JUDGMENT - N.V. DABHOLKAR, J.:---Present appellant along with Prabhakar Shahurao Tangade, was charged for the offences punishable under sections 302, 201 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The judgment delivered on 24-10-1994 in Sessions Case No. 106 of 1994 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad ended in conviction of the present appellant/original accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and acquittal of the original accused No. 2. This judgment and sentence is under challenge by the appellant in the present appeal. 2. According to prosecution deceased Pushpabai was wife of the appellant. They were married about 7 years prior to the incident and were blessed with two children. Deceased is said to have developed illicit intimacy with accused No. 2 namely Prabhakar Shahurao Tangade. The knowledge suspicion of this illicit intimacy of his wife with accused No. 2 motived appellant to commit murder of his wife Pushpabai on the night of 3-8-1993. According to prosecution case appellant committed murder of his wife in a gutter at a distance of about 25-30 feet from his residence, by throttling and thereafter he brought the dead body to his residence and tried to represent that she had died natural death, because of loose motions and vomiting. On report from Police Patil Dawarwadi Police Station Pachod investigated the matter and having arrived at a conclusion that two accused (present appellant and acquitted accused No. 2) committed murder of Pushpabai in furtherance of common intention, launched the prosecution, which culminated into conviction of present appellant, as described above. 3. In this matter, where admittedly there is no direct evidence of accused having committed murder of his wife-Pushpabai, the prosecution relies upon circumstantial evidence in order to bring home the guilty, and the trial Court returned findings of guilty on the basis of following chain of circumstances, established by the prosecution, in the opinion of the Additional Sessions Judge. (i) There was a strong motive for appellant to commit murder of his wife, in the sense that the wife had illicit relations with the stranger. (i) There was a strong motive for appellant to commit murder of his wife, in the sense that the wife had illicit relations with the stranger. (ii) The conduct of appellant, after getting knowledge regarding death of his wife was unnatural and incompatible with his innocence (iii) Appellant was instrumental in spreading false information about (cause of ) death of Pushpabai to the effect that she died by suffering with loose motions and vomiting, i.e. Appellant tried to paint a picture that she died natural death. (iv) Appellant has brought dead body from the spot of occurance to his house in the early hours of dawn. (v) There is a discovery of gold necklace (dorale) and silver anklets of deceased from the gutter i.e. spot of occurance. (vi) The injuries on the person of deceased indicated that she was subjected to violence before causing her death, although there was no motive for committing theft (since the ornaments were lying at the place of occurance and not stolen). (vii) Deceased had expressed to her brothers apprehension of danger to her life, and (viii) The defence of the alibi raised by appellant was also found to be false. Although, in all 13 witnesses were examined by the prosecution, as many as 5 witnesses turned hostile. These include, P.W. 4 Vikram, P.W. 5 Vimal, P.W. 6 Chandrakant and P.W. 10 Uttam. All there four witnesses are panch witnesses to one panchanama, or the other i.e. spot panchanama, inquest panchanama, discovery panchanama etc. P.W. 11 Syed Babar is a mason under whom deceased Pushpabai worked for one and half months and had lent him her tape recorder. Amongst the remaining 8 witnesses, P.W. 1 Dinkar is Police Patil of Dawarwadi, who reported the death to Pachod Police Station setting investigation into motion. P.W. 2 Sambhaji and P.W. 3 Ashok are real brothers of deceased, examined to testify about the relations between appellant and deceased, immediately before the alleged incident, P.W. 8 Ranjanabai is neighbour and P.W. 9 Sarasbai is wife of accused's brother. They are mainly examined on the point of illicit intimity between deceased and accused No. 2. Sarasbai has also helped appellant to fetch the dead body in the house and consequently her evidence is also significant from the point of view of conduct of appellant as influenced by the fact in issue. Remaining three are technical witnesses, P.W. 7 Dr. They are mainly examined on the point of illicit intimity between deceased and accused No. 2. Sarasbai has also helped appellant to fetch the dead body in the house and consequently her evidence is also significant from the point of view of conduct of appellant as influenced by the fact in issue. Remaining three are technical witnesses, P.W. 7 Dr. Narode has carried out post mortem of dead body. P.W. 12 Dhanaji is Head Constable and P.W. 13 Shaikh Nasir is the Police Sub-Inspector. P.W. 12 and P.W. 13 are the Police Officers attached to Pachod Police Station, who had carried out the investigation. P.W. 13 Shaikh Nasir has also lodged a complaint on behalf of the State. 5. The trial judge has guided himself by the principles laid down by the Apex Court in case of (Sharad Sarda v. State of Maharashtra)1, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1622 regarding appreciation of evidence in the cases based on circumstantial evidence. The Honourable Apex Court observed that following conditions must be fulfilled, before the case against the accused based on the circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established. (i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not 'may be' established. (ii) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (iii) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (v) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Ganpat v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1995 Cri.L.J. 792 is the decisions of this Court (at Bombay), relied upon by Shri Barlota, learned Counsel. Plassitum "C" Para No. 11, which was more specifically relied upon, follows the principles enunciated in Sharad Sarda's case (supra). (Ganpat v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1995 Cri.L.J. 792 is the decisions of this Court (at Bombay), relied upon by Shri Barlota, learned Counsel. Plassitum "C" Para No. 11, which was more specifically relied upon, follows the principles enunciated in Sharad Sarda's case (supra). The principle, in the nut shell can be stated as, the prosecution must establish the circumstances with firmness and the circumstances so established should form a complete chain, leading to only inference of the guilt of accused, ruling out any possibility of his innocence. Shri Barlota, learned Counsel has also relied upon the decision in case of (State of Maharashtra v. Bhanudas)3, 1997 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 678. He laid emphasis on the head note "E" which lays down that motive may create a very strong suspicion, but it cannot take place of proof. There need be no disagreement with the principle relied upon the learned Counsel for the appellant. In the case at hand, the motive is one of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution and motive by itself is not the basis of conviction in the impugned judgment. 6. The prosecution case, as we understand is based on the following chain of circumstances: (i) Appellant believed/suspected his wife having illicit intimacy with some one else, thus providing a motive for the offence. (ii) Pushpabai died homicidal death. (iii) Conduct of the accused--- (a) Attempt to represent Pushpabai having died natural death. (b) Omission to take any legal action, in spite of death of wife, apparently in suspicious circumstances, and (c) False defence of alibi. We are naturally obliged to examine if the prosecution has established these circumstances by evidence on record, and if yes, when considered together, if those circumstances lead to only hypothesis i.e. guilt of accused. As far as motive is concerned, it was contended by Shri Barlota, learned Counsel that this vital link is missing from the chain of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. According to him, the prosecution has not been able to establish appellant's knowledge/suspicion of illicit intimacy of deceased Pushpabai with accused No. 2 or anyone else. It must be taken into consideration that knowledge or suspicion is internal state of mind of an individual. Same cannot be established by any preceptible evidence except the evidence regarding conduct of the person which reflects upon the existence of such knowledge or suspicion. It must be taken into consideration that knowledge or suspicion is internal state of mind of an individual. Same cannot be established by any preceptible evidence except the evidence regarding conduct of the person which reflects upon the existence of such knowledge or suspicion. For this purpose, the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of two brothers of deceased. Both brothers have deposed that matrimonial life of deceased was normal till birth of two children but thereafter, she started complaining about ill-treatment at the hands of appellant (accused No. 1) due to suspicion. According to them, a month prior to the alleged incident, Pushpabai had come to them and complained that appellant had driven her out because of suspicion. They also admitted that subsequently appellant came and took her to his place. No doubt Sambhaji has deposed that sister did not elaborate the issue of suspicion, but Ashok has deposed that Pushpabai had expressed that the husband was suspecting against her character, and therefore, was ill-treating her. The narration about the conduct of appellant towards deceased by her brothers indicates the frame of mind of appellant. Considering the evidence of these two brothers, we are of the view that it is not open for the defence to say that prosecution has failed to adduce any evidence regarding knowledge/suspicion of appellant about the character of his wife deceased Pushpabai. The prosecution has lent support to the depositions of brothers, by evidence of neighbour Ranjana (P.W. 8) and sister-in-law of appellant Sarsabai (P.W. 9). They are examined in order to establish illicit relations between deceased and accused No. 2. Ranjanabai resides on the Eastern side of the house of appellant. According to her accused No. 2 used to visit house of Pushpabai and there was a love affair between the two. She certifies that conduct of Pushpabai was not proper. No doubt, she has admitted that she had not seen Pushpabai and accused No. 2 in amorous condition, but there is nothing unnatural in it. The illicit relations are rarely exhibited openly. Her admission "..it is her guess of accused No. 2 having illicit relations with Pushpabai........." must be read as her inference. The prosecution is also ably supported by the evidence of Sarsabai, who is wife of elder brother of appellant. Although the brothers stay separately, house of Sarsabai is opposite the house of appellant. Her admission "..it is her guess of accused No. 2 having illicit relations with Pushpabai........." must be read as her inference. The prosecution is also ably supported by the evidence of Sarsabai, who is wife of elder brother of appellant. Although the brothers stay separately, house of Sarsabai is opposite the house of appellant. According to Sarsabai, deceased was not a woman of good character, she had illicit relations with accused No. 2 and she infers this because of visits of accused No. 2 to Pushpabai. The inference of Sarsabai is well founded when she states that whenever accused No. 2 was in the house (of) Pushpabai, one plank of the door used to be closed. How firm was the belief of Sarsabai regarding these relations is evident from her narration that she had advised Pushpabai not to behave in this manner and she was not keeping any relations with Pushpabai, in all probabilities, because Pushpabai did not need to her advice. During the course of cross-examination by the Advocate for the acquitted accused, Sarsabai, while denying the suggestion that illicit relations is her guess works has volunteered, to say that she was watching them. No doubt, after some evidence, Sarsasbai was required to be declared hostile. On comparison of her cross-examination as carried out by Public Prosecutor and subsequently by the Counsel representing appellant in the trial Court, it can be said that she has supported the prosecution when she was under cross-examination by Public Prosecutor and also tried to support appellant her brother in law, when put to cross-examination by the defence Counsel. In the act of balancing, she has created a variance regarding the time at which appellant had approached her enquiring about deceased and the time when the two brought dead body of Pushpabai to that house. She has also tried to support the alibi of appellant by stating the tonight appellant had gone to the land in orders to protect the crop. Although she is at a variance on these two points during the two cross-examinations, there is sufficient material on record to enable us to separate the grain from the chaff. Admittedly, her police statement does not contain recital that appellant had gone to the land on that night and she has no explanation for the same. Although she is at a variance on these two points during the two cross-examinations, there is sufficient material on record to enable us to separate the grain from the chaff. Admittedly, her police statement does not contain recital that appellant had gone to the land on that night and she has no explanation for the same. Consequently, it can be said that such a statement is after thought aimed at lending support to defence of alibi. Her admission to this effect, therefore, neither establishes not supports the alibi pleaded by appellant. In the course of cross-examination by Public Prosecuter, Sarsabai admitted arrival of appellant and fetching of dead body to the house, to be after midnight but before dawn, but in the cross-examination by the defence Counsel, she had stretched this time to 7 a.m. i.e. just before sunrise. According to her, by the time, they brought dead body home, there was sunrise. On reference to the statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of appellant, although he claims to have gone to the field tonight (reply to question No. 13) and returned home only in the morning (answer to question No. 14), he also admits that he had returned from the land at 5 a.m. (reply to question No. 15). Thus in any case, the dead body was shifted from the place of occurrence to the residence in the some what dark hours. The evidence of Sarsabai, who is related to appellant, certainly establishes the fact that there were reasons to suspect/ believe such illicit relations, which fact should stand established by the conduct of Sarsabai, as influenced by said suspicion. Her contention that one door flap used to be shut at the time of visit of accused No. 2, that she rendered advice about her behaviour to Pushpabai and ultimately refused to maintain relations with Pushpabai, certainly goes to establish that Sarsabai bona fide believed in existence of immoral relations between deceased and accused No. 2. The evidence of Sarsabai together with evidence of two brothers of deceased, therefore, goes to establish that appellant must have had a knowledge of or atleast suspicion about illicit relations between deceased and appellant. We should say that the trial Court has rightly held that the prosecution has established a strong motive for appellant to commit murder of his wife. The evidence of Sarsabai together with evidence of two brothers of deceased, therefore, goes to establish that appellant must have had a knowledge of or atleast suspicion about illicit relations between deceased and appellant. We should say that the trial Court has rightly held that the prosecution has established a strong motive for appellant to commit murder of his wife. We must hasten to add that for a husband to get perturbed, suspicion of immoral character of his wife is more than enough and firm belief by evidence may not be necessary. 7. There is no direct evidence regarding the cause of death and the Court is required to rely upon the inferences those are possible on the basis of medical evidence, for arriving at a conclusion that death was homicidal. Post mortem was carried out by P.W. 7 Dr. Lalman Narole and on reference to his deposition as also post mortem report, it appears that there had been abrasions over right gluteal region, both thighs and both knees. Length of abrasions suggests that victim was subjected to violence. Although it is tried to be suggested by the defence that the abrasions could have occurred when the dead body was brought from the place of occurrence to the residence of appellant, the medical opinion that all the injuries were ante mortem, rule out any such possibility. The injury described at Sr. No. 6 is most important. The Medical Officer observed that neck was swollen around the larynx and there was also blood congestion in the surrounding tissues. It is on the basis of this injury and observations of internal organs, the Doctor has positively opined that death was due to throttling only. The opinion of the Medical Officer was tried to be challenged during the course of cross-examination, because there were no finger marks or nail marks on the neck, because the tongue was not protruding outside the mouth, and because the heart was not full of blood. Reliance is also placed on the fact that hyoid bone was not fractured. In fact, while challenging medical evidence before us, learned Advocate Shri Barlota did not produce any authoritative literature on the subject, so as to enable us to take different view regarding the opinion of the Medical Officer on the basis of observations in the post mortem report. Reliance is also placed on the fact that hyoid bone was not fractured. In fact, while challenging medical evidence before us, learned Advocate Shri Barlota did not produce any authoritative literature on the subject, so as to enable us to take different view regarding the opinion of the Medical Officer on the basis of observations in the post mortem report. On reference to Modi's Medical jurisprudence and Toxicology, it appears that marks on the neck in case of death caused by strangulation, which includes throttling, vary according to the means used. Recognised author has also indicated as to how many different ways can be adopted for causing death by throttling, apart from the finger grip. Absence of marks of fingers will only indicate that throttling was not caused by mere fingers. According to Modi, bloody foam escapes from mouth and nostrils and in the present case, such oozing of blood from nostrils was noticed by brothers of deceased, when they reached the house of appellant. Fracture of hyoid bone is not a must, but such a result can ensue. On reference to Page 152 of the Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (XIX Edition), we find the details as to what should be the appearance of internal organs. The larynax and trachea are congested, lungs are congested and emphysematous patches are seen over the lung surface. On cut section, the lungs may show blood stained forth. On reference to observations on internal examination, as recorded in columns Nos. 19 onwards of the post mortem report, it is evident that larynx and trachea are congested, emphysematous patches are seen over the lung surface, lung exodes blood stained froth. It is reported that heart was empty. According to Modi's jurisprudence, ordinarily right side the heart is full of dark fluid-blood and left empty but there can be cases where both the cavities are found full if the heart stopped during diastole and cases of right ventricle also being contracted and empty like left, i.e. whole heart being empty. This is a case were heart had continued to beat after stoppage of respiration. Thus the opinion of Medical Officer that death is caused by strangulation (through) cannot be doubted, merely because there were no finger marks or there was no fracture of hyoid bone or because the heart was not containing any blood. This is a case were heart had continued to beat after stoppage of respiration. Thus the opinion of Medical Officer that death is caused by strangulation (through) cannot be doubted, merely because there were no finger marks or there was no fracture of hyoid bone or because the heart was not containing any blood. We must say that the fact of death being homicidal is firmly established by the prosecution by the medical evidence and defence has nothing to penetrate in it. 8. The contention of the prosecution that appellant tried to represent Pushpabai having died due to loose motions and vomiting i.e. natural death, meets with very weak and untenable challenge. Appellant has admitted to have brought Pushpabai from the plan of occurance to the residence. Naturally he was the first person to have learnt about death of Pushpabai and first person in a position to know the cause of death, may be by inference. Naturally, it can be safely presumed that whatever opinion, right or wrong, about the cause of death was spread, appellant must have been the source of the same. It was suggested to Police Patil in his cross-examination that brother of deceased and not the appellant, told Police Patil of Pushpabai having died due to loose motions and vomiting. From the evidence of brothers of deceased, it appears that they have reached the house of appellant after the Police Patil. The brothers of deceased ordinarily may not know the cause of death, except one, that is disclosed by appellant. Appellant being husband of deceased cannot escape the responsibility of taking reasonable care before informing the cause of death of his wife, either to relatives or persons in authority like Police Patil of the village. It is pertinent to note that according to Sambhaji, brother of deceased, the message did not disclose the cause of death. Both the brothers assert that it was appellant, who told them tat she died of loose motions and vomting. Version of brothers stands confirmed by deposition of Police Patil and Police Patil himself stands corroborated by his report Exhibit 12 intimating Police Station Pachod regarding the death and also the cause of death, as narrated to him by husband of deceased i.e. appellant. Version of brothers stands confirmed by deposition of Police Patil and Police Patil himself stands corroborated by his report Exhibit 12 intimating Police Station Pachod regarding the death and also the cause of death, as narrated to him by husband of deceased i.e. appellant. In our opinion, that appellant tried to indicate deceased having died a natural death, is a circumstances firmly established by depositions of as many as three witnessess, and is a very clinching circumstance. In case of homicidal death, there can be only one individual who would desire the world to believe the death to be otherwise than homicidal i.e. the person who has caused the death. The attempt on part of appellant to propagate the loose motions and vomiting as the cause of death of Pushpabai speaks volumes against him. It is admitted by appellant that he traced out the dead body in gutter and brought it to the residence. If the cause of death was not known, it was expected by him to move for legal assistance, especially when there were indications that death was not natural. The evidence on record clearly indicates that death was homicidal, and there were clear circumstances, suggesting death to be unnatural. Action on the part of appellant to seek some assistance from the appropriate state machinery to find out cause of death would have exonerated him of the allegations. It is not his case that he approached Police Patil. Although Sarsabai has said that appellant had gone to residence of accused No. 2 who is Deputy Sarpanch, appellant himself does not claim to have approached accused No. 2, much less for the purpose of informing about unnatural death of his wife and expecting accused No. 2 to take some action. In fact, the deposition of Sarsabai that appellant went to inform about death of Pushpabai to accused No. 2 appears to be unnatural and therefore, improbable. It was accused No. 2 who is alleged to have developed illicit relations with deceased. Although Deputy Sarpanch, admittedly he belongs to opposite group, as suggested by the defence and admitted by Sarsabai. Therefore, it cannot be believed that appellant went to report death of his wife to accused No. 2, with a desire that he should take suitable steps for investigation. Although Deputy Sarpanch, admittedly he belongs to opposite group, as suggested by the defence and admitted by Sarsabai. Therefore, it cannot be believed that appellant went to report death of his wife to accused No. 2, with a desire that he should take suitable steps for investigation. On the contrary, appellant by saying that there was a water pot near Pushpabai, taken for the purpose of answering nature's call, appears to be an attempt on his part to advance his plea of natural death, unsustainable in the light of medical evidence. As per deposition of P.W. 13 Sk. Nisar, appellant had shown location and two anklets, one necklace and ribbon were also shown by appellant. Although showing of the location cannot be termed as discovery at the instance of appellant under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, there was certainly discovery of couple of ornaments, which, rules out the possibility of killing for the purpose of theft, as rightly observed by the trial Court. It is pertinent to note that water pot referred by appellant in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not discovered, when other articles were seized from the location shown by appellant. 9. Lastly, the alibi pleaded by appellant, that surfaces prominently only during the course of trial, is conduct influenced by the fact in issue. Ranjana- P.W. 8 and Sarsabai P.W. 9 both have deposed to have seen appellant and deceased Pushpabai at home on that night. According to Sarsabai, appellant and Pushpabai took meals together. At this juncture, Sarsabai switches over to support appellant by saying that appellant had gone to the field after the dinner. Unfortunately, this version of Sarsabai is an improvement over her police statement, and this is not the only reason to believe that this is a false statement by Sarsabai aimed to save her brother-in-law. Sarsabai has many more admissions, which are circumstances indicating that there was no need for appellant to go to field. Admittedly appellant owns no bullocks or agricultural implements, land is Jiyayat and Sarsabai admits that in view of these circumstances, there is no question of residing in the land at night. Being dry land, they are required to do labour work and they get the land sown from others by making payment. Ranjanabai P.W. 8 has stated that it was raining on that night. Being dry land, they are required to do labour work and they get the land sown from others by making payment. Ranjanabai P.W. 8 has stated that it was raining on that night. According to Sarsabai it was raining for whole of the night. This circumstances further rules out the possibility of appellant having gone to the field tonight. During the course of cross-examination of Sarsabai, defence has taken a chance to obtain admission that there was Mung crop in the field, which was ready since 8 days prior to incident and appellant was going to the field every night for protecting the crop. The trial judge has rejected this theory for the reasons discussed in Para No. 25 of his judgment. Advocate Shri Barlota was critical on the inference drawn by the trial judge that date of incident being 3rd August, it cannot be believed that Moong crop could be ready at that time. According to Shri Barlota, the Judge making a reference that rainy season starts at the end of June itself is a guess work and Moong crop can be ready within 60 days. First of all, we do not agree with Sri Barlota that arrival of rainy season can be termed to be guess work. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act permits the Court to presume the existence of any fact likely to have happened, having regard to common course of natural events, to the human conduct and public ad private business, in relation to the facts of particular case. The illustration below the said section are not exhaustive. The Court can certainly take cognizance of the seasons in the Country i.e. June to September-rainy season, October to January Winter and February to May-Summer. The Court can presume certain things regarding natural events, ordinary course of human conduct and business. The rainy season commences from June. Taking into consideration the time initial showers, then sowing operations, even if Moong crop can be ready within sixty days as pleaded by Shri Barlota, it could not have been ready eight days prior to alleged incident i.e. on 25th July. Therefore, it can safely be said that the theory of appellant having gone to the field for protecting his crop is unacceptable. On the contrary, such an attempt on his part confirms an attempt on his part to sever himself from the offence. 10. Therefore, it can safely be said that the theory of appellant having gone to the field for protecting his crop is unacceptable. On the contrary, such an attempt on his part confirms an attempt on his part to sever himself from the offence. 10. Appellant is also convicted for the offence punishable under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. An attempt on the part of appellant in bringing the dead body at the residence and then trying to represent that she died natural death, when considered together speak about the attempt on the part of appellant to conceal the evidence of offence. Had he succeeded in disposing of the dead body by funeral on pretending the same to be natural death, the evidence of homicidal death could not have been available. 11. To sum up, the prosecution has established beyond all reasonable doubts, the motive by indicating that appellant had atleast suspicion, if not knowledge, regarding illicit relations of his wife with accused No. 2, that death of Pushpabai was homicidal and that accused tried to represent the same to be natural death. He also failed to take steps expected of husband, whose wife dies in suspicious circumstances and he also tried to sever himself from the offence by pleading alibi. We are of the view that all these circumstances taken together do not lead to any other hypothesis except appellant being guilty. 12. In view of the reasons discussed by the find no case for interference in the findings recorded and conviction/sentence passed by the trial Court. 13. The appeal, therefore, merits only dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed. -----