JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs/appellants (hereafter referred to as the plaintiffs) have preferred the present appeal against the judgment and decree dated December 15, 1993 passed by the learned District Judge, Bilaspur upholding the judgment and decree dated January 10, 1986 passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Ghumarwin dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that one Sohan, now represented by his legal representatives appellants No. 1 and 2 and Ram Singh, instituted a suit for declaration that they are the owners in possession of land comprising Khata Khatauni No. 260/347 min, Khasra No. 2127, measuring 1 bigha, 3 biswas, situate in village Sindhiar, Pargana Sunhani, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (hereafter referred to as the suit land). The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, is that the suit land had been in their open, peaceful and hostile possession for the last 40 years at the time of institution of the suit and they were recorded in possession of the suit land in the revenue papers prior to 1960 which entries were subsequently changed without their ejectment from the suit land. It is further their case that being in possession, the plaintiffs applied for grant of suit land as Nautor to them which was granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Ghumarwin but such grant was subsequently cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner whose order was confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner. Since the revenue officials are now threatening to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land, hence the present suit. 3. The defendant/respondent State of H.P. (hereafter referred to as defendant No. 1) resisted the claim of the plaintiffs and took preliminary objections in the written statement that the suit was not maintainable in the present form, that the suit was liable to be dismissed for want of service of notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the present suit and that the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit by their act and conduct. On merits, it was averred that the plaintiffs had never been in possession of the suit land which is owned and possessed by the replying defendant and the entries in the revenue papers are also in its favour. On merits, it was averred that the plaintiffs had never been in possession of the suit land which is owned and possessed by the replying defendant and the entries in the revenue papers are also in its favour. The plaintiffs, however, tried to encroach upon a portion of the suit land five-six years before the institution of the suit and were ejected there from pursuant to the proceedings initiated under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest in the suit land. It is, however, admitted that the plaintiffs had applied for grant of suit land to them as Nautor. Thus, the claim of the plaintiffs has been denied. 4. During the pendency of the suit, respondents/defendants No. 2 and 3 (hereafter referred to as defendants No. 2 and 3), on their application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, were added as defendants to the suit and they also filed their written statement wherein they took the preliminary objections that the suit was not maintainable in the present form, that the plaintiffs had no right to sue, that the suit was liable to be dismissed because of contradictory and inconsistent pleas, that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, the plaint deserves to be dismissed for want of notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and that the suit was not valued properly for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction. On merits, it was claimed that the suit land is surrounded by the land of answering defendants and the plaintiffs had never been in possession thereof. The plaintiffs had applied for grant of the suit land to them as Nautor in the year 1965 but the Nautor as sanctioned by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Ghumarwin was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur which order was confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner. It is further averred that a Khalwara on the suit land belongs to the replying defendants. The claim of the plaintiffs regarding long and adverse possession has been denied. 5. The plaintiffs filed replication to the written statement of defendant No, 1 wherein the grounds of defence as taken in the written statement were denied and the claim made in the plaint was re-affirmed. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues: “1. 5. The plaintiffs filed replication to the written statement of defendant No, 1 wherein the grounds of defence as taken in the written statement were denied and the claim made in the plaint was re-affirmed. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners by virtue of adverse possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD. 3. Whether no notice under Section 80 C.P.C. has been served upon the State? OPD. 4. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD. 5. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit against the defendants by his act and conduct? OPD. 7. Whether the D.C. and Divisional Commissioner cancelled the Nautor grant without any inquiry? OPP. 8. Relief.” 7. By its judgment dated January 10, 1986 the trial Court decided issues No. 1 and 7 against the plaintiffs. Issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the defendants whereas the remaining issues were decided against the defendants. As a consequence of findings on issues No. 1, 2 and 7 the suit was dismissed. 8. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge, Bilaspur who by the impugned judgment dismissed the same and affirmed the findings returned by the trial Court, hence the present appeal. 9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 10. This appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the appellants have acquired ownership rights over the suit land by virtue of their adverse possession, the same being coming continuously much prior to 1938. 2. Whether orders of cancellation regarding reguiarisation of ownership in favour of the appellants by the Deputy Commissioner Bilaspur vide Exhibit D-8 and order as passed by the Ld. Divisional Commissioner vide Exhibit D-9, are without jurisdiction." 11. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs had been in continuous, uninterrupted and hostile possession of the suit land for more than 40 years at the time of the institution of the suit and such possession has matured into title. 12. Divisional Commissioner vide Exhibit D-9, are without jurisdiction." 11. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs had been in continuous, uninterrupted and hostile possession of the suit land for more than 40 years at the time of the institution of the suit and such possession has matured into title. 12. The plea of the plaintiffs that they have been in adverse possession of the suit land for more than 40 years and thereby acquired title, has been negatived by both the Courts below and, thus, there are concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs had not been in adverse possession of the suit land for 30 or more years as claimed by them. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs that the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below are contrary to the evidence on record. However, it is not so. The plea of adverse possession taken by the plaintiffs is negatived by their own acts and conduct. It is the case of the plaintiffs themselves, vide para 4 of the plaint that they applied to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Ghumarwin for grant of the suit land as Nautor and the suit land was allotted to them as Nautor but the grant was cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner whose order was confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner. A photo copy of the application dated 7.12.1965 for grant of 18 biswas out of the suit land as Nautor made by the plaintiffs in form-D is Ext. D-l. Such applications at the relevant time could be made under the Rules called "The Himachal Pradesh Nautor Rules, 1954". The contention for the plaintiffs about the making of this application is that under Rule 21 of the Rules ibid, a person who has encroached upon the Government land and had been in uninterrupted possession for 30 years or more or even for lesser duration of not less than five years, could apply for grant of such land as Nautor. Therefore, this application was moved by the plaintiffs only with a view to regularise the adverse possession into ownership as was permissible under the said rules. The contention, however, is not sustainable. Therefore, this application was moved by the plaintiffs only with a view to regularise the adverse possession into ownership as was permissible under the said rules. The contention, however, is not sustainable. No doubt, an encroacher on the Government land could apply for grant of illicitly possessed land as Nautor to him under Rule 21 of the Rules ibid, provided that he had encroached upon the land before 17th of July, 1951. In case the encroachment was made after 17th of July, 1951, such land could not be granted to him as Nautor as per the provisions of Rule 21 ibid. As and when such encroached land was desired to be acquired as Nautor by the encroacher, he had to make an application on a court fee of Re. 1 accompanied by Fard and Tatima as provided under sub-rule (6) of Rule 21 of the aforesaid Nautor Rules. Evidently, the encrocher has to mention in the application that he had encrocached upon the land prior to the specified date, i.e. 17th July, 1951 and as such he was entitled for grant thereof as Nautor. 13. Application Ext. D-l is not in that form. In fact it is an application in Form-D which is an application for grant of land other than encroached land as Nautor as provided under Rule 10 of the Rules ibid and had to be accompanied by copies of Tatima Shajra and Fard Jamabandis, whereas the application under Rule 21(6) is required to be accompanied by one copy each of Fard and Tatima and not by copies as required under Rule 10. For the purpose of application under Rule 10, Nautor means the right to break up waste land owned by Government outside the reserved forest and such area as may be closed by the Government for grant of Nautor from time to time. Thus, the application in Form-D will necessarily be in respect of waste land owned by the Government. Thus, by their application Ext. D-l, the plaintiffs had admitted the ownership of the State Government over the suit land by virtue of making an application for its grant to them as Nautor in Form-D. Not only they have so admitted the ownership of the Government but at the time of consideration of their application for grant of Nautor by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Ghumarwin they made a statement Ext. D-3. D-3. Even in the said statement they have nowhere claimed that they were in possession of the land applied for as encroachers and it was with a view to regularise the encroachment they had made the application. On the contrary, what they have stated is that in case the land applied for is granted to them that will not cause inconvenience to any one nor any one has any objection about the grant thereof in their favour. They have further stated that their family consists of 8-9 persons. They have derth of means of livelihood because of insufficiency of land, therefore, the land applied for deserved to be granted to them as Nautor. 14. Even from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), copy whereof is Ext. D-6, appellate orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Divisional Commissioner respectively Ext. D-8 and Ext. D-9, it is apparent that it had nowhere been the case of the plaintiffs that they are encroachers on the Government land and it be given to them as Nautor under the relevant Rules. Thus, by moving the aforesaid application on 7.12.1965 and making the aforesaid statement on 29.1.1967, the plaintiffs have clearly admitted ownership of the State over the suit land. In view of such admission, it could not be held that they had acquired ownership righs over the suit land by virtue of adverse possession. The concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below on this count are so recorded after due appreciation of the evidence on record and even on this count, these findings do not call for any interference in the second appeal by this Court. 15. The contention that the order cancelling the grant of Nautor in favour of the plaintiffs Ext. D-8 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur and the order Ext. D-9 passed by Divisional Commissioner affirming the order of the Deputy Commissioner are without jurisdiction, is without merit and substance. At the relevant time from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) granting Nautor, appeal lay to the Deputy Commissioner and from his order to the Divisional Commissioner. Thus, both the Officers were competent to hear the appeals. These orders cannot be challenged in any manner on the ground that these are bad for not regularising the encroachment for the simple reason that the plaintiffs themselves have not claimed the Nautor on the basis of alleged encaocehment/illegal possession. Thus, both the Officers were competent to hear the appeals. These orders cannot be challenged in any manner on the ground that these are bad for not regularising the encroachment for the simple reason that the plaintiffs themselves have not claimed the Nautor on the basis of alleged encaocehment/illegal possession. The parties were heard by both the officers and there is no illegality in the orders passed by them. 16. As a result this appeal merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Costs on parties. Appeal dismissed. -