaration to the effect that the order dated 11/01/1990 passed by theinspector General of Police, PAP, Jalandhar Cantt, by virtue of which his revisionpetition was rejected and the order dated 6/01/1989 passed by the DIG PAP (Admn.) Jalandhar Cantt. and the order dated 1. 6. 1988 passed by the Commandant,80th Bn. PAP, Jalandhar Cantt dismissing him from service were confirmed, wereillegal. ( 10 ) THE suit was decreed and, in appeal, the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar,by his order dated 15/01/1996 took note of the various judgments as also thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Harihar Gopal s case (supra ). The decision of thesupreme court in Harihar Gopal s case-was distinguished by the Additional Districtjudge on the ground that the order regularising leave without pay was made afterterminating the employment and that it was made only for the purpose of maintainingcorrect record of duration of service. It needs to be highlighted that the order grantingleave was made subsequent to the order terminating the employment. Both theorders were passed separately and not rolled into one. In other words it was not acase of a composite order. In Bakshish Singh s case, however, -the District Judgewhile concurring with the view of the trial court found on the facts of that case that theabsence of the official was regularised by the administrative authority and the chargeof absence from duty did not survive. In other words it was not acase of a composite order. In Bakshish Singh s case, however, -the District Judgewhile concurring with the view of the trial court found on the facts of that case that theabsence of the official was regularised by the administrative authority and the chargeof absence from duty did not survive. In spite of having arrived at the conclusion thatthe charge of absence from duty did not survive, the District Judge proceeded toconsider the question whether or not absence of the official from duty was a misconductof gravest kind so as the warrant the maximus penalty of dismissal from service orwas it a bare misconduct for which lesser punishment would be appropriate. Thedistrict Judge having found that it was not a case of misconduct of gravest kindremanded the case to the punishing authority for passing a fresh order ui punishment. Aggrieved by the order of the first appellate court, th State of Punjab moved the Highcourt by way of a Regular Second Appeal No. 1555 of 1996. The High Court, by itsjudgment and order dated 21/08/1996, dismissed the Regular Second Appealof the State of Punjab without a speaking order. This led the State of Punjab to movethe Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution which came to be sposedof by the Supreme Court as Appeat No. 4212 of 1997. The Supreme Court, takingnote of the findings of the fact arrived at by the trial, court and the lower appellate court,namely, that the charge of absence from duty did not survive, went on to hold that thelower appellate court was not right in remanding the matter to the punishing authoritythe Supreme Court also noted/that the trial court had returned a finding of fact thatproper opportunity of hearing was not given and signatures were obtained underduress during the departmental proceedings which findings were neither adverted tonor disputed by the first appellate court. It appears to us that in view of the aforesaidfindings of fact the Supreme Court held that there was no occasion to remand thematter to the punishing authority for passing a fresh order of punishment. It appears to us that in view of the aforesaidfindings of fact the Supreme Court held that there was no occasion to remand thematter to the punishing authority for passing a fresh order of punishment. In thisregard the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "it will thus be seen that the trial court as also the lower appellate court bothhad recorded the findings that the period of absence from duty having beenregularised and converted into leave without pay, the charge of absencefrom duty did not survive. Once it was found as a fact (emphasis supplied)that the charge of unauthorised absence from duty did not survive, we fail toappreciate how the lower appellate court could remand the matter back to thepunishing authority for passing a fresh order of punishment. In the face ofthese findings especially the finding of the trial court that proper opportunityof hearing was not given and the signatures of the respondent were obtainedunder duress during the department proceedings which have not been setaside by the lower appellate court, we are of the view that there was nooccasion to remand the case back to the punishing authority merely forpassing a fresh order of punishment. " ( 11 ) THEREFORE, it is clear that in Bakshish Singh s case (supra) the Supreme Courtwas dealing with the question whether it was open to the first appellate court to remitthe matter to-the punishing authority in view of findings of fact arrived at by the trialcourt and not disturbed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court was not dealingwith a proposition of law already settled by Harihar Gopal s case and has notoverruled the same. To say the least the Supreme Court could not in Bakshishsingh s case be understood to have done so without adverting to its earlier decisionin Harihar Gopal s case. The Supreme Court was not dealingwith a proposition of law already settled by Harihar Gopal s case and has notoverruled the same. To say the least the Supreme Court could not in Bakshishsingh s case be understood to have done so without adverting to its earlier decisionin Harihar Gopal s case. On a further argument raised by the State of Punjab beforethe Supreme Court in Bakshish Singh s case that the respondent had not filed anycross appeal and, therefore, the order of remand passed by the lower appellate courtfor a fresh order of punishment need not be interfered with, particularly, as that orderhad been upheld by the High Court which has summarily dismissed the secondappeal filed by the State of Punjab and if, therefore, the Supreme Court intervenes inthe matter, even in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,the same would be without jurisdiction, it held as follows:- "applying the above principles to the instant case, it will be noticed that thetrial court recorded a categorical finding of fact that a proper opportunity ofhearing was not afforded to the respondent in the departmental proceedingsand that his signatures on certain papers during those proceedings wereobtained under duress, was not controverted as the State of Punjab had ledno evidence in defence. The trial court also recorded a finding thatunauthorised absence from duty without leave having been regularised bytreating the period of absence as "leave without pay", the charge of misconductdid not survive. It was with this finding that the suit was decreed. The lowerappeltate court affirmed the finding that since the period of unauthorisedabsence from duty without leave was regularised the charge did not survive,but it did not say a word about the finding relating to the opportunity ofhearing in the departmental proceedings. Since those findings were notspecifically set aside and the lower appellate court was silent about them, thesame shall be treated as having been affirmed. In the face of these findings, itwas not open to the lower appellate court to remand the case to thepunishing authority for passing a fresh order of punishment. The High Court. before which the second appeal was filed by the State of Punjab, did notadvert itself to this inconsistency as it dismissed the appeal summarily, whichindirectly reflects that it allowed an inconsistent judgment to pass through itsscrutiny. The High Court. before which the second appeal was filed by the State of Punjab, did notadvert itself to this inconsistency as it dismissed the appeal summarily, whichindirectly reflects that it allowed an inconsistent judgment to pass through itsscrutiny. It is in these circumstances that we, in exercise of our power of doingcomplete justice between the parties, finally decide the appeal and the wholecase by providing as follows. . . . "( 12 ) THE court finally passed the following directions :- " (A) the appeal is allowed: (b) the judgment dated 15/01/1996passed by the lower appellate court, in so far it purports to remand the caseto the punishing authority as also the judgment of the High Court dated21. 6. 1996 set aside: (c) the judgment and decree passed by the trial court isupheld. " ( 13 ) FROM the operative part of the judgment it appears that the appeal of the Statewas allowed even though the reasoning is otherwise. Further, the earlier judgment ofthe Supreme Court in Harihar Gopal s case was not placed before the Court norwas its attention drawn to the question of law decided by it, namely, that merely byregularising the absence from duty subsequent to termination of employment did nothave the effect of invalidating termination. Moreover, the case of Bakshish Singhhas been decided on its own fact situation. The judgment of the Supreme Court laysemphasis on the findings arrived at by the trial court on which the suit was decreed,namely, that proper opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the respondent in thedepartmental proceedings, that his signatures on certain papers during thoseproceedings were obtained under duress and that the charge of absence from dutydid not survive were not set aside by the first appellate court. In view of the findings offact arrived at by the courts below, the Supreme Court held that the first appellatecourt could not have remanded the case to the punishing authority for passing of afresh order on punishment. We do not find anything in the judgment of Bakshishsingh s case (supra) which expressly or by implication overrules the judgment inharihar Gopal s case. To our mind, Harihar Gppal s case (supra) still holds the field. The distinction sought to be drawn to the effect that the order regularising theabsence from duty as "leave without pay" is not a separate order, as was in the caseof Harihar Gopal, cannot be accepted. To our mind, Harihar Gppal s case (supra) still holds the field. The distinction sought to be drawn to the effect that the order regularising theabsence from duty as "leave without pay" is not a separate order, as was in the caseof Harihar Gopal, cannot be accepted. It does not stand to reason that the Supremecourt in Harihar Gopal s case had upheld the termination order only because theorder of regularising leave was passed subsequently. A reading of the Judgmentdoes not give such an impression. The dicta laid down by the Supreme Court isunambiguous and still holds the field, namely, that it is open to the punishing authorityto direct the record keeper to complete the service record by treating the period ofabsence as one without pay. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court in Harihar Gopal s case cannot be said to have laid downthe law to the effect that the dismissal order is protected only because it has beenmade on a different sheet of paper, although by the same authority and on the samedate. ( 15 ) THE judgment of the Supreme Court in Bakshish Singh s case is per incuriamand does not over rule nor differentiate the judgment in Harihar Gopal s case. In thisview of the matter, we are of the opinion that the order of termination does not sufferfrom any illegality and that the regularisation of leave without pay is only for purposesof maintaining correct record of service which does not interfere with nor obliteratethe order of dismissal from service. ( 16 ) THE order of the Tribunal dated 13/05/1998 in O. A. No. 99 of -1993 is upheld The writ petition is dismissed and the Rule discharged. No order as to costs.