BHANWAR SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner. Ajay Kumar Singh has invoked this Courts Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to pay to the petitioner the salary in the pay-scale of Rs. 950-1,500 (revised as Rs. 3. 050-4,590) for the post of Second Grade Clerk with effect from 24. 6. 1997. ( 2 ) THE petitioners contention is that he was appointed as Pound Keeper under the orders of adhyaksh, Zlla Parlshad. Bahraich/dlstrict Magistrate vide appointment letter No. Memo/niyukti/pound/zi Pa/87 dated 11. 8. 1987 in the pay-scale of Rs. 225-475. He was promoted to the post of Tax Collector vide order dated 28. 2. 1995, issued by the Upper Mukhya adhikari, Zila Parishad, Bahralch. He performed his duty to the utmost satisfaction of his higher authorities and never gave a cause of annoyance to any one. In the year 1997, a post of Second grade Clerk had fallen vacant consequent upon promotion of one Layeek Ahmad to the post of record Keeper. The petitioner, considering himself to be eligible for the said post, applied for consideration of his appointment to the said post. As the petitioners work had always been satisfactory, the opposite party No. 2, namely, Adhyaksh, Zila Panchayat. Bahraich. on a recommendation of Mukhya Nagar Adhfkari directed that the petitioner be allowed to work on the post of Second Grade Clerk and in pursuance of the letter dated 24. 6. 1997, the petitioner on having resumed the charge, started functioning as Second Grade Clerk in the office of the Zila panchayat. However, in spite of his devotional discharge of duty, he was not paid the salary admissible to the said post and when he repeatedly requested for payment of his salary in the pay scale of the post of Second Grade Clerk, he was informed that his promotion being subject to condition that he will get his salary admissible to him in his original cadre of Tax Collector, he was not entitled to the next higher pay-scale. It was also Informed to him that since he was still discharging his part-time duty as a Tax Collector, he would not get the pay scale of the post of second Grade Clerk. It was also Informed to him that since he was still discharging his part-time duty as a Tax Collector, he would not get the pay scale of the post of second Grade Clerk. The two fold reply of the opposite parties, as has been contended by the petitioner, is arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable and against the provisions of Article 39 (d) of the constitution of India which provides equal pay for equal work for both men and women. When the petitioners request in this regard failed to yield any result, the petitioner filed this writ petition. ( 3 ) THE opposite parties filed their reply by means of counter-affidavit sworn by Layeek Ahmad khan. Mukhtar-e-Aam of Zila Panchayat Bahralch. Mr. Khan asserted that the petitioner was allowed to work as Clerk as a stop gap arrangement but it was categorically provided that he would get the salary for his original post of Tax Collector. The post of Tax Collector was different from that of the Second Grade Clerk and since the petitioner had no lien in the cadre of second Grade Clerk, he was not entitled to claim salary of the said post. It was also stated by Mr. Khan that the cadre of Tax Collector could not be merged with the cadre of Second Grade Clerk as it would have been against the departmental Rules and Regulations, As per Rules, the petitioner was entitled to get promotion to the post of Tax Inspector on fulfilling the eligibility criteria. For these reasons, it was prayed that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. ( 4 ) ON having heard learned counsel on both the sides and scanned the pleadings as well as documentary evidence on record. It is clear that the controversy lies in a narrow compass and the same can be resolved by reaching at a definite conclusion on the question as to whether the petitioner, who is admittedly working on the post of Tax Collector, is entitled to claim his salary to the higher post of Second Grade Clerk? Naturally, the letter dated 24. 6. 1997 which is the basis on which the petitioner has preferred his claim is of utmost relevance and a perusal of the said letter reveals that the President of Zila Panchayat, Bahralch, vide his order dated 17. 6. 1997, directed that the petitioner would work as Clerk. Naturally, the letter dated 24. 6. 1997 which is the basis on which the petitioner has preferred his claim is of utmost relevance and a perusal of the said letter reveals that the President of Zila Panchayat, Bahralch, vide his order dated 17. 6. 1997, directed that the petitioner would work as Clerk. However, a condition was levied and it was to the effect that he would not be entitled to get any additional salary or allowance. It was further made clear in the said letter that the petitioner would continue to get his salary in the pay-scale of Tax Collector which was his original cadre. He was also directed to look after the work of tax collection pertaining to the Estate Department of Nanpara Tehsil. A close scrutiny of the letter, referred to above, would further show that the work of tax collection was entrusted to him as a stop-gap arrangement but his appointment as a Clerk was not as a measure of stop-gap arrangement. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the opposite parties contended that a careful reading of the letter makes it clear that the petitioner was only attached as a Clerk which means that he was not promoted for all times to come. This argument was further supplemented by stating that it was not a promotion rather it was an official arrangement made in the interest of work for a short time. I am afraid the two fold contention has no merit. ( 6 ) MERE recital of word sambaddh means attachment is meaningless as the petitioner was specifically asked to execute the duty of a Clerk which, according to him, was known as Second grade Clerk and if he was to work as a Second Grade Clerk, there does not seem any plausible reason as to why he was not entitled to claim his salary admissible to the said post. It is significant to note that when the petitioner was to look after the work of two posts, question arises, as to why he should not have been entitled to claim higher wages as admissible to the post on which he was working. Obviously, the condition Imposed in the letter was absolutely unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary. It is significant to note that when the petitioner was to look after the work of two posts, question arises, as to why he should not have been entitled to claim higher wages as admissible to the post on which he was working. Obviously, the condition Imposed in the letter was absolutely unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary. ( 7 ) AS said above, the opposite parties have not been able to bring forward any reason to withhold the petitioners salary which he was entitled to claim for his devotional discharge of duty as second Grade Clerk. Further, it is Important to take note of the fact that the deponent of the counter-affidavit Sri Layeek Ahmad Khan handed over the charge of his post to the petitioner on 24. 6. 1997 itself and in the certificate of charge (Annexure-5 to the petition), it was recited that sri Khan had handed over the complete charge of his post of Clerk to Sri Ajay Kumar Singh. The term complete charge is meaningful and it appears to indicate that the petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in place of Sri Layeek Ahmad Khan who was promoted as Record Keeper from the post of Second Grade Clerk. Sri Layeek Ahmad Khan has not disputed these facts. However, his averment that it was a temporary official arrangement does not seem to inspire any confidence as the petitioner continued to work as Second Grade Clerk for a considerable period. He was working as Second Grade Clerk when he filed this writ petition in October, 1998. The word temporary implies in it a stop-gap arrangement for a short period. The original document on which the Adhyaksh, Zila Parishad has passed the order has not been filed before this Court for the reasons best known to the opposite parties. If produced before this Court, the said original record would have certainly revealed the reality pertaining to the short period or duration, if any, for which the petitioner was allegedly appointed as a Second Grade Clerk. The opposite parties have not disclosed in the counter-affidavit of Mr. Layeek Ahmad Khan any period for which the petitioner would have been asked to work as a Second Grade Clerk. The opposite parties have not disclosed in the counter-affidavit of Mr. Layeek Ahmad Khan any period for which the petitioner would have been asked to work as a Second Grade Clerk. Had there been some substance in the opposite parties claim, the petitioner would have been reverted to the post of tax Collector within about one and a half year tenure of his having worked as Second Grade clerk. It appears that during the pendency of the writ petition and after the opposite parties received notice, the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari out of Ill-will and malice asked the petitioner under an arrangement dated 4. 11. 1998 to look after the work of tax coll ection. ( 8 ) BY virtue of this arrangement, the petitioner cannot be said to have been reverted to the post of tax Collector as he was appointed to work as Second Grade Clerk by Adhyaksh of Zila parishad. A careful scrutiny of the order dated 4. 11. 1998, passed by the Additional Mukhya adhlkarl, Zila Panchayat would show that the petitioner was directed to look after the entire work of collection of tax. Merely because he was shown to be a Tax Collector does not mean that the President of Zlla Panchayat has withdrawn the order pertaining to his appointment as second Grade Clerk. Had there been some substance that the appointing authority had withdrawn the said order, the relevant record should have been filed for perusal of this Court. In absence of any such record, a reasonable presumption would be drawn that the President has not yet passed any order regarding discontinuance of the petitioner as Clerk. Even the order dated 4. 11. 1998 has not been passed by the Additional Mukhya Adhlkarl with the prior approval or sanction of the President. Zila Parishad. It is a local arrangement and this Court is constrained to observe that the order was not at all fair as it was passed during the pendency of this writ petition and after receipt of its notice. The petitioner has worked for fairly a long period as Second Grade clerk and, therefore, there is no question as to why he should not be paid his wages in the pay scale admissible to the said post. This view is fortified by a decision of Honble Supreme Court in Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh v. Hari Om Sharma and others. 1998 (79) FLR 657 . This view is fortified by a decision of Honble Supreme Court in Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh v. Hari Om Sharma and others. 1998 (79) FLR 657 . In that case, the respondent was appointed as Junior Engineer-1 with the condition based on his own undertaking that he would not claim higher wages. Honble Supreme Court held that an agreement that if a person is promoted to a higher post or a stop-gap arrangement is made to place him on the higher post, he would not claim higher salary or other attendant benefits, would be contrary to law and also against public policy. It was also held by Honble Supreme Court that a long period (in that case, it was ten years) cannot be treated to be a stop-gap arrangement. ( 9 ) FOLLOWING the principle of law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in the case referred to above. 1 am inclined to hold that in the case in hand also, the petitioner has worked till date for two and a half years as Second Grade Clerk and, therefore, he would be entitled to higher wages in the pay-scale as admissible to the said post. By no stretch of reasoning. It could be said a stop-gap arrangement or a temporary official arrangement as was asserted by Sri Layeek Ahmad khan. ( 10 ) IN the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, a writ of mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to pay to the petitioner his wages in the pay scale as admissible to the post of Second Grade Clerk on which the petitioner is working. ( 12 ) NO order as to costs. .