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2000 DIGILAW 404 (MP)

Daya Ram v. Ramesh Chandra Goyal

2000-04-19

S.P.SHRIVASTAVA

body2000
ORDER S.P. Shrivastava, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. Perused the record. 3. The Civil Revision No. 792/98 which has been filed by the plaintiff/landlord is directed against the order passed by first appellate Court whereunder an application moved by the defendant/tenant on 6.1.1995 during the pendency of the first appeal had been allowed in part permitting the defendant to incorporate the proposed amendments indicated in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid application in his written statement and amend the same accordingly. 4. The Civil Revision No. 1295/98 which has been filed by the defendant/tenant is directed against the order passed by the first appellate Court rejecting his application dated 12.11.1994 seeking amendments in his written statement as well as that part of the order passed by the first appellate Court whereunder his application dated 6.1.1995 had been rejected refusing permission to incorporate in the written statement the proposed amendments as indicated in paragraph 4 of the said application. 5. Taking into consideration the nature of the controversy involved in both the revisions which arise out the same suit, same appeal and the same order are being disposed of by a common order. 6. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of these revisions lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff, Dayaram had filed the suit giving rise to these revisions on 20.5.1978. The suit has been filed seeking a decree for the eviction of the defendant/tenant from the premises in dispute let out to him for the non-residential purposes and for the recovery of arrears of rent and damages for the use and occupation etc. The plaintiff had sought for the decree of eviction of the tenant on the grounds envisaged under section 12 (1) (a) as well as 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. So far as the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act was concerned, it had been asserted that in spite of the notice dated 3.10.1977 which had been served on the defendant/tenant on 5.10.1977, he had neither cleared off the arrears of rent which was due since 1.1.1977 nor had vacated the premises. So far as the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was concerned, it was asserted that the accommodation in dispute was bona fide required for his sons; Madan Mohan and Pawan. So far as the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was concerned, it was asserted that the accommodation in dispute was bona fide required for his sons; Madan Mohan and Pawan. 7. It may be noticed that in paragraph 9 of the plaint, the plaintiff had asserted that the shop in dispute was required for settling in business his major son, Madan Mohan asserting that for want of a shop both the sons of the plaintiff i.e., Madan Mohan as well as Pawan had to sell their goods on a thela and had been prosecuted also by the police on many occasions. In the said paragraph, however, the plaintiff had come up with a clear case that he bona fide required the premises in dispute for his sons. In his deposition recorded by the trial Court on 17.12.1987, he, however confined the requirement of the shop for the need of Madan Mohan who wanted to settle in the business in the sale of bangles. 8. Madan Mohan was examined as P.W. 2. He had stated that Pawan, his brother also accompanied him along with his thela. 9. Dayashanker who was examined as P.W. 3 had also supported the case of the plaintiff and the need of the shop for settling Madan Mohan in the business. He had also stated that the brother of Madan Mohan accompanied him with the thela. 10. Durga Devi, and other witness examined by the plaintiff had also stated that the plaintiff was bona fide required the shop in dispute for satisfying the need of Madan Mohan, his son who was to settle in the business. 11. The case of the plaintiff that the shop in dispute was bona fide required for the need of Madan Mohan was also supported by the other witnesses examined by him. 12. The trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence brought on record by the parties, decreed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 17.2.1994. 13. The trial Court while holding the defendant/tenant to be a defaulter as contemplated under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), relieved him from the decree of eviction on the ground envisaged under the aforesaid provision as he had deposited the amount of rent due. 13. The trial Court while holding the defendant/tenant to be a defaulter as contemplated under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), relieved him from the decree of eviction on the ground envisaged under the aforesaid provision as he had deposited the amount of rent due. However, upholding the claim of the plaintiff in regard to the bona fide requirement of the shop in dispute for settling his son Madan Mohan in business, the decree for eviction was granted on the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 14. It may be noticed that the trial Court while relieving the defendant from the decree for eviction on the ground of being a defaulter had observed that the defendant had deposited the entire amount of rent due covering the period upto January, 1994 complying with the directions of the Court. In the decree so far as the money part was concerned it was provided that the defendant will pay to the plaintiff the rent accruing with effect from 1.1.1977 till the date of delivery of the possession. The rent for a period of 2 years was also made payable as compensation. 15. The aforesaid decree passed by the trial Court was challenged by the defendant/tenant in appeal. 16. During the pendency of the appeal, an application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C., seeking permission to amend the written statement was filed by the defendant on 12.11.1994. In this application, it had been asserted that subsequent to the decree of eviction passed against him, an other tenant of the plaintiff, namely, Sonpal had vacated the premises for which a suit was filed in the year 1961. It was asserted that since alternative suitable accommodation was available, it could be utilisted by Madan Mohan for settling in his proposed business which accommodation had an opening in the Galli and therefore the need for which the suit had been filed stood satisfied. Along with the aforesaid application, the defendant/tenant had filed an other application under order XLI rule 27 C.P.C. seeking permission to file the copy of the plaint of suit No. 290-A of 1961 filed by Dayaram against Sonpal and Pyarelal. 17. Along with the aforesaid application, the defendant/tenant had filed an other application under order XLI rule 27 C.P.C. seeking permission to file the copy of the plaint of suit No. 290-A of 1961 filed by Dayaram against Sonpal and Pyarelal. 17. The aforesaid application was contested by the plaintiff on various grounds taken in the objections filed on 22.11.1994 denying the allegations made in the application seeking amendments in- the written statement. Objections to the application filed under Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C., were also filed by the plaintiff. 18. On 6.1.1995, an other application seeking amendments in the written statement was filed by the defendant. In this application, the defendant wanted to add 2 paragraphs in the written statement. The amendment as proposed in paragraph 3 of the application, the defendant claimed that there had been an oral partition between the plaintiff and his sons on 28.9.1993, the terms thereof had been reduced into writing on 23.12.1993. Under the aforesaid oral partition, the shop in dispute had been allotted to the share of the plaintiff's other son, Pawan Kumar who was to be its exclusive owner in possession. It was asserted by the defendant that the plaintiff had ceased to be the owner of the shop in dispute and was not in possession thereof. The defendant claimed to have come to know about the partition on 25.12.1994. In the proposed amendment as indicated in paragraph 4 of the aforesaid application, the defendant wanted to assert that the wife of the plaintiff had died on 30.12.1994 and the plaintiff as well as his sons Pawan Kumar and Madan Mohan had become the owner of the property purchased in her name. The non-residential portion of the house which now beloned to the plaintiff and his two sons was more than sufficient to satisfy the need set up in the plaint with the result that the plaintiff had ceased to have any right to evict the defendant from the shop in dispute. 19. The plaintiff filed detailed objections in opposition to the aforesaid application dated 6.1.1995. 20. In the aforesaid objections, it had been asserted that the story of oral partition and the same having been reduced into writing and sworn before a Notary had been cooked up and manufactured. 19. The plaintiff filed detailed objections in opposition to the aforesaid application dated 6.1.1995. 20. In the aforesaid objections, it had been asserted that the story of oral partition and the same having been reduced into writing and sworn before a Notary had been cooked up and manufactured. The alleged memorandum of partition relied upon the defendant was said to be a forged and fictitious document manufactured for the purpose of the case. It was categorically asserted that there had been no partition between the plaintiff and his sons and no document had ever been prosecuted as claimed by the defendant. It was also asserted that the defendant had set up an imposter and colluding with them had manufactured and fabricated the evidence for which he was liable to be prosecuted. 21. It may be noticed that a perusal of the copy of the document sought to be relied upon by the defendant in support of the plea in regard to the cessation of the ownership of the plaintiff which was described as Likhatam Maukhik, Vibhajan, Abhisweekrit Anubandh Patra" indicated that Dayaram was only one of the co-parcenars of the property joint Hindu family owning which was the subject matter of the aforesaid transaction which included the shop in dispute which was disclosed to be purchased in the name of Dayaram from the ancestral money i.e., joint family nucleus and was a joint family property of Dayaram, Madan Mohan and Pawan Kumar. Dayaram was the Karta Khandan of the joint Hindu family and this was also the reason why he was shown to be the owner thereof. It was further indicated in the aforesaid deed that Dayaram had agreed to partition the property and it was on 29.8.1993 all the parties had partitioned orally the joint family property in dispute. In the aforesaid document, it had also been clearly indicated that the shop in dispute had been given to Pawan who was to be the sole owner in possession of the property allotted to him which was shown in "red" colour in the map attached with the aforesaid deed. It is, therefore obvious that the defendant had come up with a clear cut and definite case that with effect from 28.9.1993 Dayaram had ceased to be the owner of the property in dispute. 22. It is, therefore obvious that the defendant had come up with a clear cut and definite case that with effect from 28.9.1993 Dayaram had ceased to be the owner of the property in dispute. 22. The provision contained in section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 provides as follows : that the accommodation let from non-residential purposes is required bonfide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. (emphasis supplied) 23. A perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it apparent that for maintaining a claim for the decree of eviction of the tenant from an accommodation let out for the non-residential purposes which is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of starting his business or that of any of his major sons is maintainable if the plaintiff is the owner thereof. 24. The plea raised by the defendant in his application dated 6.1.1995 in essence was that with the cessation of the ownership with effect from 29.8.1993, the condition precedent seeking a decree of eviction on the ground contemplated under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act could not be taken to have been satisfied with the result that the ground envisaged under the aforesaid provision for a decree of eviction ceased to be available to the plaintiff. 25. It may further to noticed that section 12 (1) (c) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 provides as follows : that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein: Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he has admitted to the tenancy; 26. A perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it apparent that the ground contemplated under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act included the ground of disclaimer of the title of the plaintiff by the tenant in which situation a decree for his eviction from the premises in dispute can be passed. The expression "or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein" as contemplated under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act is wide enough to include within its ambit the plea of disclaimer of title of the plaintiff/landlord by a tenant. Reference in this connection may be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Balveersingh vs. Kishanlal, reported in 1988 JLJ 693 . 27. In the present case, the defendant/tenant had clearly set up a case denying the title of the plaintiff on the one hand and in order to negative the case of the plaintiff for a decree on the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act had set up a plea of cessation of ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the aforesaid accommodation. In the pleadings sought to be incorporated in the written statement vide the application dated 6.1.1995, the defendant had come up with both the pleas. The plea furnished a ground to the plaintiff envisaged under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act which could sustain the ultimate decree for eviction passed by the trial Court in case it was established, considering the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Divisional Manager, M.P. State Road Transport Corpn., vs. Ajit Kumar Jain, S.A. No. 500 of 1998 decided on 14.10.1998 which has been afirmed by the Apex Court with the dismissal of the S.L.P. No. 3455/99 vide the order dated 19.3.1999 filed against the same. 28. The first appellate court rejected the application dated 22.11.1994 and also rejected the application dated 6.1.1995 for permitting the amendment in the written statement as indicated in paragraph 4 of the application but adopting a novel method allowed the said application so for as the amendments proposed in paragraph 3 of the application were concerned. The defendant was not permitted to amend the written statement before the first appellate Court. The defendant was not permitted to amend the written statement before the first appellate Court. Similarly, the plaintiff was also not permitted to amend the plaint incorporating therein the amendments consequent upon the order allowing amendments in the written statement. Instead the trial Court was directed to permit the defendant as well as the plaintiff to amend the written statement and the plaint. Since the pleading were not allowed to be amended at the appellate stage, the first appellate Court did not frame any issue arising out of the amended pleadings as in the absence of the amendments in the written statement and the plaint, there could be no occasion for framing any additional issues. The trial Court was however directed to permit the defendant to amend his written statement by incorporating therein the proposed amendments as indicated in paragraph 3 of the application dated 6.1.1995 and the trial Court was further directed to frame any additional issue if it was found necessary and after taking the evidence of the parties on the basis of the new pleadings return its findings to the first appellate Court. 29. A learned single Judge of this Court vide the order dated 18.1.2000 directed the counsel for the parties to satisfy the Court whether the revision is tenable as against such an order passed by the first appellate court indicating that after addressing the Court on the said point, the parties will be heard on merits also. 30. Order XLI Rule 23 C.P.C., provides that where the Court from whose decree and appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, the Appellate Court may if it thinks fit, by order remand the case, and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tired in the case so remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, with directions to re-admit the suit under its original number in the register of Civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit; and the evidence any recorded during the original trial shall subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand. 31. In the present case, none of the essential requisites attracting an action under Order XLI Rule 23 C.P.C., stand established. 31. In the present case, none of the essential requisites attracting an action under Order XLI Rule 23 C.P.C., stand established. In fact, a perusal of the impugned order indicates that it is not an order remanding a case by the appellate Court. The decree passed by the trial Court has not been upset in any manner. 32. Under the provision contained in Order XLI Rule 23-A C.P.C., the appellate Court can remand a case in the event where the Court from whose decree an appeal has been preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and a re-trial is considered necessary. 33. In the present case as had already been indicated hereinabove neither the decree of the trial Court has been reversed nor the first appellate Court has considered it necessary to have a re-trial of the case. In such circumstances, the present case does not fall within the ambit of Order XLI Rule 23-AC. P.C., 34. It may be noticed that under Order XLI Rule 25 C.P.C., where the Court from whose decree the appeal was preferred has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the Appellate Court may, if necessary, frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the Court from whose decree is preferred, and in such case shall direct such court to take the additional evidence required. In such cases, the trial Court has to proceed to try such issues remanded to it and shall return the evidence to the Appellate Court together with its findings thereon and the reasons therefor. 35. In the case in hand, however, the appellate Court has not framed any additional issue. In fact, as has already been noticed hereinabove, even the parties have not been permitted to amend the written statement and the plaint and this has been left to be done before the trial Court. The trial Court has been directed to frame any additional issue if it considers necessary after the pleadings are amended. In such a situation, the requisite conditions attracting under Order XLI Rule 25 C.P.C., cannot be taken to be satisfied. The trial Court has been directed to frame any additional issue if it considers necessary after the pleadings are amended. In such a situation, the requisite conditions attracting under Order XLI Rule 25 C.P.C., cannot be taken to be satisfied. For attracting the provision contained in the Order XLI Rule 25 C.P.C., it was incumbant upon the appellate Court to frame the issues and refer them for trial to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. Framing of the issues by the first appellate Court is a condition precedent. This work cannot be left to be done by the trial Court. Further, framing of the issues cannot be left at the discretion of the trial Court. It is for the first appellate Court to either reframe an issue or frame an additional issue on the pleading of the parties as they stand. In case the pleadings are allowed to be amended in that event frame an additional issue if the occasion so warrants and it is this issue which has to be referred or remitted to the trial Court inviting its findings thereon either permitting it to take the additional evidence or to record a finding on the basis of the evidence already on the record, as the case may be. 36. An order under Order XLI Rule 23 C.P.C. or Order XLI Rule 23-A C.P.C., is appealable under order XLIII Rule 1 (u) C.P.C. 37. In the present case, since the impugned order cannot be taken to fall within the ambit of the provision contained in Order XLI Rule 23 or Order XLI Rule 23-A C.P.C., no appeal is maintainable. The said order cannot be taken to be appealable. In this view of the matter, the present revisions are clearly maintainable and entertainable. 38. The learned counsel for the tenant/applicant has strenuously urged that the application filed by him dated 12.11.1994 has been erroneously rejected. 39. The first appellate Court has given cogent reasons for rejecting the aforesaid application. 40. The said order cannot be taken to be appealable. In this view of the matter, the present revisions are clearly maintainable and entertainable. 38. The learned counsel for the tenant/applicant has strenuously urged that the application filed by him dated 12.11.1994 has been erroneously rejected. 39. The first appellate Court has given cogent reasons for rejecting the aforesaid application. 40. It may further be observed that the question in regard to the requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself occur for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. The judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest and of the answer be in the positive, the need as bona fide. Once the Court is satisfied that the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. 41. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Sarla Ahuja vs. United India insurance Co. Ltd, reported in 1998 (8) SCC 119 , had observed that when the landlord shows a prima facie case a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide is available to be drawn indicating further that it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without giving possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 42. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove, it was not open to the tenant to come up with a case that the plaintiff's requirement stood satisfied because he had with him a small accommodation in a Galli specially when the entire matter had been considered threadbare by the trial Court. 42. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove, it was not open to the tenant to come up with a case that the plaintiff's requirement stood satisfied because he had with him a small accommodation in a Galli specially when the entire matter had been considered threadbare by the trial Court. I find absolutely no justification for any interference in the discretion exercised by the first appellate Court in rejecting the application filed by the defendant/tenant dated 12.11.1994 seeking amendments in the written statement. The order of the first appellate Court so far as the rejection of the application dated 12.11.1994 filed by the defendant is upheld. 43. So far as the grievance of the defendant against the rejection of prayer made in his second application dated 6.1.1995, seeking amendment in the written statement as indicated in paragraph 4 of the said application is concerned, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record in view of the findings returned by the trial Court in regard to the ownership of the building standing in the name of the wife of the plaintiff and further the nature of the accommodation in dispute and its situation and the finding that it could alone satisfy the requirement set up in the plaint in the peculiar facts and circumstances including the nature of the business sought to be set up, no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for interfering in the discretion exercised by the trial Court in rejecting the prayer of the defendant to permit him to amend the written statement by incorporating therein the proposed amendments as indicated in paragraph 4 of the application dated 8.1.1995. 44. So far as the revision filed by the plaintiff/applicant is concerned, which is directed against that part of the order of the first appellate Court whereunder the proposed amendments indicated in paragraph 3 of the application dated 6.1.1995 have been permitted to be incorporated in the written statement is concerned suffice it to say that the pleas raised therein have a material bearing on the controversy raised in the suit. 45. It may be noticed that he trial Court had decreed the suit on 17.2.1994. The alleged partition was claimed to have been effected on 28.9.1993 i.e., during the pendency of the suit before the trial Court. 45. It may be noticed that he trial Court had decreed the suit on 17.2.1994. The alleged partition was claimed to have been effected on 28.9.1993 i.e., during the pendency of the suit before the trial Court. The defendant, however, has urged that the came to know about the alleged partition on 25.12.1994. The application dated 6.1.1995 was duly supported by an affidavit of the defendant/tenant sworn on 6.1.1995. The objection which had been filed against the aforesaid application was also duly supported by an affidavit of Dayaram, the plaintiff sworn on 18.1.1995. 46. In the aforesaid affidavit, it has been categorically asserted that there had been no partition between him and his two sons; Pawan and Madan Mohan. The fact of oral partition dated 28.9.1993 was emphatically denied. It was also denied that no document had been executed on 23.12.1993 by him or his sons. It has further been asserted that they had never appeared before Hingalal Gupta, Notary. The plaintiff or his sons did not know Hingalal Gupta and had never visited him or appeared before him. It was also asserted that Thakur Mohan Singh and Lalchand, the witnesses to the document were not known to him. It was also asserted that the said document was forged and manufactured and prepared for the purposes of the case. 47. Subsequent to the impugned order in the present revisions, the defendant/tenant amended the written statement on 6.8.1998. He thereafter moved an application under Order XI rule 14 C.P.C. with a prayer to direct the plaintiff to produce the original of the alleged document dated 23.12.1993. He had also filed a certified copy of the aforesaid document issued by the Notary or. 25.12.1994. The endorsement of the Notary indicates that the certified copy was supplied to Rameshchand on his request. In face of the affidavit filed by the plaintiff dated 18.1.1995 referred to hereinabove, there could be no occasion for requiring him to file the original claimed to be the alleged partition. His application dated 6.8.1998, in the circumstances was totally misconceived and deserved to be rejected. 48. On 17.8.1998, the defendant has moved an application praying to lead the secondary evidence in support of the aforesaid document seeking to prove its due execution etc., by summoning Umeschand Gupta, son of Hingalal Gupta who has since died, along with the Notary register and the copy of the agreement. 48. On 17.8.1998, the defendant has moved an application praying to lead the secondary evidence in support of the aforesaid document seeking to prove its due execution etc., by summoning Umeschand Gupta, son of Hingalal Gupta who has since died, along with the Notary register and the copy of the agreement. On the same date, the defendant had again moved an application to permit him to lead expert evidence to prove the signatures of Pawan and Madan Mohan as well as the plaintiff as occurring on the alleged Anubandh/ partition. 49. The aforesaid applications were objected to by the plaintiff. 50. It may be noticed that after the written statement had been amended, the plaintiff had also moved an application praying for making the consequential amendments in the plaint in reply to the amendments which had been incorporated in the written statement pursuant to the order passed by the first appellate Court. For the purpose, application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C., was moved on 10.8.1998 proposing to incorporate paragraph 9-B in the plaint. In the proposed amendment, the plaintiff denied the assertions made in the newly added paragraphs in the written statement. 51. The situation thus as it emerges at this stage is that the defendant has already amended the written statement setting up the pleas in regard to the cessation of the ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the accommodation in dispute and also setting up a plea of disclaimer of the title of the plaintiff. The plea in regard to the disclaimer of the title entitles the plaintiff to raise a ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act which as has already been noticed hereinabove is more than sufficient for sustaining the decree of the trial Court in case it is established. Since the defendant in his pleadings as they stand today has denied the title of the plaintiff and further in the application dated 6.1.1995 had on an affidavit asserted that the plaintiff has ceased to be owner of the accommodation in dispute which fact has been denied by the plaintiff on oath the question in regard to the availability of the ground for eviction as envisaged under sanction 12 (1) (c) of the Act could very well be decided by the first appellate Court itself without any other evidence. 52. 52. Since the assertion in regard to the cessation of the ownership of the plaintiff is contained in the application of the defendant and in his pleadings as brought on record and the denial of the plaintiff on oath is also there, it would be appropriate for the first appellate Court to frame a clear issue oh this aspect and decide the same after hearing the counsel for the parties. 53. In the facts and circumstances as noticed hereinabove, the first appellate Court could proceed to determine the aforesaid question without any further evidence as it is well established that if allegations of fact are admitted or must be deemed to be admitted, there is no need to prove what is admitted or deemed to be admitted. If on the own showing or the defendant, the plea of disclaimer of the title of the plaintiff was made out, there could be no difficulty in determining the issue in face of the denial of the plaintiff and the assertion that he was still continuing to be the owner in possession of the accommodation in dispute. 54. It must be emphasised at this stage that in a suit based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the landlord/plaintiff is required to establish his ownership only on the event where a decree for eviction of the tenant is sought on the grounds envisaged under section 12 (1) (e) or (f) of the Act. For the purposes of the grounds envisaged under section 12 (1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act, the question of title of the plaintiff/landlord is only incidental as the defendant/tenant stands estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff once the fact that the accommodation had been let out to him by the plaintiff stands admitted or proved. 55. In the present case, there was no dispute that the plaintiff had let out the premises to the defendant. He had been relieved from the decree of eviction even though the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act had been made out only because he had made the deposit of rent due in the Court to the credit of the plaintiff. He had been relieved from the decree of eviction even though the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act had been made out only because he had made the deposit of rent due in the Court to the credit of the plaintiff. Therefore, the relationship of landlord and tenant continued to exist and the denial of this relationship disclaiming the title of the plaintiff was by itself sufficient to sustain the ultimate decree for the eviction on the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. 56. So far as the effect of cessation of the ownership of the building in dispute is concerned, the defendant had stated that he had come to know about this fact only on 25.12.1994. 57. It may be noticed that the burden to prove that there had been a partition by and bounds resulting in the cessation of the ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the accommodation in dispute rested squarely on the defendant in face of the clear and categorical denial by the plaintiff to which a reference has already been made hereinabove. It is for the defendant to prove by cogent evidence that the plaintiff has ceased to be the owner of the accommodation in dispute. The stage for considering this question can arise only if the issue on the question in regard to the disclaimer of the title and the availability of the ground envisaged under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act is negatived. 58. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case and to ensure that no prejudice is caused to the defendant, the civil revision No. 792/98 filed by the plaintiff is allowed in part. The impugned order passed by the first appellate Court disposing of the application for amendments dated 6.1.1995 is modified to the extent that the first appellate Court shall permit the plaintiff to amend the plaint by incorporating therein the paragraph 9-B as indicated in his application to which a reference has been made hereinabove and shall frame the additional issues covering the controversy in regard to the disclaimer of the title of the plaintiff by the defendant and the cessation of ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the property in dispute on the basis of the alleged oral partition set up by the defendant in the newly added paragraph in his written statement. After framing the additional issues the first appellate Court itself shall proceed to decide the issue in regard to the disclaimer of title and the ground envisaged under section 12(1) (c) of the Act. In case the aforesaid issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff, it will not be necessary for the first appellate Court to decide the other issue as the ultimate decree can be sustained in that event. However, in case, the first appellate Court comes to the conclusion that there was no disclaimer of title, it can proceed to decide the other issue by affording the parties opportunity to lead evidence limited to the additional issue in accordance law. 59. The first appellate Court shall finally dispose of the appeal within a period not later than 3 months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order before it. 60. The record of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court shall be sent to the first appellate Court within a week. 61. In the result, Civil Revision No. 792/98 is allowed to the extent as indicated hereinabove. The Civil Revision No. 1295/98 is dismissed. 62. Considering the circumstances, there shall however be no order as to costs.