S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated January 30, 1996 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in C. O. No. 12456 (W) of 1996 on January 30, 1996, whereby and whereunder the said learned Judge allowed the writ application filed by the respondents herein questioning an order dated March 18, 1986 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central Industrial Tribunal in Reference No. 4 of 1981. ( 2 ) THE basic facts of the matter is not in dispute. The concerned employees were appointed by the respondents upon undergoing a selection process through a Selection Committee. 42 candidates appeared before the Selection Committee and out of them 39 were appointed. Complaints of irregularities of the selection were received by the Head Office of the first respondent herein and pursuant thereto an enquiry was conducted, whereafter, allegedly, on the ground of fraud having been practised upon the Corporation, certain employees were punished and the services of the concerned workmen were terminated. An industrial dispute was raised by the appellant and the appropriate Government by a letter dated 1st August, 1980 refused to refer the said dispute allegedly on the ground that Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not attracted in the matter. The appropriate Government was approached again and by reason of an order dated December 27, 1980, a reference was made before the respondent Tribunal on the following dispute:"whether the action of Joint Manager (Port Operation), Food Corporation of India, Calcutta, in dismissing Shri Niranjan Dasgupta and forty nine other workmen from service as per office order dated March 28, 1974 is legal, proper and justified? If not, to what relief, are the workmen entitled?" ( 3 ) BEFORE the learned Tribunal the respondent herein raised the following preliminary issues:"1. The second reference is bad in law because the Food Corporation of India was not given any opportunity to be heard before making the order of reference; 2. The Association in question which is espousing the cause of the concerned 50 workmen has no locus standi and, thus, having no representative character it should be held that no industrial dispute exists; 3. The Association in question which is espousing the cause of the concerned 50 workmen has no locus standi and, thus, having no representative character it should be held that no industrial dispute exists; 3. No dispute having been raised by the Association with the management, the reference should be held to be illegal;and ( 4 ) THE present reference being a delayed reference having been made in 1981 in respect of the dispute of concerned workmen in 1974 should be held to be invalid. " the learned Tribunal, by reason of the order dated May 11, 1985 impugned in the writ application, rejected the said preliminary objections whereagainst the writ petition was filed. 4. The learned Trial Judge, as regard the. first contention, held that an opportunity of hearing ought to have been granted to the respondent herein before the appropriate Government made the second reference. As regards the second and third contentions, it was held that as the appellant-association is not a recognized one, they had no right to represent the concerned workmen, and thus, the reference was illegal. It was also held that in any event the reference being a stale one, the same should have been set aside. ( 5 ) MR. K. K. Moitra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that the learned Trial Judge committed an illegality in entertaining the writ application at that stage having regard to the decision of the Apex Court in D. P. Maheswari v. Delhi Administration and Ors. The learned Counsel submits that having regard to the provisions of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal could adjudicate upon the dispute and, thus, the learned Trial Judge must be held to have committed an illegality in passing the impugned judgment. It was further submitted that there being no period of limitation for making such a reference, the learned Trial Judge must be held to have acted illegally in holding that the appropriate Government has acted without jurisdiction in making the reference. ( 6 ) MR. Chattopadhyay, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent, on the other hand, submitted that having regard to the fact that fraud has been committed in the matter of obtaining employment, the learned Trial Judge must be held to have correctly set aside the award. ( 6 ) MR. Chattopadhyay, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent, on the other hand, submitted that having regard to the fact that fraud has been committed in the matter of obtaining employment, the learned Trial Judge must be held to have correctly set aside the award. Reliance in this connection has been placed in Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar and Anr. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel, the concerned workmen were merely probationers and thus they have no right to continue in service. The learned counsel contended that having regard to the definition of the term retrenchment as contained in Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it cannot be said that the services of the concerned workmen had wrongly been terminated. ( 8 ) THE questions raised in this application are no longer res integra. The Apex Court in several decisions has clearly held that having regard to the fact that adjudication of industrial dispute takes a long time, the writ Court should be slow in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as against an order passed by the Tribunal refusing to reject the preliminary objections raised by the management. In D. P. Maheswari's case, it has been held:"1. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether at (sic) such threshold part adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues. "in this view of the matter the learned Trial Judge ought not to have entertained the writ application at all. ( 9 ) THIS aspect of the matter has also been considered in S. K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and Anr. , wherein it was held:"2. There appears to be three preliminary objections which have become quite the fashion to be raised by all employers, particularly public sector corporations, whenever an industrial dispute is referred to a tribunal for adjudication. One objection is that there is no industry, a second that there is no industrial dispute and the third that the workman is no workman. It is a pity that when the Central Government in all solemnity, refers an industrial dispute for adjudication, a public sector Corporation which is an instrumentality of the State instead of welcoming a decision by the Tribunal on merits so as to absolve itself of any charge of being a bad employer or of victimisation etc. should attempt to evade decision on merits by raising such objections and never thereby satisfied, carry the matter often times to the High Court and to the Supreme Court, wasting public time and money. We expect public sector corporations to be model employers and model litigants. should attempt to evade decision on merits by raising such objections and never thereby satisfied, carry the matter often times to the High Court and to the Supreme Court, wasting public time and money. We expect public sector corporations to be model employers and model litigants. We do not expect them to attempt to avoid adjudication or to indulge in luxurious litigation and drag workmen from Court to Court merely to vindicate, not justice, but some rigid technical stand taken up by them. We hope that public sector corporations will henceforth refrain from raising needless objections, fighting needless litigations and adopting needless postures. " ( 10 ) SO far as the question of jurisdiction of the appropriate Government in making the second reference is concerned, the same is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Avon Services (Production Agencies) Pvt. Limited v. Industrial Tribunal Haryana, Faridabad and Ors. In the aforementioned decision it has been held by the Apex Court that the power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is exercised by the appropriate Government in its administrative capacity and not in its judicial capacity. For the purpose of forming an opinion as to whether a dispute should be referred for adjudication before an appropriate Tribunal/labour Court, the only consideration which would arise therefor would be: (1) whether there exists an industrial dispute; and 2) whether an industrial dispute is apprehended. There cannot be any doubt that there are several other factors which may be taken into consideration by the appropriate Government in refusing to make any reference, but it is also equally well settled that while doing so, it cannot exercise any quasi-judicial function, nor can it enter into the merits of the dispute so as to usurp an adjudicatory role. Once an opinion has been formed by the appropriate Government that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, as indicated hereinbefore, the same can be questioned either before the Industrial Tribunal or by filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, only in the event it is established that the conditions precedent therefor is fulfilled, viz. absence of existence of or apprehended industrial dispute. absence of existence of or apprehended industrial dispute. ( 11 ) HAVING regard to the fact that the appropriate Government exercises its jurisdiction under Section 10 of the Act on the basis of the materials on record, which are forwarded to it by the Conciliation Officer when a failure report is submitted in terms of Section 12 thereof, the question of complying with the principle of natural justice does not arise. ( 12 ) AS regard the question of compliance of principle of natural justice by the appropriate Government before making a reference suffice it to point out to say that in Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana and Anr. , it has been held at p. 881 of LLJ:"5. Therefore, it is not necessary to issue notice to the employer nor to consider his objections nor to hear him before making a reference. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was wholly wrong in its conclusion that before making reference on second application, it was incumbent upon the State Government to give notice to the employer and to give an opportunity to the employer and record reasons for making reference. The previous decision of that Court relied on in the case at hand was wrongly decided. " ( 13 ) IN The Workmen represented by the Ananda Bazar Patrika Group of Publication Employees' Union v. Ananda Bazar Patrika Limited and Ors. , reported in 1999-II-LLJ-899 (Cal-DB), a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (S. B. SINHA, J.) was a member clearly held:"a writ application is maintainable against an order of the Tribunal provided thereby the rights of the parties had been decided. Unfortunately, the learned Trial Judge failed to apply his mind in so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. It is further well settled that this Court will not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against orders passed by the Industrial Tribunal deciding preliminary issues, as thereby the purpose of getting the industrial dispute resolved by the Tribunal without any delay may become frustrated. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners ought not to have been entertained at all at this stage. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners ought not to have been entertained at all at this stage. " ( 14 ) HAVING regard to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Avon Services (Production Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) we are clearly of the opinion that a second reference was maintainable and prior thereto appropriate Government was not obligated to comply with the principles of natural justice. ( 15 ) SO far as the findings of the learned Trial Judge to the effect that the appellant union has no locus standi to represent the workmen are concerned, it may be noticed that admittedly from the very beginning the union had taken up the cause of the concerned workmen. It had not been established that the 3 concerned workmen were not its members. The learned Trial Judge appears to have proceeded on the basis that the appellant union was not a recognized union. For the purpose of raising an industrial dispute on behalf of the workmen it is not necessary that the trade-union must be a recognised union. Even some of the other workmen are entitled to raise an industrial dispute on behalf of the concerned workmen. ( 16 ) SO far as the fourth contention of the first respondent is concerned, it may be pointed out that no period of limitation has been provided for raising industrial dispute. The Apex Court in the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Services Society Ltd. and Anr. , has categorically held that Section 137 of the Limitation Act has no application and in a case where delay has occurred for more than 7 years, the Court only moulds the relief by refusing back wages or directing part of that wages. In the cases of Gurmail Singh v. Principal, Government College of Education and Ors. , reported in 2000-I-LLJ- 1080 the Apex Court has held:"as laid down by this Court in the case of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Service Society Ltd. and Anr. , (supra), if the order of dismissal is challenged belatedly, the dispute would still continue for adjudication, the only question would be to deprive back wages for the period of delay in raising such a dispute if on merits it is to succeed. , (supra), if the order of dismissal is challenged belatedly, the dispute would still continue for adjudication, the only question would be to deprive back wages for the period of delay in raising such a dispute if on merits it is to succeed. " ( 17 ) IT may be noticed that in the case of Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. v. J. Sterling, it has clearly been held that Limitation Act in relation to a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act has no application. ( 18 ) IN fairness to Mr. Chattopadhyay, let us consider the decisions cited by him. In the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, reported in 1998 (1) SCC 460 : 1998-II-LLJ-1161, the Apex Court was considering a matter after an award had been published. The decision of the Apex Court in Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar and Anr. , (supra) is also to the same extent. ( 19 ) IN the instant case an allegation has been made that a fraud had been practised in the matter of appointment by the appellant. It is, therefore, not a case where the services had been terminated on the ground that the services of the petitioners were not found to be satisfactory during the probationary period. In fact in V. P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab and Ors. , and Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, it has clearly been held that when the order is stigmatic, a probationer has also a right to be heard, and once an order of dismissal is passed on such ground, the same can be questioned. ( 20 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. The writ application of the respondent is dismissed. The respondent shall bear the costs.