D. K. SETH, J. Leave is granted to Mr. Vinod Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioner to amend the cause title so as to convert this petition into one under Ar ticle 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. In the present case the petitioner has challenged an order passed under Sec tion 16 (1) of U. P. Act, 13 of 1972 in case No. 32 of 1999 by the Rent Controller, Allahabad, since been affirmed in revision being Rent Control Revision No. 36 of 2000 by the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Allahabad through its order dated 31st January, 2000. The op posite party Nos. 3 and 4 had filed a peti tion under Section 16 (1) since been num bered as case No. 32 of 1999 before the Rent Controller for eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the ground that he has ceased to occupy the building by reason of Section 12 (3) of the Act 13 of 1972. It was contended in the said petition that two sons of the tenant had acquired vacant possession of building and as such the provision of Section 12 (3) of the said Act is attracted. 3. This petition was contested by the tenant by filing affidavit denying the claim of the landlord. The Rent Controller had relied on the enquiry reports and the materials placed before him and had decided the questions against the tenant by this order dated 3rd January, 2000. The revision thereout was dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the im pugned order was not a final order and it is not a case decided. 4. Mr. Vinod Sinha had argued on behalf of the petitioner that in order to attract the application of sub- section (3) of Section 12 of the said Act, two conditions are to be fulfilled namely- (a) that a mem ber of family ordinarily resides with the tenant and (b) that he is fully dependent on the tenant. In the case of Triveni Pratap Singh v. Smt. Gauri Ghakravarty and others, 1977 ARC 307, this Court have held that both these conditions are to be ful filled in order to attract such provisions. But the Full Bench in the case of Smt. Ram Devi Shakhya and anther v. First Addl. In the case of Triveni Pratap Singh v. Smt. Gauri Ghakravarty and others, 1977 ARC 307, this Court have held that both these conditions are to be ful filled in order to attract such provisions. But the Full Bench in the case of Smt. Ram Devi Shakhya and anther v. First Addl. Dis trict Judge, Lucknow and another, 1981 ARC 305, in paragraph 16 had held that it is not necessary that a person should both be normally residing with the tenant as well as be wholly dependent on such tenant before his acquiring another building will cause vacancy. The decision of the Full Bench was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Harish Tandon v. Addi tional District Magistrate, Allahabad and others, 1995 (25) ALR 184 (SC), wherein the decision of the Full Bench was not approved. In an earlier decision to that of Supreme Court the learned Single Judge of this Court had held in the case of Syed Mazhar Mustafa Jafri and another v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others, 1992 (19) ALR 3 (Sum): 1991 (2) ARC 427, that if one of the conditions is fulfilled, the provision is attracted. Ac cording to Mr. Sinha, the decision of the learned Single Judge has since been whit tled down by reason of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Harish Tandon (supra ). He had also relied on the decisions in the case of Mohammed Azeem v. District Judge, Aligarh and others, 1985 (11) ALR 358 (SC) ; Thakur Din v. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1984 UPRCC 389; Som Nath Seth v. Ilndaddl District Judge, Rampur and others, 1981 ARC 82 and Prem Raj Gupta and anotherv. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur and others, 1998 (32) ALR 539, and con tended that since the sons of the tenant were not fully dependent on the tenant that they had not been normally residing with the tenant therefore, the said provisions cannot be attracted. He next contends that in fact there is nothing to show that the sons of the tenant had been residing normally with the tenant. Accord ing to him it is for the landlord to prove in order to take advantage of Section 12 (3) of the said Act that the ingredients thereof had been satisfied. He next contends that in fact there is nothing to show that the sons of the tenant had been residing normally with the tenant. Accord ing to him it is for the landlord to prove in order to take advantage of Section 12 (3) of the said Act that the ingredients thereof had been satisfied. In the absence of any such proof the order cannot be sustained. 5. Mr. Sunil Ambwani appearing on behalf of the opposite parties on the other hand contends that the proceeding being a summary procedure, this Court is not sup posed to enter into the finding of fact arrived at by the Rent Control Authority, unless it is shown that the finding is per verse. He had relied on the materials that had been taken into consideration by the authority concerned and had pointed out that there were sufficient materials to come to the conclusion in one or other way. He had further pointed out that the decision was on the basis of the affidavit and it is a question of belief or disbelief. Since the authority had considered the case on the basis of the materials on record, this Court even of a different view cannot interfere with such finding when one or the other finding could be arrived at on the basis of such materials. He further contends that by reason of the Full Bench decision cited by Mr. Sinha namely the case of Ram Devi Shakhya (supra), it is no more res integra. Now it is settled principle of law that if any one of the ingredient is satisfied, the mischief of Section 12 (3) of the said Act is attracted. The position stands clarified in the decision of Syed Mazhar Mustafa Jafri (supra ). Sinha namely the case of Ram Devi Shakhya (supra), it is no more res integra. Now it is settled principle of law that if any one of the ingredient is satisfied, the mischief of Section 12 (3) of the said Act is attracted. The position stands clarified in the decision of Syed Mazhar Mustafa Jafri (supra ). The decision in the case of Harish Tandon (supra), by the apex Court cannot be said to have whittled down the decision of the learned Single Judge in Syed Mazhar Mus tafa Jafri (supra), or that of the Full Court in view of the decision in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1983 (4) SCC 353 ; Shiv Kumar v. Jawahar Lal Verma and others, 1988 (14) ALR 633 (SC) and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, 1999 " (6) SCC 172, the observation made by Supreme Court cannot eclipse the decision of the Full Bench in respect of a local Act unless it is expressly and con sciously decides the issue. In the decision in the case of Harish Tandon (supra), the Apex Court has not decided the issue and had made an observation in a context when the apex Court had recorded that it was not necessary to go into the question. As such the observation made therein cannot have any impact on the decision of the Full Bench that any one of the ingredient, if satisfied, would attract the mischief of Sec tion 12 (3 ). He had further pointed out from the materials on record that there are sufficient materials to arrive at the finding. He further contended that the mischief is attracted as soon the acquisition con templated in the said provision is com pleted. Subsequent shifting of the member of the family after acquisition would not mean that he does not ordinarily reside with the tenant. The effective date is the date on which the acquisition is made. In such circumstances, according to him the petition should be dismissed. 6. I have heard both the Counsel at length. 7. The facts of this case are more or less admitted. It is admitted that there are two sons of the tenant- petitioner herein. It is also admitted that both the sons are employed and are not fully dependent on the tenant. 6. I have heard both the Counsel at length. 7. The facts of this case are more or less admitted. It is admitted that there are two sons of the tenant- petitioner herein. It is also admitted that both the sons are employed and are not fully dependent on the tenant. It is also admitted that both the sons have acquired accommodation in the City of Allahabad. However, it is con tended that one of the accommodations had been acquired by the wife of one of the sons. On this admitted facts, it is con tended on behalf of the tenant that the said two sons are living separately and had not been ordinarily residing with the tenant. On the other hand, the landlord had been insisting that both the sons had been or dinarily residing with the tenant until the respective properties were acquired by the respective sons and even thereafter. It is further contended that one of the sons had let out the flat acquired by him to tenant which has since been found on enquiry by the Competent Authority. In such cir cumstances, according to the landlord the tenant cannot succeed in opposing the case of the landlord. 8. In this background the question as raised by both the Counsels are to be ex amined. Admittedly in the decision in the case of Triveni Pratap Singh (supra), this Court had held that the twin ingredients are to be satisfied before the mischief of Section 12 (3) is attracted. However, the question stands settled by reason of the decision of the Full Bench in Smt. Ram Devi Shakhya (supra) to the extent that any one of the ingredients would be sufficient to attract the mischief. It stood clarified by the decision in the case of Syed Mazhar Mustafa Jafri (supra), which had clarified that the mischief is attracted when both the ingredients are satisfied as well as when anyone of them is satisfied. The apex Court in the case of Harish Tandon (supra), has not consciously and expressly gone into the said question though it had observed certain anomalies in paragraph 19 of the said judgment. The apex Court in the case of Harish Tandon (supra), has not consciously and expressly gone into the said question though it had observed certain anomalies in paragraph 19 of the said judgment. It would be beneficial to quote the expression used in the said decision namely "although we are not concerned in the present case with the scope of sub- section (3) of Section 12, but in order to appreciate the submission made on be half of the respondents, we may point out that sub-section (3) of Section 12 does not conceive that if one of the sons living with the tenant who is not wholly dependent on such tenant, acquires any other residential building in the same city or town then even the original tenant shall be deemed to nave ceased to occupy the building in question. " This is apparent from the explanation (b) to said sub-section (3) which says:- (b) the expression any member of family in relation to a tenant shall not include a person who has neither been normally residing with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant. " In view of the explanation any mem ber of the family mentioned in sub-section (3) shall not include any person who has neither been normally residing with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant. As such if son of the tenant who is not wholly depend ent on such tenant acquires or gets any residential building in the same city or town, there is no question of the tenant deeming to have ceased to occupy the building under sub-section (3) of Section 12. 9. This observation according to Mr. Ambwani does not eclipse the ratio decided by the Full Bench in the case of Smt. Ram Devi Shakhya (supra ). 10. In the case of Sreenivasa General Traders (supra), the apex Court had held that a case is an authority only for what is actually decides and not for what may logi cally follow from it. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be exposi tions of the whole law but governed or qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be exposi tions of the whole law but governed or qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would appear that there are certain ob servations to be found in the judgment in Kewal Krishna Puri v. State of Punjab, 1980 (1) SCC 416 , which were really not neces sary for the purposes of the decision and go beyond the occasion. Therefore, they have no binding authority though they have persuasive value. 11. Be that as it may. The observation was made in the context where out of four sons one had acquired such accommodation. But in the present case, the context is completely different where both the sons had acquired accommodation and as such, we may not go into that question par ticularly, when the apex Court was not in seisin of the issue involved in the Full Bench. In such circumstances I am bound by the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Smt. Ram Devi Shakhya (supra),and I do find any reason for disagreement with that of the learned Single Judge in the case of Syed Mazahar Mustafa Jafri (supra ). 12. The position now is that either one of the ingredients is to be satisfied in order to attract the application of Section 12 (3 ). 13. In the present case, admittedly the sons are not fully dependent on the tenant. The question remains to be seen as to whether the sons had been normally residing with the tenant or not. 14. The landlord had contended that the sons had been residing with the tenant normally though the house was acquired in the name of the wife of one of the sons. It is in effect an acquisition of the property by the sons. In the affidavit the tenant had disclosed that her son Sri Shyam Lal had been living separately and his wife has entered into an agreement to purchase the house referred to by the landlord and her other son Sri Chandrajeet Chaddha had entered into an agreement to purchase the house in question and that the said sons are living separately from the deponent. The question is decided on the basis of the affidavit filed by the parties. This affidavit was filed in order to counter the statement made in the application by the landlord where he had contended that they were residing with the tenant ordinarily. There was a report of the Rent Control Inspector. The procedure has been laid down in the Act and the Rules. The procedure being a summary procedure that is not open to this Court to sit on appeal. This Court also while exercising revisional jurisdiction is not supposed to enter into disputed ques tion or interfere with the finding of fact unless it appears to be perverse. It is open to the Rent Controller to believe or dis believe one or the others case. This Court cannot interfere with arriving at a con clusion on the basis of such belief although it might be of different view. 15. But then there has to be a definite finding to the extent that the sons of the tenant had been residing with the tenant ordinarily. From the impugned order, it does not appear that there was any such finding. Mr. Ambwani has drawn my atten tion to the report of the Rent Control Inspector. The said report shows that one of the sons had let out the premises to one Sri Rajendra Pal Mehrotra but the Rent Controller has not reverted to the said report and discussed the same though in law he is not expected to write an elaborate judgment. But then there must be a finding to the extent that the sons of the tenant had been ordinarily residing with the tenant. 16. So far as the question that the sons of the tenant had been residing ordinarily with the tenant at the time of acquisition of the property is to be decided by the Rent Controller. This proposition can be ex amined having regard to the expression used in Section 12 itself. 16. So far as the question that the sons of the tenant had been residing ordinarily with the tenant at the time of acquisition of the property is to be decided by the Rent Controller. This proposition can be ex amined having regard to the expression used in Section 12 itself. In order to ap preciate the situation, it would be benefi cial to quote sub-section (1) and (3) of Section 12: " (1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if- (a) he has substantially removed his ef fects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence not being temporary residence else where. (2 ). (3) In the case of a residential building, if the tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets va cated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy: Provided that if the tenant or any member of his family had built any such residential build ing before the date of commencement of this Act, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy upon the expiration of a period of one year from the said date. (3-A ). . . . . . . . 17. It appears that under sub-section (1) a landlord or tenant deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or part thereof it he substantially removes his ef fects therefrom or he allows any person not being a member of the family to occupy the premises or the tenant as well as the member of the family takes up a residence elsewhere which is not a temporary residence. It further provides in sub-sec tion (3) in respect of residential building that if a tenant or any member of his family builds 01 otherwise acquires in vacant state or gets vacated any residential building in the same city in which the tenanted building is situated, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy. 18. Thus, the expression used indi cates that the relevant date is the date when the acquisition is made. Therefore, the relevance of residence had nexus with the date of the acquisition. It is immaterial if he shifts to new accommodation after the acquisition is made then it would not dis qualify him as an ordinary resident of the tenanted house. The relevant point of time is anti-dated to the acquisition. Therefore it is to be seen that whether on the date of acquisition of the property the sons of the tenant had been residing ordinarily with the tenant. 19. This question since appears not to have been determined by the Rent Con troller though there were certain materials. In my view this is a case fit to be sent back for fresh decision by the Rent Controller in accordance with law on the face of the materials placed before it or such other materials that might be placed before the authority by the respective par ties who would be free to produce other materials in order to support their respec tive contentions. 20. in such circumstances this peti tion succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Rent Controller is hereby set aside with the direction that the Rent Controller shall decide the question once again in accordance with law and according to the direction contained hereinbefore within a period of two months from the date of a copy of this order is produced before the authority concerned, whatever materials are to be produced by the parties, the same should be produced within one month from the date of this order. In default, it would be open to the Rent Controller to proceed without such materials and decide the case on the materials that already exist. The revision is thus disposed of. However, there will be no order as to costs. Let a certified copy of this order be given to the Counsel for both the parties on payment of usual charges. Petition allowed .