Judgment : 1. The petitioner association has filed this writ petition praying to issue a writ of Mandamus directing the second respondent Board not to insist the payment in excess of Rs. 2,95,000 as originally fixed and determined with reference to the members of the petitioner association for the allotment of HIG houses in Aringnar Anna Nagar, Madurai. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner association would submit that the second respondent Board is a Corporate Body constituted under the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, (Act 1708 of 1961), that the Board was constituted for the purpose of effecting improvement schemes, acquiring lands, erecting buildings thereon and selling them to persons who do not have any houses that in pursuance of a scheme known as Shenbagam Garden HIG House scheme at Madurai, the Board had put up 17 HIG houses and called for application in 1987 for the allotment of the said houses through advertisement circulated by the Executive Engineer and Administrative Officer, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madurai, the third respondent herein; that in the advertisement the tentative cost of each HIG house had been fixed at Rs. 2,95,000; with an initial deposit, of Rs. 95,000 and a monthly instalment of Rs. 3,500 to be paid for a period of 8 years; that 17 applications were selected and provisional allotment orders were also issued in May, 1988, wherein also the above terms regarding the cost of the house deposit and instalments to be made have been insisted. 3. The further submission of the petitioner association is that some of the members have paid the entire cost of Rs. 2,95,000 and some others have paid the initial cost, which includes the cost of land, building and betterment charges as quoted in the advertisement and regular allotment orders were also issued in February 1989; that in the allotment order, the members of the association were also requested to remit the difference in land cost of Rs. 12,000 within 21 days from the date of the letter, thus fixing the cost of the house at Rs. 3,07,000, terming that such an enhancement of land cost as not maintainable, the petitioner association has come forward to file the writ petition seeking the relief extracted supra on these and some other grounds as set out in the grounds of writ petition. 4. 3,07,000, terming that such an enhancement of land cost as not maintainable, the petitioner association has come forward to file the writ petition seeking the relief extracted supra on these and some other grounds as set out in the grounds of writ petition. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second and third respondent and adopted by the first respondent, it would be submitted, that the Government of Tamil Nadu sponsored several housing schemes for the purpose of enabling the public at large to put up buildings for their residential purposes and such schemes have been implemented on “no profit, no loss” so as to provide better housing facilities for the public in the city of Madras and in other Corporation and Municipal towns in the State; that the object of the scheme itself is to provide house sites or houses to such bona fide persons, who do not own any site or building of their own or in the name of any member of their family; that in pursuance of the said scheme, the third respondent constructed several types of houses in Arignar Anna Nagar and K.K. Nagar at Madurai town, that observing the formalities, the third respondent invited application fixing the tentative cost of each flat at Rs. 42,000; that as and when the flat is ready for occupation necessary intimation will be given to the allottees to execute the necessary documentation in favour of the third respondent and thereafter the building would be handed-over to the allottees, after completion of the necessary formalities; that Clauses 14 to 19 of the terms of agreement clearly show that after determination of the final cost by the. second respondent, sale deeds will be executed in favour of the allottees on payment of the final cost; that till the final cost is determined and paid by the allottees registered, sale deeds will not be executed in their favour, and hence, there is no mala fides or arbitrariness involved on the part of the respondents in payment of the final cost of the building and that as per the orders passed by the single Judge of this Court in W P No. 9603 and 9604 of 1990 dated 28.2.1992, the above writ petition is not maintainable at all. On such and other reasons adduced, the counter affidavit would pray to dismiss the writ petition with costs. 5. On such and other reasons adduced, the counter affidavit would pray to dismiss the writ petition with costs. 5. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would differentiate the cost of the building under 2 orders the first one under the regular allotment order fixing the amount on 8.2.1989 and the second one re-fixing the amount on 14.5.l991; that when the amount was to be paid they said that the value of the land is increased and hence they have to increase their price by Rs. 57,200; and that in the counter the Housing Board has raised the question of maintainability. At this juncture, the learned counsel would cite four judgments reported as under: - 1. Madras High Court Advocates Association rep. by its Honourary Secretary v. State of Tamil Nadu rep by its Secretary to Government Home Department, Fort St. George, Madras -9 and 3 others , 1995 WLR 441 2. State of Punjab and others v. Brigadier Sukhjit Singh, 1993 (3) SCC 459 3. Ramakrishan Nagar Flat Allottes/Owners Co-operative Housing Society rep by its Secretary K.Veeramani v. Tamil Nadu Housing Board rep. by its Chairman having its Office at No. 36, Mount Road, Nandanam, Madras 600 035 and another , 1997 W L R 721 4. K.R..Zillaparishad High School Committee, Katuru v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others , AIR 1976 A P 285, citing the above judgments, the learned counsel would point out that the President of the association can maintain the writ petition, that within a period of 25 months, the price of the building had been increased, that the Housing Board is not a profit making body; that the term tentatively does not have any consequences. On such arguments, the learned counsel would pray to allow the writ petition. 6. On such arguments, the learned counsel would pray to allow the writ petition. 6. On the contrary, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the first respondent and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Housing Board would contend that there had been a demand in this area; that as early as on 14.5.1991 notices to the individual allottees including the members of the petitioner association were sent and the said notices had not at all been challenged by them; that the allotment was separately made in favour of each individual on separate orders passed against them, and they have to file separate writ petitions but not a single writ petition in the name of the association. At this juncture, they would cite relevant paragraphs from the order of the single Judge of this Court made in W P No 12798 of 1985, dated 25.6.1994 wherein the learned single Judge has held in para 2 which is extracted hereunder. “A similar issue with reference to the very respondent Corporation came up before a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No 1149 of 1986 and W P No 10826 of 1985. After hearing learned counsel appearing on either side and going through the decision of the Division Bench, I am of the view that, as held by the Division Bench, the grievance sought to be made out by the association in such general terms cannot be countenanced for adjudication or acceptance. If in a given case any prejudice or illegality or damage is specifically raised or sought to be vindicated then only this Court can entertain such individual claims for consideration and adjudication. The same view has been taken by the Division Bench also in a similar matter. Applying the same to the present writ petition also, this writ petition shall stand dismissed. As noticed earlier, the dismissal of this writ petition shall not stand in the way of the employees who agitate for their rights as against any individual orders passed against t hem. Applying the same to the present writ petition also, this writ petition shall stand dismissed. As noticed earlier, the dismissal of this writ petition shall not stand in the way of the employees who agitate for their rights as against any individual orders passed against t hem. No costs.” The learned counsel would also cite yet another order passed by another single Judge of this Court, recently, in W P No 17407 of 1994 dated 14.9.1999, wherein the learned single Judge dealing with the similar writ petition filed by the association challenging the impugned order of demand of final cost given to the individual member remarking that such a writ petition cannot be sustained in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, which has been followed in W P No 12798 of 1985 dated 25.6.1994 and would ultimately dismiss the said writ petition also on ground of non-maintainability. 7. The learned counsel would further submit that without challenging the demand notice issued, there cannot be a mandamus relief that could be granted; that the individual allottees are ready to pay 10% of the increased cost and not above the said amount. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the respondents would site the following judgments:- 1. Shimla Development Authority v. Asma Rani, AIR 1996 SC 1591; 2. Preeta Singh Etc., v. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others , AIR 1996 S.C 2201 ; 3. V.S. Raghunathan and 2 others v. The Tamil Nadu Housing Board rep. by its Chairman , 331, Anna Salai, Nandanam, Chennai600035 ,1997WLR 25 and 4. The order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W P No 5835 of 1990 dated 26.2.1999. 8. So far as the first judgment cited above, reported in Shimla Development Authority v. Asma Rani , AIR 1996 SC 1591 is concerned, it is held that “Housing Scheme by Development Authority Allotment of flats - Escalation of cost allottees bound to bear not only escalation in construction cost but also of escalation value of land when Court enhances compensation for land acquired under Land Acquisition Act at various stages”. 9. 9. In the second judgment cited above reported in Preeta Singh Etc., v. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others, AIR 1996 S C 2201, it is held that “Urban Development Authority is only a statutory body for catering to the housing requirement of the persons eligible to claim allotment. They acquire the land, develop it and construct buildings and allot the buildings or the sites, as the case may be. Under these circumstances, the entire expenditure incurred in connection with the acquisition of the land and development thereon is required to be borne by the allottees when the sites or the buildings sold after the development are offered on the date of the sale in accordance with the regulations and also conditions of sale”. 10. In the third judgment cited above, reported in the year V.S. Raghunathan and 2 others v. The Tamil Nadu Housing Board rep. by its Chairman , 331, Anna Salai, Nandanam, Chennai 600 035,1997 W L R 25, the Division Bench of this Court, held that “the power to make a final determination as to cost of the plot has been retained and has been made one of the conditions of the order of allotment and the lease-cum-sale agreement, which has been executed by the petitioners. The grounds on which the cost can be enhanced are also stated in the order of allotment and also in the order of lease-cum-sale agreement. Therefore the Housing Board has undoubted authority to enhance the cost of the plot. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the petitioners that the Housing Board has no jurisdiction or authority to enhance the cost. In fact, the cost as mentioned in the allotment order as well as the lease-cum-sale agreement is only provisional, subject to the final determination. If the petitioners were aggrieved with the final determination of the cost, it was required of them to demand from the Housing Board the details and the basis on which the final cost has been determined. In the event, the Housing Board furnished the details, that would have provided the necessary material or consideration as to whether there is a valid determination or not”. 11. In the event, the Housing Board furnished the details, that would have provided the necessary material or consideration as to whether there is a valid determination or not”. 11. The last judgment cited above is one delivered by the Division Bench of this Court, of which I am a Party, that is made in W P No 5835 of 1990 dated 26.2.1999, wherein also citing the above judgment reported in 1997 WLR 25, the same conclusion has been arrived at. 12. Assessing the case in the light of the above judgments cited on the part of the respondents it is quite clear that the second respondent Housing Board is quite competent to enhance the cost of the property since the assumption of the value in the lease-cum-sale agreement is only a tentative one and subject to final determination at the time of allotment of the building and hence the Housing Board is within its rights to enhanced price of the building and in these circumstances, it has to be decided by this Court also following the Divisional Bench judgments cited supra that with the enhancement of the cost of the building materials it has become necessary on the part of the second respondent to enhance the cost of the building and such decision of the Housing Board is perfectly valid and binding on the members of the petitioner association and hence the averments of the writ petition and the prayer as sought for in the writ petition cannot be sustained. 13. Moreover, since it was an order passed against the individuals, demanding the enhanced cost of the building and served individually on the allottees, a common writ petition in the name of the petitioner association cannot be filed as it has been made clear in the orders passed by the different single Judges in W P No 12798 of 1985 dated 25.6.1994 and in W P No 17407 of 1994 dated 14.9.1999 and hence conjoint writ application filed by all the allottees cannot be maintained and hence at the point of maintainability also the above writ petition does not merit consideration and the same fails at this score also. Thus, neither the above writ petition could be maintained as it had been framed and filed before this Court in the name of the petitioner Association nor is there any merit in the petition so as to consider the relief prayed for by the petitioner Association for all the above discussions held, and the only conclusion that could be arrived at, is to dismiss the above writ petition, but without costs. 14. In result, the above writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.