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2000 DIGILAW 379 (KER)

Saji S. Nair v. Bindu

2000-07-21

C.S.RAJAN

body2000
Judgment :- C.S. Rajan, J. The petitioner married the first respondent on 28.8.1998. They are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act. The second respondent is the father of the first respondent. They were Jiving together at the petitioner's house. For various reasons, the marriage broke down and they ceased to live as husband and wife. Thereafter, O.P. No. 284 of 1999 was filed before the Family Court, seeking for a decree of divorce under Ss.12 and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Thereafter, Ext. P1 petition was filed under S.13B of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking divorce by mutual consent. Along with Ext. P1, Ext. P2 petition was also filed praying to dispense with the requirement of six months time. The Family Court considered these petitions and rejected the same as per Ext. P3 order. The reasons stated for rejecting Exts. P1 and P2 are as follows: Though it has been stated by the petitioner that the petitioner and the first respondent had been living separately from September, 1998 onwards, the actual date from which they started living separately had not been specifically stated. Further, it was averred in the divorce petition that the parents of the first respondent took her to Dharwad and that she is now under the care and custody of the second respondent. Therefore, according to the Family Court, the parties to the marriage are living separately from 3.4.1999 only. Ext. P1 was filed only on 26.10.1999. Therefore, the period of one year is not over and therefore, the essential requirement of S.13B has not been complied with. 2. Sri. T.R. Ramachandran Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Smt. Sureshta Devi, Appellant v. Om Prakash, respondent (AIR 1992 S.C. 1904). The expression 'living separately' occurring in S.13B of the Hindu Marriage Act was the subject matter of the above case. The Supreme Court dealing with the above aspect, held as follows: "9. The 'living separately' for a period of one year should be immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is necessary that immediately preceding the presentation of petition, the parties must have been living separately. The expression 'living separately', connotes to our mind not living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The 'living separately' for a period of one year should be immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is necessary that immediately preceding the presentation of petition, the parties must have been living separately. The expression 'living separately', connotes to our mind not living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The parties may live under the same roof by force of circumstances, and yet they may not be living as husband and wife. The parties may be living in different houses and yet they could live as husband and wife. What seems to be necessary is that they have no desire to perform marital obligations and with that mental attitude they have been living separately for a period of one year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The second requirement that they' have not been able to live together' seems to indicate the concept of broken down marriage and it would not be possible to reconcile themselves. The third requirement is that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved." 3. Thus, it is quite clear that it is not the physical separation of the husband and wife that matters. If they lived together in the same house, but do not live as husband and wife, then also it can be described that they are living separately. The important ingredient is the frame of mind of the parties. If they do not perform the marital obligations and if they do not live like husband and wife, then they are "living separately" in the eye of law even though they are residing under the same roof. It is always a question of the mental attitude of the husband and wife. The further question is only that there was no possibility of any reconciliation and the marriage bond was irrecoverably broken. In this case, the averments of the petitioner and the first respondent in Ext. P1 joint application are that they were living separately from September, 1998 onwards and they were not" able to live together and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. The fact that the first respondent was taken to the house of the second respondent on 3.4.1999 is immaterial. P1 joint application are that they were living separately from September, 1998 onwards and they were not" able to live together and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. The fact that the first respondent was taken to the house of the second respondent on 3.4.1999 is immaterial. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, mere residence in the petitioner's house till 3.4.1999 does not mean that they were not living separately as husband and wife. Therefore, the reasoning adopted by the Family Court is unsustainable. Therefore, I quash Ext. P3. The learned counsel for the respondents also agrees that they have no objection to dissolve the marriage and to pass a decree for divorce. Under these circumstances, I do not find it necessary to send back the case before the Family Court to pass fresh orders. Therefore, Exts. P1 and P2 petitions are allowed and a decree for divorce is passed by mutual consent.