JUDGMENT : K. Ramamoorthy, J. The petitioner in the above CM.(M)s. opposed the application for registration by the respondent and all formalities were complied with and the petitioner was to submit its evidence. For that purpose an application was made by the petitioner and it was granted three time thrice. The time granted stood extended from 6.10.1988 to 6.12.1998, 6.12.1988 to 6.4.1989 and 6.4.1989 to 6.5.1989. On the ground that the petitioner wanted time to collect evidence, on the 21st of March, 1989 a request was made by the petitioner for the grant of time by two months. 2. On the ground that the time granted had expired, and order was passed on the 10th of May, 1989. The order dated 10.5.1989 reads as under : "Proceedings having been taken under Section 21 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 by the abovenamed Opponent to oppose the registration of the trade mark applied for by the abovenamed applicants and whereas by reason of operation of Sub- Rule (2) of Rule 53 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959, the abovenoted Opposition No. Del-4888 is deemed to have been abandoned : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT in pursuance of Section 97(b) of the Act abovenamed Opponents Usha Rectifier Corporation (India) Limited shall forthwith pay to the above named applicants Chinar Trust a sum of Rs. 30 (Rupees Thirty) only as costs of these proceedings." 3. An application for review was filed stating that the letter dated 5.4.1989, which is alleged to have been posted by the Registrar, was not received by the petitioner, and inasmuch as no communication was sent to the petitioner, the order passed on the 10th of May, 1989 was not valid and was liable to be reviewed. 4. The application for review filed by the petitioner was opposed by the respondent. By order dated 15.9.1989, the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, Delhi dismissed the application for review. That is the order that is challenged in the three CM.(M)s. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. 4. The application for review filed by the petitioner was opposed by the respondent. By order dated 15.9.1989, the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, Delhi dismissed the application for review. That is the order that is challenged in the three CM.(M)s. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. C.M. Lail, submitted that the letter dated 5.4.1989, which is stated to have been posted, was never received by the petitioner and the view taken by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks that there is a presumption and the reliance by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks on the decision of the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji and others vs. Ramshashi Roy and others AIR 1918 PC 102 , is totally misconceived and the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks had not appreciated the ratio laid down by the Privy Council in the above case. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. C.M. Lail submitted that if a month's time is granted to the petitioner, the petitioner would submit its evidence and the Registrar of Trade Marks could dispose of the matter on the merits. 6. Mr. Sai Krishna, the learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the view taken by the Deputy Registrar is in accordance with rules and the practice adopted by the Registrar of Trade Marks. The learned counsel relied upon the observation made by the Deputy Registrar at page 12 of the paper book, which is as tinder "According to the Dispatch Register, maintained by the Registry, the said letter No. TOP/1684 dated 5.4.1989 was properly addressed and put into the post. Postal stamps work Re. 0.60 were fixed on that letter. The said letter was sent by ordinary post. Undelivered articles are returned to the addressed (Section 37(3) of the Post Office Act, 1898). The said letter dated 5.4.1989 has not been returned to the Registry. When a letter is put in the Post Office, it is to be presumed that the letter reached its destination, according to the regular course of business of the Post Office, in the absence of rebuttal of such a presumption the said letter dated 5.4.1989 has reached its destination and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. (Harihar Banerji and others vs. Ramshashi Roy and others) (supra), cited in The General Clauses Act, 1897 by V.D. Mahajan, 4th edn. page 460)." 7. (Harihar Banerji and others vs. Ramshashi Roy and others) (supra), cited in The General Clauses Act, 1897 by V.D. Mahajan, 4th edn. page 460)." 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. C.M. Lail, and the learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Sai Krishna, referred to Rule 53 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959 and also decision of the Full Bench of this Court with reference to the scope of the power of the Registrar of Trade Marks acting under Rule 53 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959. This point would not arise for consideration if it is held that the letter dated 5.4.1989 did not reach the petitioner and it has not been established that it was posted and the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks acted in accordance with Iaw. 8. In my view, the Deputy Registrar had assumed that the letter dated 5.4.1989 was properly addressed and dispatched to the addressee. Section 37 of the Post Office Act, 1898 deals with a different situation. The provisions of that section reads as under : "37. Power to make rules to disposal of undelivered postal articles : (1) The Central Government may make Hales as to the disposal of postal articles which for any reason cannot be delivered (hereinafter referred to as "undelivered postal articles"). (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may : (a) prescribe the period during which undelivered postal articles at a post office shall remain in that office ; and (b) provide for the publication of lists of undelivered postal articles, or of any class of undelivered postal articles. 9. In a matter like this, provision of Rule 19 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959 would be relevant and the provision reads as under : "19. Address for service in application and opposition proceedings-An applicant for registration of a trade mark or an opponent filing a notice of opposition may, notwithstanding that he has a principal place of business in India, if he so desires, furnish the Registrar with an address in India to which communication in relation to the application or opposition proceedings only may be sent. Such address of the applicant or the opponent shall be deemed, unless subsequently cancelled, to be the actual address of the applicant or the opponent, as the case may be, and all communications and document in relation to the application or notice of opposition may be served by leaving them at, or sending them by post to, such address of the applicant or the opponent, as the case may be." 10. The Privy Council in Harihar Banerji and others vs. Ranrslrashi Roy and others (supra) had to decide service of notice and there was some evidence before the Court that on behalf of the addressee somebody had received the notice. The headnote (b) of the decision of the Privay Council makes the position clear and the same is as under : "Transfer of Property Act, Section 106Notice to quite-Tender Personal Delivery may take place anywhere-Vicarious delivery must be at the residence of the person to be served-In the case of joint tenant service to one is good service for all-Notice by post is presumed-to reach addressee if its posting is proved-The presumption is still stronger in the case of registered letter, whoever may sign the acknowledgement. The personal tender or delivery of the notice may taken place anywhere, the vicarious tender or delivery must taken place at the residence of the person intended to be bound by the notice. In the case of joint tenants, each is intended to be bound, and service of a notice to quite upon one joint tenant is, prima facie evidence that it has reached the other joint tenants. Doed. d.Macartney vs. Crick, (1805) 5 Esp. 196 Doe. d, Bradford vs. Watkins, (1806) 7 Eat. 551 and Pollock vs. Kcttey, (1856) 6 I.R.C.L.R. 367. If a letter properly directed 0 containing a notice to quit, is proved to have been put in the post office, it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed and the presumption would apply with still greater force to letters which the sender has taken that precaution to register, and is not rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself." 11. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks relies upon the ratio of the decision of the Privy Council without appreciating the circumstances under which the question was decided by the Privy Council. The point is distinct by this : whether the letter dated 5.4.1989 has been served on the petitioner ? On facts, one cannot escape the conclusion that it was not served. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to extension of time. Time is, accordingly granted to the petitioner to submit its evidence on or before the 31st of May, 2000 and on such submission of evidence, the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks shall adjudicate on the matter in accordance with law. 12. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks shall dispose of the main matter on or before the 30th of September, 2000. 13. The CM.(M)s. stand ordered in above terms. 14. There shall be no order as to costs.