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2000 DIGILAW 406 (KER)

Viswanathan v. Abdul Hameed

2000-08-08

P.K.BALASUBRAMANYAN, T.M.HASSAN PILLAI

body2000
Judgment :- P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. This revision under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is by a tenant who was sought to be evicted by his landlord under S.11(3) of the Act on the ground that the landlord needed the building for bonafide occupation by his son, who was dependent on him, for starting a trade. The tenant in addition to denying the bonafide need set up claimed that he could not be evicted from this non-residential building on the ground of bonafide need under S.11(3) of the Act since he was entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act. He had also raised a claim that he was entitled to the protection of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act The Rent Controller and the appellate authority having found that the bonafide need alleged by the landlord was established, that the tenant had failed to show that he was entitled to the protection of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act or to show that he was entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act, ordered eviction. This is questioned before us in this revision on the basis that the decision of the appellate authority is illegal, irregular and improper and calls for interference by this court in revision. 2. The facts are not in serious dispute. The building, a non-residential one, a shop room was let out to the father of the revision petitioner one Appu under Ext. B22 rent deed dated 14.10.1933. The lessor was the predecessor of the present landlord. The term of the lease was three months. The rent payable was Rs. 47-per month. The rent was subsequently enhanced and Appu, the tenant continued in occupation. His occupation was never terminated. Appu died in the year 1987. Appu had executed a will bequeathing his tenancy right in favour of some of his heirs including the tenant The other legatees released their rights by way of a registered deed in favour of the present tenant, one of the heirs of Appu. The person on whom the rights of the original landlord Asiya Umma devolved and the present tenant, one of the heirs of the original tenant Appu, executed another lease deed Ext. A2 on 6.4.1989. Thereunder, the tenant was to continue in occupation as a tenant on agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. The person on whom the rights of the original landlord Asiya Umma devolved and the present tenant, one of the heirs of the original tenant Appu, executed another lease deed Ext. A2 on 6.4.1989. Thereunder, the tenant was to continue in occupation as a tenant on agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. 150/- per month to the landlord. The term of the lease was again three months. Thus the devolution of the tenancy right which originally belonged to Appu, on the present tenant was accepted and recognised by the landlord with an obligation on the part of the tenant to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. It was while the tenant was thus holding the building, that the landlord filed the application for eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. The application for eviction was filed on 25.7.1996. 3. Though i n the application for eviction a claim was also made under S.11 (2) of the Act, the claim thereunder was rejected by the Rent Controller and the same was not pursued by the landlord. We are therefore not concerned with that claim in this Revision. 4. In support of his claim for eviction under S.11(3) of the Act the landlord pleaded that he required the petition schedule building bonafide for the occupation of his son and power of attorney holder Fayad Abdul Hamid Fayad had completed his education and he had no income or source of livelihood. He was dependent on the landlord. He could not sit idle. There was no chance of his getting a job in Government service or in private firms based on the educational qualification he had. Fayad did not want to depend upon his parents for his livelihood. He wanted to start a stationery business on his own in the petition schedule building. The landlord was ready to support his son financially to start the business. Neither the landlord nor his son Fayad had possession of any vacant building in which they could start the stationery business. The tenant was not doing any serious business in the petition schedule building. The main income of the tenant was from other sources. A number of vacant buildings were also available in the locality. Neither the landlord nor his son Fayad had possession of any vacant building in which they could start the stationery business. The tenant was not doing any serious business in the petition schedule building. The main income of the tenant was from other sources. A number of vacant buildings were also available in the locality. In his objection, the tenant pleaded that the possession of the tenant did not commence on 6.4.1989 as pleaded in the Rent Control Petition, that it has originated on the basis of the lease of the year 1933 in favour of his father Appu, that Appu was in continuous occupation as a tenant until he died in the year 1987, that on the death of Appu the legatees under a will executed by Appu continued their occupation as tenants, that the tenant who was one of the heirs and legatees of Appu had subsequently become solely entitled to the tenancy right, that the occupation of the tenant was in continuation of the earlier occupation that the tenant was in continuous occupation from prior to 1.4.1940 and that the tenant was not liable to be evicted under S.11(3) of the Act in view of S.11(17) of the Act. The tenant also denied the bonafide need set up by the landlord. Fayad Abdul Hameed was not a dependent on the landlord. The landlord and his son were having various other businesses and several sources of income. The need for starting a stationery business put forward in the petition was merely a ruse for eviction and that the claim for eviction was not bonafide. The tenant also pleaded that he was mainly depending on the income derived from the business carried on in the petition schedule building for his livelihood and there were no suitable buildings available in the locality and hence he was protected by the second proviso to S.11 (3) of the Act. The Rent Controller held that even though the occupation of Appu, the father of the tenant, commenced in the year 1933, since the tenant had executed Ext. The Rent Controller held that even though the occupation of Appu, the father of the tenant, commenced in the year 1933, since the tenant had executed Ext. A2 lease deed on 6.4.1989 in favour of the landlord and the recitals in that deed show that he had taken the building on rent from the landlord that day, it must be held that the tenant was not in occupation from prior to 1.4.1940 the date of application and his tenancy must be held to have commenced only on 6.4.1989, the date of the fresh lease deed Ext. A2. The Rent Controller therefore held that the tenant was not entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act. The Rent Controller further held that the landlord had established the bonafide need set up that his son, who was dependent on him had to start a business in the petition schedule building. The Rent Controller also held that the tenant had not established the two limbs of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act and hence was not entitled to the protection of that proviso. The Rent Controller also overruled the contention that the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act was attracted in this case. Thus the Rent Controller ordered eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. The appellate authority referred to the fact that while in occupation as an heir of the tenant under the transaction of the year 1933 the tenant had executed Ext. A2, a fresh lease deed. In view of the execution of such a lease he has lost the protection which would have been otherwise available to him under S.11(17) of the Act, since Ext. A2 represented a new entrustment and not a renewal of the earlier entrustment. The Appellate Authority also referred to and relied on the decision of this court in A. Sulaikha Beevi v. K.C. Mathew (1997 (1) KLT 69 =1997 (1) K.L.J. 1). The appellate authority also held' that on the evidence, the landlord had established the bonafide need set up by him and that the tenant had failed to establish the facts that would enable him to seek the protection of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. Thus the order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller was confirmed. 5. The appellate authority also held' that on the evidence, the landlord had established the bonafide need set up by him and that the tenant had failed to establish the facts that would enable him to seek the protection of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. Thus the order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller was confirmed. 5. Before proceeding further, it may be proper to notice that the decision of the Division Bench relied on by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority in A. Sulaikha Beevi v. K.C. Mathew (1997 (1) KLT 69 = 1997 (1) K.L.J. 1) was reversed in appeal by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 5616 of 1997. Of course, the reversal in appeal was mainly on the ground that the Division Bench had not framed substantial questions of law in terms of S.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure while deciding the Second Appeal and hence the judgment under appeal was unsustainable and the Second Appeal had to be decided afresh after complying with the requirements of S.100 of the Code. Thus the decision in A. Sulaikha Beevi v. K.C. Mathew (1997 (1) KLT 69 =1997 (1) K.L.J. 1) lost its effect as an authority binding on this court. But it cannot but be said that the reasons given therein have persuasive value and have to be considered by this court while considering the effect of the execution of Ext. A2 by the tenant in favour of the landlord. Their Lordships in that decision had also referred to an earlier unreported decision of a Division Bench of this court in S.A. No. 957 of 1973 which was affirmed in appeal by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 1198 of 1978. We may also notice that both those decisions were rendered in the context of claims for protection under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, whereas the claim here is for protection under S.11(17) of the Act. On the language of S.11(17) of the Act, what is the effect of the ratio of the said decisions may also have to be considered. 6. On the language of S.11(17) of the Act, what is the effect of the ratio of the said decisions may also have to be considered. 6. Before proceeding to consider the claim based on protection under S.11(17) of the Act, it may be proper to consider whether the findings rendered by the authorities below that the landlord has made out a case for eviction under S.11(3) of the Act and the tenant has not made out a case for protection under the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act call for interference. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority have appreciated the pleadings and the evidence in the case in the light of the various documents produced and have come to the conclusion that the son of the landlord who had studied only up to the pre-degree level had no other occupation and his need for starting a business put forward in the petition for eviction, was bonafide and not a pretext for eviction. The authorities below have also found that the tenant has not established that he was mainly depending on the income from the business carried on in the petition schedule building for his livelihood and that he had also not shown that no other suitable building in the locality was available for him to shift his business. Notwithstanding the effort made in that behalf by learned counsel for the tenant-revision petitioner to persuade us to differ from the conclusions of the appellate authority and the Rent Controller on these aspect, we are not satisfied that the findings now rendered by the authorities below suffer from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety calling for correction by us in exercise of our jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act. We have gone through the relevant pleadings and the evidence in the case. On a consideration of the relevant materials, we are of the view that the findings rendered by the authorities below in that behalf are justified and do not call for interference. 7. Thus the only question that has to be examined is whether the finding by the authorities below that the tenant is not entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act suffers from any illegality or impropriety. We have already noticed that the tenancy was created in favour of Appu, the father of the tenant by the predecessor in interest of the landlord under Ext. We have already noticed that the tenancy was created in favour of Appu, the father of the tenant by the predecessor in interest of the landlord under Ext. B22 dated 14.10.1933. Appu died in the year 1987. The tenant was one of the heirs of Appu and hence was a tenant going by the definition of 'tenant' contained in the Act was including the heir or heirs of deceased tenant. Two things therefore are clear. One is that Appu was entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act on the day the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, Act 2 of 1965 came into force and until he died in the year 1987. Two, that the tenant could have been entitled to the same protection on the death of Appu since he was an heir of the tenant and along the other heirs of Appu, the tenant had the same protection that was available to Appu. Appu had bequeathed his tenancy rights in favour of some of his heirs and those heirs had released their rights in favour of the tenant. Of course this legacy or the releases, are not binding on the landlord who could have looked upon all the heirs of Appu, who died after the Hindu Succession Act, as the tenant under the Act since on the death of Appu, the heirs of Appu took the right in a body. In the year 1989, after the tenant had, on the basis of the will and the releases become the repository of all the rights of Appu over the building, he was recognised by the landlord as the sole tenant by taking a koolikychit from him. It may be noted that Ext. A2 dated 6.4.1989 is not a bilateral document, but is one executed by the tenant in favour of the landlord. In that document it is specifically recited that the father of the tenant and others had taken the building on lease as per a koolikychit of the year 1933, that the original rent of Rs. A2 dated 6.4.1989 is not a bilateral document, but is one executed by the tenant in favour of the landlord. In that document it is specifically recited that the father of the tenant and others had taken the building on lease as per a koolikychit of the year 1933, that the original rent of Rs. 4/- per month had been enhanced to Rs.60 per month, that both the original grantor and the grantee had died, that the rights of the grantor, the lessor, had come to the four sons referred to in the document in whose favour the koolikychit was being executed, the rights of Appu had devolved as per a will on his sons and pursuant to release deeds, in favour of the tenant who was in possession of the premises and who was carrying on a trade in the building and the parties having decided to pay and accept a rent of Rs. ISO/- per month from the tenant, the building was being taken on that rent for a period of three months by the tenant and that he was bound to vacate as and when demanded by the landlord on the expiry of the term. Thus what is clear from Ext. A2 is that the occupation that Appu had as per the koolikychit dated 14.10.1933, was never terminated and the right became exclusively that of one of his heirs, the tenant, as recognised by the landlord by virtue of the execution of Ext. A2 koolikychit dated 6.4.1989, on payment of an enhanced rent. The essential decision by the authorities below is rested on the fact that Ext. A2, which is an attornment by one of the heirs of the tenant in favour of the landlord, puts and end to the original tenancy in favour of Appu in the hands of his heirs and brings about a new tenancy and on principle, the surrender of the original lease of the year 1933 has to be implied. Thus postulating that the original occupation had ceased and the tenant entered the premises only in the year 1989, it was held that the tenant was not entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act. Thus postulating that the original occupation had ceased and the tenant entered the premises only in the year 1989, it was held that the tenant was not entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act. The two aspects that require to be considered are whether on the language of S.11(17) of the Rent Control Act, the line of enquiry adopted by the authorities below is warranted and the other, whether they are justified in holding on the basis of execution of Ext. A2, that the occupation of the tenant, one of the heirs of Appu whose occupation commenced in the year 1933 under Ext. B22 transaction of lease had come to an end. 8. S.11(17) of the Rent Control Act provides that a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of a building from 1st April, 1940 as a tenant shall not be liable to be evicted for bonafide occupation of the landlord or of the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. This is an absolute prohibition for claiming eviction under S.11(3) of the Act in respect of a non-residential premises. As regards residential premises, S.11(17) of the Act provides that an eviction can be had for bonafide need of the landlord, if the landlord had been away from the city, town or village for five years prior to the application or the landlord is able to establish a dire need for the building in question. There is also an explanation to the provision which says that in computing the period of continuous occupation from 1st April, 1940, the period during which the landlord was residing outside the city, town or village in which the building is situate, shall be excluded. In the case on hand, the explanation does not have any application since the landlord had no case based on the explanation. The building is a non-residential one and therefore the question of the landlord establishing a dire need or that he was away from the town for more than five years are also irrelevant. The only question therefore is, whether the tenant now in occupation, was in occupation continuously from a date prior to 1.4.1940 and continued to be in occupation on the date of the application for eviction. In the case on hand, Appu, the tenant, was in occupation from 14.10.1933 till his death in the year 1987. The only question therefore is, whether the tenant now in occupation, was in occupation continuously from a date prior to 1.4.1940 and continued to be in occupation on the date of the application for eviction. In the case on hand, Appu, the tenant, was in occupation from 14.10.1933 till his death in the year 1987. On the death of Appu in 1987 his heirs in a body constituted the tenant. That tenant continued in occupation of the building. What happened in the year 1989 was that the landlord recognised the status of one of the heirs of Appu as the person exclusively entitled to continue the occupation of the building as a tenant on the terms set out in Ext. A2. The occupation as tenant that commenced in the year 1933 was never put an end to. It therefore appears to us that notwithstanding the execution of Ext. A2, the occupation of the tenant that commenced on 14.10.1933, had continued until the date of application for eviction. The term of three months fixed in Ext. A2 had no relevance in view of S.11(1) of the Act. Hence going by the language of S.11(17) of the Act the tenant in this case cannot be deprived of the protection afforded by that provision. 9. What is contended by the landlord is that when Ext. A2 was executed by the tenant in favour of the landlord on 6.4.1989, there was an implied surrender of the original tenancy and since the original tenancy had been surrendered and the tenant went into occupation under a fresh arrangement, it cannot be postulated that, the occupation of the present tenant was a continuation of the occupation he earlier had as one of the heirs of the original tenant under the transaction of the year 1933. In other words, what is contended is that by the execution of Ext. A2 in this case, the relationship of landlord and tenant that came into existence between the predecessor of the landlord and Appu, the predecessor of the tenant, had come to an end and a fresh relationship of landlord and tenant or a fresh tenancy had come into existence in the year 1989 and hence the tenant cannot be heard to say that he had been in continuous occupation of the building as a tenant from a period prior to 1.4.1940. It is pointed out that a surrender need not necessarily be express and it can also be implied. It is further contended that on execution of a fresh lease deed or a deed of attornment, agreeing to pay an enhanced rent, there is an implied surrender of the original lease and thereafter the tenant must be taken to hold only under the fresh transaction and that would result in the tenant being deprived of the protection that would have been otherwise available to him under S.11(17) of the Act. 10. Before considering these contentions in depth, we must say that on the terms of Ext. A2 in this case, it is not possible to postulate a surrender of the pre-existing tenancy. The deed executed by the present tenant, one of the heirs of the original tenant Appu, clearly suggests that Appu went into possession as per document No. 2627 of 1933 on a rent of Rs. 4 per month, that the rent was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 60 per month, that Appu died, that the rights of Appu over the tenancy came into the hands of the tenant under a will and by virtue of releases by the other children of Appu, that the property was thus in the possession of the tenant on the date Ext. A2 was being executed and that the shop room was being taken on rent for a sum of Rs. 15(1 per month from the date of that transaction, for a period of three months and that on the expiry of the term the room would be surrendered to the landlord. The document emphasises that the tenant was in possession as a tenant from the year 1933. It emphasises that on the death of the tenant, his heirs including the present tenant, were in possession as tenants. It emphasises that it was the tenancy rights of Appu that have now come into the hands of the tena.nl exclusively, that the tenant was thus in possession as tenant, when he entered into Ext. A2 transaction and that he had agreed to pay a rent of Rs. 150 per month from the date of that transaction and that on the expiry of the term he had agreed to surrender the building. S.11(1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, no tenant shall be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of S.11. 150 per month from the date of that transaction and that on the expiry of the term he had agreed to surrender the building. S.11(1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, no tenant shall be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of S.11. Therefore, the stipulation of a period and the agreement to surrender on expiry of that period, cannot legally affect the right of the tenant to seek the protection of the Rent Control Act. Since that is so, it is clear that at no point of time the possession of the tenant or his legal representatives, ceased even for a moment and that the occupation that commenced on 14.10.1933 continued uninterruptedly till the date of the application for eviction made under S.I 1(3) of the Act. On the terms of Ext. A2 we are of the view that the theory of implied surrender sought to be relied on by the landlord cannot have any application to deprive the tenant of the protection available to him under S.11(17) of the Act. 11. The text books say that an implied surrender can either be by the execution of a fresh lease or by the physical surrender of possession. There is no case here that there was any physical surrender. The case of surrender is only based on the execution of afresh lease deed. On the wording of S.11(17) of the Act, we are of the view that in a case where the court is called upon to imply a surrender not because of an actual surrender of possession but because of the execution of a fresh lease deed. Such implied surrender the same cannot affect the claim of the tenant for protection under S.11(17) of the Act. For, what S.11(17) contemplates is, 'occupation' as a tenant continuously from a date prior to 1.4.1940 and the section does not insist that the occupation must be under the same or original transaction of lease. What is needed is only continuous occupation as a tenant even if it be after fresh attornments, or execution of periodic rent deeds or by holding over. We are therefore of the view that the theory of implied surrender relied on by the landlord in this case on the execution of Ext. What is needed is only continuous occupation as a tenant even if it be after fresh attornments, or execution of periodic rent deeds or by holding over. We are therefore of the view that the theory of implied surrender relied on by the landlord in this case on the execution of Ext. A2 by the tenant, is of no avail in the face of the continued occupation of the building by his predecessor and by the tenant from 14.10.1933. 12. Learned counsel for the landlord relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamalabhai v. Mangilal (AIR 1988 SC 375) to point out that the fact that possession was not physically handed over to the tenant was of no consequence when considering whether the right under the previous tenancy had been surrendered. Counsel also relied on the decision in Kodiyil Ambu v. Kodiyil Pathumma(1998 (1) K.L.J. 538) to contend that when a previous tenancy is to be deemed to have been put an end to, S.I 1(17) of the Act can not apply. As against these decisions, learned counsel for the tenant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Lathika v. S.K. Jamnadas (1999 (3) K.L.T. 235 (SC)) to point out that the principle that governs the doctrine of implied surrender of a lease is that when certain relationship existed between two parties in respect of a subject-matter and a new relationship has come into existence regarding the same subject matter, the two relationships cannot co-exist, being inconsistent and incompatible with each other, that is, if the latter can come into effect only on termination of the former, then it would be deemed to have been terminated in order to enable the latter to operate. A mere alteration or improvement or even impairment of the former relationship would not ipso facto amount to implied surrender. Counsel also referred to the decision in Mathew Filial Padmanabha Pillai v. Anilappan Nadar Yovan Nadar (1998 (6) SCC 617) to point out that in this case a surrender cannot be implied in the circumstances. 13. Going by the decision in Lathika, it cannot be said that in the present case, the new relationship could have come into existence only on the termination of the earlier relationship. Even under the earlier relationship, the tenant who was one of the heirs of the original tenant was holding over as a tenant. 13. Going by the decision in Lathika, it cannot be said that in the present case, the new relationship could have come into existence only on the termination of the earlier relationship. Even under the earlier relationship, the tenant who was one of the heirs of the original tenant was holding over as a tenant. The only thing was that he was only one of the heirs of the tenant and by an interse arrangement among the heirs of the tenant had become the sole holder of the tenancy rights. No doubt this arrangement inter se among the heirs of the tenant was not binding on the landlord. By creating the new relationship all that the landlord did was to consent to the arrangement come to among the heirs of the tenant or to acknowledge the devolution of the rights of the tenant in one of his heirs, the present tenant and agree to look to him for payment of the future rent at an enhanced rate. Since that is all that had happened by the execution of Ext. A2 by the tenant in this case, we are of the view that this is not one of those cases where the new relationship could have commenced only on termination of the earlier relationship. We are therefore of the view that on the basis of the test laid down in Lathika's case, it could be held that there was no implied surrender of the lease involved, on the execution of Ext. A2. 14. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that a physical departure may not always be necessary to postulate a surrender as held in Kamalabhai's case. As far as the decision of the Division Bench in Kodiyil Ambu v. Kodiyil Pathumma (1998 (1) K.L.J. 538) is concerned, it is clearly distinguishable on facts. Paragraph 4 of the said decision relied on by counsel for the landlord shows that that was a case where the father had taken a lease of a building in the year 1930 or so from the family of his wife. The building belonged to a Muslim Marumakhathayam family which took in the landlady and her two brothers. In a partition the building was set apart to the share of the landlady, that is the wife of the tenant. Two brothers of the landlady had thereafter executed an agreement in favour of the landlady. The building belonged to a Muslim Marumakhathayam family which took in the landlady and her two brothers. In a partition the building was set apart to the share of the landlady, that is the wife of the tenant. Two brothers of the landlady had thereafter executed an agreement in favour of the landlady. The property was set apart to the share of the thavazhy consisting of the landlady and her children as per a partition in the lessor family. The building had been reconstructed by the tenant, the husband of the landlady. On the terms of the rent deed executed in that case, their Lordships found that the previous possession had been put an end to. Their Lordships further found that the landlady in that case was also one of the heirs of the tenant (her husband), and the tenancy right had also devolved on her. The building had also been demolished and reconstructed. It was under those circumstances, that the court held that it could not be held that the brothers of the landlady who were also heirs of the tenant, were holding the property as tenants under the original transaction in favour of the husband of the landlady. The facts of that case clearly showed that there could not have been a continuous occupation of the building as contemplated by S.11(17) of the Act. The ratio of that decision cannot have any application in this case. 15. The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is a beneficent piece of legislation intended to protect tenants from eviction except on a case being made out in that behalf in terms of the relevant provisions of the Act. While construing such a legislation, even if it is assumed that two interpretations are possible of a provision giving protection to the tenant, the one that achieves the object of providing such protection should be preferred to an interpretation which tends to deprive the tenant of that protection. Therefore even if for the purpose of S.11(17) of the Act the theory of implied surrender of the lease is invoked, but there has been no physical discontinuance of occupation, we are inclined to the view that the interpretation should be in favour of the tenant in continuous occupation as a tenant, whether it be under the same transaction or under periodic renewals or under different lease deeds executed one after another. In that view also, we are of the view that in a case where the occupation of the tenant as a tenant had commenced prior to 1.4.1940 and had never ceased until the date of the application for eviction, the tenant must be held to be entitled to the protection of S.11(17) of the Act. By misunderstanding the legal effect of Ext. A2 deed and by misinterpreting S.I 1(17) of the Act, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have committed an illegality and an impropriety, which call for correction in exercise of our jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act. We are therefore constrained to interfere with the orders for eviction passed under S.11(3) of the Act. We therefore allow this Civil Revision Petition and setting aside the order for eviction under S.11(3) of the Act hold that the tenant is entitled to the protection of S.I 1(17) of the Act. The result is that the application for eviction filed by the landlord stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.