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2000 DIGILAW 39 (MAD)

Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation v. Employees Provident Fund Tribunal and Others

2000-01-12

E.PADMANABHAN

body2000
Judgment :- E. PADMANABHAN, J. All the above writ petitions were ordered to be consolidated as the points involved in the writ petitions are identical. In W.P. No. 11226 of 1998, the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari in the nature of a writ calling for the records of the third respondent made in TN 6029/C4/SDC/SRO-TRY of 1997, dated November 10, 1997, and quash the same. W.P. No. 11227 of 1998 has been filed by the same petitioner for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent connected with ATA No. 13(51) of 1998, dated May 18, 1998, quash the same and direct the first respondent to take on file the appeal and decide the same on the merits. In W.P. No. 12679 of 1998, the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records in ATA No. 13(52) of 1998 dated May 18, 1998, on the file of the first respondent, the Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, quash the same and direct the first respondent to take the appeal on file and decide the same on the merits. In W.P. No. 12681 of 1998, the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the third respondent made in proceedings No. TN/17712/C5/SDC/SRO-TRY of 1997, dated November 10, 1997, and quash the same. In W.P. No. 14996 of 1998, the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records in ATA No. 13(67) of 1998, dated July 16, 1998, on the file of the first respondent, the Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, quash the same and direct the first respondent to take the appeal on file and decide the same on the merits. In W.P. No. 18340 of 1998, the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the third respondent not to claim any penal interest except the already paid amount of 12 per cent accrued interest.In W.P. Nos. 18340, 18342, 18352, 18353, 18435, 18434 and 18433 of 1998, the petitioners pray for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the third respondent not to claim any penal interest except the already paid amount of 12 per cent accrued interest. 18340, 18342, 18352, 18353, 18435, 18434 and 18433 of 1998, the petitioners pray for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the third respondent not to claim any penal interest except the already paid amount of 12 per cent accrued interest. In W.P. No. 18347 of 1998 the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the fourth respondent not to claim any penal interest except the already paid amount of 12 per cent accrued interest. In W.P. No. 20632 of 1998, the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the first respondent made in proceedings No. TN/MDU/SDC/19708 of 1998, dated December 16, 1998, and quash the same. In W.P. No. 20633 of 1998, the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the first respondent made in proceedings No. TN/MDU/SDC/6882 of 1998, dated December 16, 1998, and quash the same. W.P. Nos. 8044 and 8094 of 1998 have been filed by the same Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd. (KMU Division-I), seeking to quash the order passed under Section 14-B of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and also for directing the respondent to refund the money deposited by the writ petitioner while seeking to quash the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in ATA No. 13(51) of 1958, dated May 18, 1998. W.P. Nos. 11226 and 11227 of 1998 have been filed on behalf of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Villupuram Divn.-I) Ltd., seeking to quash the order passed under Section 14-B of the Act as confirmed by the Appellate Authority and consequently refund the money deposited by the petitioner. W.P. Nos. 12679 and 12681 of 1998, have been filed by the State Transport Corporation (Kum. Division-II) Ltd., seeking to quash the proceedings passed under Section 14-B and for refund of the amount deposited by the petitioner as well as to quash the orders of the Appellate Tribunal in ATA No. 13(52)98 dated May 18, 1998.W.P. No. 14996 of 1998 has been filed by the State Transport Corporation (Kum. Division-II) Ltd., seeking to quash the proceedings passed under Section 14-B and for refund of the amount deposited by the petitioner as well as to quash the orders of the Appellate Tribunal in ATA No. 13(52)98 dated May 18, 1998.W.P. No. 14996 of 1998 has been filed by the State Transport Corporation (Kum. Division-IV) Ltd., to call for and quash the proceedings of the Appellate Tribunal in ATA No. 13(67) of 1998, dated July 16, 1998, on the file of the Appellate Tribunal to quash the same and direct the said Appellate Tribunal to decide the case on the merits. W.P. Nos. 18340, 18352, 18342, 18347, 18353, 18433, 18434 and 18435 of 1998 have been filed by the various divisions of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporations to quash the proceedings of the Appellate Tribunal as well as seeking for waiver of damages and for consequential directions not to proceed further to recover the damages pending disposal of the application filed for waiver of damages before the Central Board of Trustees for employees' provident fund. W.P. No. 20632 of 1998 has been filed by the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai Divn.-I) seeking to quash the orders of the original authority without exhausting the appeal remedy. So also W.P. No. 20633 of 1998 where the same Transport Corporation has prayed for quashing the impugned proceedings of the original authority without preferring an appeal. In W.P. Nos. 8044, 11226, 12679 and 14996 of 1998, the entire amount of damages levied had been realised by the respondents in the said writ petitions. As seen from the facts of the case the writ petitioners, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation represented by its various divisions are covered by the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and it is also liable to contribute its pension fund under Section 6(a) of the Act read with paragraph 3 of the Scheme. Such payments and contributions should have been remitted by separate bank drafts or cheques within 15 days of the close of every month. The petitioner-Corporation and its various divisions have failed to pay the pension fund contribution from November, 1995, to January, 1997.The respondent initiated proceedings and called upon the petitioner to appear for personal hearing. Such payments and contributions should have been remitted by separate bank drafts or cheques within 15 days of the close of every month. The petitioner-Corporation and its various divisions have failed to pay the pension fund contribution from November, 1995, to January, 1997.The respondent initiated proceedings and called upon the petitioner to appear for personal hearing. During the personal hearing it was submitted that the payment of the pension fund contributions were withheld due to the directions of the Government on the ground that the petitioner-Corporation would formulate a pension scheme for its employees. Admittedly, none of the petitioner-Corporations or its sub-divisions have applied for exemption as provided in paragraph 39 of the Pension Scheme. The third respondent being the custodian of the fund has to implement the provisions and administer the welfare scheme to the workmen in terms of the Act and the Schemes framed thereunder and has to necessarily implement the provisions of the Act and the scheme and there shall be no delay on the part of the petitioner or other sub-divisions. The third respondent quantified the amount payable by the petitioner by passing orders under Section 7-A of the Act and recover the accumulated arrears. The delay in remitting the contribution had resulted in loss to the fund and indirectly affects the subscriber in general. In the light of the admitted facts and in view of the default, the third respondent after issuing a show-cause notice levied damages by exercise of power conferred under Section 14-B of the Act. In most of the cases, damages levied have been realised by the third respondent. Aggrieved by the levy of damages the writ petitioners have filed writ petitions invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court challenging the levy of damages and contended that the delay in remittance on the facts of the case do not attract Section 14-B of the Act and that no damages could be levied. Per contra, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that in so far as the petitioners had not submitted any alternate pension scheme in terms of paragraph 39 of the Pension Scheme and hence the respondent is well justified in levying damages and recover the same.The damages are liable to be paid by the petitioners in terms of paragraph 5 of the Pension Scheme. The liability is a statutory liability and also for failure to comply with the statutory provisions and for the belated compliance, the respondent had assessed and levied damages under Section 14-B of the Act. The delay varies from case to case and it varies in each case. According to the respondents, the petitioner has no reasonable cause for withholding the contribution of pension contribution. The writ petitioner-Corporation instead of depositing the dues had kept the amount in fixed deposit either as short-term deposit or long-term deposit of their choice and made profits by way of interest and/or utilised the funds for their benefit. There is no dispute in this respect. The third respondent has no power to waive the damages. The objections raised by the writ petitioner-Corporation were considered and rejected by the third respondent. There is no dispute that each of the writ petitioner-Corporations had committed default in remitting the pension fund contribution to the corpus of the statutory fund and it has necessitated the third respondent to take action and pass orders under Section 14-B of the Act. The levy of damages is in accordance with the statutory provision and the quantum of damages levied is neither arbitrary nor excessive and the facts of each case do warrant such a levy of damages. The undertaking is an exempted establishment under Section 17(1)(a) of the Act. But it has to pay the pension fund contribution as specified in paragraph 3 of the Pension Scheme at the rates fixed therein. There is no dispute about, the belated remittance of the contribution towards pension fund. It is also admitted that a notice of hearing was issued to show cause as to why damages should not be imposed under Section 14-B of the Act after hearing the writ petitioner and after holding an enquiry the damage was assessed.As against the damages so assessed, some of the writ petitions have been filed directly. At the same time some of the petitioners preferred appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 71 of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal also considered the appeals on the merits. In preferring such appeals, there were inordinate delays. At the same time some of the petitioners preferred appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 71 of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal also considered the appeals on the merits. In preferring such appeals, there were inordinate delays. Those applications were rejected by the Appellate Tribunal as it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal after the lapse of 120 days as it has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond 120 days from the date of service of the order. At that stage challenging the original order as well the writ petitions have been filed. It is fairly admitted that there is huge delay in remittance and the writ petitioner-Corporation had not only retained the money with itself, but also invested them in deposit and earned interest or utilised it for its benefits. It is also admitted that the petitioner-Corporation had not submitted alternate pension scheme nor had applied for exemption in terms of paragraph 39 of the Pension Scheme. As the petitioner in each of the writ petitions has failed to remit the contributions within the time permitted, the respondent had rightly initiated action under Section 14-B of the Act and levied damages. Apart from challenging the orders levying damages, the petitioners have also challenged the very same order pending their application for waiver in some of the cases and in some of the cases the Appellate Tribunal disposed of the appeal with a suggestion to the writ petitioner-Corporation to approach the Central Board of Trustees under Section 14-B of the Act. It is true in respect of some of the cases, the Central Board of Trustees is seized of the matters. Pending those applications, the petitioners have also prayed for stay of the proceedings levying damages. All these facts are not in dispute.Further, the damages have already been remitted Rs. 36, 33, 761 in W.P. No. 8044 of 1998, Rs. 36, 75, 473 in W.P. No. 11226 of 1998, Rs. 34, 03, 797 in W.P. No. 11679 of 1998 and Rs. 4, 60, 755 in W.P. No. 14996 of 1998. In the remaining writ petitions as the appeals have already been rejected applications seeking waiver of damages have been filed before the Central Board of Trustees and the petitioner had also sought for quashing of the proceedings levying damages. 34, 03, 797 in W.P. No. 11679 of 1998 and Rs. 4, 60, 755 in W.P. No. 14996 of 1998. In the remaining writ petitions as the appeals have already been rejected applications seeking waiver of damages have been filed before the Central Board of Trustees and the petitioner had also sought for quashing of the proceedings levying damages. The writ petitioner in all the writ petitions is an establishment within the meaning of Section 1(3) of the Act and admittedly they committed default in payment of family pension scheme dues. This necessitated issue of show-cause notice to the petitioners and the petitioners attempted to explain the default. The explanation offered by the petitioners were not acceptable and the authority held that there is no mitigating circumstances and consequently levied damages. In Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, 1979-II-LLJ-416 while considering the scope of Section 14-B of the Act, the Apex Court held thus at p. 429 of LLJ : "The expression 'damages' occurring in Section 14-B is in substance, a penalty imposed on the employer for the breach of the statutory obligation. The object of imposition of penalty under Section 14-B is not merely 'to provide compensation for the employees'. We are clearly of the opinion that the imposition of damages under Section 14-B serves both the purposes. It is meant to penalise defaulting employers as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees. It is not only warning to employers in general not to commit a breach of the statutory requirements of Section 6, but at the same time it is meant to provide compensation or redress to the beneficiaries, i.e., to recompense the employees for the loss sustained by them. There is nothing in the Section to show that the damages must bear relationship to the loss, which is caused to the beneficiaries under the scheme. The word 'damages' in Section 14-B is related to the word 'default'. The words used in Section 14-B are default in the payment of contribution and therefore, the word 'default' must be construed in the light of paragraph 38 of the Scheme which provides that the payment of contribution has got to be made by the 15th of the following month and, therefore, the word 'default' in Section 14-B must mean 'failure in performance' or 'failure to act'. At the same time the imposition of damages under Section 14-B is to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees.There appears to be a misconception that the object of imposition of penalty under Section 14-B is not to provide compensation for the employees whose interest may be injured, by loss of interest and the like. There is also a misconception that the damages imposed under Section 14-B are not transferred to the employees' provident fund and the family pension fund, of the employees who may be adversely affected, but the amount is transferred to the General Revenues of the appropriate Government. We find that this assumption is wholly unwarranted. In assessing the damages, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is not only bound to take into account the loss to the beneficiaries but also the default by the employer in making his contributions, which occasions the infliction of damages. The learned additional Solicitor-General was fair enough to concede that the entire amount of damages awarded under Section 14-B except for the amount relatable to administrative charges, must necessarily be transferred to the employees' provident fund and the family pension fund. We hope that those charged with administering the Act will keep this in view while allocating the damages under Section 14-B of the Act to different heads. The employees would, of course, get damages commensurate with their loss, i.e., the amount of interest on delayed payments; but the remaining amount should go to augment the 'fund' constituted under Section 5 for implementing the schemes under the Act." 16. In Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. K.T. Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd., 1995-I-LLJ-882 the Apex Court held thus at p. 883 of LLJ : "There can be no dispute in law that when a power is conferred by statute without mentioning the period within which it could be invoked, the same has to be done within reasonable period, as all powers must be exercised reasonably, and exercise of the same within reasonable period would be a facet of reasonableness. When this appeal was heard by us on September 7, 1994, and when this aspect of the matter came to our notice, we desired an affidavit from the Commissioner to put on record regarding the point of time when he came to know about the default and to explain the cause of delay. When this appeal was heard by us on September 7, 1994, and when this aspect of the matter came to our notice, we desired an affidavit from the Commissioner to put on record regarding the point of time when he came to know about the default and to explain the cause of delay. Pursuant to that order, the Commissioner filed his affidavit on November 10, 1994 according to which the power of levying damages came to be delegated to the Commissioner by an order dated October 17, 1973. As, however, large number of establishments were in existence in the State of Maharashtra the number of which in 1985 was 22, 189 - and there was only one Regional Provident Fund Commissioner having power to levy damages, delay was caused in detection of the cases of belated payment. According to the affidavit, the default at hand was located on April 19, 1985, and the damages came to be levied by order dated November 5, 1986. ......" 18. Shri Mohan, learned counsel for the respondent, pleads that keeping in view that had been ordered by this Court in Christian Medical College and Brown Memorial Hospital v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1988-II-LLJ-379 we may not sustain the order of the Commissioner. In that case dues were not paid in time because of some controversy as to whether hospitals are covered by the Act. It was, therefore, contended that as the appellants would be complying with the provisions of the Act and would pay all the arrears, damages for delayed payment of the arrears may not be approved. This Court, having regard to the facts of that case, accepted the submission. The facts of the present case are entirely different." The position of law is well-settled and in the light of the said legal position and on the admitted factual matrix, there is no escape for the writ petitioners in all the writ petitions and they are liable to pay damages. The original authority as well as the Appellate Authority wherever orders have been passed on the merits have taken into consideration of all relevant material facts, circumstances and applied the statutory provisions and the law laid down by the apex Court and rightly assessed the damage strictly in terms of Section 14-B of the Act. The original authority as well as the Appellate Authority wherever orders have been passed on the merits have taken into consideration of all relevant material facts, circumstances and applied the statutory provisions and the law laid down by the apex Court and rightly assessed the damage strictly in terms of Section 14-B of the Act. It cannot be said that the order passed by the original authority or the Appellate Authority suffer from error or illegality nor could it be held that they are vitiated by material misdirections or illegalities, nor the proceedings are vitiated by error of jurisdiction. Concedingly, the petitioners had the benefit of funds with themselves and they have been retaining the fund with them and made a profit as well. Till this date no exemption had been applied for or secured and the application for waiver is said to be pending. The grant of waiver depends upon the ultimate orders that may be passed by the Central Board of Trustees. Till waiver is granted there is no escape.Further in most of the writ petitions the entire damages have been recovered it is not as if there are mitigating circumstances by which the petitioners had explained the conduct. All these facts are admitted. Hence this Court is of the considered view that there are no merits in these writ petitions. The petitioners are not entitled to claim refund, nor could they seek such a writ seeking for direction to refund the damages, which have already been recovered. The orders of assessment and damages passed under Section 14-B is not liable to be interfered with. The petitioners attempt to gain time has caused the petitioner heavily and the petitioner have to pay for the same heavily too. In the foregoing circumstances all the writ petitions are dismissed, but without costs. With respect to the applications filed by the petitioners for waiver, it is needless to state that the authority namely the Central Board of Trustees may consider those applications on the merits and according to law and pass orders within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order, if orders have not already been passed. Consequently, all the W.M.Ps. are also dismissed. No costs.