ORDER : 1. Special leave granted. 2. The only question which arises for consideration is that when a decree has been passed by the Civil Court whether a debt recovery tribunal has the jurisdiction to deal with the application for execution of the said decree. 3. The appellant had instituted a suit against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 which resulted in a compromise decree being passed on 7th February, 1992. When the terms of the compromise, which contemplated money being paid by the respondents in a particular manner, were not fulfilled, the appellant in 1995 filed an application under section 19(1) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for the execution of the said compromise decree. 4. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 then moved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, inter-alia challenging the vires of the said Act as also the jurisdiction of the tribunal to deal with the application for execution of the decree. The High Court directed the tribunal to first deal with the objections with regard to the jurisdiction. Thereupon by order dated 10th July, 1996 the Debt Recovery Tribunal directed the respondents to file its written objections to the appellant's application under section is after rejecting the respondents contention that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the execution petition. This order was challenged by the respondents filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High court. 5. It appears that in 1996 the appellant filed another execution application for the recovery of an amount which had been the subject matter of a decree of a Civil Court. The tribunal on an objection being raised by the respondents, held that that it had jurisdiction to deal with the application and required the respondent to file objections to the application. This order, dated 20th October, 1997 was also challenged by the respondents by filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 6. By the impugned judgment dated 18th January, 1999 the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court came to the conclusion that when a decree had been passed by the Civil Court prior to the enactment of the said Act, the tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with an application for execution of a decree. 6. By the impugned judgment dated 18th January, 1999 the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court came to the conclusion that when a decree had been passed by the Civil Court prior to the enactment of the said Act, the tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with an application for execution of a decree. This conclusion was arrived at as the learned Single Judge was bound by the decision of the Division Bench of that Court dated 12th August, 1998, in Bank of India vs. Khas Kajora Coal Company Limited and Others (G.A. No. 1161 of 1997]. In Khas Kajora Coal Company's case the Division Bench had held that under section 19 the tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with an application for execution of a decree which had been passed by the Civil Court before the Act had come into force. 7. Section 2(g) of the Act defines the word ‘debt’ as under: “Debt” means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is alleged as due from any person by a bank of a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or whether payable under a decree or order of any Civil Court or otherwise and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application.” 8. Mere reading of the said definition shows that the word ‘debt’ in the said Act would include any amount payable under a decree or an order of any Civil Court. Section 17 gives jurisdiction and power to the Tribunal to entertain and decide' applications from banks and financial institutions for recovery of debt due to them. An application to the Tribunal, for the recovery of the debt due has to be failed under section 19. This section contains the manner in which an application which is filed, has to be dealt with. We may here notice that section 18 bars the jurisdiction of any Civil Court or authority in relation to the matters specified in section 17, except the jurisdiction of this Court or the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 9. We may here notice that section 18 bars the jurisdiction of any Civil Court or authority in relation to the matters specified in section 17, except the jurisdiction of this Court or the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 9. Keeping in mind the definition of the word “debt” which includes money due under a decree which is passed by a Civil Court an application for the recovery of the same by way of execution has to be made in accordance with section 19 before the Tribunal. In view of the provisions of section 18 the Court which had passed a decree would have no jurisdiction to deal with an execution application. This is more so when we see that section 34 of the Act stipulates that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding any inconsistent provision contained in any law for the time being in force. Therefore, even though the Code of Civil Procedure may have contemplated an application for execution being filed before the Court which had passed a decree but in view of the enactment of the said Act the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with such an application vests only with the Tribunal and not with any Civil Court. 10. The High Court has not correctly interpreted the provisions of section 2(g) of the Act which defines debt, inter-alia, to include an amount due in a decree passed by a Civil Court. The conjoint reading of the said provision along with sections 17, 18, 19 and 34 of the Act can lead only to one conclusion, namely, that the appellant had no remedy for executing the compromise decree after the enactment of the said Act except, to file an application under section 19(1) of the Act whereupon the Tribunal is required to deal with the said application in accordance with the said section. The a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Khas Kazora Coal Company's case does not lay down the correct law and the same is expressly over-ruled. 11. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court, the result of which would be that the tribunal will now proceed to decide the applications filed by the appellant under section 19 in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals are allowed.