VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. ( 1 ) IN this suit the Planintiff has prayed for the issuance of an Injunction restrainingthe Delhi Development Authority from dispossessing from or interfering with thepossession of the Plaintiffs in respect of property or demolishing the gate or theboundary wall. On 12. 12. 1995 when the application for ex parte ad interim injunctioncame up for hearing, the injunction prayed for was granted. This application comesup for final disposal. ( 2 ) MS. Geeta Mittal, learned Counsel for the DDA has stated that she will confineher case to the averments contained in the Written Statement. In para 2 thereof, it hasbeen stated that the iron gate and the rooms with boundary walls falls in Khasrano. 460/368/36 and 461/368/36 min which were acquired vide Award No. 90/80-81and, therefore, possession under Section 22 (1) of the DDA Act was taken videnotification No. F. 9 (2)/78-Landb dated 3. 2. 1981. Accordingly, the Defendant is entitledto remove encroachments on the land under its disposal in terms of the saidnotification. In the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the DDA has submittedthat the Plaintiffs have concealed material facts and, therefore, the injunction shouldbe rejected. It is her submission that the questions which are now being agitated inthese proceedings, are fully covered by the decision of a Full Bench of this court in abatch of writ petitions entitled Roshnara Begum Vs. UOI. AIR 1996 206. Civil writpetition 3318/1991 and C. W. P. 4777/1993 were also disposed of by this commonjudgment, and the legality of the acquisition proceedings were upheld. Thereafter, thepetitioners as well as other land owners had approached the Hon ble Supremecourt by means of Special Leave Petitions, and these petitions were also rejectedand dismissed in terms of the judgment passed in Murari and Others Vs. UOI andothers (1997) 1 SCC 15 . She has further contended that the Plaintiffs were claimingrights in respect of a transfer during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings. She had stated that the Section 4 Notification in the Land Acquisition Act was madeon 23. 1. 1965, Section 6 Notification on 26. 12. 1968 and Section 9 in 1976. Immediately, the persons affected by these Notifications including the Plaintiffs hadfiled Civil Writ Petitions, which were disposed of by the Full Bench, as mentionedabove. She had stated that the Section 4 Notification in the Land Acquisition Act was madeon 23. 1. 1965, Section 6 Notification on 26. 12. 1968 and Section 9 in 1976. Immediately, the persons affected by these Notifications including the Plaintiffs hadfiled Civil Writ Petitions, which were disposed of by the Full Bench, as mentionedabove. She further submitted that the representations made by the Plaintiffs, asenvisaged in the order of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Murari s case (supra) havealso been rejected. It was her contention that the Plaintiffs had no right in the propertyand, therefore, on the ratio of G. M. Modi Hospital and Research Centre Medicalscience Vs. Shankar singh Bhandari and other 58 (1995) Delhi Law Times 79,the Plaintiffs had no right to claim any injunction. ( 3 ) MR. P. N. Lekhi, learned Senior Counset appearing for the Plaintiffs has contendedthat the acquired land, including the suit property, has vested in the U. O. I. He palcedreliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of the City ofahmedabad Vs. chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Others. 1971 (3) SCC 821 andof this Court Delhi Development Authority Vs. Golcha Properties and Others 43 (1991) Delhi Law Times 314. He contended that there is no evidence to substantiatethat the Central Government had taken possession of the land and had transferred itto the Delhi Development Authority. This being the Position DDA had no locus standito take any action vis-a-vis the lands in question he also contended that since theplaintiffs were in possession, they were entitled to seek the injunctory protection of ( 4 ) HAVING considered the rival arguments, I am of the opinion that the judgment ofmy Learned Brother K. Ramamoorti J. in G. M. Modi Hospital s case cannot assissethe stand of the Delhi Development Authority in the facts of the spresent case. Thelearned Judge had duly considered the decision of the Supreme Court includinckrishna Ram Vs. Mrs. Shobha AIR 1989 SC 2097 in which it was held as follows: "it is well settled in a law in this country that where a person is in settledpossession of the property even on the assumption that he had no right toremain in the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of theproperty except by the recourse of law," ( 5 ) THE K. Ramamoorti J. in the facts of the case before him. had held that theplaintiffs were licencees and were not in settled possession. He, therefore, set asideof the injunctions granted by the lower courts. What is relevant and necessary in allsuch cases is to determine the nature of the possession of the Plaintiffs Learnedcounsel for the Delhi Development Authority has relied on and filed Notification No. F. 9 (2)/78-Landb dated 3. 2. 1981 byvirtue of which the lands in question were placed asthe disposal of the Delhi Development Authority for the purpose of development, "asno replication has been filed, it would be fair to assume that, as averred in para 2 onthe Written Statement, the suit property falls within the sweep of this notificationtherefore, the contention of Mr. Lekhi, Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs to thecontrary can not be accepted. The following observations in Ramnikial N. Bhuttavs. State of Maharashtra (1997) 1 SCC 134 would have to govern the decision tobe taken in the present case. They are therefore, reproduced as under:before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observationsrelevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched uponan ambitious programme of all round economic advancements to make oureconomy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract froreigndirect investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with Chinaeconomically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some ofthe Asian countries, referred to as "asian tigers", e. g. South Korea, Taiwanand Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructurenecessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in ourcountry. The means of transportation, power and communications are in direneed of substantial improvement expansion and modernisation. These thingsvery often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is,however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons effected challengethe acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are tenerallyin theshape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition isasked for and in some cases, order by way of stay or injunction are alsomade. Whatever may have been the practice in the past. a time has comewhere the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercisingtheir power of granting stay\injunction. The power under Article 226 isdiscretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice andnot merely on the making out of a legal point. Whatever may have been the practice in the past. a time has comewhere the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercisingtheir power of granting stay\injunction. The power under Article 226 isdiscretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice andnot merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of landacquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, grantingof injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutorynature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the pubnlic interestvis-s-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 -indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the Highcourt to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated onaccount of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the personsinterested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensationpayable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressinga wrong; quashing "the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode ofredress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trustthat these consider ations will be duly borne in mind by the courts whiledealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings. ( 6 ) IN view of the proceedings which have already taken place in respect of theacquisition of the land, firstly before the full Bench of this Court and thereafter, in thehon ble supreme Court, I am of the opinion that the matter has been fully dealt withand does not call for fresh hearing by this Court. It was contended by learned Counselfor the DDA that in Roshnara Begum s case the Full Bench declined the grant of aninjunction in favour of the Plaintiffs. She relied on the following passage from thedecision of the Full Bench: Paras 181, 182 Page 251 of AIR 1996 Delhi 206 Judgment. Most of the points raised in this writ petition are common with the main pointsalready discussed by us. However, Mr. She relied on the following passage from thedecision of the Full Bench: Paras 181, 182 Page 251 of AIR 1996 Delhi 206 Judgment. Most of the points raised in this writ petition are common with the main pointsalready discussed by us. However, Mr. G. L. Sanghi, Senior Advocate, whoappeared for the applicant in C. M. 8269/93 has urged that the land inbquestion has been developed into a sports complex and modern amenitieshave been provided and it would be nbational waste in allowing suchconstructions to bedemolished. It is urged that the applicant has acquired this land in 1969 before cominginto force of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 and thus,there was no bar in the transferee raising constructions. However, it is theadmitted fact that all these constructions have been raised after issuance ofthe notification under Section 4 of the Act. These constructions have beenraised obviously with complete Knowledge of the fact that this land is liable tobe acquired for public purpose. It is true that transferee of the land such asthe applicant is entitled to same benefits and rights as the transferor ( seesmt. Gunwant Kaur Vs Municipal Committee, Bhatinda. AIR 1970 SC802 ). However, unless and until it is shown that public purpose for which theland was sought to be acquired by issuing a notification under Section 4 anddeclaration under Section 6 has elapsed, it would not be possible for thiscourt to hold that mere fact land has been developed by the petitioner\applicantshould lead to the conclusion that public purpose for which me land wassought to be acquired has been achieved. It is pointed out to us that thisparticular land is required for the residential scheme of Vasant Kunj. so, itcannot be said that the sports complex built up by the applicant in the land inquestion is in consonance with the public purpose for which the land hasbeen earmarked in the scheme of the Government. Thus, we do not thinkthat the petitioner/applicant can legally get the notification quashed on anyvalid grounds in the present matter. so, itcannot be said that the sports complex built up by the applicant in the land inquestion is in consonance with the public purpose for which the land hasbeen earmarked in the scheme of the Government. Thus, we do not thinkthat the petitioner/applicant can legally get the notification quashed on anyvalid grounds in the present matter. However the petitioner/applicant is atliberty to make any representation to the authorities for getting the landreteased and it is for the authorities to examine whether in view ofs themodern sports complex having been brought into existence in the land inquestion could it serve the public purpose of acquiring this land for thatparticular scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended inrespect of the land in question. However, the acquisition proceedings are notliable to be quashed on any such plea. ( 7 ) MS. Geeta Mittal, Learned Counsel for the DDA further relied on the followingobservations of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Murari s case: (1997)1 SCC 15 para 21. . Some of the learned counsel for the appellant who submitted that even theland shown in green colour in the master plan which has been sought to beacquired but it is not understood as to for what purpose the said land is beingacquired. It was also submitted that there are a large number of structuresand complexes raised on the land sought to be acquired in which schools,sports and other recreational activities are going on. Shri G. L. Sanghi,learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal arising out ofslp (C) No. 5771 of 1996 and Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No 740 of1996 as well as other advocates appearing for some other appellantssubmitted that there exist factories, workshops, godowns and MCD Schoolbesides residential houses and quarters over the land belonging to theappellant Partap Singh situated at Roshanara Road, Subzi Mandi, Delhiwhich has been acquired and that there exists modern and well-developedfarmhouse with modem facilities in the land belonging to the appellantroshanara Begum, where there are a good number of other structures andfruit-bearing trees. Consequently these areas do not require furtherdevelopment as they are already developed and, therefore, the said landshould be released from acquisition. Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel appearingfor some of the appellants urged that the appellant concerned had. Consequently these areas do not require furtherdevelopment as they are already developed and, therefore, the said landshould be released from acquisition. Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel appearingfor some of the appellants urged that the appellant concerned had. developeda sports complex providing modem amenities therein and if the same isdemolished it would be a great national waste. It was, therefore, urged thatsuvch complexes and built-up areas should be deleted from the acquisition. Itmay be pointed out that in the master plan the land indicated in green colouris reserved for recreational facilities. The recreational facilities are also partof the planned development of Delhi and it cannot be disputed that recreationalamenities are also part of the life of the people and an important feature of adeveloped society. Therefore, no legitimate objection can be made in theacquisition of such land which is shown in green colour, so far as thestructures and constructions made on the land are concerned there is nomaterial to show that they were made before the issuance of notificationundder Section 4 of the Act. It is also not clear whether such constructionswere raised with or without necessary sanction/approval of the competentauthority. No grievance therefore can legitimately be raised in that behalf asthe same would be regarded as unauthorised and made at the risk of thelandowners. Here a reference of a deciswion of this Court in the case of Stateof U. P. V. Pista Devi may be made with advantage, para 7 of which reads asunder: (SCC p. 258, para 7) "it was next contended that in the large extent of land acquired which wasabout 412 acres there were some buyildings here and there and so theacquisition of these parts of the land onb which buildings were situated wasunjustified since those portions were not either waste or arable lands whichcould be dealt with under Section 17 (1) of the Act. This contention has notbeen considered by the High Court. We do not, however, find any substancein it. The Government was not acquiring about 412 acres. of land on theoutskirts of Meerut city which was described for planned development of theurban area it would not be proper to leave the small portions over which somesuperstructures have been constructed out of the development scheme. We do not, however, find any substancein it. The Government was not acquiring about 412 acres. of land on theoutskirts of Meerut city which was described for planned development of theurban area it would not be proper to leave the small portions over which somesuperstructures have been constructed out of the development scheme. Insuch a situation where there is real urgency it would be difficult to applysection 5-A of the Act in the case of few bits of land on which some structuresare standing and to exempt the rest of the property from its application. " "in the present case also a large extent of land measuring thousands of acreshas been acquired and, therefore, it would not be proper to leave out somkesmall portions here and there over which some structures are said to beconstructed out of the planned development of Delhi. We may, however, addhere that during the course of the arguments Shri Goswami, learned counselappearing for the respondents-State made a statement that the Governmentwill consider each of the structures and take a decision in that respect, we,therefore, leave this issue to the discretion of the respondent. ( 8 ) IN these circumstances, I have reached the conclusion that the Plaintiffs havefailed to establish the existence of a prima facie case in their favour. It is also not incontroversy that they have acquired rights over the suit property during the pendencyof acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, the transfer in their favour is void. Stay ofdispossession has been declined by the Full Bench of this Court as well as thesupreme Court. The balance of convenience, in all acquisition matters, especiallywhere their legality had been upheld by the court, would not lie in favour of theplaintiffs. The contention of the DDA that its planned development work is severlyimpeded is to be appreciated. The land owners are entitled to and shall no doubtreceive, just compensation for their lands Hence, no irreparable loss or injury wouldbe caused to them. For all these reasons the ex parte ad interim injunction granted on12. 12. 1995 is recalled and the application is dismissed. There shall, however, noorders as to costs.