D. K. JAIN,j. ( 1 ) RULE D. B. ( 2 ) BY this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, nowfourteen in number and allottees of industrial sheds in New Okhal Industrial complex,phase-1, New Delhi, seek a direction to the Delhi State Industrial Developmentcorporation Limited (for short the DSIDC ) to offer to them the same concessionswhich were offered by the DSIDC in the case of R. Sehgal Vs. DSIDC (CWP No. 3806/92), incorporated in this Court s order dated 15/09/1993 andaccept the balance amount, with interest at 10% per annum with effect from 1/04/1989, in full and final payment due from the petitioners in terms of the said offer andalso grant a rebate of 15% on the cost of each of the sheds as per the DSIDC s letterdated 27/04/1989. ( 3 ) INITIALLY there were twenty five petitioners but subsequently, either on some of thepetitioners moving applications for deletion of their names from the array of parties oron the statement of their counsel, to the effect that they had settled the matter with thedsidc and were not interested in further pursuing the petition, by various orders theirnames were deleted from the array of parties. In the final memo of parties name, filedon 30/09/1997, the names of only fourteen petitioners figure. However, itis stated at the Bar by Mr. P. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners, that we arerequired to deal with the cases of petitioners No. 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 12 (as per the saidamended memo of parties) because the remaining eight petitioners have either filedindependent petitions or have settled the matter with the DSIDC. We may note thatthe names of petitioner No. l - K. P. Gupta and Petitioner No. 6 - B. S. Bhatia werealso ordered to be deleted vide order dated 12/08/1996, but they have movedapplications (C. M. 5644/96 and CM 5645/96) for recall of the said order. These twocases are also being dealt with along with remaining four cases. ( 4 ) THE sheds in question, constructed during the period 1973-74, were originallyallotted on licence basis. These twocases are also being dealt with along with remaining four cases. ( 4 ) THE sheds in question, constructed during the period 1973-74, were originallyallotted on licence basis. However, since inception of the licence deeds there weredefaults in payment of the rent by the allottees and, therefore, on the request ofentrepreneurs, a scheme for transfer of ownership of the sheds to the allottees on hirepurchase basis was floated sometime in March 1977 but despite requests andthreats of cancellation of allotment, by means of various letters, by and large,entrepreneurs did not make the payment. In January, 1987, the DSIDC came out withnew proposals for transfer of sheds. The allottees were given options to pay the costof the sheds either by 100% or a percentage thereof on cash down and the rest ininstalments. Since there was not much response to the said offer, on 29/04/1989,further benefits were announced, in that special rebates and discounts were offeredin case the payment plan was adhered to and a 15% special rebate was offered inthe event of unconditional acceptance and payment as per one of the options, withinthirty days of receipt of the offer. The petitioners did not accept any of the offers in asmuch as they failed to make full payments in terms of either of the offers. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the DSIDC had voluntarily offered variousconcessions to other allottees, in particular to R. Sehgal and Chander Prakash, whohad filed writ petitions, and that even after the filing of the said writ petitions, in April,1994, the DSIDC had made yet another revised offer reducing the interest from 10%to 9% on payment of 100% cash down, which offer was initially open upto 3 1/08/1994. The petitioners, grievance is that the DSIDC had not only failed tocirculate this offer to them, they also did not supply the statement of accounts to them,depriving the petitioners from the same benefit which was granted to other allottees,and, thus, their action in not treating the petitioners at per with R. Sehgl andchandra Prakash s cases, is arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional and, as such, thestatement of account issued to the petitioners, demanding the outstanding amountwith interest at 17. 74% instead of 9%, offered in June, 1994, deserves to bequashed. 74% instead of 9%, offered in June, 1994, deserves to bequashed. ( 6 ) THE petition is resisted by the DSIDC, inter alia, on the ground that the petitionerswere in default not only in payment of rent since inception of the licence deeds, theyfailed in even accepting offers made in June, 198 7/04/1989 and November, 1989in as much as full payments in terms of any of the options exercised were not made. Itis maintained that the petitioners case is fully covered by the decision of this Court inthe case of- Pushp Lata and Ors. , Vs. DSIDC 1996 (37) DRJ 41 and that thepetitioners had failed to clear their account even as directed in the case of Push?lata (supra ). ( 7 ) WHEN the case came up for hearing on 19/12/1994, while staying thedispossession of the petitioners, they were permitted to pay the arrears with interestat 10% per annum calculated with effect from 1/04/1989. As per the statementsof account of the petitioners, placed on record by the respondents, though someamounts were paid but full payment of arrears in terms of the said order were notmade. ( 8 ) WE have heard Mr. P. K. Jain on behalf of the petitioners and Ms. Gita Mittal forthe DSIDC. ( 9 ) IN our view, the issue whether the petitioners are entitled to the same concessionswhich were offered to R. Sehgal (CWP No. 3086/92) and Chander Prakash (CWPNo. 4446/92) having been examined threadbare in Pushp Lata s case (supra) towhich one of us (D. K. Jain, J.) was a party, we deem it unnecessary to reconsider theissue all over again. In Pushp Lata s case, speaking for the Court, Y. K. Sabharwal,j. (as his Lordship then was) rejected the argument that the denial of the sameconcessions to the petitioner as was given in R. Sehgal and Chander Prakashcases was arbitrary and illegal. It was observed that the offer contained in the order,dated 15/09/1993, in the case of R. Sehgal, was not in the nature of a"judgment", It was a case of offer given in a specific case and accepted and cannotbe treated as a dispensation of general concession to everyone creating anyenforceable right. The said order could not be said to be a binding precedent. The said order could not be said to be a binding precedent. It wasalso observed that the entrepreneurs were not entitled to the same concessions andbenefits, being rank defaulters and if for some reason some concession is given toone defaulter, it does not follow in law that same concession must be given to otherdefaulters. In our view the petitioners are not in any manner better places than Pushplata and other allottees, whose writ petitions, seeking similar relief, already stancdismissed. ( 10 ) MOREOVER. the petitioners have even failed to make full payment in terms of theinterim orders passed on 19/12/1994 and the petition could be dismissecon this ground alone. It is pertinent to note that while dismissing a batch of similapetitions along with Pushp Lata s case, the entrepreneurs were granted one lasopportunity to make payment in terms of the DSIDS s letter dated 28/09/1994 and make. 100% cash down payment, without and concession in regard to therate of interest or 15% rebate or cash discount, with interest at 17. 74% quarterlycompounded upto the date of payment and all the entrepreneurs were directed t (collect their statement of account from the office of the DSIDC and make payment ofor before 19/02/1996. Admittedly, the petitioners have not availed of thiopportunity as well. ( 11 ) WE may now consider the plea of the petitioners, orally urged by their counsethat they, having made substantial payments, are entitled to the same relief anconcession as was given to Mrs. Madhu Jatti (CWP 4770/94) in terms of the orderpassed by this Court in that case on 6/11/1996, whereby the benefit cjune, 1994 offer was granted to her on her making payment of the balance amourwithin the extended time, on the ground that the DSIDC had failed to inform her on thamount due from her on the basis of the said offer, despite demand. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, apart from the fact that it was never the case of the petitionerin the writ petition that they had accepted the June, 1994 offer or had made payrneiin terms thereof and, therefore, entitled to claim relief on the basis of"june, 1994 offethe facts of the present case are not in pan materia with the facts in Madhu Jatticase wherein, while noting the various amounts paid by her and observing that nfault could be attributed to her for non-payment, as having failed to receive arresponse from the DSIDC on her letter she had got calculated with the help of thchartered Accountant, which is not the case, here. On the contrary the petitionehave neither made full payments in terms of any of the offers made nor in terms-order passed by this Court on 19/12/1994. ( 13 ) WE are, therefore, of the view that the facts of the instant case not being akinthe facts in Madhu Jatti s case, no relief can be granted to the petitioners in termsthat case. The present case is fully covered by the decision of this Court in Pushplata s case (supra ). We may also note that vide order dated 14/02/1996was clarified that in case the petitioners do not make payment within the period fix (in the case of Pushp Lata, they would be doing so on their own risk and peradmittedly, payments in terms of Pushp Lata s case have not been made. ( 14 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, no relief can be granted to the petitioners. The writpetition is accordingly dismissed and the rule is discharged. ( 15 ) THERE will, however, be no order as to costs. CMs No. 5644 and 5645/96 ( 16 ) BY these two applications, petitioners No. 1 and 6 seek recall of order dated 12/08/1996 whereby their names were deleted from the array of parties forwant of instructions by their counsel. ( 17 ) SINCE we have already dealt above with the cases of the applicants on meritsand have held that they are not entitled to any relief, the present applications arerendered infructuous and are disposed of accordingly.