D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has applied for sanction of building plan in respect of a premises which was separated through mutation since been allowed by the Corporation. It is alleged that the portion owned by the petitioner is not a manufacturing unit whereas the other separated portion contains a manufacturing unit. The petitioner proposed to raise a building on his own separated portion which is not a manufacturing unit. The Corporation instead of refusing or granting sanction had required the petitioner to obtain a 'no Objection Certificate' from the Industrial Reconstruction Department. This direction by the Corporation for obtaining 'no Objection Certificate' from the Industries Department and the delay or default either in sanctioning or refusing the plan the petitioner has invoked writ jurisdiction. ( 2 ) MR. Saktinath Mukherjee, ld. Sr. Counsel had pointed out that as soon an application for sanction is made it is incumbent on the Corporation either to refuse or to grant sanction. It cannot sit over the matter neither can it delay the same indenfinitely. Relying on Section 395 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 he contends that it can refuse sanction of a plan only on conditions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 396 and not otherwise. It can also insist upon the permission as contained in sub-section (3 ). Elaborating his submission he contended that the provisions containedin sub-section (3) do not include obtaining of a clearance from the Industries Department. In support of his contention he had further submitted that he has a right under Article 300-A to hold the property. This right includes the right to possess, right to enjoy. Such right, however, is restricted by law and such law is a law made by the Parliament. It does not include laws made through executive action. Unless there is any such restriction the petitioner cannot be deprived of his right to property as enshrined under Article 300-A. Therefore, the Municipal Authority cannot sit tight over it nor can refuse to sanction the plan except on grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) within which the petitioner's case does not fall. In support of his contention Mr. Mukerjee has cited a few decisions which will be dealt with at appropriate stage. ( 3 ) MR. Dipankar Chakraborty, ld. In support of his contention Mr. Mukerjee has cited a few decisions which will be dealt with at appropriate stage. ( 3 ) MR. Dipankar Chakraborty, ld. Counsel for the Calcutta Municipal Corporation on the other hand contends that there is a trend of raising multistoreyed building after closing industries and thereby reducing the scope of employment and increasing unemployment in the State. Therefore, the Government had taken a policy decision to issue certain guidelines in the matter of sanctioning of a plan by the Corporation. Since Corporation is subordinate to the State Government, therefore, it is bound by such policy decision and therefore, it is well within the power of the Corporation to seek the 'no Objection Certificate' as a condition for grant of sanction to a building plan. ( 4 ) I have heard both the Counsel at length. ( 5 ) IT is not disputed that the portion mutated in favour of the petitioner is not a manufacturing unit. Be that as it may whether it is a manufacturing unit or not is not for us to consider in view of the law laid down on this subject by this Court consistantly, to which reference would be made at a later stage. ( 6 ) SECTION 396 of the said Act in sub-section (2) provides the conditions in which a plan can be refused. There is nothing in the Act to show that a 'no Objection Certificate' from the Industries Department is a requisite condition for sanction of a plan or absence of such 'no Objection Certificate' is a condition for refusing grant of sanction of a plan. Clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (2) does not indicate any such proposition. Sub-section (3) also does not indicate that any licence or permission is required from the Industries Department for the purpose of making a construction. The allegation that a manufacturing unit would be closed down or there will be spurt of unemployment is well taken care of by the Industrial Laws, namely, the Industrial Disputes Act or Industrial and Labour Laws operating in the field. These enactments are completely different and are operating completely in different fields and are distinct from the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act which operates altogether on a field foreign to the industrial and labour laws. It has nothing to do with the question of employment or unemployment in the State. These enactments are completely different and are operating completely in different fields and are distinct from the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act which operates altogether on a field foreign to the industrial and labour laws. It has nothing to do with the question of employment or unemployment in the State. ( 7 ) THEN again the Corporation itself is an autonomous body created under a Special Statute by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act which had replaced the Calcutta Municipal Act, the earlier enactments governing the field. The State Government may issue direction and guidelines but the same would not be binding on the Corporation unless it is issued in exercise of the power available to the State Government which may bind the Corporation within the scope and ambit of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act. It is not alleged that the guideline has been issued in exercise of the power conferred by the State Government by virtue of the provisions contained in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act making the same binding on the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. Even if the Government may take a decision but the same would not be binding on the Calcutta Municipal Corporation unless it has a binding effect by reason of any law that makes it binding on the Corporation. Mr. Chakraborty has not been able to show any such law which binds the Corporation to adhere to the guidelines or the policy decision of the State Government. The Corporation being a statutory authority and an autonomous body cannot be guided by any body unless it is applicable to the Corporation by reason of any law governing it. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, if any provision in any other law prohibits the construction or requires a clearance by reason of any enactment operating in the area, then such clearance may be one of the conditions or factors to be considered in the matter of grant or refusal of sanction. For example we may refer to the provisions contained in Town andcountry Planning Act under which Land Use and Development Plan, having a statutory force is prepared. By reason of provisions contained therein no use or development work contrary to such plan is permissible. Therefore such clearnace may be one of the necessary conditions. There may be some such other enactments which may make it necessary to obtain clearance from the authority created under such enactments. By reason of provisions contained therein no use or development work contrary to such plan is permissible. Therefore such clearnace may be one of the necessary conditions. There may be some such other enactments which may make it necessary to obtain clearance from the authority created under such enactments. ( 9 ) BUT then these are through Acts of legislature. The expression 'authority of law' in Article 300a means not merely a law made by a competent legislature but also law which possess the ingredients of the doctrine of 'rule of Law as was held in Basantibai Fakrichand Khetan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 Bom 366 . It means by or under a law made by competent legislature, as laid down in M/s. Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U. P. , AIR 1982 SC 33 . In State of M. P. v. Thakur Bharat Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1170 it was held that merely because the executive authority of the State extends to its legislative competence, it would not follow that the State or its officers can deprive a person of his property without the authority of a law made by the Legislature. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, the contention that delay in or refusal to grant sanction in a case where it could not be refused in law amounts to deprivation of property without the authority of law, does not seem to be a just proposition. Inasmuch as refusal of sanction to erect a building does not deprive a person of his property within the meaning of Art. 300-A. He is not deprived of his possession of the property by reason thereof. The word 'deprived' in Art. 300-A has been explained by the Apex Court to mean destruction, confiscation or taking over possession of immoveable property. ( 11 ) IT is contended that right to property including right to possess and enjoy the property. (sic) Refusal to grant sanction amounts to deprivation of right to enjoy the property in any manner i. e. to construct a building and enjoy it. ( 12 ) BUT in my view inability to construct on account of legal restriction is not a deprivation of right to enjoy. Then again, inability to enjoy according to one's own will are subject to legal restrictions which can never be equated with the deprivation of property. ( 12 ) BUT in my view inability to construct on account of legal restriction is not a deprivation of right to enjoy. Then again, inability to enjoy according to one's own will are subject to legal restrictions which can never be equated with the deprivation of property. Though however prevention of user of a land without any legal sanction or freezing of user of land is contemplation of preparation of Land Use and Development Plan without any such provision provided in law is a deprivation within the meaning of Art. 300-A. But as soon such plan is prepared and effected it would be more by a deprivation in view of legal sanction. ( 13 ) BE that as it may, we are to look into the question from the standpoint as to whether clearance by the Industries Department can be imposed as one of the condition for grant of sanction, in view of a policy decision taken by the Government. As observed earlier the policy decision is not a legislation by a competent legislature. That apart such clearance from Industry Department is not a law or enactment that governs the field to restrict development. The question of employment or unemployment is not a matter that can be brought into the field with which we are now concerned. In the absence of any law or enactment requiring such clearance from Industry Department the policy decision of the Government with regard thereto cannot be consideration for grant or refusal of sanction. ( 14 ) ). Since the 'no Objection Certificate' sought for is neither a condition for granting of a sanction nor the absence thereof is a condition thereof or is a ground for refusing sanction, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation is not entitled to compel the petitioner to obtain a 'no Objection Certificate' nor it can refuse the grant of the sanction to the petitioner in the absence of such 'no Objection Certificate,' from the Industrial Development. ( 15 ) SIMILAR questions had been dealt with in the case of Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority v. Smt. Ratna Banerjee (1995) 1 Cal HN 383 wherein a Division Bench of this Court had taken a view that the building plan cannot be refused on the ground that 'no Objection Certificate' of the CMDA was not available. ( 15 ) SIMILAR questions had been dealt with in the case of Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority v. Smt. Ratna Banerjee (1995) 1 Cal HN 383 wherein a Division Bench of this Court had taken a view that the building plan cannot be refused on the ground that 'no Objection Certificate' of the CMDA was not available. This decision and all such other decisions which were on the subject were taken note of in the case of Re : Bijay Raj Jain (1995) 1 Cal HN 324 which had taken note of the decisions in the cases cited therein taking the same view in respect of 'no Objection Certificate' asked from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority. ( 16 ) THE decision in re : Bijay Raj Jain was upheld by the Division Bench on appeal and the proposition enunciated in the single Judge decision was affirmed by the Division Bench as would be appearing from the unreported decision in the case of State of West Bengal v. Bijay Raj Jain in FMAT No. 951 of 1994 disposed of on 24th February, 1995, xerox copy of the certified copy whereof has since been produced before this Court. In the judgment in the case of Calcutta Power Mills Ltd. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Writ Petition No. 1941 of 1995) disposed of on 3rd June, 1996, the learned single Judge of this Court had taken the same view with regard to the circular for obtaining 'no Objection Certificate' in order to obtain sanction of a building plan from the Calcutta Municipal Corporation since being overruled by such decision. ( 17 ) THUS I am supported in my view by the decisions cited at the Bar by Mukherjee referred to hereinabove. ( 18 ) THE other decision in the case of Samaresh Das v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation, reported in 1956 (1) CHN 380 has also recognised the right under Art. 300-A and had dealt with the same proposition. ( 19 ) FOR all these reasons this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation is hereby directed to consider the question of sanctioning of the plan in accordance with law without insisting upon a 'no Objection Certificate' from the Industries Department, as early as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the concerned authority. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation is hereby directed to consider the question of sanctioning of the plan in accordance with law without insisting upon a 'no Objection Certificate' from the Industries Department, as early as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the concerned authority. ( 20 ) THERE will however, be no order as to costs. ( 21 ) ALL parties shall act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking. Petition allowed.