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2000 DIGILAW 393 (PAT)

Sunil Kumar v. Institute of Bankers

2000-03-08

AFTAB ALAM, B.P.SINGH, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

body2000
JUDGMENT B.P.SINGH, J.:- This batch of letters patent appeals came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. By order dated 12.1.96 the Bench directed that the appeals be listed for hearing before a Full Bench. That is how these appeals have come up for disposal before this Bench. The appellants in these appeals were the writ petitioners in the writ petitions filed before this Court challenging the action of the respondent-Indian Institute of Bankers cancelling the result of the associate examination held in December, 1990 and debarring them from appearing at the examinations of the institute upto 31st December 1995. C.W.J.C. Nos. 1574, 1579, 1580, 2295 and 2296 of 1995 were rejected by a common judgment and order dated 2.8.1995 passed by a learned Judge of this Court following the Division Bench decision of this Court, reported in [1995(1) P.L.J.R. 449], Kundan Bharthuar and others vs. the State Bank of India and others, which held that the respondent-Institute of Bankers is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and was also not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1127, 1028, 1027, 1029 and 1026 of 1995 have been preferred against the aforesaid common judgment and order. C.W.J.C.No.927 of 1995 was also dismissed by the learned Judge by order dated 28.5.95 following his earlier judgment and this has given rise to L.P.A. No. 1291 of 1995. Similarly, C.W.J.C.No.4151 of 1995 was rejected by the learned Judge on 7.9.95 giving rise to L.P.A.No.1303 of 1995. In all these appeals the questions which arise for consideration are common, namely, whether the consideration are common, namely, whether the respondent-Indian Institute of Bankers is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and whether the respondent-Indian Institute of Bankers is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. I may at the threshold indicate that both these questions have been answered in the negative by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and also by the High Courts of Orissa, Bombay, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh. As noticed earlier, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court also reached the same conclusions. 2. I may at the threshold indicate that both these questions have been answered in the negative by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and also by the High Courts of Orissa, Bombay, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh. As noticed earlier, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court also reached the same conclusions. It was urged before us that the Division Bench judgment of this Court required reconsideration in the light of the later decisions of the Supreme Court, reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 167, AIR 1988 S.C. 469 and 1993(1) SCC 645 . 3. The facts of the cases are similar and, therefore, I shall take the representative facts from C.W.J.C.No.2296 of 1995 giving rise to L.P.A.No.1026/95. The appellant is an employee of Punjab National Bank and at the relevant time was posted at Muzaffarpur. The Indian Institute of Bankers conducts its associate examination(CAIIB-Certificated Associate of Indian Institute of Bankers). The examination consists of two parts. Part I consisting of five papers and Part II consisting of six papers. The case of the petitioner is that he had applied to appear in the Associate Examination Part II. He had already passed in five subjects, but he was required to clear the sixth subject, namely, Commercial Law. In the month of December 1990 he took the said examination and obtained 50 marks in the subject of Commercial Law. Since he had obtained the prescribed pass marks, a result advice was sent to him by the respondent-Institute on 7th March 1991. 4. The appellant received a communication from the respondent-Institute dated 24.4.1991 in which it was stated that he had appeared at the Associate Examination and on the basis that he had not adopted malpractices at the said examination, his result of the said examination had been released, and thus he was provisionally considered as having completed in all the subjects in Part II of the Associate Examination and eligible to be issued the Completion Memorandum for having completed Part II. However, it had been reported that malpractices had been adopted at the above examination and the said matter was under investigation to determine which of the candidates who had taken the examination had adopted malpractices, as reported. On completion of the investigation further communication will be issued. However, it had been reported that malpractices had been adopted at the above examination and the said matter was under investigation to determine which of the candidates who had taken the examination had adopted malpractices, as reported. On completion of the investigation further communication will be issued. In the event of it being established that a candidate had adopted malpractices, the result of such candidate would be cancelled and the candidate will not be permitted to appear at the examination of the Institute for specified number of years. It was also stated that the appellant would not be eligible to claim any benefit from his employer on the basis of having completed Part II till the Completion Memorandum was issued. By Annexure-2 dated 26.8.93 the respondent-Institute called upon the appellant to submit his explanation in regard to the charges set out in the said notice. In sum and substance, the charge against the appellant was that the scrutiny of the answer books in the subject of Commercial Law indicated that the answer given by the appellant to one of the questions was similar to the answer of another candidate who had also appeared at the examination in the same subject from the same centre. Such similarity of answers as specified in Annexure-A to the notice prima facie indicated that the appellant had copied his answer from each other or from some common source. The appellant was, therefore, charged of having adopted a malpractice at the said examination. 5. The appellant submitted his explanation dated 10.9.1993 (Annexure-3 to the writ application), but his explanation did not find favour with the respondent-Institute and by communication dated 12.1.95 (Annexure-6 to the writ application) he was informed that the Institute had come to the conclusion that the charge framed against the appellant had been established beyond all reasonable doubt. Consequently the Institute had decided to cancel his result of the December 1990 Associate Examination and to debar him from appearing at the examinations of the Institute upto 31st December, 1995. It also decided to report his name to his employer Bank for information. The aforesaid order dated 12.1.95 was impugned in the writ petition filed by the appellant. As earlier noticed, his Writ petition was dismissed by a learned Judge of this Court. 6. It also decided to report his name to his employer Bank for information. The aforesaid order dated 12.1.95 was impugned in the writ petition filed by the appellant. As earlier noticed, his Writ petition was dismissed by a learned Judge of this Court. 6. The respondent-Institute had taken a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition filed by the appellant on the plea that the respondent-Institute is not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India nor is it an "authority" within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution, nor is it "any other authority" within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As such, the respondent-Institute is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court. Relying upon its Memorandum and Articles of Association it was submitted that the Institute is a private body incorporated under the Companies Act which holds examinations and grants certificates on passing such examinations. The State neither supports nor controls either the management of the Institute or its functions. The management of the Institute is entrusted to a Council constituted in accordance with its Memorandum and Articles of Association. The duties performed by the Institute are not statutory nor does it discharge any duty-public in nature in compliance of any law. 7. As directed by this Court the respondent-Institute has placed before this Court 59th, 60th, 61st and 62nd Annual Reports of the Council and Accounts. It has also placed before us the handbook and rules pertaining to the respondent-Institute. It has also brought on record the relevant extracts of the proceedings of the Annual General meetings held in the year 1981 and 1987 as also the minutes of the Council held in December 1979 and February 1981. 8. A few facts which are not in dispute may be noticed at the threshold. The respondent-Indian Institute of Bankers was incorporated on 30th April, 1928 under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. The objects for which the Institute was established are, inter alia, to encourage the study of the theory of banking and for that purpose to institute a scheme of examinations and to give certificates, scholarships and prizes, and to promote information on" banking and allied subjects by lectures, discussions, books, correspondence with public bodies and individuals. The objects for which the Institute was established are, inter alia, to encourage the study of the theory of banking and for that purpose to institute a scheme of examinations and to give certificates, scholarships and prizes, and to promote information on" banking and allied subjects by lectures, discussions, books, correspondence with public bodies and individuals. The management of the Institute is entrusted to a Council comprising of maximum of 30 members who are elected at the annual general meeting. 1/3rd of the Council members retire by rotation. The President of the Institute is elected by the members of the Institute at the Annual General meeting in terms of Article 69 of the Articles of Association of the Institute. As a matter of convention the Governor of Reserve Bank of India is elected as the President of the Institute, but that is not mandatory and it is open to the members of the Institute to elect any other person as its President at the Annual General meeting. All members of the Institute are eligible for being elected as members of the Institute. The membership of the Institute is open to serving employees of any public or private sector Banks as well as other financial institutions. There are five classes of members in the Institute, namely, Fellows, Associates, Certificated Associates, Ordinary Members and Institutional Members. The Fellows of the Institute are elected by the Council in terms of Article 5 of the Memorandum of Articles of Association of the Institute from amongst those members who have not been less than 10 years in the service of any banking establishment, or any other member institution, or from those who have passed any of the examinations instituted or recognised by the Council etc. The Certificated Associates consist of those members of the Institute who have gained the Certificate of the Indian Institute of Bankers after having passed Part I and Part II of the Associate Examination. The ordinary membership is open to the clerical, supervisory and subordinate staff of recognised Banks, financial institutions operating in India. The ordinary members are admitted by the Chief Secretary on application being made on the prescribed form. Institutional members consist of banking establishments both in the nationalised as well as private sector. The members are required to pay subscription as determined by the Council from time to time. The ordinary members are admitted by the Chief Secretary on application being made on the prescribed form. Institutional members consist of banking establishments both in the nationalised as well as private sector. The members are required to pay subscription as determined by the Council from time to time. The Institute conducts the Associate examination consisting of Part I and Part II and also conducts the correspondence course for the benefit of members preparing for all the subjects of Part I and Part II examination. The examination is open only to the members of the Institute whose Subscription is not in arrears. The Institute has been promoted by eminent Bankers, businessmen and Industrialists of the country. Many of the Banks including foreign Banks are institutional members of the Institute. The member Banks accord recognition to the certificates, diplomas etc. awarded by the Institute and on the basis thereof the certificate holders get advantage in the matter of promotion, increment etc. The share capital of the Institute is not held by the Central Government or any State Government nor is the Institute dependent on the Government for financial assistance. The Institute has evolved a system of examination over the years which is peculiar to the Institute and in that sense it is a pioneer and virtually holds monopoly, but the status is neither State conferred nor State protected. 9. Mr. S.P. Srivastava appearing on behalf of the appellant in L.P.A. No. 1026 of 1995 submitted that a writ of mandamus may issue even against a private person or body on whom a public duty is cast. According to him having regard to the functions performed by the respondent-Institute it must be held that the respondent-Institute performs a public duty, namely, to educate its members in the subject of banking and other allied subjects. Sri Rajendra Narain, advocate appearing on behalf of appellants in L.P.A.Nos.1291 and 1303 of 1995 submitted that the respondent-Institute is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India for four reasons advanced by him. Firstly, he submitted that the respondent-Institute is a special Institute of its kind which holds examinations and grants certificates to its "members in the subject of banking and other allied subjects. It has acquired significant importance being the lead or sole Institution in the field of banking. Firstly, he submitted that the respondent-Institute is a special Institute of its kind which holds examinations and grants certificates to its "members in the subject of banking and other allied subjects. It has acquired significant importance being the lead or sole Institution in the field of banking. Secondly, there is no other such Institution enjoying the reputation which the respondent-Institute enjoys and, therefore, the respondent-Institute enjoys a monopoly in its field. Thirdly, the certificates granted by the Institute give some advantage to the employees of the Banks and financial institutions in the matter of grant of promotion, increment etc. Lastly, in case an adverse report is communicated to the employer, it may result in departmental proceeding against the concerned employee. He submitted that the monopoly status enjoyed by the respondent-Institute is neither State conferred nor State recognised as there is nothing to show that the State has recognised the monopoly status of the respondent-Institute. He, however, submitted that such monopoly may be inferred, having regard to the activities of the respondent-Institute and the importance attached to the Institute even by nationalised banks. Elaborating his argument he submitted that even the Government of India at one time requested the respondent-Institute to change its syllabus to make it more practicable. 10. It was then submitted that assuming that respondent-Institute was not 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, it was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 26 of the Constitution of India being an authority within the meaning of that term under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Sri Shravan Kumar appearing on behalf of the appellant in L.P.A. No. 1127 of 1995 submitted that duties performed by the respondent-Institute are public in nature. Holding of examination is a governmental function and the respondent-Institute holds examinations and grants certificates which confer added benefits on the employees who are awarded Such certificates by the Institute. He, however, conceded that the grant of certificate to an employee by the Institute by itself does not confer upon him any service benefit by its own force, but since the banks have recognised the certificates/diplomas issued by the respondent-Institute, it has the effect of conferring a benefit or advantage on the employees of the Banks and financial institutions who are awarded such degrees/ diplomas. Counsel appearing on behalf of other appellants have either not addressed any argument at the Bar, or have adopted the arguments advanced by counsel appearing on behalf of other appellants. 11. Sri S.P. Sinha appearing on behalf of the respondents challenged the maintainability of the writ petitions filed by the appellants and submitted that having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it was not possible to hold that the respondent- Institute is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, nor is it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court having regard to the functions performed by it. Counsel for the parties have relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court and of various High Courts in support of their rival contentions. 12. I shall now proceed to examine those decisions. 13. In Sabhajit Tewary vs. Union of India and others [ 1975(1) SCC 485 ] a question arose as to whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was really an agency of the Government and was, therefore, an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Court noticed that the Prime Minister of India is the ex-officio President of the Society and the Governing Body consisted of some persons appointed by the Government of India. The Government of India had the authority to terminate the membership of any member, or at one and the same time, of all members other than the ex-officio members of the Governing Body. However, the Governing Body was entrusted with the management of all the affairs and funds of the Society. It also had power with the sanction of the Government of India to frame, amend or repeal bye-Laws not inconsistent with the rules for the administration and management of the affairs of the Society. The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 provided that all matters relating to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research are under the department of Science and Technology. After noticing these features the Court rejected the contention that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was really an agency of the Government. The Society did not have a statutory character. After noticing these features the Court rejected the contention that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was really an agency of the Government. The Society did not have a statutory character. The mere fact that the Prime Minister is its President, or the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body, did not establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific research etc. are carried out in a responsible manner. Relying upon the earlier judgment of the Court in Praga Tools Corporation and other cases it was held that such Companies having an existence independent of the Government, could not be held to be Departments of Government. The Council therefore was not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 14. In Ramana Davaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority[(1979)3 Supreme Court Cases 489] it was held that it is well-settled that a constitutional or statutory authority would be within the meaning of the expression 'other authorities' in Article 12, if it has been invested with statutory power to issue binding directions to third parties, the disobedience of which would entail penal consequence or it has the sovereign power to make rules and regulations having the force of law. The Court observed that the Government which represents the executive authority of the State may act through the instrumentality or agency of natural persons or it may employ the instrumentality or agency of juridical persons to carry out its functions having regard to the tasks of the Government. With the advent of the welfare State it began to be increasingly felt that the framework of civil service was not sufficient to handle the new tasks which are often of specialised and highly technical character. The inadequacy of the civil service to deal with these new problems came to be realised and it became necessary to forge a new instrumentality or administrative device for handling these new problems. It was in these circumstances, and with a view to supplying this administrative need, that the public corporation came into being as the third arm of the Government. A Corporation may be either established by the statute or incorporated under law such as the Companies Act or Societies Registration Act. It was in these circumstances, and with a view to supplying this administrative need, that the public corporation came into being as the third arm of the Government. A Corporation may be either established by the statute or incorporated under law such as the Companies Act or Societies Registration Act. Where a Corporation is wholly controlled by Government not only in its policy making but also in carrying out the functions entrusted to it by law establishing it, or by the charter of its incorporation, there can be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of the Government. Ordinarily, a Corporation established by statute is autonomous in its working, subject only to a provision, that it shall be bound by any direction that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matters. So also a corporation incorporated under law is managed by a board of directors or committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the statute under which it is incorporated. The question posed was, when such a Corporation becomes instrumentality or agency of the Government. Answering the question the Court observed: "Now, one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it woul~ go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, as is quite often the case, a corporation established by statute may have no shares or share holders, in which case it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a board of directors appointed by Government, though this consideration also may not be determinative, because even where the directors are appointed by Government, they may be completely free from governmental control in the discharge of their functions. What then are the tests to determine whether a corporation• established by statute or incorporated under law is an instrumentality or agency of Government? It is not possible to formulate an all inclusive or exhaustive test which would adequately answer this question. What then are the tests to determine whether a corporation• established by statute or incorporated under law is an instrumentality or agency of Government? It is not possible to formulate an all inclusive or exhaustive test which would adequately answer this question. There is no cut and dried formula which would provide the correct division of corporations into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of Government and those which are not." The Court went on to observe that if extensive and unusual financial assistance is given and the purpose of the Government in giving such assistance coincides with the purpose for which the Corporation is expected to use assistance and such purpose is of public character, it may be a relevant circumstance supporting the inference that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of a Government. It may, therefore, be possible to say that where the financial assistance of the State is so large as to meet almost the entire expenditure of the Corporation, it would offer some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with governmental character. But, where the financial assistance is not so extensive, it may not by itself, without anything more, render the Corporation an instrumentality of the Government Though there are many private institutions which are in receipt of financial assistance from the State, merely on that account they cannot be classified as State agencies. Equally a mere finding of some control by the State would not be determinative of the question since the State has considerable measure of control under its police power over all types of business operation, but a finding of State financial support plus unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characterise operation as State action. So also the existence of deep and pervasive State control may offer an indication that the Corporation is State agency or instrumentality. It may also be a relevant factor to be considered whether the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. There can be little doubt that the State control would be surely relevant in assuming the character of State. There is also another factor which may be regarded as having bearing on the issue and it is whether the operation of the Corporation is an important public function. There can be little doubt that the State control would be surely relevant in assuming the character of State. There is also another factor which may be regarded as having bearing on the issue and it is whether the operation of the Corporation is an important public function. If the functions of the Corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental function, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency. Institutions engaged in matters of high public interest or performing public function's are by virtue of the nature of the functions performed government agencies. Activities which are too fundamental to the society are by definition too important not to be considered government functions. The public nature of the function, if impregnated with governmental character or tied or entwined with Government or fortified by some other additional factor, may render the Corporation an instrumentality or agency of Government. Specially if a Department of Government is transferred to a Corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference. Having noticed the authorities on the subject the Court summarised the law in the following words: "We have referred to some of the these factors and they may be summarised as under. Whether there is any financial assistance given by the State, and if so, what is the magnitude of such assistance, whether there is any other form of assistance given by the State, and if so, whether it is of the usual kind or it is extraordinary, whether there is any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and what is the nature and extent of such control, whether the corporation enjoys State conferred or State protected monopoly status and whether the functions carried out by .the corporation are public functions closely related to governmental functions. This particularisation of relevant factors however is not exhaustive and by its very nature it cannot be, because with increasing assumption of new tasks, growing complexities of management and administration and the necessity of continuing adjustment in relations between the corporation and Government calling for flexibility, adaptability and innovative skills, it is not possible to make an exhaustive enumeration of the tests which would invariably and in all cases provide an unfailing answer to the question whether a corporation is governmental instrumentality or agency. Moreover, even amongst these facts which we have described, no one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the Court will have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particularised enquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case. "The dispositive question in any State action case" as pointed out by Douglas, J., in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company (supra) "is not whether any single fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of State involvement, but rather whether the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a find,.,g of State responsibility". It is not enough to examine seriatim each .f the factors upon which the Corporation is claimed to be an instrumentality or agency of Government and to dismiss each individually as being insufficient to support a finding of that effect. It is the aggregate or cumulative effect of all the relevant factors that is controlling." 15. In Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ) the Court culled out from the judgment in the National Airport Authority's case the tests for determining as to when a Corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government, but the Court observed: "These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they are merely indicative indicia which have to be used with care and caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression "other authorities", it must be realised that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. We may summarise the relevant tests gathered from the decision 'in the International Airport Authority's case as follows: (1) "One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government." (2) "Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character." (3) "It may also be a relevant factor...... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected." (4) "Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality." (5) "If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of government." (6) Specifically, if a department of Govt. is transferred to a Corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of government." If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would, as pointed out in the International Airport Authority's case be 'authority' and, therefore, State within the meaning of the expression in Article 12." In this case it was held that the Society was an instrumentality or agency of the State and the Central Government and was an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12. In coming to this conclusion the Court took notice of the fact that the Regional Engineering College, though it was administered and managed by a Society registered under the Jammu & Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, it was an instrumentality and the agency of the State and the Central Government. The composition of the Society was dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government and the Governors of various States. The monies required for running the College were provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The rules made by the Society were required to have the prior approval of the State and the Central Government and the accounts of the Society were also required to be submitted to both the Governments for their scrutiny. The Society was also to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government. The control of the State and the Central Government was so deep and pervasive that no immovable property of the Society could be disposed of without the approval of both the Governments. The Society was also to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government. The control of the State and the Central Government was so deep and pervasive that no immovable property of the Society could be disposed of without the approval of both the Governments. Both the Governments had power to appoint any person or persons to be members of the Society and any member of the Society other than the member representing the State or the Central Government could be removed from the membership of the Society by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government. The Board of Governors was also largely controlled by nominees of State and Central Government. 16. In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India ( AIR 1984 SC 541 ) the question arose as to whether the Indian Council of Agricultural Research and its affiliate Indian Veterinary Research Institute are such other authorities as would be comprehended in the expression other authority in Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court held that they were instrumentality or agency of the State. In fact, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research came into existence as a Department of Government of India and continued to be an attached office of the Government, even though it was registered as a Society, and was wholly financed by the Government. The taxing power of the State was invoked to make it financially viable and to which independent research institutes set up by the Government were transferred. On these facts it was held that the Indian Council of Agricultural Research was almost an inseparable adjunct of the Government of India having an outward form of being a Society. It is quite apparent that the tests applied by the Court in this case were those enumerated in Ajay Hasia's case. 17. The next decision which was cited at the Bar is one reported in Tekraj Vasandi alias K.L. Basandhi vs. Union of India & others (AIR 1988 Supreme Court 469). In this case a question arose before the Supreme Court as to whether the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies registered under the Societies Registration Act is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In this case a question arose before the Supreme Court as to whether the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies registered under the Societies Registration Act is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships referred to the tests formulated in several decisions of the Supreme Court and observed that there cannot indeed be a straight jacket formula. It is not necessary that all the tests should be satisfied for reaching the conclusion either for or against holding an institution to be 'State'. In a given case some of the features may emerge so boldly and prominently that a second view may not be possible. There may yet be other cases where the matter would be on the border line and it would be difficult to take one view or the other outright. The Court considered the objectives of the Society in question. The Society was born out of a feeling that there should be a voluntary association mostly consisting of members of the two Houses of Parliament with some external support to fulfil the objectives which were adopted by the Society. The objectives of the Society were not governmental business but were certainly the aspects which were expected to equip Members of Parliament and the State Legislatures with the requisite knowledge and experience for better functioning. Undoubtedly, the annual contribution from the Government had been substantial and, perhaps, constituted the main source of funding, yet some money had been coming from other sources. There was no material to show that the Society was not entitled to receive contribution from any indigenous source without Government sanction. However, Government money had been coming, the usual conditions attached to Government grants had been applied and enforced. After an exhaustive consideration of the authorities on the subject the Court observed: "We have several cases of societies registered under Societies Registration Act which have been treated as 'State' but in each of those case it would appear on analysis that either governmental business had been undertaken by the Society or what was expected to be the public obligation of the 'State' had been undertaken to be performed as a part of the Society's function. In a Welfare State, as has been pointed out on more than one occasion by this Court, governmental control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence. In a Welfare State, as has been pointed out on more than one occasion by this Court, governmental control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence. In the absence of a fair application of the tests to be made, there is possibility of turning every non-governmental society into an agency or instrumentality of the State. That obviously would not serve the purpose and may be far from reality. A broad picture of the matter has to be taken and a discerning mind has to be applied keeping the realities and human experiences in view so as to reach a reasonable conclusion. Having given our anxious consideration to the facts of the case, we are not in a position to hold that ICPS is either an agency or instrumentality of the State so as to come within the purview of 'other authorities' in Art.12 of the Constitution. We must say that ICPS is a case of its type-typical in many ways and the normal tests may perhaps not properly apply to test its character. 18. In Chander Mohan Khanna vs. The National Council of Educational Research & Training and others (AIR 1992 Supreme Court 76) a question arose whether the National Council of Educational Research & Training is 'State' as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court noticed the earlier authorities on the subject and tests laid down by this Court. It found that the object of NCERT is to assist and advise the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in the implementation of the governmental policies and major problems in the field of education, particularly secondary education. NCERT undertakes every kind of programmes and activities connected with the co-ordination of research extension service and training, dissemination of improved educational techniques, collaboration in the educational programmes. It also undertakes preparation and publication of books, materials, periodicals and other literatures. Having noticed the functions of the NCERT the Court observed: ".....The affairs of the NCERT are conducted by the Executive 'Committee comprising of Government servants and educationists. The Executive Committee would enter into arrangements with Government, public or private organisations or individuals in furtherance of the objectives for implementation of programmes. The funds of the NCERT consist of: (i) grants made by the Government, (ii) contribution from other sources, and (iii) income from its own assets. The Executive Committee would enter into arrangements with Government, public or private organisations or individuals in furtherance of the objectives for implementation of programmes. The funds of the NCERT consist of: (i) grants made by the Government, (ii) contribution from other sources, and (iii) income from its own assets. It is free to apply its income and property towards the promotion of its objectives and implementation of the programmes. The Government control is confined only to the proper utilisation of the grant. The NCERT is thus largely an autonomous body. The Court noticed the earlier decision of the Supreme Court relating to the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies and following the principles laid down in that decision and other decisions of this Court held that the NCERT was not 'State' as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 19. In Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others [(1993)1 Supreme Court Cases 645] a question arose as to whether private educational bodies receiving grants from Government were obliged to act fairly in consonance with Part III of the Constitution as well as rules and regulations framed by the Government. In the case of private unaided recognised educational institutions running professional courses it was held that no educational institution except University can award degrees. Private educational institutions cannot award their own degrees, and even if they do so their certificates and other testimonials have no practical value inasmuch they are not good for obtaining any employment under the State or for admission in higher courses of study. No private educational institution can survive or subsist without recognisation or affiliation. The bodies which grant recognisation and/or affiliation are the authorities of the State. In such a situation it is obligatory in the interest of general public upon the authorities granting recognition or affiliation to insist upon such conditions as are appropriate to ensure not only education of requisite standard but also fairness and equal treatment in the matter of admission of students. Since the recognising/affiliating authority is the State, it is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of its duty enjoined upon it by Article 14 of the Constitution. Since the recognising/affiliating authority is the State, it is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of its duty enjoined upon it by Article 14 of the Constitution. As regards aided institutions it was held that they had to abide by the rules and regulations as would be framed by the Government and/or recognising/affiliating authorities in the matter of recruitment of teachers and staff, their conditions of service, syllabus, standard of teaching etc. In particular, in the matter of admission of students they have to follow the rule of merit and merit alone, subject to any reservation made under Article 15. They shall not be entitled to charge any fees higher than what is charged in governmental institutions for similar courses. These are and shall be understood to be the condition of grant of aid. Public funds, when given as grant, and not as loan, carry the public character wherever they go; public funds cannot be donated for private purposes. The element of public character necessarily means a fair conduct in all respects consistent with the constitutional mandate of Articles 14 and 15. It will thus be seen that even private institutions supplementing the State function of imparting education performed a public duty and were, therefore, amenable to Part III of the Constitution. 20. In Air India Statutory Corporation & others Vs. United Labour Union and others [(1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 377] a question arose as to whether the appellant was an industry carried on or under the authority of the Central Government. It was noticed that the appellant initially was a statutory authority under the International Airport Authority of India Act; 1971 and on its repeal by the Airport Authority of India "Act, 1994 was amalgamated with National Airport Authority under single nomenclature, namely, IAAI, which was reconstituted as a company under the Companies Act. The Court held that such a corporation was an establishment pertaining to industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government within the purview of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. It was held that the statutory corporation involving public element, even though carrying on commercial activities, would be an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government and, therefore, the activities of such Corporations are amenable to Part III and Part IV of the Constitution of India. 21. It was held that the statutory corporation involving public element, even though carrying on commercial activities, would be an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government and, therefore, the activities of such Corporations are amenable to Part III and Part IV of the Constitution of India. 21. In U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. vs. Chandrabhan Dubey and others [(1999)1 Supreme Court Cases 741] the Court found that though the appellant U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank was registered as a Cooperative Society, it was constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Land Development Act, 1964. In exercise of power conferred on the State Government by section 30 of the Bank Act, rules were framed and the service conditions of the employees of the appellants are to be found in the Societies Act and the regulations framed by the U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board constituted under section 122 of the Societies Act as well as to the service Rules framed by the appellant under regulation 102 of the Service Regulations. After analyzing various provisions of the Act and the rules and the extent to which the State Government exercises control over the appellant - Society the Court observed: "In view of the fact that control of the State Government on the appellant is all pervasive and the employees had statutory protection and therefore the appellant being an authority or even instrumentality of the State, would be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it may not be necessary to examine any further the question of Article 226 makes a divide between public law and private law. Prima facie from the language of Article 226, there does not appear to exist such a divide." 22. The appellants have placed great reliance on the decision in Shri Anaoi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others vs. V.R. Rudani and others, (AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1607). In this case appellant no.1 was a public trust and other appellants were its trustees, running a Science College at Ahmedabad. The college had initially temporary affiliation to the Gujarat University. Later it was granted permanent affiliation. The University teachers and those employed in the affiliated colleges were paid the pay-scale recommended by the University Grants Commission. In this case appellant no.1 was a public trust and other appellants were its trustees, running a Science College at Ahmedabad. The college had initially temporary affiliation to the Gujarat University. Later it was granted permanent affiliation. The University teachers and those employed in the affiliated colleges were paid the pay-scale recommended by the University Grants Commission. Some disputes having arisen between the teachers association and the University about the implementation of certain pay-scales, the dispute by agreement of parties was referred to the Chancellor of the Universities for his decision. The Chancellor gave his award which was accepted by the State Government as well as by the University. The University issued directions to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms thereof. The appellant Institution, instead of Implementing the award served notice of termination upon 11 teachers on the ground that they were surplus and approached the University for permission to remove them. The Vice Chancellor refused the permission sought for whereafter the trust took a decision to close down the college. The affiliation of the college was surrendered and the college was closed from June 15, 1975, with the termination of the services of all the academic staff. The academic staff under law were entitled to terminal benefits, but the management did not pay them their terminal benefits simultaneously, and this led the teachers to file a writ petition before the High Court praying for the issuance of, a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction or order directing the respondent-Trust and its trustees to pay to the petitioners their due salary and allowances, provident fund, gratuity etc. in accordance with the rules framed by the University as also compensation payable to them. The trust resisted the writ petition on several grounds including the ground that the tryst was not statutory body and was not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court negatived the objections observing: “......The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus can not be denied.....Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De Smith states "to be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract" (Judicial Review of Administrative Act 4th Ed. P 540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put in water tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition." 23. In the case of K. Krishnamacharyulu and others vs. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering and another [(1997) 3 Supreme Court Cases 571], in a brief judgment the court held that when there is an interest created by Government in an institution to impart education, which is a fundamental right of the citizens, the teachers who impart the education, get an element of public interest in the performance of their duty. The element of public interest requires to regulate conditions of service of those employees at par with Government employees. Such employees are entitled to parity of pay-scales as per executive instructions of Government. The State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to the people to avail of the right of education. The private institutions cater to the need of providing educational opportunities. A teacher duly appointed to a post in a private institution is entitled to seek enforcement of orders issued by the Government. The State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to the people to avail of the right of education. The private institutions cater to the need of providing educational opportunities. A teacher duly appointed to a post in a private institution is entitled to seek enforcement of orders issued by the Government. When an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the teacher, being the arm of the institution is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Article 226. It was, therefore, held that the employees of such an institution had enforceable right to claim remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. I shall now refer to the three decisions where a question directly arose as to whether the respondent-Indian Institute of Bankers is an instrumentality of the State or the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and whether. It was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In Kundan Bharthuar ys. State Bank of India [1995(1) PLJR 449] a Division Bench of this Court noticed the decision in Ajay Hasia (supra) and held that the decision had no application because the institute was incorporated under the Companies Act and was a private institution. It merely held examinations which were not statutory. The control of the institution is vested in its own council and none of its members are appointed by the Central or any other Government. In these facts it was held that the writ petition against the respondent-Institute was not maintainable. 25. A Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Prasad vs. Indian Institute of Bankers (AIR 1992 Punjab and Haryana 1) also considered the same questions in relation to the respondent-Institute. Having noticed the objects of the institute, the functions performed by it and the manner of its functions, and having considered the authorities cited before it including the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia, it held, quoting the tests laid down by the Supreme Court and other well-recognised conditions for Mandamus that the Indian Institute of Bankers is not an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 or for purposes of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Noticing the tests laid down In Ajay Hasia, it held that the tests nos: (1) and (2) supported the conclusion that the Institute was not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India The shale capital of the institute is not held by the Central Government or the State Government nor is the institute dependent on the Government for financial assistance Referring to the 60th Annual Report of the Institute it found that the Institute derived its income from examination fee subscription from individual members, subscription from institutional members, interest and other miscellaneous items and correspondence courses, tutorial class fees and royalty on publication of books. It was, therefore, obvious that the financial assistance of the State was almost absent. So far as the test relating to enjoyment of monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected, it was held that the supposed monopoly status is not State conferred nor State protected. The Institute was incorporated as public limited company and it continues to be so. There is no law prohibiting any other company with similar aims and objects to be incorporated. It referred to an article by Mr. M.N. Goiporia in which there is reference to several institutions which have training facilities in various branches of banking. No doubt, the system of examination of CAIIB as evolved over the years is peculiar to the Institute and in that sense it is a pioneer and holds monopoly, but the status is neither State conferred nor State protected. It also repelled the argument that there was deep and pervasive control over the Institute. This argument was sought to be built upon the fact that as a matter of convention the Governor of Reserve Bank of India was elected as a President of the Institute. The Court held that having regard to the provisions of the Articles of Association, the President of the Institute is to be elected in the general meeting. It is, therefore, perfectly possible to discontinue the convention of electing the Governor of Reserve Bank of India as President. In fact, it appears to be a mutually acceptable arrangement both for the Institute as well as for the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India to continue the convention. As far as the Articles of Association are concerned, the provision is for the election of the President from amongst its members. In fact, it appears to be a mutually acceptable arrangement both for the Institute as well as for the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India to continue the convention. As far as the Articles of Association are concerned, the provision is for the election of the President from amongst its members. Repelling the contention that the functions of the Institute were of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it was held that the decisions show that the test of public or governmental character is not easy of application and does not invariably lead to correct inference because governmental action is broad and varied, and merely because an activity may be such as may legitimately be carried on by the Government, it does not mean that the Corporation which is otherwise private entity would be an instrumentality or agency of the Government by reason of carrying of such activity. For applying the test, therefore, further precaution is to be taken and it is to be seen whether the public nature of the function is impregnated with governmental character or tied or entwined with the Government or fortified by some other additional factor. Applying the 6th test in Ajay Hasia it was held that the institute was not established by the transfer of any Government Department to the institute. 26. The Court also held that the institute was not amenable to its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Relying upon the decision in Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer ( AIR 1966 SC 81 ) and on the observations in Sri Anandi Mukta Sadguru (supra) it upheld the contention of respondent-Institute that mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public duty or a statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. The condition precedent for issue of mandamus is that there is one claiming it a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one against whom it is sought. In other words an order of mandaus is in the form of a command directed to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. It was emphasised that even in Sr. In other words an order of mandaus is in the form of a command directed to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. It was emphasised that even in Sr. Anandi Mukta Sadguru's case it was held that the words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty (emphasis supplied). The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant but what is relevant is nature of the duty imposed on the body. The Court, therefore, concluded by holding that in the sense, explained by their Lordships it cannot be said that the Indian Institute of Bankers can be considered a public authority, even though the institute, performs function in relation to public. The said function is not being performed in compliance with any statute. Moreover, in Sri Anandi Mukta Sadguru (supra) the trust running the Science College received grant from the State which was completely absent in the instant case. 27. The third decision is of the Orissa High Court in Laxman Nath Das v: Dy. Secy (Exam.) Indian Institute of Bankers (AIR 1995 Orissa 277). The Division Bench of the Court after noticing the authorities cited before it including the Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that considering the nature and duty of the institute it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court also noticed that the same view had been taken by several other High Courts, particulars whereof have been mentioned in penultimate paragraph of the judgment. It would appear therefrom that the High Courts of Bombay, Rajasthan, Allahabad, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh apart from Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court have taken the same view. In the light of the principles well-settled I may now proceed to consider whether the respondent-Indian Institute of Bankers can be said to be 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the principles well-settled I may now proceed to consider whether the respondent-Indian Institute of Bankers can be said to be 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. While considering a question of this nature, as observed by the Supreme Court, Article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which have some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression 'State'. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. Keeping in view the fact that in a welfare State independent institutions, corporations and agencies are generally subjected to some form of State control, that by itself may not render such bodies as 'State' under Article 12. Even the tests laid down in Ajay Hasia are merely indicative and are by no means conclusive or clinching in any case. There is no cut and dried formula which may enable us to classify those which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government and those which are not. The approach indicated by the Supreme Court has to be adopted while considering this question. 28. It is no one's case that the Government owns any share capital in the respondent-Institute. The absence of Government's share in the share capital of the Institute would be indicative of the fact that the Institute is not an instrumentality of the State. Similarly there is absence of financial assistance by the State to the Institute. The Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court considering the annual accounts of the Institute placed before it came to the conclusion that the Institute has its own sources of income and is not dependent on the Government in financial matters. Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost the entire expenditure of the Corporation, it would offer some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with governmental character. Conversely, in its absence, it would be indicative of the Corporation not being impregnated with governmental character. It was faintly submitted that the Institute derives its income also from its institutional members which include Nationalised Banks. It was therefore contended that some part of its income is relatable to the membership fee which the Institute gets from its Institutional members including Nationalised banks. It was faintly submitted that the Institute derives its income also from its institutional members which include Nationalised Banks. It was therefore contended that some part of its income is relatable to the membership fee which the Institute gets from its Institutional members including Nationalised banks. This to my mind hardly supports the conclusion that the Institution is impregnated with governmental character. The membership fee is payable by all members of the Institute and there is no compulsion for a Nationalised Bank to be a member of the Institute. Moreover, the membership fee realised from such institutional members is only a small fraction of the total income of the Institute. There is no direct funding by the State, and even the membership fee which the Nationalised Banks pay to the Institute, is not so much as to meet almost the entire expenditure of the Corporation. 29. It was next contended that the Institute enjoys monopoly status. Counsel however could not satisfy the Court that such monopoly status is State conferred or State protected. Nothing has been brought to our notice to show that the monopoly has been conferred by the State by authorising only the Respondent-Institute to take examinations which are conducted by it. Negatively there is no prohibition against any other Institution or Organisation conducting such examination. Indeed the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court has noticed the fact that several Institutions do exist which have training facilities in various branches of banking. To me it appears that the use of the word 'monopoly' in relation to the Respondent-Institute is not at all appropriate. What perhaps IS meant is that the Respondent-Institute enjoys a unique position which it has acquired on the basis of its reputation, experience and the pioneering work which it has done in the field. The certificates granted by the Institute are well recognised and is of value to those who have obtained them. It may be that the Officers of the Banks and the Financial Institutions get some added advantage in the matter of promotion and increments for having obtained the certificate known as CAIIB. But it is not binding upon the Banks and the Financial Institutions to recognise the certificate granted by the respondent-Institute. If they have done so, they have done so in recognition of the value that they attach to such certificates granted by the Respondent-Institute. 30. But it is not binding upon the Banks and the Financial Institutions to recognise the certificate granted by the respondent-Institute. If they have done so, they have done so in recognition of the value that they attach to such certificates granted by the Respondent-Institute. 30. There is complete absence of deep and pervasive State control over the Respondent-Institute. The management of the Institute is entrusted to its Council which is elected in accordance with the provisions of its Memorandum and Articles of Association. It is no doubt true that as a matter of convention the Governor of Reserve Bank of India is elected as the President of the Institute. That however is only a matter of convention and it is open to the members to elect any other person as the President of the Institute. As noticed by the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, it appears to be a mutually acceptable arrangement both for the Institute as well as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India to continue the convention. As far as Articles of Association are concerned, the provision is for the election of the President from amongst its members. 31. The functions of the Respondent-Institute cannot be said to be of public importance and closely related to governmental functions. The mere fact that the Institute conducts examination cannot lead one to the conclusion that the functions of the Institute are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions. It is not as if a Department of the Government was transferred to the Institute to perform the functions which were earlier performed by the Department. The Institute only holds examinations to test the competency and efficiency of its members and grants them certificate, if they are declared successful in the examinations. Even if they have a correspondence course for training such member candidates, who intend to take the examination, that cannot be equated with the education which the State is required to provide to its citizens who have a right to be educated. There is nothing to Show that any of the functions performed by the Respondent-Institute is closely related to governmental functions. I am, therefore, of the considered view that applying the tests enumerated in Ajay Hasia case (supra), the Institute cannot be said to be 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 32. There is nothing to Show that any of the functions performed by the Respondent-Institute is closely related to governmental functions. I am, therefore, of the considered view that applying the tests enumerated in Ajay Hasia case (supra), the Institute cannot be said to be 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 32. It was then submitted that even if the Respondent-Institute is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it is certainly an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Considerable reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Anandi Sadguru (supra). It is no doubt true that the term 'authority' used in Article 226 of the Constitution in the context must receive a liberal meaning since the High Court has wide powers under Article 226 to issue writs for the enforcement not only of fundamental rights, but other rights as well. But as has been observed in the same judgment, the words any person or authority used in Article 226 of the Constitution though not confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State, they may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is nature of the duty imposed on the body. It is also relevant to notice that the Institute does not receive any grant from the State nor is it affiliated to any University so as to be bound by the terms & conditions of affiliation. I, therefore, hold that the Respondent-Institute is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 33. In the result these Letters Patent Appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. I agree.