JUDGMENT V.Kanagaraj, J: Writ Appeal No.1386 of 1993 has been preferred by the Management Rhone-Poulenc (India) Limited as against the Presiding Officer, I Additional Labour Court, Madras and some of its workers and the legal representatives of a deceased workman and Writ Appeal No.232 of 1994 has been preferred by some of the workers of the said Management and legal representatives of a deceased workmen against the said Management and the Presiding Officer, I Additional Labour Court, Madras both testifying the validity and challenging one and the same order passed by a single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.1910 of 1986, dated 4.10.1993, thereby ordering the reinstatement of workmen, who got retrenched by the Management, but without backwages. 2. Both the above writ appeals since arising from out of one and the same order passed by the single Judge of this Court as aforementioned and the facts and circumstances involved interconnected, interrelated and interwoven, they both are jointly heard and a common judgment is passed herein. 3. To trace the history of the case, the petitioner- Management is a company but a subsidiary one of the International Company called M/s.May and Baker Limited, England; that the said Company was incorporated in the year 1928 at Calcutta and later the registered office was shifted to Bombay; that it had various branches at different important cities in India; that the branch at Madras was started in the year 1949; that the company is engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and chemical products; that all the appointments, promotions, increments and disciplinary proceedings are made only at the Head Office at Bombay; that the petitioners were recruited on a temporary basis by the Madras office and thereafter their services were confirmed by the Head Office at Bombay and they have put in many years of service ranging from 9 to 31 years. 4. 4. The workmen would further contend that they belong to May and Baker Employees Union, which was started in the year 1972; that much to the fury of the Management, the workmen raised a Charter of Demand on 2.5.1980 and on conciliation, on 30.3.1981, the Labour Officer is said to have sent the failure report; that on 14.5.1981 the Management exhibited on the notice board a notice stating that the petitioners in W.P.No.1910 of 1986 were going to be retrenched from service and in spite of advice tendered by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour I, the Management proceeded to implement the scheme of retrenchment from service against the petitioners in the writ petition with effect from 22.5.1981. 5. The further case of the workmen is that the retrenchment is nothing but victimization since the workmen did not opt to retire under the “Voluntary Abandonment Scheme”; that the matter was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication wherein the workmen contended that the orders of retrenchment have violated several provisions of Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) particularly Secs.25-F, 25-G and 33(2)(b) of the Act and that the orders had been passed by an incompetent person; but however, the Labour Court, ultimately justified and upheld the contentions of the Management, passing an Award dated 28.8.1985 and hence the Writ Petition No.1910 of 1986 had come to be filed before this Court. 6. 6. On the part of the Management it would be submitted that the Company’s registered office is at Bombay and there are two factories at Bhandup and Paithan, Aurangabad; that they have also depots at Delhi, Bombay, Lucknow, Patna, Gauhati, Indoor, Jaipur, Calcutta, Madras, Hyderabad and Bangalore; that the nature of operations in the Branch offices were to receive the stocks from the factory, repack and despatch them to various destinations; that they also attend to preparations of invoices and collections of sale proceeds; that in the year 1980, the Management opened depots at Hyderabad and Bangalore, which were previously taken care of by the Madras Branch Office; that consequent to this the work at Madras Branch Office was reduced to half of its normal work; that under such circumstances the employees in the Madras Office were asked to give option letters to go on transfers to the said two depots, but none came forward to give such options; that ultimately, the Madras Branch Office was converted into a depot and was being run with bare minimum staff; that it is under these circumstances, on 23.3.1981, the Management sounded the employees as to whether they would be interested in voluntary retirement under the scheme introduced viz., “Voluntary Abandonment Scheme” and on 1.4.1981, the scheme was made known to the employees coupled with the amount of compensation that would be offered to the employees. 7. The further contentions of the Management are that out of 32 employees working in the Madras office, four opted for transfer, nine opted for voluntary retirement scheme and one retired on attaining the age of superannuation; that the depot at the Madras needed only eight employees and therefore about ten employees became surplus; that by middle of May, 1981, it became clear that there was necessity to reduce the strength by resorting to retrenchment, thus giving the story as to how the employees got retrenched with effect from 22.5.1981. It would further be contended that the retrenched workmen were offered by a demand draft for the earned wages, one month wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation; that a notice under Sec.25-F(3) of the Act was sent to the Government; that subsequently, two of the ten retrenched employees agreed to settle their dues amicably and it is only the remaining eight workmen who raised the Industrial Dispute before the Labour Court under Sec.2-A of the Act. 8. On the above facts and circumstances brought forth in the pleadings, the I Additional Labour Court, Madras, to which the reference had been made, framed four points that were raised on behalf of the workmen, which are: (i) Whether the order of retrenchment amount to victimisation? (ii) Whether it violates Secs.25-F and 25-G of the Act? (iii) Whether it violates Sec.33(2)(b) of the Act? (iv) Whether the Branch Manager has no competence to issue orders of retrenchment? The Labour Court holding enquiry on the above points, ultimately decided all the points in favour of the Management and dismissed the I.D.No.7 of 1982 as per its Award dated 28.8.1985. Aggrieved, the workmen filed W.P.No.1910 of 1986 before this Court and the learned single Judge of this Court with due opportunity for both to be heard and dealing with all the four points one by one and discussing the same in the context of the facts and circumstances encircling the whole affair and in the light of the decided cases and upon fully hearing the learned counsel for both and in application of the norms of law, would ultimately arrive at the conclusion to order reinstatement of the retrenched employees in service, but without backwages. It is only against this order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.1910 of 1986, dated 4.10.1993, both the above writ appeals have come to be preferred as aforementioned, on certain grounds as brought forth in their respective memorandums of appeal. 9. It is only against this order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.1910 of 1986, dated 4.10.1993, both the above writ appeals have come to be preferred as aforementioned, on certain grounds as brought forth in their respective memorandums of appeal. 9. In the first of the above two writ petitions filed by the Management in W.A.No.1389 of 1993, the grounds alleged are: (i) that the learned Judge erred in holding that in effecting the disputed retrenchment, the appellant Management violated Sec.25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act’; (ii) that the learned Judge also erred in holding that in effecting the retrenchment, the appellant should have adopted All India Seniority; (iii) that having held that the principle laid down in the decision reported in Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Bombay, (1962)1 L.L.J. 108 , is applicable to the facts of the present case, the learned single Judge erred in holding that “substantially the service conditions were the same except for small adjustments depending upon local conditions”; (iv) that the learned Judge failed to see that since the respondents 2 to 6 contended that All India Seniority should be adopted, it was their burden to lead evidence to show that the service conditions in all the establishments were the same and when the respondents 2 to 6 had not let in evidence on this aspect, their plea should have been rejected; (v) that the learned Judge failed to advert to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Parry & Company Ltd. v. P.C.Pal, (1970)2 L.L.J. 429 , wherein it is reveled that, “the liability of an employee to be transferred and the rights of the company to transfer him did not mean that there was a corresponding obligation on the company to transfer the employees to another branch”; (vi) that the learned Judge, unsupported by evidence, has given a finding to the effect that the scales of pay were the same between the Madras office and the Bangalore office and the difference between the Madras and Bangalore offices and that of the Bombay office is also very little and All India Seniority is warranted with uniformity of service conditions among all the branches; (vii) that the learned Judge failed to see that Exs.M-8 to M-31 were the cases wherein the employees opted for transfer and while such being the case, there was no justification for the learned Judge to observe that “there is no reason why the first respondent did not offer to transfer them to other branches”; (viii) that the learned Judge also failed to consider that immediately after the publication of the seniority list, respondents 2 to 6 did not raise any objection to the same and hence they were estopped from raising the question of seniority at a later stage before the first respondent, and (ix) that the learned Judge erred in directing the appellant to reinstate the concerned workmen in branches or offices other than the Madras office. With the above grounds of appeal, the appellant Management would pray for allowing the Writ Appeal No.1389 of 1993 setting aside the order dated 4.10.1993 made in W.P.No.1910 of 1986. 10. With the above grounds of appeal, the appellant Management would pray for allowing the Writ Appeal No.1389 of 1993 setting aside the order dated 4.10.1993 made in W.P.No.1910 of 1986. 10. So far as the grounds concerned with the Writ Appeal No.232 of 1994 filed by the employees are concerned, it would be contended: (i) that the learned Judge erred in holding that the petitioners are not entitled to back wages after coming to the conclusion that Sec.25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act has been violated; (ii) that the learned Judge ought to have held that since Sec.25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act has been violated, the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement in service with full back wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits; (iii) that the learned Judge erred in denying the back wages due to the petitioner; (iv) that the learned Judge ought to have held that Sec.25-G is a statutory precondition to be followed while retrenching the petitioners and any violation of the Section renders the retrenchment void and the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement in service with back wages, continuity of service and other attendant benefits; (v) that the learned Judge erred in not considering the fact that the respondent had prevented the petitioners from working whereas the petitioners were always ready and willing to work under the respondent; (vi) that the learned Judge erred in holding that proper delegation has been made to Hosangady and that he had further powers to subdelegate the said delegated powers; (vii) that the learned Judge failed to note that the power of attorney bearing only the company seal and without the signature of the Managing Director will not have any value; (viii) that the learned Judge ought to have held that the delegation of powers to Mr.Hosangadi is not valid and when the delegation itself is not valid, the further subdelegation can have any validity at all; (ix) that the learned Judge erred in considering the refusal on the part of the petitioners to opt for transfer when giving option and that the same would disentitle them from receiving their back wages; (x) that the learned Judge ought to have held that the passage of time is due to the illegal act of the respondent and further the passage of time when the appellants are diligently fighting their case in a Court of Law cannot be a ground for denying back wages to the appellants; (xi) that the learned Judge erred in moulding the relief as if it is a case under Sec.11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, forgetting the fact that it is a case of retrenchment and Sec.11-A will have no application at all; and (xii) that the learned Judge erred in not granting any benefits to the deceased appellant’s legal heirs and the retired appellants. 11. During arguments, Mrs.Devi Sankar appearing for M/s.T.Fenn Walter, the learned counsel on record for the appellants in W.A.No.232 of 1994 and for respondents 2 to 16 in W.A.No.1389 of 1993, besides adhering to the grounds of appeal has pleaded regarding the order of the learned single Judge favouring reinstatement of the workers, but denying the back wages would cite a number of judgments in support of the contentions and grounds raised in favour of the workmen. Among those decisions cited by the learned counsel for the workmen, the first one is delivered by the Apex Court in Goverdhan Prasad and others v. Management of M/s.Indian Oxygen Ltd., (1984)1 S.C.C. 144 , wherein dealing with Sec.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act regarding recovery of the money due to the workman from an employer, the Apex Court would clarify as follows: "It was not disputed that for all administrative and managerial control, workmen stationed at Ghaziabad are part and parcel of the staff employed in Delhi branch. And this ought to be so because Ghaziabad is hardly at a distance of 20 kms. from Delhi. Secondly the price structure prevalent in Delhi and Ghaziabad would not be materially different. And when the expression used in the award is general staff employed at Delhi Branch, obviously those workmen who are under the administrative and managerial control of Delhi Branch would be included in the expression. Obviously, therefore, the dearness allowance admissible to the appellant- workmen would be according to the award by which dearness allowance is now being paid to those working in Delhi Branch. Dearness allowance having not been paid in accordance with the award, it was quite legitimate for the workmen stationed at Ghaziabad to move the Labour Court under Sec.33-C(2) and there was no question of making any fresh demand and seeking an adjudication thereof. 5. Any other view would be wholly unjust and unfair." 12. Then dealing with the retrenchment of the appellant workmen, relating to Sec.25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned counsel for the workmen would cite another decision of the Apex Court delivered in Swadesamitran Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1960)1 L.L.J. 504 : A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 762, wherein the Full Bench of the Apex Court held: "Once it is found that retrenchment is unjustified and improper, it is for the tribunals below to consider to what relief the retrenched workmen are entitled. Ordinarily if a workman has been improperly and illegally retrenched, he is entitled to claim reinstatement. The fact that in the meanwhile the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily defeat the claim for reinstatement of the retrenched workman, nor can the fact, that protracted litigation in regard to the dispute has inevitably meant delay, defeat such a claim for reinstatement. In the case of wrongful dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, a claim for reinstatement could not be defeated merely because time has elapsed or that the employer has engaged in the meantime fresh hands.“ 13. Dealing with Sec.25-F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned counsel for the workmen would cite a Division Bench judgment of this Court delivered in Management of Coimbatore Pioneer B.Mills v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore and others, (1979)1 L.L.J. 41 , wherein it is held: “Industrial Disputes Act (1947), Secs.25-F and 25-G, Chapter VA -Retrenchment of workmen - Labour Court finding retrenchment bona fide and valid and at the same time finding noncompliance with Sec.25F - Whether payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement proper remedy - Whether in such circumstances the Labour Court has no option but to order reinstatement - Whether introduction of Ch.VA in the Act will make any difference in the matter - Swadesamitran case, (1960)1 L.L.J. 504 : A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 762 - Whether an authority for the proposition that where Sec.25-F is not complied with, reinstatement is the only remedy.” 14. The learned counsel for the workmen would then read out the observations of the learned single Judge to the effect that ”In respect of the Madras office and the Bangalore office, there was practically no difference in the service conditions. It may be that in the Bombay head office the service conditions were slightly different. But even here one can easily understand that the service conditions were not so drastically different that adjustments could not be made.... the transfer order indicates that the scales of pay were the same between the Madras office and the Bangalore office and the scales of pay were not very different even in respect of Bombay office.“ “It is now conveniently argued on behalf of the petitioners that the power of approval was the prerogative of the management and there was no reason that the petitioners should not have been transferred to other branches. Taking all these above circumstances and after giving my anxious thought I am of the opinion that the petitioners are entitled to be reinstated, but they are not entitled for the payment of back wages.” The learned counsel for the workmen would then cite a decision of the Apex Court delivered in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980)1 L.L.J. 137 , wherein it is held that, ”The course of this precarious coexistence was often ruffled, and there was, now and then, some flare-up leading to strike, conciliation and even reference under Sec.10. When one such reference was pending, another unconnected dispute arose which, after some twists and turns, led to an industrial breakdown and a total strike. The episodic stages of this bitter battles will have to be narrated at length a little later. Suffice it to say that the management jettisoned all the 853 workmen and recruited some freshers to take their place and to keep the wheels of production moving. In the war of attrition that ensued, labour lost and capitulated to capital. At long last, between the two, a reference to arbitration of the disputes was agreed upon under Sec.10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act for short). The highlight of the dispute referred for arbitration was whether the termination orders issued by the management against the workmen whose names were set out in the annexure to the reference were “legal proper and justified”, if not, whether the workmen were “entitled to any reliefs including the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages”. The Arbitrator’s decision went against the Sabha while, on a challenge under Art.226, the High Court’s judgment virtually vindicated its stand. This is the hang of the case. The substantial appeal is by the management while the Sabha has a marginal quarrel over a portion of the judgment as disclosed in its appeal. The “jetsam” workmen, a few hundred in number, have been directed to be reinstated with full or partial back pay and this is the bitter bone of contention.“ 15. The learned counsel for the workmen would then cite a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court delivered in Navbharat, Hindi Daily, Nagpur v. Navbharat Shramik Sangha and another, 1984 Lab.I.C. 445, wherein it has been held. The learned counsel for the workmen would then cite a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court delivered in Navbharat, Hindi Daily, Nagpur v. Navbharat Shramik Sangha and another, 1984 Lab.I.C. 445, wherein it has been held. “It was next contented that the Tribunal having found that the petitioner having followed conditions precedent, as provided for in Sec.25-F, could not come to an adverse conclusion in respect of Sec.25-G of the Act. This contention is equally devoid of any merits. Both these Sections are independent of each other and either of them have to be complied with at the time of effecting retrenchment. Whereas Sec.25-F stipulates conditions precedent to be complied with while effecting retrenchment, Sec.25-G casts an obligation to follow the procedure prescribed therein. Failure to comply either Sec.25-F or follow Sec.25-G will in our opinion, render the retrenchment invalid. 19. It was lastly contended that if at all there was a contravention of rule of “last come first go”, it was only in respect of two compositors, thereby suggesting that the retrenchment in respect of other eleven compositors must be sustained. We are even unable to accept this contention of the petitioner since failure to comply with Sec.25-G and Rule 81 of the Bombay Rules would render the whole action of retrenchment illegal and invalid. The Industrial Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the petitioner while effecting retrenchment, had committed infraction of the mandatory provisions as contained in Sec.25-G of the Act.” 16. Regarding the nature of relief where the employee attains the age of superannuation during the pendency of proceedings and would have been validly retired if he continued in service, the learned counsel for the workmen would cite a decision of the Apex Court delivered in M/s. Gammon India Ltd. v. Sri Niranjan Dass, (1984)1 L.L.J. 233 , wherein it has been held: “It is hereby declared that the respondent shall continue to be in service uninterruptedly from the date of termination of service till the date of superannuation if the company establishes that under a valid rule the employee had reached the age of superannuation. Employee would be entitled to all back wages including the benefit of revised wages or salary if during the period there is revision in pay scales with yearly increment, revised dearness allowance or variable dearness allowance and all terminal benefits if he has reached the age of superannuation such as Provident Fund, gratuity etc. Back wages should be calculated as if the employee continued in service uninterruptedly. He is also entitled to leave encashment and bonus if other workmen in the same category were paid the same. It appears that the employee has been unlawfully kept out of service, therefore it is just the company shall pay all the arrears calculated according to above directions with 12% interest from the date the amount became due and payable till realization”. 17. The learned counsel for the workmen contending that retrenchment without offer of compensation is void ab initio and reinstatement is the proper relief and Sec.11-A will not apply to cases of termination under Sec.25-F, would cite a Division Bench judgment of the Gurajat High Court delivered in Bharat Heavy Electronics Ltd., Baroda v. R.V.Krishna Rao, (1990)1 L.L.J. 87, wherein it has been held: ”Once it is found that Sec.25-F is violated, retrenchment becomes non-est and a declaration has to be given that the workman has continued in the service of the employer. In case arising under Sec.25-F, Sec.11-A will not apply. When once termination is found to be null and void, there is no question of reinstatment, but only declaration that the workman had continued in service de hors the termination which was violative of Sec.25-F." 18. On the part of the Management, the learned senior counsel besides laying emphasis on the grounds of appeal as raised in the Writ Appeal No.1389 of 1993, would cite a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court delivered in Management of Coimbatore Pioneer B.Mills v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, (1979)1 L.L.J. 41 , wherein it has been held: "In none of the cases cited, it has been held that even if the Labour Court were to find that there was need for retrenchment and the retrenchment was bona fide, there was no option for the Labour Court but to order reinstatement in all cases of non-compliance with Sec.25-F.... We are therefore, of the view that in such circumstance on non-compliance with the provisions of Sec.25-F(b) where bona fides or the need for retrenchment is justified, the Labour Court will have a discretion with reference to the facts in each case, either to order reinstatement or direct payment of compensation in lieu of such reinstatement." 19. The learned counsel would then cite a decision of the Larger Bench of the Apex Court delivered in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962)1 L.L.J. 409, wherein it has been held: "Having regard to the principles deducible from the language of the Section already stated, the decisive elements in our judgment are the location of the establishment and the functional integrality, i.e., the existence of the one Code relating to the categories of workmen and their scales of wages. In Tulsidas Khimji Case, (1961)1 L.L.J. 42 , the question was whether four departments of a business establishment in the City of Bombay were distinct industrial establishments within Sec.25-G and it was held that as there was no functional integrality between them, they should be held to be different establishments, notwithstanding they were located in the same place. And in this case the branches are located in different places and there is also a lack of functional integrality. We are of opinion that each branch is a separate industrial establishment. On this finding it follows that the dispute of the respondents is an industrial dispute as defined in Sec.2(k) as that has been raised by the majority of the workmen of the Ambala branch, which is an industrial establishment. But as the establishment has been closed and the closure itself is not impugned as bad on the ground that it is colourable and not bona fide, Sec.25-G has no application and the respondents, therefore, are not entitled to any relief under that Section." Citing the above judgments, the learned counsel would pray for the relief sought for by the Management in W.A.No.1389 of 1993. 20. 20. A true assessment of the case in hand, in consideration of the facts and circumstances encircling the whole affair as projected by parties in their respective pleadings and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, would reveal that the dispute is between the Management of Rhone-Poulenc (India) and some of its workmen pertaining to their retrenchment, which the workmen would call unreasonable, arbitrary and void and would pray for reinstatement with continuity of service, full back wages and the attendant benefits and the said retrenchment on the part of the Management would be attempted to be justified. 21. The Labour Court, in the enquiry held, had examined three witnesses in toto, two witnesses on the side of the Management as M.Ws.1 and 2 and one witness on the side to the workmen as W.W.1. and further marking 92 documents on the side of the workmen as Exs.W-1 to W-92 and 121 documents on the side of the Management as Exs.M-1 to M-121 and having assessed the evidence thus put forth in its own way, would ultimately justify the retrenchment of the eight workmen further holding that the workmen are not entitled to any relief. Aggrieved against the said Award, the said eight workmen have filed W.P.No.1910 of 1986 during the pendency of which, since one of the workmen viz. V.L.Narayanan passed away his legal representatives were brought on record as per the orders of the single Judge of this Court in W.M.P.No.5641 of 1991, dated 14.3.1991 In assessment of the case of both sides, in the context of the Award passed by the Labour Court and in the light of many decided cases, the learned single Judge of this Court, had arrived at the conclusion to set aside the Award of the Labour Court further ordering reinstatement of th petitioners in the writ petition in service, but without back wages further remarking that since the first petitioner is said to be no more, his legal representatives will not be entitled to any relief because the claim for backwages has been denied. It is only against the said order of the learned single Judge of this Court made in W.P.No.1910 of 1986 dated 4.10.1993, both the Management and the retrenched workmen have come forward to prefer the above writ appeals. 22. It is only against the said order of the learned single Judge of this Court made in W.P.No.1910 of 1986 dated 4.10.1993, both the Management and the retrenched workmen have come forward to prefer the above writ appeals. 22. We carefully studied all the materials placed on record focussing particular attention to the evidence both oral and documentary, the Award passed by the Labour Court dated 28.8.1985, the grounds of both appeals and the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No.1910 of 1986, dated 4.10.1993. We also carefully heard the arguments advanced on the part of the learned counsel for both with particular attention to the decided cases cited by the learned counsel for both and on such consideration and assessment, we hereby pass the following order: 23. On the part of the workmen of the Rhone-Poulenc (India) Limited, which is a company engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and chemical products as a subsidiary company of the internationally reputed company M/s.May and Baker Limited, England having its Head Office at Bombay, it would be submitted that all the proceedings are made only at the Head Office at Bombay; that they were recruited on temporary basis by the Madras office and their services were confirmed by the Bombay Head Office. As such they have been put in many years of service ranging from 9 to 31 years; that the workmen raised charter of demands on 2.5.1980 and on conciliation, on 30.3.1981, the Labour Officer sent a Failure Report; that the Management put up a notice in the Notice Board that it was going to retrench some of its workers and in fact proceeded to implement the scheme of retrenchment of the petitioners in the writ petition from service with effect from 22.5.1981, which is nothing but victimization and resorted to as a retaliation since the workmen did not opt to retire under the “Voluntary Abandonment Scheme”; that the retrenchment has been ordered in violation of several provisions of the Act; that however, the Labour Court has erroneously concluded justifying the retrenchment of the workmen as per its Award dated 28.8.1985 and seeking not only to quash the said Award of the Labour Court but also to order reinstatement with back wages and attendant benefits, they filed W.P.No.1910 of 1986 and the learned single Judge of this Court passed order directing the Management to reinstate the workmen but without back wages as per his order dated 4.10.1993; that aggrieved against denial of back wages, while ordering reinstatement in service, by the learned single Judge, the workmen have come forward to prefer W.A.No.232 of 1994. 24. 24. On the part of the Management, they would submit that the company’s registered office is at Bombay; that besides having factories at Bhandup and Paithan, Aurangabad, they have also depots at various places including Madras wherein the sphere of activity is to receive the stocks, repack and despatch them to various destinations besides attending to the preparation of the invoices and collection of sale proceeds; that on opening such depots at Bangalore and Hyderabad in the year 1980, the work at Madras Branch Office was reduced to half of its normal work and in such circumstances, option for transfer to the said new depots was sought for from the workers but none gave such option leading to sound the employees to opt for voluntary retirement under the “Voluntary Abandonment Scheme” floated on 1.4.1981 coupled with payment of compensation; that out of 32, four employees opted for transfer, nine opted for voluntary retirement and one retired and since Madras office needed only eight employees and since there was a surplus of ten employees, the Management retrenched ten surplus employees with effects from 22.5.1981 following the procedures established under Sec.25-F of the Act and from out of the ten, since two agreed to settle down amicably, the remaining eight raised the Industrial Dispute under Sec.2-A of the Act. 25. The further case of the Management is that the Labour Court, framing four points, held the enquiry and ultimately decided all the points in favour of the Managements thus dismissing the I.D.No.7 of 1982 as per its Award dated 28.8.1985; that in the writ petition filed against the said Award by the aggrieved workmen, the learned single Judge arrived at the conclusion to order reinstatement of the retrenched employees in service but without backwages and it is only aggrieved against that part of the order of the learned single Judge directing the Management to reinstate the workmen, the Management has filed W.A.No.1389 of 1993. 26. Bearing in mind the grounds raised on either side, it is relevant to dissect the order of the learned single judge of this Court, since it is this order, which is the focal point of attack and challenge by both the Management and the workmen. 27. 26. Bearing in mind the grounds raised on either side, it is relevant to dissect the order of the learned single judge of this Court, since it is this order, which is the focal point of attack and challenge by both the Management and the workmen. 27. From the whole of the grounds raised on the part of the workmen, their grievances are that the Labour Court and the learned single Judge have failed to consider that the workmen have been retrenched having no regard rather in violation of Secs.25-F, 25-G and 33(2)(b) of the Act; that even the learned single Judge, who on a lengthy discussion held in the context of the position of law and in the light of the decided cases, ordered only reinstatement in service but not back wages; that the learned single Judge should have gone alongwith back wages and all the attendant benefits and that once the retrenchment was held arbitrary and void and ordered reinstatement, back wages with continuity of service and attendant benefits would flow automatically which has not been provided with by the learned single Judge. 28. Quite contrarily on the part of the Management it would be argued that even in cases of noncompliance with Sec.25-F of the Act, if there was need, the retrenchment was bona fide and there was no option for the Labour Court to order reinstatement and hence even in the event of noncompliance of the provision under Sec.25-F(b), where bona fides of the need for retrenchment is justified, the Labour Court will have its discretion to decline reinstatement or payment of compensation in lieu of such reinstatement. Citing the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Indian Cable Co. Citing the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962)1 L.L.J. 409, it would be argued on the part of the Management that the Apex Court in the said judgment, in consideration of the question of Sec.25-G of the Act and in the light of its own earlier judgment delivered in Tulsidas Khimji Case, (1961)1 L.L.J. 42 , held that the business establishments were distinct within the meaning of Sec.25-G and since there was no functional integrality between them, they should be held to be different establishments notwithstanding their location in the same place and would claim that in the case in hand, each branch is a separate industrial establishment and hence the question of application of Sec.25-G of the Act does not arise at all. 29. So far as the case of the workmen as argued before us is concerned, dealing with Sec.25-F(a) and (b) of the Act, they would cite a Division Bench judgment of this Court delivered in Management of Coimbatore Pioneer B.Mills v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, (1979)1 L.L.J. 41 , wherein finding non-compliance of Sec.25-F, it has been held that in such circumstances, the Labour Court has no option but to order reinstatement, but, the Labour Court, in the case in hand, has quite contrarily arrived at the wrong conclusion to justify retrenchment thus denying the claim of the workmen for reinstatement with backwages. Dealing with Sec.25-G of the Act, the learned counsel for the workmen would cite a judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Swadesamitran Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1960)1 L.L.J. 504 , wherein the Full Bench of the Apex Court has held that, it is for the Tribunal below to consider, to what relief the retrenched workmen are entitled, once it is found that retrenchment is unjustified and improper and the fact that in the meanwhile, the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily defeat the claim of the reinstatement of the retrenched workmen and in the case of wrongful dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, a claim for reinstatement could not be defeated merely because time has elapsed or that the employer has engaged in the meantime fresh hands. 30. 30. For the same point, yet another judgment delivered in Navbharat, Hindi Daily, Nagpur v. Navbharat Shramik Sangha, 1984 Lab.I.C. 445, would be cited by the learned counsel for the workmen wherein it has been authoritatively held by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court that Secs.25-F and 25-G of the Act are independent and either of them has to be complied with at the time of effecting retrenchment; that Sec.25-F stipulates conditions precedent to be complied with while effecting retrenchment and Sec.25-G casts an obligation to follow the procedure prescribed therein and failure to comply either Sec.25-F or 25-G will render the retrenchment invalid. Ultimately, on the part of the workmen, the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court delivered in Bharat Heavy Electronics Ltd., Baroda v. R.V.Krishna Rao, (1990)1 L.L.J. 87 would be cited wherein it has been held that once it is found that Sec.25-F is violated, the retrenchment becomes non-est and a declaration has to be given that the workman has continued in the service of the employer and in case arising under Sec.25-F, Sec.11-A will not apply and when once termination is found to be null and void, there is no question of reinstatement, but only a declaration that the workman had continued in service de hors the termination which was violative of Sec.25-F. 31. At this juncture, it would be pointed out on the part of the workmen that the learned single Judge, in spite of having arrived at the conclusion to hold the retrenchment illegal and order reinstatement of the workmen in service, has wrongly withheld the back wages and the proposition as laid down by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court should have been given effect to by the learned single Judge according to which, the moment retrenchment is ordered illegal, it becomes non-est in law and a declaration to the effect of the workmen continuing in service should have been made, when automatically the back wages would flow and the learned single Judge has failed to adopt this which is quite applicable and warranted in the circumstances of the case. 32. 32. So far as the order passed by the learned single Judge is concerned, having narrated the case as pleaded by parties and further dealing with the order of the Labour Court based on four points which were taken for consideration especially points Nos.2 and 3, which relate to Secs.25-F, 25-G and 33(2)(b) of the Act and further having an elaborate discussion in the context of the evidence made available and remarking that on the part of the Management, the decision to reduce the strength was due to bona fide considerations on account of the reduced activity of the Madras branch office resulting in issuance of Ex.M-7 notice dated 23.3.1981 thereby announcing the Management’s decision to minimise its operational sphere and further announcing under Ex.M-8 dated 1.4.1981 its decision to introduce the voluntary abandonment scheme, which was not restricted to Madras Branch Office alone, but extended to other centres also and such actions of the Management could hardly be characterized as an action taken with an oblique motive or with an intention to victimise the workers and since it is a policy decision of the employer without any particular grievance against the office bearers as seen from Exs.M-19 and M-20 which are promotion orders given to the office bearers, the learned single Judge would hold on the conclusions arrived at by the Labour Court that the plea of the victimization on account of the Trade Union activities undertaken by some of the petitioners in the writ petition is quite justified and would accept the same, since according to the learned single Judge, the Labour Court has offered valid reasons to hold that the order of retrenchment is not due to any victimization or unfair labour practices adopted on the part of the Management. 33. 33. Coming to the second aspect of the case of the workmen that is violation of Secs.25-F and 25-G of the Act, the learned single Judge would remark that the Labour Court has rightly referred to Sec.25 of the Service Rules of the Madras Office of the Company marked as Ex.W-82 and noticing the fact that the Management has a right to transfer an employee from one post to another in the interest of the efficiency or business exigencies, and would remark that the Labour Court has strangely proceeded to accept the oral evidence of M.W.1 to the effect that unless an employee made a request for transfer, normally they were not transferred to other branches and further the Labour Court had relied on Exs.M-65 and M-67 notices inviting options from the employees to accept the transfer to Bombay. With reference to the transfer of four employees from Madras as seen from Exs.M-28 to M-32, pointing out that the same had been issued only after a discussion with the respective employees and resenting on such aspects relied upon by the Labour Court to arrive at its conclusion regarding this aspect of the case, the learned single Judge would further remark that, “when the Rule permits a transfer of the employee from one Branch to another, the fact that the employees were consulted before issuing orders of transfer would not mean that in a fit and proper case, the Management cannot exercise its right to order a transfer. It has been held in very many cases that the power of transfer is a prerogative of the Management and is an incident of service. In this case, admittedly, the Service Rules contain a power of transfer. Therefore, I am of the opinion that instead of resorting to retrenchment, the Management could have offered to transfer the employees to the nearby depots like Bangalore or Hyderabad. At least they could have made it clear that if the transfer was not accepted, then the employees would stand retrenched. Such an attitude on behalf of the Management could have been characterized as a bona fide gesture.” With such remarks, the learned single Judge would not accept the finding of the Labour Court on this aspect of the case. 34. Such an attitude on behalf of the Management could have been characterized as a bona fide gesture.” With such remarks, the learned single Judge would not accept the finding of the Labour Court on this aspect of the case. 34. Dealing with violation of Sec.33(2)(b) of the Act, as alleged on the part of the workmen, the learned single Judge would justify the observation made by the Labour Court to the effect that the instant case is certainly not a case of discharge or punishment of the workmen for any misconduct nor connected with the dispute pending conciliation and that no conciliation proceeding was pending at the time of retrenchment and hence Sec.33 of the Act was not attracted. The learned single Judge would write that he is impressed more by the reasoning of the Labour Court that the instant case is not one of discharge or punishment for a misconduct and hence would agree with the finding of the Labour Court to the effect that there is no violation of Sec.33(2)(b) of the Act. 35. Dealing with the quantum of compensation offered under Sec.25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge would remark that the Labour Court has rightly held that the average pay for the three months should relate to the months of February, 1981 to April, 1981; that the document Ex.M-144 shows the calculation for the total number of years put in by each employee and the ultimate compensation payable under Sec.25-F of the Act and further remarking that the petitioners could not find fault with the calculation, the learned single Judge would hold that the Labour Court had rightly arrived at the conclusion that Sec.25-F of the Act had also been properly complied with. 36. 36. Separately dealing with the noncompliance of Sec.25-G of the Act, in an elaborate manner the learned single Judge would consider what had been submitted on the part of the learned counsel for the workmen that the seniority should have been worked out on All India basis and not with reference to the Madras Bench alone and even in considering the seniority of the Madras Bench, there are discrepancies in the seniority list and therefore Sec.25-G of the Act is violated and would sum up the arguments placed on behalf of the workmen categorising the same into five parts, which are extracted hereunder: (i) Even though temporary appointments were made by the Madras Office, the confirmation orders were given by the Bombay Office; (ii) Clause 25 of the Rules relating to the Madras Office of the Company Marked as Ex.W-82 reserves a right in the Management to transfer an employee from one post to another; (iii) Provident Fund, Gratuity and Bonus are paid on a uniform basis in respect of all the branches and the Head Office; (iv) Single Balance-Sheet is prepared for the entire company only at the Head Office on All India Basis; and (v) Long Service Awards are issued only by the Head Office. 37. Offering his opinion on the question whether all the branches and the Head Office form one integral part for the purpose of application of Sec.25-G of the Act, the learned single Judge would remark that it depends upon the meaning of the word “Industrial Establishment” and would further remark that the word “Industrial Establishment” was not defined before the Act 46 of 1982, which came into effect on 21.8.1984; that in this case, since the retrenchment took place on 19.5.1981, the unamended provisions of the Act relating to “Industrial Establishment” should alone be taken into consideration and would reject the plea put forward on the part of the workmen that there was no wrong in taking into account the amendment relating to the definition of “Industrial Establishment” since it is only clarificatory in nature. The learned single judge would further remark that the parties should be expected to have applied the provisions of law as existed on the date of retrenchment. 38. The learned single judge would further remark that the parties should be expected to have applied the provisions of law as existed on the date of retrenchment. 38. The learned single Judge in quest of finding out the meaning of the word “Industrial Establishment” for the purpose of Sec.25-G of the Act, would start discussing this aspect of law in the context of the decided cases. The first case thus taken into consideration by the learned single Judge is one decided in India Tyre and Rubber Company Limited v. Its Workmen, (1957)2 L.L.J. 506, wherein an identical situation has been considered by Rajagopalan, J. following his own earlier judgment and held: “The petitioner company is an industrial concern, and the office at Madras is an industrial establishment of that industrial concern. Each of the sub-depots in the different States is a separate industrial establishment of that same Industrial concern for purposes of Sec.25-G.” 39. The next judgment considered by the learned single Judge is delivered in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962)1 L.L.J. 409. (already considered in para No.19 supra while discussing the argument on the part of Management), wherein, according to the learned single Judge, the Apex Court had occasion to deal with an identical situation of having retrenched eleven workmen effecting the payment of retrenchment compensation and in considering the fact whether the branch at Ambala was an “Industrial Estate” within the meaning of Sec.25-G and whether the seniority was rightly considered by the Management including the other branches while retrenching eleven of its workmen working at Ambala branch consequent to the decision of the Management to close it down since being unremunerative, the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court found that the meaning of the word “Industrial Establishment” could be gathered from Sec.2(kkk) of the Act besides approving the decision of this Court in India Tyre and Rubber Company Limited v. Its Workmen, (1957)2 L.L.J. 506. 40. Extracting the other considerations noticed by the Apex Court, the learned single Judge would offer the same as follows: “(i) Sec.10(1-A) relating to a reference of an industrial dispute indicating that an industrial establishment of a concern situated in different States are distinct establishments; (ii) The in built meaning of the terms of Sec.25-G relating to the grant of relief within the category of workmen who were proposed to be discharged. This postulates one code governing and it is possible only when the establishment is functioning at a given place; (iii) The existency of different branches and different scales of wages ruled out the application of Sec.25-G because it will be impossible to find out the seniority. (iv) Similarly, the provisions of an order for automatic transfer from one place to another is an indication of common seniority being taken. In addition they have also referred to the judgment in A.C.C. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1960)1 L.L.J. 1 and have added the tests referred to in the said judgment. They are: (i) The control exercised by the Registered Office on the Branch Office. (ii) The power of appointment and power of taking disciplinary proceedings; (iii) The preparation of the Annual Balance Sheet by the Head Office; (iv) The Rules of the company relating to Provident Fund, gratuity and Bonus; (v) The applicability of the Service Rules to all the employees of the Company including the branches.” 41. The learned single Judge would then extract the important ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court, which is given hereunder: “What is material for the purpose of the present discussion is whether the same rules relating to the category of workmen and their scales of wages are in force in all the branches. It is only then that Sec.25-G could be applied. On that the uncontradicted evidence of R.W.1 is that,”the Indian Cable Company has different scales of pay for different branches“. On this evidence, there can be no question of integrating workmen retrenched in one branch to another branch and, in a consequence, the establishment in each branch must be treated as a separate entity.” 42. Holding that the above judgment had been rightly relied upon by the Labour Court, the learned single Judge would then cite another judgment delivered in Western India Match Co. v. Their Workmen, (1963)2 L.L.J. 459 , wherein the question was whether production bonus was payable not only to the workmen in the factory but also to the staff working in the factory office, the Apex Court held that the production bonus scheme has to be extended to the Sales Office staff also. v. Their Workmen, (1963)2 L.L.J. 459 , wherein the question was whether production bonus was payable not only to the workmen in the factory but also to the staff working in the factory office, the Apex Court held that the production bonus scheme has to be extended to the Sales Office staff also. The learned single Judge would then remark needless to point out that the consideration for payment of bonus are slightly different as noticed by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962)1 L.L.J. 409. 43. The learned single Judge considered yet another case decided in S.G.C. & D.T.E.U. v. S.C.G. & D.T. Ltd. and another, (1986)1 L.L.J. 490, wherein the Supreme Court has generally considered the considerations for finding out whether two units could be considered as one establishment for the purpose of Sec.25-O of the Act and held that the total number of workmen at the relevant time in the Trombay Factory and the Churchgate division of the Company. S.G.Chemicals and Dyes should be taken together with for the purpose of Sec.25-O of the Act. 44. The next judgment considered by the learned single Judge is one delivered in Pakshiraja Studios v. Its Workmen, (1961)2 L.L.J. 380 , relating in the payment of bonus, wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that, “Applying these principles, we find that while the several lines of activities carried on by the Pakshiraja Studios could exist independently of each other, it is quite clear that the owner decided to mix them up. There is, in the first place, one capital fund for the two bank account one cash-book account is maintained. Separate staff is not maintained. There is one accountant for both the production side and the studio side; the administrative staff is also the same. It is true that a studio account was prepared separately from the picture trading account. There is, in the first place, one capital fund for the two bank account one cash-book account is maintained. Separate staff is not maintained. There is one accountant for both the production side and the studio side; the administrative staff is also the same. It is true that a studio account was prepared separately from the picture trading account. But that is of little relevance on our present question.” “Whatever tendency this fact that separate balance sheets were prepared for these different lines of business might have had by itself to show that these were distinct units, is totally nullified by the numerous circumstances set out by the tribunal, some of which have been mentioned above, viz., the fact that one single bank account was maintained; no separate staff was maintained for the production side; there is one account for the two sides of the business; the administrative staff was also the same. We have therefore, come to the conclusion that the tribunal has applied the correct principles for the decision of the question before it - whether the studio line of Pakshiraja Studios was distinct from the production and distribution side of the same, and has come to the correct conclusion in holding that they were not distinct, but together form one single industrial unit.” 45. Analysing all the above judgments delivered in different cases, in order to extract the true meaning of the word - “Industrial Establishment”, the learned single Judge would be of the opinion that the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court delivered in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962)1 L.L.J. 409 should prevail, subject however to the facts of the present case being analysed. The learned single Judge would then discuss the findings of the Labour Court to the effect that there are separate Service Rules in the Madras Branch Office as seen from Ex.W-82 and in Ex.M-66 letter dated 6.6.1980 addressed to all the depots in the Madras branch indicating that the Company proposed to open depots at Bangalore, Jaipur, Ernakulam, Baroda and Calcutta further requesting the employees in the company to give their options for transfers to the new depots and that the conditions of service in the different depots are different. But, the learned single Judge does not agree with the findings of the Labour Court in concluding that the conditions of service in the different depots are different. 46. At this juncture, the learned single Judge would remark that though Ex.W-82 shows that the same is the Service Rules for the Madras Branch, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that different Service Rules were available in respect of the other branches or depots; that it is quite possible that the same Service Rules had been adopted for all the branches, except to indicate the change in the name of the branch; that he is inclined to take this view because of Rule 25 which enables transfer of the employees from one branch to another; that even in Ex.M-66, the Company reserves its prerogative to transfer the conditions of transfer and that more proof is available from Exs.M-28 to M-31, which are all orders of transfer of employment. 47. Further, considering Exs.M-28 to M-31, particularly Ex.M-31, which is the transfer order of one N.V.Krishnan from the Madras office to the Bangalore office, the learned single Judge has observed that in respect of Madras Office and the Bangalore Office, there was, practically, no difference in the service conditions; that it may be that in the Bombay Head Office, the service conditions were slightly different but not so drastically different that adjustments could not be made; this is precisely the reason why transfers were being made even from Madras Office to Bombay Office after making the necessary adjustments and from the oral evidence and the documents filed by both the parties, one can easily understand that substantially the service conditions were the same except for small adjustments depending upon the local conditions; that the parties have not given specific evidence on this aspect of the case and it has to be arrived at based on what have been indicated in some other documents; that the transfers were made after discussing the issue with the concerned employees, but there is no reason at all, why such a discussion was not made with the retrenched employees and that there is evidence from W.W.1 that the retrenched employees did not specifically ask for a transfer but there is no reason why the Management did not offer to transfer them to the other branches. 48. 48. Further taking into consideration of Exs.W-13 to W-18, the leaned single Judge would observe that the company was having a booklet called Service Rules, which was uniformly applicable to all the branches and further with reference to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962)1 L.L.J. 409, the learned single Judge would write that he is clearly of the opinion that with reference to Sec.25-G of the Act, all the branches have to be taken as one industrial establishment and it is not proper to restrict the meaning of the words “Industrial Establishment” to the Madras Branch alone and with such remarks, the learned single Judge would arrive at the firm conclusion that the Management had violated Sec.25-G of the Act in the matter of preparing the seniority list. 49. The learned single Judge would also refer to Rule 62 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, referring to the manner of maintaining a seniority list and would remark that the Management contends that Ex.M-32 seniority list is prepared by them as per Rule 62, but from Ex.M-32, it is clear that there were only three categories of workmen viz. Stenographers, Clerks and Drivers and there are certain discrepancies in the seniority list maintained from among these three categories, but the argument advanced on the part of the workmen that even as per Ex.M-32 seniority list, there has been violation in the manner of retrenchment is not admitted by the learned single Judge and the learned single Judge would remark that all the Branches should have been taken as one “Industrial Establishment” for the purpose of Sec.25-G of the Act and to this extent, there has been a clear violation of the provisions of Sec.25-G of the Act. 50. 50. Further, learned single Judge would discuss on the last contention that the orders of retrenchment had been passed by the Acting Branch Manager of the Madras Office and that he is not the competent authority to pass orders; that according to the workmen, Exs.W-12 to W-18, prove that the appointment of the petitioners were confirmed by the Bombay Office; that the delegation of power in favour of one Hosangady, General Manager at Bombay executed by the Company is disputed by the petitioners and in any event, the further delegation made by the said Hosangady to and in favour of the Acting Branch Manager of the Madras office one I.P.Lavingia is hit by the doctrine of “delegata postestas non potest delegari” as it has been laid down in the decision delivered in D.H.M. Pramji v. Eastern Union Bank, A.I.R. 1951 Punj. 371, as whether the original power of attorney was not signed by the Managing Director of the Company and does not bear the seal of the Company, it is nothing but a mere waster paper. But, this stand taken on the part of the workmen has not been accepted by the learned single Judge and would cite yet another judgment delivered in Benoari Lal v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 Cal. 285, wherein this doctrine is referred to while discussing the power of the Governor General to authorise the Provincial Government to decide on the question of emergency and following this judgment, the learned single Judge would conclude that in his opinion, the said principle is well established and unless the Power of Attorney authorises the agent to subdelegate his power to some other authority, sub-delegatee cannot exercise any power. Applying the said norms to the case in hand and relying on Ex.M-117, which is the minutes of the meeting of the Directors of the Company held on 20.2.1980, the learned single Judge would observe that the said delegatee Hosangady had further powers to authorise or substitute others in his place and this is precisely what has been done under Ex.M-72, dated 1.9.1980 specifically authorising several stated persons to sign letter of appointment, issue show-cause notices, terminate or dismiss employees, take disciplinary action wherever necessary and such other similar powers. The learned single Judge would further observe that the Acting Branch Manager Lavingia is one of the persons mentioned in Ex.M-72 and hence would conclude that by virtue of the delegation, the Acting Manager was perfectly competent to issue the orders of retrenchment thereby rejecting the plea of the workmen that the power of attorney under Ex.M-71 has not been signed by the Managing Director and does not bear the seal of the company since Ex.M-71 has been signed by the Chairman of the company and others and the seal of the company has also been affixed to the document. Therefore, the learned single Judge would hold that the orders of retrenchment are vitiated by the Significant violation relating to Sec.25-G of the Act thus holding the retrenchment of the petitioners not justified. 51. Coming to the next question as to what is the relief that could be granted in favour of the workmen, while exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the learned single Judge would discredit the practice of remanding the case to the Labour Court observing that delay will cause prejudice to the workmen since the retrenchment took place in May, 1981. Citing the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980)1 L.L.J. 137 , wherein it has been held: “So broad are the expressive expressions designedly used in Art.226 that any order which should have been made by the lower Authority could be made by the High Court. The very width of power and the disinclination to meddle, except where gross injustice or fatal illegality and the like are present, inhibit the exercise but do not abolish the power.” And having further discussion on the conditions that are prevalent in the case in hand, the learned single Judge would ultimately arrive at the conclusion that the workmen are entitled to be reinstated but they are not entitled for the payment of back wages and further giving the option to the Management to reinstate the workmen in any branch or depot, the learned single Judge would set aside the impugned Award and issued a direction to the Management to reinstate the workmen in service but without backwages. The learned single Judge would further hold that since the first petitioner in the writ petition is said to be no more, the legal representatives will not be entitled to any relief because the claim for back wages has been denied and only reinstatement has been ordered. 52. To put it in a nut shell, from out of the three legal questions posed, alleging violations of Secs.25-F, 25-G and 33(2)(b) of the Act, the learned single Judge would reject the plea of violation of Secs.25-F and 33(2)(b) but has upheld the plea of violation of Sec.25-G of the Act. It is the firm conclusion that is arrived at by the learned single Judge that all the branch depots are one single unit falling under a single administration and that in the event, the activities in one branch or depot get dwindled on account of the new branches having been opened nearby the Madras office, instead of leaving it to the option of the employees and ultimately retrenching them from service abruptly, under the rules of the company, transfer, since being the prerogative of the Management among its different units, should have been effected mandatorily in which event, at least the workmen would not have lost their jobs but would have only transferred. 53. In emphasis of the above dictum, the learned single Judge would not only arrive at the conclusion to hold that all the branches or depots are considered to be only one “Industrial Establishment” thereby holding the retrenchment to be illegal and violative of Sec.25-G of the Act consequently ordering the reinstatement of the retrenched workmen. But, the case of the workmen is that once it is held that the retrenchment is illegal or improper, automatically, the employees would become entitled to not only reinstatement in service but also the back wages. But, the case of the workmen is that once it is held that the retrenchment is illegal or improper, automatically, the employees would become entitled to not only reinstatement in service but also the back wages. Citing the judgments delivered in Swadesamitran Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1960)1 L.L.J. 504 , Management of Coimbatore Pioneer B.Mills v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, (1979)1 L.L.J. 41 , Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980)1 L.L.J. 137 and M/s.Gammon India Ltd. v. Sri Niranjan Dass, (1984)1 L.L.J. 223, wherein reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits and with continuity of service have been emphasised and ultimately citing the decision of the Gujarat High Court delivered in Bharat Heavy Electronics Ltd., Baroda v. R.V.Krishna Rao, (1990)1 L.L.J. 87, it would be argued on the part of the workmen that when once termination is found to be null and void, there is no question of reinstatement but only declaration that the workmen had continued in service de hors the termination, which was violative of Sec.25-F of the Act. It is relevant to note that this judgment is authoritative to the effect of reinstatement with back wages with continuity of service and attendant benefits should flow, once the termination is held void and still such a result is advocated specifically if there is a violation of Sec.25-F, which is not the case in hand, so far as the decision of the learned single Judge is concerned, whereas non-violation of Sec.25-F has been arrived at on substantial discussions held by the learned single Judge. On the contrary, the violation is arrived at only regarding Sec.25-G of the Act. 54. On the contrary, the violation is arrived at only regarding Sec.25-G of the Act. 54. The learned single Judge has also held further discussions after arriving at the decision, holding violation of Sec.25-G of the Act is present in the retrenchment of the workmen in the cases in hand, remarking that under such circumstances, normally, it is the practice to make a remand of the case to the Labour Court, but on account of the long pending nature of the case and to avoid the future delay that would be caused if the case is to be remanded to Labour Court for fresh enquiry, citing the landmark judgment of the Apex Court delivered ion Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980)1 L.L.J. 137 would not only arrive at the conclusion that the retrenchment of the workmen is null and void but also would direct reinstatement of the workmen but without back wages, which in our view is the correct and appropriate remedy that could be made available and rendered in over all consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the conditions under which the retrenchment of the workmen from service had been ordered by the Management. 55. All the points raised on the part of the Management and the workmen have been met with, discussed and decided by the learned single Judge in the context of the position of law and the decided cases and in the light of the evidence made available and we find no inconsistency or infirmity in the manner in which the subject has been dealt with and the conclusions arrived at by the leaned single Judge and in these circumstances, we are left with no option but to confirm the order of the learned single Judge, since being rightly held in the manner expected by law. On either side whether it is the Management on the workmen, they are not able to establish any patent errors of law or perversity in approach so far as the order of the learned single Judge is concerned and hence in all respects, the said order of the learned single Judge holds good and to be sustained and the same is hereby confirmed. 56. In results both the above writ appeals fail and the same are dismissed. No costs.

The Management of Rhone-Poulenc (India) Limited, Madras v. The Presiding Officer, I Additional Labour Court, Madras and others