JUDGMENT - F.I. REBELLO, J.:---By the present petition the petitioner impugns award dated 14th May, 1999. By the said award the Arbitral Tribunal has partly allowed the claim of the respondent No. 1. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the award is liable to be set aside on the following grounds :- 2.That the Arbitral Tribunal was not constituted in terms of bye-laws 245/262 of the bye-laws in force. It is contended that in terms of the bye-laws before amendment the petitioner could appoint any member as an arbitrator on his behalf. It is contended that the petitioner was asked to restrict his choice amongst the 26 persons notified by the Stock Exchange. It is, therefore, contended that as the appointment was contrary to the aforesaid bye-laws the Arbitral Tribunal is illegally constituted and the award is liable to be set aside. In support of the contention that the arbitration proceedings have to be conducted strictly in terms of the agreement, reliance was placed on the judgment of a Single Judge of Jammu Kashmir in the case of (Shahdad v. Moh. Abdullah Mir and others)1, A.I.R. 1967 Jammu Kashmir 120, more particularly para. 21. The petitioner nominated his arbitrator. He has thereafter participated before the Arbitral Tribunal. It is only in the reply that he raised the contention that the constitution was improper. At the time when the tribunal had to be constituted, appointment by the arbitrator was in terms of bye-laws 245/262. The fact, however, remains that the person who was selected was a member of the Bombay Stock Exchange. He was one of the persons whom the petitioner could have appointed. The petitioner did not at the relevant time question the notice whereby he was called upon to nominate a member from amongst the list notified. The petitioner has participated in the proceedings. In that light of the matter it will be difficult at this stage to allow the said contention, more so as there is no allegation whatsoever against the conduct of the member as a member of the Arbitral Tribunal. Even if there be some irregularity it cannot be said to be an illegality which would warrant interference under section 34 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996. In so far as Shahdab v. Moh. Even if there be some irregularity it cannot be said to be an illegality which would warrant interference under section 34 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996. In so far as Shahdab v. Moh. Abdullah Mir (supra) as earlier pointed out I have already held that the petitioner participated in the proceedings after nominating a member of the Stock Exchange. In that light of the matter the proposition as set out in the said judgment would not be attracted. That contention must, therefore, be rejected. 3.It is secondly contended that the petitioner was called upon to lead negative evidence. It is contended that this would be contrary to section 28 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996 as that would be against the substantive law of India. For that purpose learned Counsel relies on a judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the case of (M/s. Nagori and Company v. Indian Sugar Industries Export Corporation Ltd.)2, A.I.R. 1990 Delhi 125. That was a case where a party had sought damages. All that the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court has stated is the well settled proposition that the party claiming damages must also prove that he had taken steps to mitigate the damages. This follows from section 74 of the Contract Act. In the instant case the respondents had come to the Court on the contention that there were bad delivery of certain shares. The petitioner by his letter of June 4, 1997 before the Investor's Grievance Redressal Committee had accepted that the claim made by SHCII is correct. In the context of this, the question of the petitioner being called upon to lead any negative evidence does not arise. The question whether there are any admissions and those admissions can be dealt with will be dealt with while answering the said contention. At any rate in so far as the present contention is concerned the petitioner himself had admitted the claim of the respondents. If the petitioner wanted to retract from the statement contained in his letter and the minutes recorded before the Investors Grievance Redressal Committee, the burden was on him to prove otherwise. This burden had not been discharged. That contention, therefore, must be rejected. 4.It is then contended that there was no evidence on record to allow the claim. If the petitioner wanted to retract from the statement contained in his letter and the minutes recorded before the Investors Grievance Redressal Committee, the burden was on him to prove otherwise. This burden had not been discharged. That contention, therefore, must be rejected. 4.It is then contended that there was no evidence on record to allow the claim. In the alternative it is contended that the reasons given cannot be sustained considering the material on record. For that purpose reliance is placed in the case of (Re. Poyser and Mills Arbitration)3, (1963) All England Law Reports, 612 for the following proposition :- "Now, Parliament having provided that reasons shall be given, in my view that must clearly be read as meaning that proper, adequate, reasons must be given; the reasons that are set out, whether they are right or wrong, must be reasons which not only will be intelligible, but also can reasonably be said to deal with the substantial points that have been raised, and in my view it is right to consider that statutory provision as being a provision as to the form which the arbitration award shall take." This proposition contained in the aforesaid judgment, it is contended, has been approved by the Apex Court in the case of (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Indian Carbon Ltd.)4, 1988(3) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)688. The submission made is that in so far as the bye-law No. 244 is concerned, it contemplates the fixation of the price. The Arbitral Tribunal has not dealt with the said argument at all. In the instant case, it is pointed out that reading of Bye-law No. 244 would indicate that the price which the respondents could claim would be if the respondents had followed the principles as set out in bye-law No. 244. In the first instance a perusal of the award will indicate that in para 4 of the award the Arbitral Tribunal has noted the submissions on behalf of the petitioner and the invocation of the bye-laws No. 244. In the first instance a perusal of the award will indicate that in para 4 of the award the Arbitral Tribunal has noted the submissions on behalf of the petitioner and the invocation of the bye-laws No. 244. In para 7 of the award the Arbitral Tribunal has discussed the various arguments raised before him and thereafter at the end of the paragraph observed as under :- "Similarly, there is nothing on record to show that there is breach of any other rule or rules." Even assuming for a moment that there is no specific mention in so far as bye-law No. 244 is concerned, the petitioner will have to still make out a case for interference by this Court under section 34. Mere non-mentioning by itself would not be against the Public Policy of India. In the instant case if bye-law No. 244 is perused it contemplates a situation where there is no delivery. The instant case is not of no delivery, but bad delivery. This flows from the correspondence which the petitioner has exchanged with the authorities. In the light of that I do not find any merit in so far as these contentions are concerned. 5.It is then contended that the Arbitral Tribunal was wrong in upholding the contention on behalf of the respondents that the shares were not returned as the petitioner was not bound to give collateral security. It is contended that neither the bye-law requires that there has to be a collateral security in exchange of shares nor for that matter have the respondents established any custom. In that context it is contended that the reasons given for the award are not sustainable. 6.In para 7 of the award the Arbitral Tribunal has noted that in the past the petitioner himself in some cases has given collateral securities for bad deliveries. Apart from that the correspondence exchanged and which is on record shows that apart from the certificates the other documentary evidence like the transfer deeds, etc., were given to the petitioner. In these circumstances once the Arbitral Tribunal based upon the practice followed by the petitioner, in some cases has accepted the contention on behalf of the petitioner to my mind it would not be a case where this Court should interfere under section 34 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996. In these circumstances once the Arbitral Tribunal based upon the practice followed by the petitioner, in some cases has accepted the contention on behalf of the petitioner to my mind it would not be a case where this Court should interfere under section 34 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996. 7.It was then finally contended that in so far as the statement is concerned the Arbitral Tribunal had not taken into consideration certain bad deliveries for which the petitioner could not be faulted. This is merely appreciation of evidence. Apart from that in the award itself the various objections in respect of the shares have been noted and have been discussed. Even if another view is possible that would not be a case where this Court would interfere with the award. 8.Having said so I am of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out a case and consequently I find no substance in the petition, which is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.