JUDGMENT : L. Mohapatra, J. - This revision has been filed against the order dated 2.8.1996 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior for Division), Berhampur in Execution Proceeding No. 1 of 1995. 2. As it appears from the order-sheet, notice on admission has not been issued and pursuant to notice in the limitation matter the opposite parties 1 to 3 have entered appearance. An application u/s 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") has been filed to accord leave to prosecute this revision and no orders have been passed on the said application. Since the opposite parties 1 to 3 are represented by their Advocates and opposite party No. 4 is represented by the learned counsel for the State, on consent of parties the revision is taken up for hearing. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri S.S. Rao submitted that at the request of the petitioner Land Acquisition Officer, Ganjam, at Chatrapur (opposite party No. 4) issued notification u/s 4(1) and 17(4) of the Act on 11.8.1977 and Ac. 2.65 cents of land belonging to the family of the opposite parties 1 to 3 were acquired. After such acquisition, opposite party No. 4 passed award on 2.2.1978 u/s 11 of the Act and determined the compensation at Rs. 30,000/- per acre. The opposite parties 1 to 3 not being satisfied with the compensation awarded, prayed for reference u/s 18 of the Act and on such reference, the case was registered as M.J.C. No. 87 of 1990 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Berhampur. 4. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) after hearing the parties fixed the market price at Rs. 1,22,880/- per acre and passed award dated 20.2:1987. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that during pendency of the case before the learned Civil Judge the Act was amended by Act 68 of 1984 which came into force w.e.f. 24.9.1984. Under the Amending Act several benefits so far as it relates to interest and grant of enhanced solatium are concerned were provided for. However, the Amending Act conferred the benefits to the proceedings pending on 30.4.1982. 5. The opposite party No. 4 challenged the said award in First Appeal No. 131 of 1987 before this Court and the same was disposed of on 6.2.1990 fixing market price at Rs. However, the Amending Act conferred the benefits to the proceedings pending on 30.4.1982. 5. The opposite party No. 4 challenged the said award in First Appeal No. 131 of 1987 before this Court and the same was disposed of on 6.2.1990 fixing market price at Rs. 1.20.000/- per acre and it was directed that the opposite parties 1 to 3 shall be entitled to the permissible statutory benefits under the Amended Act. After passing of the award the opposite parties 1 to 3 filed execution case for realisation of the decretal amount. In the said execution case, counter was filed by the opposite party No. 4 questioning the entitlements of the additional benefits claimed by the opposite parties 1 to 3 as the calculation sheet filed by the opposite parties 1 to 3 indicated all statutory benefits at the enhanced rates. i.e., 30% solatium on the awarded amount, additional amount of 12% per annum, interest u/s 23(1A) of the Act, and interest was also calculated on the solatium amount. Apart from the objection an affidavit was filed indicating that since the case was not pending when the Amended Act came into force, the interest cannot be paid on the awarded amount including solatium. However, learned Civil Judge passed the impugned order holding that it being an executing Court, it has no jurisdiction to go behind the award which has the effect of a decree. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Civil Judge while passing the impugned order has lost sight of the direction issued by this Court in the aforesaid First Appeal. Learned counsel has also drawn attention of this Court to several provisions of the Amending Act and submits that the petitioner is not entitled to 30% solatium as claimed, as well as 12% additional amount under the Amended Act. Learned counsel for the opposite parties 1 to 3 submitted that the petitioner is the beneficiary of the acquisition and has no right to approach this Court in a revision having not contested the case at any stage. Learned counsel has relied upon a decision reported in National Thermal Power Corporation Vs. Surendra Prasad Jha and Others, and submitted that this revision at the instance of the petitioner is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on two decisions reported in U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. Learned counsel has relied upon a decision reported in National Thermal Power Corporation Vs. Surendra Prasad Jha and Others, and submitted that this revision at the instance of the petitioner is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on two decisions reported in U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. and another, etc. etc., and M/s. Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely and others, . In the decision reported in U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. and another, etc. etc., Five-Judges Bench of the apex Court considered the question with regard to rights of the local authority or company for whose benefits the acquisition has been made and held as follows : "(1) Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference Court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. (2) The said right carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference Court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending of the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up. (3) The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference Court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act. (4) In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. (5) Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226. (5) Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226. (6) The local authority is a proper party on the proceedings before the reference Court and is entitled to be impleaded as party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and opposite enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. (7) In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference Court if the Government does not file an appeal, the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court. (8) In an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference Court, the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in Supreme Court. (9) Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority u/s 50(2), whatever has been said with regard to a company too. (10) The matters which stand finally concluded will, however, not be reopened." Similar view has been taken in the decision reported in M/s. Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely and others, . In the decision cited by the learned counsel for the opposite parties, Patna High Court was of the view that where the award in land acquisition proceedings, for the benefit of company, was passed much prior to the decision of Supreme Court reported in U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. and another, etc. etc., the company for whose benefit land was acquired was not a necessary party to the acquisition proceedings. Considering the view of the apex Court in the decision reported in U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. and another, etc. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. and another, etc. etc., the company for whose benefit land was acquired was not a necessary party to the acquisition proceedings. Considering the view of the apex Court in the decision reported in U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. and another, etc. etc., that the local authority for whose benefit the land has been acquired has also remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the ground on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226, the present case is to be examined whether the same principle shall apply to proceeding u/s 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 115 of the C.P.C. empowers the High Court to call for the records of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears : (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. In the present case, the question is as to whether the opposite parties 1 to 3 are entitled to the benefits the Amending Act, 1984. If the claimants-opposite parties 1 to 3 are not entitled to such benefits under the Amending Act, then the Court passing order granting such benefits will be exercising jurisdiction not vested in it by law or exercising its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularities. This Court can also exercise suo motu power of revision when it is satisfied that the trial Court/executing Court has passed an order by exercising jurisdiction not vested in it or illegally or with material irregularity. 6. From the impugned order, it is clearly evident that the questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have not been answered at all on the ground that the executing Court cannot be behind the decree. It appears from the impugned order that the Civil Judge (Senior Division) has lost sight of the direction issued by this Court in the First Appeal wherein it is specifically stated that the claimant-opposite parties would be entitled to permissible statutory benefits under the Act as amended in Act 68 of 1984. 7. It appears from the impugned order that the Civil Judge (Senior Division) has lost sight of the direction issued by this Court in the First Appeal wherein it is specifically stated that the claimant-opposite parties would be entitled to permissible statutory benefits under the Act as amended in Act 68 of 1984. 7. In view of the discussions made above, I allow the revision and set aside the impugned order and direct the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Berhampur to reconsider the objection filed before it with regard to entitlements of the opposite parties under the Amending Act, 1984. As the case is very old and the impugned order was passed in 1996, it is further directed that the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Berhampur shall reconsider the matter and dispose of the same within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Since the parties are appearing before this Court, on their consent, it is directed that they shall appear before the trial Court on 11.8.2000, after which the Court below shall fix the date of hearing and dispose of the same in accordance with law. Final Result : Allowed