ORDER: These revision petitions are filed by the second plaintiff in O.S.No.339 of 1995 on the file of District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Thirumayam. 2. Suit filed by plaintiffs was one for mandatory injunction directing defendants 1 to 7 to give first mariyadhai to the representatives of Panayoor Village, Thirumayam Taluk, Pudukkottai District on all festival occasions at the temple of Udaya Parasakthiamman, Kulamangalam Village, Thirumayam Taluk, Pudukkottai District and for costs of the suit. 3. It is alleged in the plaint that the Deity Udaya Parasakthi temple is situated in Thirumayam Taluk and it is an ancient temple having its origin from ancient times. Festivals in the temple are used to be celebrated both on auspicious days and on other occasions during which first mariyadhai is used to be given to the representatives of Panayoor village. Since the village Panayoor consist of large number of people, suit is filed by plaintiffs in their individual as well as representative capacity representing Panayoor village under O.1, Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure. It is further averred that with regard to giving Mariyadhai as per custom and convention which was in vogue, the priority was Aranmanaiyar (authorities representing Government), Rajakal, Nayagarmar, Amara Oozhiyam, Kangani, Panayoorar and then Kulamangaloorar, etc. As per order of priority, Panayoor must be given priority as per ancient customs. When dispute arose regarding issuance of mariyadhai, an enquiry was conducted under Sec.63(8) of HR & CE Act by the Deputy Commissioner. That case was numbered as O.A.No.53 of 1979, which was later transferred to the file of Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), HR & CE, Madras on administrative grounds. After elaborate enquiry and marking several documents the case was decided in favour of plaintiffs. In that case, representatives of Kulamangalam village were impleaded as party respondents. Though the matter was taken on appeal, the order of Deputy Commissioner became final and conclusive. 4. Reason for filing the suit was present defendants 1 to 7 have fixed to celebrate Kappukattu festival which is a prelude to the performance of annual festival to Udaya Parasakthiamman temple at Kulamangalam village. Though the matter was taken on appeal, the order of Deputy Commissioner became final and conclusive. 4. Reason for filing the suit was present defendants 1 to 7 have fixed to celebrate Kappukattu festival which is a prelude to the performance of annual festival to Udaya Parasakthiamman temple at Kulamangalam village. According to plaintiffs, if defendants are allowed to achieve their objective by denying the mariyadhai to be given prior to the Kulamangalam villagers, the representatives of Panayoor village will loose not only their prestige and right but also they entertain belief that the villagers of Panayoor will get into trouble on account of wrath of the god. Under such circumstances, suit was filed for mandatory injunction as stated above. 5. Reason for filing these revision petition is, after institution of suit, plaintiffs filed I.A.No.451 of 1998 for an order that the defendants who have already been impleaded must also be allowed to be sued in representative capacity. In the affidavit in support of the petition it is said that defendants 1 and 2 are present trustees and administrators of Udhaya Parasakthi Temple of Kulamangalam village and other persons are some of the villagers of Kulamangalam village, who are the henchmen of defendants 1 and 2. 6. The same was seriously opposed by third defendant. According to him, any such petition at this stage is not maintainable and the petition ought to have been taken at the time of institution of the suit. 7. It may be stated that the application is filed in 1996 though the suit was instituted in the year 1995. Along with the application seeking permission to implead the defendants as representatives of Kulamangalam Village, plaintiffs also filed I.A.No.452 of 1998 seeking consequential amendment of plaint. 8. Both these applications were dismissed on the ground that the applications are belated and cannot be entertained. The same are challenged in these revision petitions. 9. After hearing counsel for petitioners I do not think that the order of courts below is correct. 10. In Chinnaswami v. Kandasami, A.I.R 1970 Mad. 81, Justice Veeraswami (as his lordship then was) held that the question of limitation apply even in the case where permission is sought for to institute a suit under O.1, Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure. That is also a case where amendment was refused on the ground of limitation. 10. In Chinnaswami v. Kandasami, A.I.R 1970 Mad. 81, Justice Veeraswami (as his lordship then was) held that the question of limitation apply even in the case where permission is sought for to institute a suit under O.1, Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure. That is also a case where amendment was refused on the ground of limitation. In paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Judgment learned Judge held thus, “2. The view taken by the Court below is unsustainable. No doubt amendment of pleading should be freely allowed, at whatever stage it is asked for. But, this can only be subject to the pleas as to limitation or other prejudice to the other party. If the suit had been instituted on 21st July, 1967, it would undoubtedly be barred by limitation. Mr. Desikan for the petitioner urges that Madina Bibi v. Ismail Durga Association, I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 808: A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789 is distinguishable on the ground that there application for amendment of the plaint was taken out after issues had been framed and the trial held thereon. But I see no difference in principle, whether the amendment is sought for after the expiry of the period of limitation and at the stage of trial, before or after. The principle is that an application for amendment of the pleading should be within the time allowed for the institution of the suit. 3. Reference for the petitioner is also made to Ayyamperumal Chettiar v. Palaniandi Chettiar, (1958)2 M.L.J. 540 . Ramaswami, J. held, in similar circumstances, that an amendment should be freely allowed. That was a suit by an attaching creditor under O.21, R.63, Civil P.C. to establish his right to attach and bring to sale certain property by avoiding a transfer of the property on the ground that it had been made with the intent to defeat his claim. The learned Judge, in view of Madina Bibi v. Ismail Durga Association, I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 808: A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789 was aware that such a suit should be brought in a representative capacity in compliance with O.1, Rule 8 of the Code. The learned Judge, in view of Madina Bibi v. Ismail Durga Association, I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 808: A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789 was aware that such a suit should be brought in a representative capacity in compliance with O.1, Rule 8 of the Code. On the question of limitation the learned Judge observed that it was by then well settled that in a suit of this nature, where on account of ignorance or misapprehension there was no prayer that the decree that may be passed such be for the benefit of all the creditors, amendment should be freely allowed even at a late stage. 4. With respect, I am not able to share that view. The question is one of limitation and not one of sympathy or expediency. If excusing the delay is permissible, that is another matter. In the absence of an enabling provision, I do not see how, if on the date the application for amendment was made the suit would have been barred by limitation, there is any escape but that the application has got to be dismissed on the ground of limitation, and that is the principle laid down in I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 808: A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789. As I said, on principle that case is not distinguishable from the instant one.” 11. It may be noted that learned Judge followed the decision in Madina Bibi v. Ismail Durga Association, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789. In that case also plaintiff initially instituted the suit without getting permission under O.1, Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure but after written statement was filed, plaintiff applied for amendment of plaint so as to bring the amendment in conformity with law under O.1, Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure. Learned Judge of this Court held that if the date of application is taken the suit is barred by limitation. 12. There is also another decision of this Court reported in Shankara Menon v. Kuttani, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 639, where also similar view was taken. 13. Both these decisions came for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Nandaramdas v. Zulika Bibi, A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 531. In fact, this decision was not taken note of by Justice Veerasamy in the decision reported in Chinnaswami v. Kandasami, A.I.R 1970 Mad. 81 and I am not following the same. 13. Both these decisions came for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Nandaramdas v. Zulika Bibi, A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 531. In fact, this decision was not taken note of by Justice Veerasamy in the decision reported in Chinnaswami v. Kandasami, A.I.R 1970 Mad. 81 and I am not following the same. In page 536 of the reports, the Division Bench held thus, “....An amendment which does not seek to bring in a new party but only varies the ground on which the relief was originally sought or asks for a different or additional relief without changing the cause of action, does not bring the case within Sec.22, Limitation Act. It is equally clear that where a party is already on the record either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, an amendment which merely alters the capacity in which he has been impleaded to one of a different character does not involve an addition of parties so as to attract the provisions of Sec.22. Some of the cases which bear on this aspect of the question have been referred to in the judgment of Wadsworth J. in Shankara Menon v. Kuttani, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 639. But this line of cases does not, in our opinion, directly bear on the question which we have to decide in the present case and we do not therefore consider it necessary to examine them in detail. A better guidance is afforded by two principles recognised by the Court in working O.1, Rule 8. In Sahib Thambi Marakayar v. Hamid Marakayar, I.L.R. 36 Mad. 414, Benson and Sundara Ayyar JJ. stated: “The general rule of law, undoubtedly, is, that in suits where one person is allowed to represent others as defendant in a representative capacity any decree passed can bind those others only with respect to the property of those others which he can in law represent and no personal decree can be passed against them, although the parties on record eo nomine may be made personally liable. This is the principle applied in suits against a Hindu family as represented by its managing member and in suits to which O.1, Rule 8, Civil P.C., 1908 is applicable: see Sadagopachari v. Krishnamachari, I.L.R. 12 Mad. 356 and Srinivasa Iyengar v. Arayor Srinivasa Iyengar, I.L.R. 33 Mad.483”. This is the principle applied in suits against a Hindu family as represented by its managing member and in suits to which O.1, Rule 8, Civil P.C., 1908 is applicable: see Sadagopachari v. Krishnamachari, I.L.R. 12 Mad. 356 and Srinivasa Iyengar v. Arayor Srinivasa Iyengar, I.L.R. 33 Mad.483”. The basis of the rule is that persons other than those on the record are not parties to the suit in the full sense of the term. They may be bound by the decision passed in so far as it affects the common interests of the entire body of persons represented in the suit, but they cannot be personally bound by the decree unless they are actually impleaded as parties to the action. If they are not,a fresh suit must be filed, for obtaining such a decree against them. The point has been considered from another aspect also. If a member of the class who has not applied to be made a party under sub-rule (2) dies pending the action, is it necessary that his legal representatives should be brought on the record? A negative answer has been given to this question in Udimi v. Hira, 1 lah. 582 and Mohammed Sheer Khan v. Ghulam Mohammed, 13 Lah. 92. The principle was extended to appeals in 13 Lah 195. This result can be understood only on the footing that they are not parties to the suit in fact. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the amendment of the plaint by which the suit was converted into a representative action under O.1, Rule 8, does not involve the addition of fresh parties. It is true that the capacity of the plaintiff changed, for after the amendment he became a representative of a body of persons consisting of himself and the other creditors; but it is impossible to maintain, in the face of the decision of the Privy council in Peary Mohan Mookerjee v. Narendranath Mookerjee, I.L.R. 37 Cal 229. not to mention other cases, that the amendment introduced fresh parties and having been made after the period of limitation, the suit is barred. We are therefore unable with all respect, to accept the decision of Wadsworth J. In Shankara Menon v. Kuttani, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 639. as correct.” (Italics supplied) 14. not to mention other cases, that the amendment introduced fresh parties and having been made after the period of limitation, the suit is barred. We are therefore unable with all respect, to accept the decision of Wadsworth J. In Shankara Menon v. Kuttani, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 639. as correct.” (Italics supplied) 14. In view of the binding precedent, which is not taken note of by the lower court, I am bound to set aside the order of lower court. Consequently I.A.Nos.451 and 452 of 1998 in O.S.No.339 of 1995 on the file of District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Thirumayam are allowed. Plaintiffs are directed to incorporate amendment on or before 30.6.2000. Plaintiff may produce copy of this order before lower court enabling the lower court to permit them to incorporate amendment, before the stipulated time. After incorporating amendment, defendants will be given opportunity to file additional written statement to the amended portion of plaint. 15. The revision petitions are allowed as above. No costs. Consequently C.M.P.No.20095 of 1999 is also closed.