JUDGMENT 1. - By this revision, the defendant petitioners seek to challenge the order of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Pali dated 19.04.1997, passed in Civil Appeal No. 3/94, allowing the plaintiffs application dated 10.01.1997, for amendment of the plaint. 2. The suit in the present case was filed on 19.01.1980 for perpetual injunction, seeking to restrain the defendants from trespassing or encroaching upon the suit property and from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession. Obviously, for entitlement of this relief, the plaintiff alleged the suit property to be belonging to him and to be in his possession. Then in para 3, it was categorically contended that for last 4 days, the defendants are trying to illegally take possession of the suit property. It was also pleaded that the defendants with their relations did come to forcibly enter into the possession, but they were not allowed to succeed and they are out and out to illegally capture the possession and, therefore, the necessity arose for filing the suit for permanent injunction. It was also pleaded that if the defendants feel to be having any right, then they may take appropriate proceedings, but cannot forcibly take possession. Then, in para 5, the cause of action pleaded was that the suit was alleged to be under the threat of the defendants to illegally trespass and was said to have arisen some 3-4 days prior to the filing of the suit. 3. On this plaint, a written statement was filed by the defendants way back on 03.07.1980, denying all averments of the plaint and contending categorically that it was on 16.01.1980 that the plaintiff wanted to forcibly dispossess the defendants and the defendants were severely beaten physically for that end, but, then, the defendants could not dispossess and the defendants are continuing to be in actual physical possession. It was also contended that in the guise of the ad interim injunction, the plaintiffs wanted to physically dispossess the defendants, but they failed and the property continues to be in actual physical possession of the defendants. In their first para of additional pleadings, the defendants contended to be having title and also raised a plea, about their possession to be ancestral, open, continuous, peaceful and as an owner without any interference by the plaintiffs. In their first para of additional pleadings, the defendants contended to be having title and also raised a plea, about their possession to be ancestral, open, continuous, peaceful and as an owner without any interference by the plaintiffs. Then in para 11 of the written statement, it was contended that without asking for relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession, the suit is not maintainable as the plaintiff is not in the actual physical possession of the suit property. It is with this pleadings that the parties went to trial and the suit was decreed by the learned trial Court. 4. The petitioners filed appeal and during pendency of the appeal, learned Lower Appellate Court, vide order dated 02.01.1997 found that in view of the pleadings and the controversy involved, the issues were not properly framed and did require to be recast, in as much as, various un-necessary issues existed on record. Consequently, vide the said order dated 02.01.1997, fresh issue No. 1 was framed to the effect as to whether as on the date of the suit, the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property in accordance with law, and issue No.2 was maintained to be of relief. 5. Thereafter, on 10.01.1997, the plaintiffs filed the present application for amendment of the plaint seeking to add one para as para (3) (A) and also one Clause in the relief Clause as (1)(A), which respectively run as under:- "(3)( , ) ;g fd mijksDr dFkuksa dh fcuk gkfu igqapk;s ,oa fodYiu izfroknhx.k oknhx.k ds ekfydkuk vf/kdkjh dks pqukSrh ns jgs gS blfy;s oknhx.k ds oknxzLr lEifRr ds ekfydkuk vf/kdkjksa dh ?kks"k.kk dk Hkh ;g okn is'k gS rFkk ;fn fdlh dkj.k U;k;ky; bl fu"d"kZ ij igqaps fd oknxzLr lEifRr ;k mlds fdlh Hkkx ij dCtk izfroknhx.k dk gS ;k gks x;k gS rks vly dCtk oknhx.k dks izfroknhx.k ls fnyk;k tkosaA " "(1)( v ) oknxzLr lEifRr ds ekfyd oknhx.k gS fd ?kks"k.kk dh tkos rFkk ;fn oknxzLr lEifRr ;k mlds fdlh Hkkx ij dCtk izfroknhx.k dk ekuk tkos rks mldk vly dCtk izfroknhx.k ls oknhx.k dks fnyk;k tkosaA " 6. This application was contested on the side of the petitioners, inter alia, the ground that the application is mala fide, in as much as, it is when the plaintiff felt that he will not be able to succeed in establishing to be in possession on the date of the suit, then, in an attempt to seek a back door entry, the present application has been filed which will cause serious prejudice to the defendant. It was also contended that a suit for possession on the basis of title is entirely different from the suit for injunction based on the plaintiffs' possession and, thus, the point in issue in the two nature of the suits is entirely different. It was also contended that, in this view of the matter, the theory about avoiding multiplicity of litigation is not available. It was also contended that the amendment seeks to adversely effect the rights acquired by the defendant and, thus, the application for amendment was prayed to be dismissed. The learned trial Court, as mentioned above, by the impugned order, has allowed the application for amendment. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the learned lower Appellate Court was in jurisdictional error in allowing the amendment as the learned Court proceeded on the assumption that by amendment, the nature of the suit and cause of action will not be changed and that whatever reply the defendant could file to contest the suit for declaration, at the initial stage, can very well be filed even now, with the result that none of the rights of the petitioners are prejudiced. According to the learned counsel, all this is a basic misconception. The learned counsel submits that by the amendment, a definite cause of action which as on the date of the application for amendment has become barred by time, is sought to be added by amendment, with the consequence that valuable rights vested in the petitioners by passage of time and expiry of limitation are sought to be taken away. The learned counsel submits that by the amendment, a definite cause of action which as on the date of the application for amendment has become barred by time, is sought to be added by amendment, with the consequence that valuable rights vested in the petitioners by passage of time and expiry of limitation are sought to be taken away. Elaborating the argument, it was submitted that a look at para (3)(A) sought to be added, shows that the plaintiffs seek to lay claim for declaration BECAUSE the defendants are challenging the title of the plaintiffs, likewise, for possession also, the plaintiffs seek to contend that if the Court finds that as on the date of the suit, the defendants were in possession or have subsequently acquired possession, then a decree for possession be passed. The learned counsel contends that thus, the cause of action for the relief of declaration is said to have accrued, rather first accrued on the defendants challenging the plaintiffs title. Advancing the argument further, in this sequence, it was pointed out that the written statement was filed way back on 03.07.1980 and therein, the title of the plaintiff was challenged, not only this in that written statement itself defendants asserted to be in ancestral, continues, actual, physical, open and peaceful possession as an owner and, thus, in any case, since that date, the existing possession of the defendants was contended to be adverse. In this view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, if the suit were to be filed by the plaintiff, now for declaration and possession, it would have become barred by time as per Arts. 58 & 65 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, this valuable right accrued to the defendants by virtue of the above referred two Articles & Section 27 of the Limitation Act, is sought to be taken away by this amendment by seeking to relate it back to the date of the suit. 8. Controverting the submissions, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners submitted that it is established law that the amendments should be liberally allowed and cannot be refused, merely on the ground of delay. 8. Controverting the submissions, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners submitted that it is established law that the amendments should be liberally allowed and cannot be refused, merely on the ground of delay. It was further submitted that the amendment can be allowed, even at the appellate stage, so as to include new prayers, where for such prayer, parties had already led evidence, in other words, where from the existing pleadings, and evidence, if the plaintiff is entitled to any further relief, that may always be added by way of amendment. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, being AIR 1960 SC 622 , AIR 1967 SC 96 , AIR 1979 SC 551 , AIR 1957 SC 357 and 1999 (10) JT (SC) 61. The learned counsel also contended that the grant of amendment is a discretionary matter and does not involve the question of jurisdiction and, therefore, in view of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1983 SC 319 , no interference should be made in the impugned order. The learned counsel contended that the plaintiffs had already pleaded in the plaint to be having title in the suit property, both the parties had already led evidence on the question of their respective title and, therefore, if from that evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to have a declaration of his title, addition of such prayer at any stage could not be refused. Likewise, it was further submitted that the plaintiff, even by amendment, is maintaining his stand about being in possession as on the date of the suit and is only seeking an alternative pleading and relief for possession in the event of the Court not finding the plaintiff to be in possession as on the date of the suit or the defendant having subsequently taken possession of the suit property and, therefore, on the parameters laid down by the various judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, the amendment has rightly been allowed. 9. I have considered the rival contentions and have respectfully perused the judgments of the Hon'ble the Supreme Court. 10. At the outset, it may be observed that the principles propounded by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court are not matter of controversy and are to be followed. 9. I have considered the rival contentions and have respectfully perused the judgments of the Hon'ble the Supreme Court. 10. At the outset, it may be observed that the principles propounded by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court are not matter of controversy and are to be followed. The question in the present case only is as to whether even on those parameters, the learned Lower Appellate Court was not in jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order. I may straightway say that the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, on facts, are entirely different and I am concerned with the principles propounded therein. It may further be observed that the general principles propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, even according to the Supreme Court judgments itself, are subject to the condition that the application for amendment should be bona fide, it should not have the effect of taking away any valuable or vested right of the other party, more so, when it may have accrued by passage of time. In the present case, this is the most significant aspect, in as much as, as mentioned above, the suit was filed way back on 09.01.1980 and the written statement had also been filed way back on 03.07.1980 and it is in that written statement that the petitioners denied and challenged the title of the plaintiff and also asserted their own title, so also asserted their ancestral continued actual physical possession of an adverse nature. In such circumstances, there is no dispute that a cause of action did accrue to the plaintiff for a suit for declaration of title, so also for claiming the relief of possession, may be in the alternative and a look at Art. 58, so also Art. 65 of the Limitation Act would show that there under, a suit for declaration could be filed only within three years computed from the date when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff. Even according to the pleading, sought to be added by way of amendment, the plaintiff has alleged that it is on account of the defendant, denying the plaintiffs title that necessitated asking for relief of declaration. Thus, even, according to the plaintiff, the right to sue for declaration WWI accrued to the plaintiffs on the defendants denying the plaintiffs title and, thus, it accrued on 03.07.1980. Thus, even, according to the plaintiff, the right to sue for declaration WWI accrued to the plaintiffs on the defendants denying the plaintiffs title and, thus, it accrued on 03.07.1980. Consequently, despite this cause of action, having accrued and to the knowledge of the plaintiff, having not asked for the relief of declaration for all these years, if the plaintiffs were to file a suit for declaration, as on the date of filing of the application for amendment, it would have clearly been barred by time. Likewise, u/Art. 65, a suit for possession on the basis of title can be filed within a period of 12 years computed from the date when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. On this aspect also, though defendants claim to be in ancestral possession and, in any case, they, in the written statement, have categorically taken the stand that since much before filing of the suit, they are continuing in the actual physical possession continuously, openly, peacefully and as owners. Thus, the pleading taken in very first para of additional pleadings, so also in para 3 of the written statement do clearly amount to an assertion of adverse possession and, there- fore, without prejudice to the what plaintiff had to say in the plaint, all said and done, at least from that date, it had very much become clear to the plaintiffs that the defendants are asserting their adverse possession. Consequently, if the plaintiffs were to file a suit for possession on the basis of their title, on the date of filing of the application for amendment, even that suit would have been clearly barred by time. In these circumstances, for both the reliefs or alternative reliefs, as on the date of the application for amendment, the so-called right of the plaintiff had become barred by time and by virtue of Section 27, the right of the plaintiffs for these reliefs stood extinguished. 11. Amendment, sought by the plaintiffs, in the above back ground, can very well be said to be calculated to get over this difficulty by invoking the theory of relate back to the date of the suit and thereby deprive the defendants of the valuable rights accrued to them by lapse of time, by expiry of limitation, with the result that the desired amendment cannot be said to be bona fide. Likewise, the desired amendment, since has the effect of adversely effecting the defendants to an extent which cannot be compensated by costs as it seeks to take away the right vested in the defendant by passage of time and by expiry of limitation, even on the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court, the amendment could not be allowed. If the plaintiff is able to establish that he was in possession of the suit property as on the date of the suit, he can very well get a decree for injunction in the suit as originally framed and if the learned Lower Appellate Court were to find that the plaintiffs were not so in possession, then, obviously, the suit is to fail and in the guise of the amendment, the plaintiffs cannot seek the relief which as on the date of the application for amendment has become barred by time. Thus, by allowing the application for amendment, by the impugned order, the learned Court below has committed an illegality and material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In view of the finding recorded above, if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would occasion a substantial failure of justice. 12. In the result, the revision petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The application for amendment filed by the plaintiffs stands dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.Revision Allowed. *******