Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 381 (ALL)

RAJMANI SINGH v. DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.

2000-03-03

D.K.SETH

body2000
D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this petition has challenged the order dated March 26, 1998 contained in annexure 3 to the writ petition purporting to retiring him on March 31, 1998 on attainment of 58 years of age. ( 2 ) MR. H. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner was appointed in the District Co-operative Bank Limited Mirzapur, a Central Co-operative Society, registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 in the post of Clerk on December 8, 1962. The age of retirement on the date the petitioner was appointed as prevalent in the said Bank was 60 years. Since the petitioner was born on May 10, 1940 he was due to retire on the attainment of age at 60 years in May, 2000. Whereas the respondent bank sought to retire him on attainment of 58 year by virtue of the order dated March 26, 1998 contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition. The petitioner had further alleged that other employees who were situated like the petitioner were being permitted to retire at the age of 60 years of age. It is further contended that there was bipartite settlement between the bank and the employees of the Bank to fix the retirement age at 60 years which was entered into a settlement under compromise between the parties in a proceeding relating to a dispute pending before the Industrial Forum. It was further contended that a dispute in respect of 50 District Co-operative Banks was referred to, by the State government by an order dated December 11, 1963 in connection whereof bipartite settlement in the form of compromise was reached between the parties on February 22, 1966, which was agreed to be effective from January 1, 1965. In that view of the matter the retirement age as fixed in the U. P. Co-operative Bank Societies Employees Regulations, 1975 framed under Section 122 of the Co-operative Societies Act would be 58 years with the proviso that where before commencement of the said regulation at the time of appointment an employee had entered into a contract by which he would have been entitled to be retained in service after 58 years, in such case such employee would be retiring in terms of such contract as provided in Regulation 24 thereof. Relying on this provision, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner having entered into a contract under which he was due to retire an attainment of 60 years, he cannot be asked to retire on attainment of 58 years. Therefore, the said order should be quashed and the petitioner should be permitted to continue till 60 years together with all benefits. ( 3 ) MR. K. N. Mishra, learned Counsel for the respondents on behalf of the respondent bank contended that the alleged bipartite settlement appears to be an application made in the dispute pending before the Industrial Forum. But from the record he had pointed out that no order was passed on the said application. On the other hand he pointed out that the award was passed on the said adjudication of the dispute where the age of retirement was fixed at 58 years which is to be treated to be a contract entered into between the parties before commencement of the 1975 regulation as contemplated in Regulation 24 of the said 1975 Regulations. He further pointed out that there is nothing to show that at the time of appointment the petitioner had ever entered into any contract under which he can be retained in service till attaining the age of 60 years. The alleged condition of service produced by the petitioner does not seem to be an authenticated one. The copy appears to have been prepared in old papers but from the print thereof it appears that it was printed recently which is also apparent from the soaking (sic) of the ink where it is sought to be attested or signed with anti date. On the other hand Mishra had produced a copy of the service conditions which was duly authenticated wherein retirement age was mentioned as 55 years. Thus he contends that since it is apparent that the petitioner had entered into the contract while appointed that he would be retired at the aged 55 years which was ultimately fixed at 58 years in the award and was also adopted in the 1975 Regulations as such the petitioner cannot claim any benefit on the basis of the fact as has been surfaced from the materials produced before this court. ( 4 ) BOTH the learned Counsel had relied on various materials before this Court as well as several decisions cited at the bar on behalf of the respective parties in order to substantiate the respective cases. ( 5 ) I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has been sought to be retired at the attainment of 58 years of age through the impugned order contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition. In case the petitioner is governed by the 1975 Regulations, in that event, he is due to retire at the age of 58 years. In case he is governed by the Joshi Award in Adjudication Case No. 53/63 dated June 25, 1971 in that event also he is supposed to retire on attainment of 58 years. If he is governed by the conditions of service contained in Annexure 1 to the III Supplementary Affidavit, in that event, the date of retirement being mentioned as 55 years in the service conditions, he is again due to retire at the age of 58 years. In case the petitioner succeeds in establishing that there was in existence of contract permitting him to be retained in service till 60 years of age at the time of appointment, in that event only he will succeed. ( 7 ) IN order to substantiate his contention, the petitioner had relied on service rules purport date have been adopted by the bank effective from January, 1960 which contains retirement age as 60 years. In view of the proviso of Regulation 24 of 1975 Regulations, the Joshi Award in paragraph 21, while deciding the issue No. 6 relating to retirement age, had fixed 58 years without any qualification or exception. Thus the Joshi Award may not help the petitioner unless he is capable of showing that he had entered into a contract for permitting him to retire at the attainment of 60 years in view of the proviso to paragraph 23 of the said award which provided that no employee governed by the award will be a loser in respect of any benefit or emoluments which he may be getting before the award became enforceable and the same would be personal to such employee. ( 8 ) MR. ( 8 ) MR. H. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner had contended that even by virtue of the award, the petitioner is entitled to continue till the attainment of age of 60 years since it was an existing benefit available to the petitioner on the date of enforcement of the award. This also, in my view, is a question became identical to the extent that the petitioner has to show that he had entered into a contract allowing him to be retained in service till the attainment of 60 years at a time before 1975 Regulation was framed or before the date of enforcement of the Joshi Award. It is not in dispute that respondent was a party to the dispute which culminated in the Joshi Award. ( 9 ) IN interpreting the terms of the Joshi Award Mr. K. N. Mishra, learned Counsel for respondent had contended that the exception provided in paragraph 23 of the Award will not help the petitioner. According to him the benefit and emoluments mentioned in the said proviso does not include the retirement age. The retirement is a condition of service. It is not a benefit arising out of the service. The benefit or emoluments are confined to the entitlement of an employee with regard to the service benefits emanating from the service in the form of reward nor with regard to the duration of the contract. The age of retirement is the time specifying the duration of contract and as such is not a benefit. ( 10 ) ON the other hand, Mr. H. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner had contended that the expressions used are benefit or emoluments. The emoluments are the reward for the services rendered whereas the benefits are the terms and conditions of service beneficial to the employee. The duration of the contract is a benefit and as such the services rules effected from January 1, 1960 fixing the retirement age on attainment of 60 years is a benefit to continue to receive the benefit of service till attainment of 60 years as such is very much a benefit. ( 11 ) THE word benefit includes privilege. Privilege is a right, which one enjoys out of certain contract. ( 11 ) THE word benefit includes privilege. Privilege is a right, which one enjoys out of certain contract. In the service jurisprudence service rules are treated to be a contract for service containing terms and conditions of the service including the duration till when service would be taken from the employee. So long service continues, an, employee is supposed to get the benefit of his service. Therefore, it is no doubt that age of retirement is a benefit, which allows the employee to continue till 60 years to receive the emoluments in lieu of his services. Thus it seems that there are some substances in the submission of Mr. Singh with regard to the meaning of expression benefit used in paragraph 23 of the Joshi Award. In the CONCISE OXFORD dictionary benefit has been defined as the good result of something that makes life better. If it were so, continuance for two more years would definitely make the life better and as such would be a benefit. At the same time benefit is also defined to mean payment or series of payments, usually made by the Government to someone who is entitled to receive it. If it is so defined then it may work little difficulty and may generate some doubt. But then it can be met with the argument that so long the person continues, he is entitled to the benefit of service in the form of payment of salary and emoluments in turn, is the reason for allowing such benefit and as such in other words is a benefit. Whereas privilege means a favour of or against an individual continuance for two more years favour for an employee and it is a favour against the employer. It has also been defined to mean a right, advantage or immunity granted to or enjoyed by a person or class of persons, beyond the common advantage of others. It also means a grant of special rights or immunities to an individual, corporation, community or place etc. The retention in service for two more years is definitely an advantage. It is also an immunity from being retired before 60 years granted by the employer and enjoyed by the employee. It is definitely a special right or immunity to an employee. The retention in service for two more years is definitely an advantage. It is also an immunity from being retired before 60 years granted by the employer and enjoyed by the employee. It is definitely a special right or immunity to an employee. Therefore, the exception provided in the Joshi Award in paragraph 23 can very well be used to the advantage of the petitioner despite fixation of age of superannuation at 58 years by the Joshi Award, provided, the petitioner succeeds in showing that there was such a contract entered into before commencement of the Joshi Award which will bring the question within the proviso to Regulation 24 of the 1975 Relegations. ( 12 ) NOW, therefore, let us examine the contention of Mr. H. N. Singh as to how far the petitioner is able to establish that there was such a contract entitling him to be retained in service till 60 years of age. ( 13 ) ADMITTEDLY, there are contentions counter contentions in the present case. Both the parties had produced materials to support their respective contentions. Mr. Singh, had relied on the service rules effective from 1960. The same was filed as Annexure R-l to the rejoinder affidavit. Mr. Mishra had denied the existence of the said service rules effective from 1960 marked as annexure R-l to the rejoinder affidavit. It appears from paragraph 2 of the II Supplementary counter-Affidavit that respondents had contended that Annexure R-l to the rejoinder affidavit had never been approved by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies nor it was published in the gazette. Unless the service rules of Co-operative Societies are framed and approved by the registrar, Co-operative Societies and published in the Gazette, it has no effect. In paragraph 3 thereof, it has been further contended that the petitioner had never stated anywhere that annexure R-1 was approved by the Registrar and had been published in the Official Gazette. In fact such a statement has not been made by the petitioner anywhere. The original of the service rules from which Annexure R-1 was prepared was produced in Court. The same does not contain any certificate by the Registrar. Annexure R-1 appears to be a Xerox of the original. When the original was produced it was found that Annexure R-l is the facsimile of the original. The original of the service rules from which Annexure R-1 was prepared was produced in Court. The same does not contain any certificate by the Registrar. Annexure R-1 appears to be a Xerox of the original. When the original was produced it was found that Annexure R-l is the facsimile of the original. Though, however, the same appears to have been attested by the then Manager of the Bank with date. Mr. Mishra has drawn my attention to the signature and pointed out that the signature was made in ink and appears to have been soaked. Thus according to him that the copy was prepared/printed on old paper but the signature was obtained at a later date. Such old paper was used, according to him, to give impression that it was original, which it is not. He further pointed out that the type printing of the said Annexure does not seem to be very old and appears to be a recent one. ( 14 ) IT seems that there may be some truth in the submission made by Mr. Mishra. Apparently it appears that type printing is of recent origin made on old papers to create an impression that the document is old and original. It also appears that the ink used in attesting the signature by then manager also has soaked. It may be presumed that contention of Mr. Mishra has same substance but it is the job of an expert and the question is a finding of fact. Sitting in writ jurisdiction I am not prepared to enter into this question, even though such an impression appears to have been created. ( 15 ) ON the other hand the document that has been produced by Mr. Mishra may be a genuine old document. Inasmuch as the papers are really old and the type printing also wore a very old look and it does not seem to be of recent origin and that the ink used for attestation and signature does not seem to have been soaked. It is noted at the end of the said document that it was circulated in 1957 by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and approved by the Deputy Registrar of co-operative Societies. ( 16 ) HAVING compared both the documents it may appear that the one produced by Mr. Mishra is genuine and an old document. While the one produced by Mr. ( 16 ) HAVING compared both the documents it may appear that the one produced by Mr. Mishra is genuine and an old document. While the one produced by Mr. Singh may give an impression to be of recent origin though printed on old paper, yet I do not think it wise to enter into this question simply on the basis of these factors advanced by Mr. Mishra on the face of the situation when Mr. Singh had disputed the same. ( 17 ) LET us now examine the two documents without being influenced by the contention as made by Mr. Mishra since been recorded in the foregoing paragraphs. I have compared the two documents. The contents of both the documents are identical word by word. There is no deviation either in the numerical series or sub-serials used in both the documents or in the wording and phrasing of the contents thereof except at three places, which I will be pointing out later on. ( 18 ) I have examined these two documents carefully and had found that no deviation anywhere except in some places. In Annexure RA-1 capital Letters have been used instead of small letters with regard to the headings relating to different chapters, except three deviations mentioned hereafter, there is not a single difference or deviation between the two documents. ( 19 ) THE first deviation is at Clause (ii ). In the one produced by Mr. Mishra both Clauses (i) and (ii) of Rule 1 are blank. Whereas in the one produced by Mr. Singh the same are complete. In clause (ii) in Annexure RA-1-mentions the date of coming into force from January, 1960. ( 20 ) THE second deviation is in Rule 17 where the age of superannuation has been mentioned as 55 years which can be extended beyond 55 years for a period of one year at a time for five years in aggregate in the one produced by Mr. Mishra. Whereas in the one produced by Mr. Singh at both the places the age has been printed as 60 years. ( 21 ) THE third deviation is at the end of the document produced by Mr. Mishra wherein it is noted that circulated in 1957 by R. C. S. and approved by Dy. R. C. S. Whereas this note is absent in the one produced by Mr. Singh. ( 21 ) THE third deviation is at the end of the document produced by Mr. Mishra wherein it is noted that circulated in 1957 by R. C. S. and approved by Dy. R. C. S. Whereas this note is absent in the one produced by Mr. Singh. ( 22 ) IN the third Supplementary Counter Affidavit in paragraphs Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 it was pointed out that in 1957 a Model Service Rule was approved arid circulated by the Registrar of cooperative Societies for terms and conditions of the service of the employees of the District co-operative Bank. In its meeting held on December 18, 1957 and March 27, 1958 the committee of management of the respondent bank had adopted the said model rule for the employees of the respondent bank. It was asserted that the age of retirement was printed in Rule 17 as 55 years and that the petitioner had played fraud and got separate rule typed manipulating the age of retirement to 60 years. Copy of this affidavit was served on Mr. Singh on July 23, 1999. The matter was adjourned from time to time and was heard on July 26, 1999 and the hearing was concluded on January 18, 2000, when the judgment was reserved. But the petitioner has not filed any Rejoinder Affidavit to the II Supplementary Counter-Affidavit. Neither these statements had been denied or disputed. Statements, which are not denied shall be deemed to have been admitted. On the basis of the submission made in paragraph 4 relating to the adoption of the rules in the meetings held on December 18, 1957 and March 27, 1958, the petitioner has not come up with any case on which date or in which meeting or in what manner and by what authority the rules produced by Mr. Singh were adopted or approved. Nor it has been contended that the said rules were ever approved or circulated by the Deputy Registrar of the Cooperative societies and Registrar of the Co-operative Societies as the case may be. In such circumstances there are some substances in the submission of Mr. Mishra, which again being disputed question of fact, I do not propose to enter into. Nor it has been contended that the said rules were ever approved or circulated by the Deputy Registrar of the Cooperative societies and Registrar of the Co-operative Societies as the case may be. In such circumstances there are some substances in the submission of Mr. Mishra, which again being disputed question of fact, I do not propose to enter into. Though, however, it may be considered to be a factor, which might weigh in the course of deciding the question having regard to other factors so as to come to a conclusion. ( 23 ) IN the present case unless the Court comes to a conclusion one or the other way, it is not possible to decide the question. In the writ jurisdiction since evidences are not being led, the question is to be decided on the basis of the affidavits and materials produced before it. It may not place sole reliance on a particular document when question is a question of fact and that too disputed, but the Court has liberty to take into consideration different factors and weigh them in the context of preponderance and probabilities and weigh the factors and thereby prefer one or the other. When there are two documents and one or the other is to be accepted then the Court has the liberty to consider the question on the basis of the different factors as are available before it. When there are two documents of two different dates in order (to) accept that both are in existence and both are genuine, the Court is still free to weigh the different factors available from the material produced before it and consider the questions on the basis of probabilities and preponderance having regard to different materials available: before the Court. ( 24 ) ONE more factor, which seems relevant, is that the petitioner has not disputed the rules relied on by Mr. Mishra. Mr. Singh had contended that the one produced by Mr. Mishra was replaced by one produced by him. But the rules produced by Mr. Singh do not refer to earlier rules, for there is anything by which the earlier rules were superseded or. repealed. Mishra. Mr. Singh had contended that the one produced by Mr. Mishra was replaced by one produced by him. But the rules produced by Mr. Singh do not refer to earlier rules, for there is anything by which the earlier rules were superseded or. repealed. If there is no change in the whole rule as was adopted in 1958 except replacing the figure 55 by figure 60 in Rule 17, in that event, it would not have been necessary to replace the whole rule by a new rule, since it could have been done simply by amending Rule 17. It is not known why instead of amending the rule 17, the whole Rule was sought to be replaced. Not a single figure or words or phrase in the whole of the rules have been changed, excepting the figure 55 in Rule 17. Thus even if I do not enter into the disputed question of fact as referred to above, but having regard to all the factors discussed hereinbefore, it seems that there are sufficient reasons to find substance in the submission of Mishra on the basis of aggregate of the weight and impact of all the facts as discussed hereinbefore. ( 25 ) SINCE the petitioner had been claiming that there was a contract that he would be retiring from service on attainment of 60 years of age, it was for him to prove the same. The petitioner had attempted to prove the same through the production of Annexure RA-I. But the said annexure RA-I could not be relied upon in preference to Annexure SCA-I to the III supplementary Counter Affidavit. For this he has to make out a case which would lead the Court to discard the one produced by Mr. Mishra, at least supporting Annexure RA-I by sufficient statement on oath. If there were certain statements on oath, which if denied, would have been oath against oath. In the absence of any oath on behalf of the petitioner with regard to its adoption and denial of the statement made in paragraphs Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the III supplementary Counter Affidavit, there is no oath against oath. If there were certain statements on oath, which if denied, would have been oath against oath. In the absence of any oath on behalf of the petitioner with regard to its adoption and denial of the statement made in paragraphs Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the III supplementary Counter Affidavit, there is no oath against oath. On the other hand it is to be presumed that the statement in those paragraphs of the III supplementary Counter Affidavit are deemed to have been admitted, ( 26 ) HAVING regard to the facts mentioned above, the Court can safely prefer the one produced by mr. Mishra to the one produced by Mr. Singh and come to a conclusion that the contract that gave service of the petitioner prior to the commencement of the Joshi Award or in other words prior to the commencement of 1975 Regulation was the one produced by Mr. Mishra by which age of superannuation was fixed at 55 years which however enhanced to 58 years by reason of the Joshi Award since been maintained by Regulation 24 of 1975 Regulations, Thus the question neither comes within the exception provided in paragraph 23 of the Joshi Award (Annexure ra-II) nor within the provisions of Regulation 24 of the 1975 Regulations enabling the petitioner to claim a better benefit in regard to age of superannuation an those provided in the said award and Regulation respectively. Thus on facts petitioner has not been able to prove that there was a contract before commencement of the award and the Regulations so as to take away the matter out of the scope and ambit of paragraph 23 of the award and Regulation 24 of the regulations. ( 27 ) THEN again the compromise that was relied upon by Mr. Singh was filed in the dispute being adjudication Case No. 53/63. In his usual fairness Mr. Singh had admitted that no order was passed on the said compromise in which the age was sought to be fixed at 60 years. On me other hand subsequent to the filing of the said compromise of Bipartite Settlement, the Joshi Award was published in which respondent bank was a party fixing age of superannuation at 58 years. This award definitely eclipses the compromise or in other words the compromise has merged in the award or was accepted as modified in the award. On me other hand subsequent to the filing of the said compromise of Bipartite Settlement, the Joshi Award was published in which respondent bank was a party fixing age of superannuation at 58 years. This award definitely eclipses the compromise or in other words the compromise has merged in the award or was accepted as modified in the award. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the alleged compromises. Whereas in the Joshi Award it was mentioned in paragraph 13 that the confusion became worse as a result of several agreements entered between number of banks and their employees from time to time which were mentioned in a combined statement and from various other papers. Thus the 1 decision on issue No. 7 in paragraph 21 of the award and paragraph 13 of the Joshi Award clearly indicates that the said compromise did not receive seal of the Tribunal and as such Bipartite Settlement was of no consequence. It is the Joshi Award that was binding. Therefore, the petitioner cannot get any benefit out of that alleged compromise. ( 28 ) MR. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention relied on the following decisions viz; All India Judges Association v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 2493 : 1993 (4) SCC 288 : 1993-II-LLJ-776, Miss. Raj Soni v. AIR Officer Incharge of Administration, air 1990 SC 1305 : 1990 (3) SCC 261 , The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Beni Singh, AIR 1990 sc 1308 : 1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1990-II-LLJ-529, Padam Kumar Rastogi v. Ghaziabad Zila sahkari Bank Ltd. 1999 (1) All WC 503; Lalji Srivastava v. Allahabad District Co-operative bank Ltd. , 1994 (1) UPLBEC 297; B. S. Yadav v. Chief Manager, Central Bank of India, AIR 1987 SC 1706 : 1987 (3) SCC 120 . ( 29 ) RELIANCE was placed by Mr. Singh on the case of All India Judges Association (supra)wherein it was observed that for the health of the administration of justice that attractive service conditions including a higher retirement age, is prescribed for the members of the judiciary. For the same reason, it is necessary that whatever trained talent is available is utilised for as long a period as is feasible. But this distinction does not apply to an employee of the cooperative society as the question is governed by the service rules and different awards and regulations. For the same reason, it is necessary that whatever trained talent is available is utilised for as long a period as is feasible. But this distinction does not apply to an employee of the cooperative society as the question is governed by the service rules and different awards and regulations. Therefore, reliance on the said decision is misplaced. ( 30 ) IN the case of Ms. Raj Soni (supra) no uniform rule was framed and different employees were due to retire on different ages, therefore, it was held that such a question should not be left at the whims of the employee and that the age of superannuation as provided in the Delhi Educational board which is 60 years should be followed unless rules are framed. Thus reliance on the said decision also is equally misplaced. ( 31 ) THE decision in the case of Lalji Srivastava (supra) was affirmed in appeal in the case of allahabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. In the said decision it was held that settlement dated february 22, 1966 had overriding effect over Regulation 24 since it was not disputed that there was neither any fresh settlement nor Award nor any regulation altering the settlement dated february 22, 1966 involved in the said case providing retirement age at 60 years. Thus the facts involved in the said case are completely different from the present case and as such reliance thereof does not help Mr. Singh. ( 32 ) IN the case of Padam Kumar Rastogi (supra) the question was as to whether services being transferred to the corresponding new bank, the employee would be governed by the same terms and conditions with regard to pension, gratuity until it was altered by the corresponding new bank. The present case is distinguished from the one involved in the Padam Kumar Rastogi (supra ). In the present case, the petitioners service was not transferred. On the other hand, the condition was settled by Joshi Award and then by the 1975 Regulations whereby the age of superannuation was increased from 55 to 58. ( 33 ) MR. The present case is distinguished from the one involved in the Padam Kumar Rastogi (supra ). In the present case, the petitioners service was not transferred. On the other hand, the condition was settled by Joshi Award and then by the 1975 Regulations whereby the age of superannuation was increased from 55 to 58. ( 33 ) MR. Mishra, learned Counsel for respondent, on the other hand relied on the notification issued by the Government being 2053/ii-B-9-1959 dated June 12, 1958 wherein it is provided that there shall be no extension of age limit beyond 58 years and all extensions or reemployment beyond 58 years required concurrence of the Appointment Department. The said notification however applied to the Government Servants. There is nothing to show that the said provision could be made applicable even in respect of the employees of the respondent Bank. Therefore, it does not seem that the said notification has any relevance for our present purpose. ( 34 ) MR. Mishra, also relied on the following decisions in support of his contention viz. Mewa ram v. United Provinces, AIR 1954 All 487; Bombay Gas Company v. R. N. Kulkarni, 1965-I-LLJ-137 (Bom-DB), State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh, 1970 (1) SCC 108 ; Piara lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 3420 , Ms. Raj Soni v. Air Officer Incharge Administration (supra), S. P. Dubey v. M. P. S. R. T. Corpn. , AIR 1991 SC 276 : 1991 Supp (1) SCC 426 S. K. Siddiqui v. Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1991 SC 310 : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 693, All India Judges Association v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 165 : 1992 (1) SCC 119 : 1993-I-LLJ-723, Board of Directors of South Arcot E. D. Co. v. Mohd. Khan, AIR 1963 mad 192 ; Union of India v. K. T. Shastri, AIR 1990 SC 598 : 1990 (1) SCC 509 , and Muneshwar mani Tripathi v. District Co-operative Bank, Deoria 1996 All WC (Suppl) 183. But in view of the foregoing discussion, it would not be necessary to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Mishra any more. ( 35 ) IN the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost. .