ASHOK NARHARI SALUNKE v. JALGAON DISTRICT CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.
2000-06-09
R.J.KOCHAR
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : R. J. Kochar, J.—The petitioner employee is aggrieved by the order dated August 29, 1998 passed by the Industrial Court, Maharashtra at Nasik, in Appeal (BIR No. 1/88) filed by the Respondent-bank challenging the order of the Labour Court, Jalgaon dated January 7, 1988 in Application (BIR) No. 6/84 filed by the petitioner employee has challenged the legality and propriety of the dismissal order passed by the Respondent bank, dismissing him from employment for the proved acts of misconduct levelled against him by the Bank. There is no dispute that both the parties are governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The undisputed facts are as follows : The petitioner was in employment of the Respondent Bank as a clerk from November 2, 1972. He appears to have been promoted in the year 1977 as a Cashier and as the Head Cashier in the year 1979 in the Head Office of the Bank at Jalgaon. On July 10, 1979 while the petitioner was working as the Head Cashier, it appears that there was a shortage of cash to the extent of Rs. 30,000/- for which according to the Bank the petitioner was responsible and therefore, he was immediately transferred to the Administration Department. By an order dated July 13, 1979 he came to be suspended pending the domestic enquiry to be held against him for the charge of misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 30,000/- in his capacity as a Head Cashier. The Respondent Bank served upon the petitioner a regular chargesheet under the Standing Orders on August 10, 1979. In addition, to the charge of misappropriation of Rs. 30,000/-, there was another charge levelled that on June 27, 1979 an amount of Rs. 562.22 was debited in the salary book of one Shri S. S. Patil but did not pay that amount to him and used it or misappropriated the same. The said Shri Patil, had complained about mat event on July 18, 1979 to the Bank. I have myself perused the said chargesheet which is in Marathi and which sets out all the details of the charges. By the said chargesheet the petitioner called upon to submit his written explanation. The chargesheet also contained in the first paragraph that the petitioner had admitted the shortage of Rs. 30,000/- and had accepted the responsibility to pay it back to the bank.
By the said chargesheet the petitioner called upon to submit his written explanation. The chargesheet also contained in the first paragraph that the petitioner had admitted the shortage of Rs. 30,000/- and had accepted the responsibility to pay it back to the bank. Not only that but on the very same day he had deposited a part in the Bank. The petitioner's admission was in writing on July 10, 1979. He has signed the same in the presence of the Manager and the Chairman of the Bank. He has clearly written in Marathi that there was a shortage of Rs. 30,000/-, out of which he has deposited a sum of Rs. 17,000/-. He has however, tried to explain the shortage by giving five names of the employees of the bank, who had taken hand loans from the bank and therefore, there was such a shortage in cash. He has tried to blame those five employees who after taking such hand loans did not return the same. After receipt of the said admission in writing from the petitioner, the bank has issued the aforesaid regular chargesheet on August 10, 1979 calling upon the petitioner to submit his written explanation. The petitioner however, did not submit his written explanation within the prescribed period but delayed it to February 18, 1980 on which day he submitted his written explanation about 6 months and more later. In his reply he has flatly denied the charges as false and fabricated and as contrary to his earlier admission asserted that he had not misappropriated any amount of the bank. From the aforesaid reply it is crystal clear that the same could have been submitted by him soon after the receipt of the chargesheet. It was not at all necessary for him to wait for a period of six months to submit such reply. In his reply he has nowhere even whispered about any documents which he needed from the bank and which the bank did not furnish inspite of his request. He has flatly and clearly denied the charge of misappropriation. At this stage itself I may mention, why the bank had waited for his written explanation for more than six months. The bank would have been fully justified in proceeding with the domestic enquiry on the basis that there was no written explanation submitted by the delinquent petitioner.
He has flatly and clearly denied the charge of misappropriation. At this stage itself I may mention, why the bank had waited for his written explanation for more than six months. The bank would have been fully justified in proceeding with the domestic enquiry on the basis that there was no written explanation submitted by the delinquent petitioner. It appears that the bank had been paying subsistence allowance to the petitioner and that the petitioner was delaying submitting his written explanation. The petitioner is trying to take advantage of the bank's leniency or lethargy in not initiating and completing the enquiry within the statutorily prescribed period of six months as contemplated u/s 78(1)(D)(i) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. After receipt of the aforesaid written explanation from the petitioner, the bank appears to have commenced the domestic enquiry against the petitioner from March 1, 1980 and the enquiry officer finally submitted his report on June 14,1980. The Respondent Bank passed the impugned order of dismissal on July 14, 1980 dismissing the petitioner from employment for the charges levelled against him. 2. Being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal the petitioner filed an application before the Labour Court u/s 79 read with Sections 78 and 42(4) of the Act challenging the propriety and legality of the order of dismissal and praying for an order of reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from July 14, 1980. It appears from the record that after completion of the pleadings and filing of the documents the Labour Court framed a preliminary point as to the fairness and propriety of the domestic enquiry. By its preliminary order the Labour Court was pleased to quash and set aside the domestic enquiry being in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The Labour Court had therefore, directed the Respondent Bank to adduce fresh evidence and material before the Labour Court to prove the alleged acts of misconducts and to justify the order of dismissal before the Court. The Respondent Bank did not challenge the said preliminary order but adduced such oral and documentary evidence to prove misconduct and justify its order of dismissal of the petitioner from the employment. The petitioner has also adduced his own evidence in rebuttal.
The Respondent Bank did not challenge the said preliminary order but adduced such oral and documentary evidence to prove misconduct and justify its order of dismissal of the petitioner from the employment. The petitioner has also adduced his own evidence in rebuttal. The Labour Court by its final order dated January 7, 1988 answered all the issues on merits in favour of the Respondent -bank but directed the Respondent Bank to reinstate the petitioner on the sole ground that the order of dismissal was in contravention of Section 78(1)(D)(i) of the Act as the order of dismissal was passed after lapse of six months from the date of the knowledge of the alleged misconduct and that the bank had not given satisfactory explanation for such delay. The Labour Court has categorically found that the bank had proved its charge of shortage of Rs. 30,000/- in the hands of the petitioner as a cashier and that the said charge amounted to misconduct under Standing Orders 23(4) and (5). The Labour Court has neatly assessed the evidence on the merits of the case and has even refused to accept the case of the petitioner that his admission was obtained under pressure or threat. The Labour Court has however, quashed and set aside the order of dismissal as it was passed after a period of six months without any explanation. 3. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Labour Court the Respondent Bank filed an appeal before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra at Nasik u/s 84 of the Act. By his order dated August 29, 1988 the learned member of the Industrial Court quashed and set aside the impugned order of the Labour Court and also dismissed the petitioner's application by allowing the bank's appeal. The learned member of the Industrial Court has considered the points of delay in passing the order of dismissal as contemplated u/s 78(1)(D)(i) of the Act. It is further pertinent to note that the petitioner did not file an appeal challenging the findings of the Labour Court on merits which were clearly against him. The Labour Court has categorically found that the charge of misappropriation of Rs. 30,000/- was proved by the bank before the Labour Court by adducing independent fresh evidence. The petitioner appears to have been over confident about the point of limitation of six months in passing of the dismissal order.
The Labour Court has categorically found that the charge of misappropriation of Rs. 30,000/- was proved by the bank before the Labour Court by adducing independent fresh evidence. The petitioner appears to have been over confident about the point of limitation of six months in passing of the dismissal order. We, therefore, have to take it that the petitioner had accepted the said findings of the Labour Court. The Industrial Court examined the contention of the petitioner and also the circumstances which were apparent on the face of the record and which are self-explanatory to explain the delay. The Industrial Court has rightly apportioned the blame and has held that the petitioner is mainly responsible for the delay. From the chronology of the events, it is crystal clear that though the petitioner had received the chargesheet dated August 10, 1979 he did not care and bother to submit his written explanation immediately or within a reasonable period. His explanation itself was filed after lapse of six months from the date of the chargesheet. The written explanation also clearly reflects that there was absolutely no difficulty in submitting the very same written explanation soon after receipt of the chargesheet. He has nowhere explained the delay in submitting his written explanation after lapse of six months. In fact, it was his primary duty to have submitted his written explanation as early as possible and within a reasonable period. He cannot escape the blame of the delay which is contributed by him also. No doubt the bank officers have also been equally lethargic in not pursuing the matter promptly. The bank could have commenced the domestic enquiry after waiting for a reasonable period for the written explanation and could have started on the premises that there was no written explanation from the bank. It is of course to the credit of the bank that soon after receipt of the written explanation the bank has moved with reasonable speed and within a period of 5 months had passed the order of dismissal against the petitioner. When there is time constraint in completing the disciplinary proceeding, it is for the employer to expedite the proceedings within the stipulated period as is the case under the provisions of the B.I.R. Act.
When there is time constraint in completing the disciplinary proceeding, it is for the employer to expedite the proceedings within the stipulated period as is the case under the provisions of the B.I.R. Act. Though, the language of the section appears to be mandatory, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to be directory and has further cast obligation on the employer to explain the delay after the prescribed period of six months. In the present case from the facts it is clear that it is the petitioner who was responsible for the delay in passing of the order of dismissal against him. Had he acted bona fide and in good faith and had he submitted his written explanation within a reasonable period from the receipt of the chargesheet, the bank would have been certainly in a position to comply with the provisions of law. According to me the blame for the delay is not wholly at the doors of the bank. The Bank is not wholly responsible for the delay. To repeat the bank would have been fully justified in proceeding with the enquiry even without waiting for the written explanation. Nonetheless, the bank having succeeded fully in establishing the charge of misappropriation of Rs. 30,000/- levelled against the petitioner, it cannot be punished by awarding reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service to such an employee. The petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. The petitioner has accepted his state on merits. He was trying to clutch a straw of technical point of delay beyond six months in passing of the dismissal order. 4. Before parting I must mention that the learned advocate for the petitioner had relied on a judgment of a learned single Judge of this High Court in the case of Superintending Agricultural Officer Nagpur Division, Nagpur and another Vs. Govind Narayan Vaidya, wherein the order of dismissal was beyond a period of six months from the date of misconduct and therefore, the Learned single Judge had upheld the contention of the employee. I have carefully gone through the said judgment. It was a case of total absence of any explanation given by the employer for the delay on his part to complete the action within a period of six months under the law.
I have carefully gone through the said judgment. It was a case of total absence of any explanation given by the employer for the delay on his part to complete the action within a period of six months under the law. The law is clear that there should be explanation for the delay in completing the action within a period of six months. In the present case the explanation for the delay is apparent from the record. The dates and the chronology of the events are self-explanatory. In our case the petitioner himself has taken more than six months in submitting his written explanation and now he wants to take advantage of his own wrong. According to me the said judgment of the Learned single Judge will not help the petitioner in any manner from the facts and circumstances of that case. 5. In the aforesaid circumstances, I find no substance in the present Writ Petition, which deserves to be dismissed and it is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged. Certified copy is expedited.