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2000 DIGILAW 41 (CAL)

UNION OF INDIA v. PODDAR UDYOG LIMITED

2000-01-21

ALTAMAS KABIR, S.N.BHATTACHARJEE

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A. KABIR, J. ( 1 ) THERE will be an order in terms of prayer (a ). For the sake of convenience and upon the consent of the parties the appeal and the stay application in respect of the order appeared against were taken up together for hearing and disposal. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against an order dated 26th November, 1998, whereby the learned single Judge disposed of the writ petitioner filed by the respondents herein, inter alia, by directing the Union of India, one of the appellants before us, to pay rent and/or occupation charges for the premises in question at the rate of Rs. 15. 65p per square foot with effect from 1st September, 1992. Quantifying the amount payable on the said basis, the learned single Judge directed the Union of India to pay to the writ petitioners/respondents a sum of Rs. 3,37,46,798. 40 paise, being the sum payable from 1st September, 1992, to 30th October, 1998, within 31st May, 1999. As to the execution of the lease agreement, the learned Judge observed that the said condition has become infructuous on the expiry of five years from 1st September, 1992. ( 3 ) THE case made out in the writ petition is that the writ petitioner No. 1 was and still is the owner of portions of the third, fourth, fifth and eighth floors of premises No. 18, Rabindra Sarani, Calcutta-700 001, popularly known as "poddar Court", and from 1968 the Income Tax Department has been a tenant of the said portions of the building under the writ petitioner No. 1. ( 4 ) IT is not disputed that the writ petitioner No. 1 is the owner of portions of the third, fourth, fifth and eighth floors of premises No. 18, Rabindra Sarani, Calcutta-700 001, and that from 1968 the Income Tax Department has been a tenant of the said portions of the building, measuring approximately 1,34,664 square feet, under the writ petitioner No. 1. It is not also in dispute that at the inception of the tenancy, the Income Tax Department used to pay rent for the said premises at the rate of Rs. 1. 05p per square foot per month. It is not also in dispute that at the inception of the tenancy, the Income Tax Department used to pay rent for the said premises at the rate of Rs. 1. 05p per square foot per month. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, between 10th July, 1972 and 13th June, 1985, the Central Public Works Department issued various office Memoranda providing for enhancement and/or revision of rent in respect of properties taken on rent by the Central Government. Such enhancement was to be effective from 1st September, 1982, and, thereafter, after every five years. According to the writ petitioners, although, in terms of the said office Memoranda they became entitled to enhancement of rent from 1st September, 1982, the appellants herein delayed the process and ultimately the matter of re-assessment of the rents was referred to the Hiring Committee of the Central Public Works Department, Calcutta, in or about the month of July, 1985. Pursuant to the decision of the Hiring Committee, the appellants herein by a letter dated 15th July, 1986, informed the writ petitioner No. 1 that the Government had agreed to and sanctioned enhancement of the rents at the rate of Rs. 8. 46p per square foot per month with effect from 1st September, 1982. On the writ petitioners submitting a Bill on the basis of the sanctioned revision, the writ petitioner No. 1 was informed by letter dated 1st April, 1987, that the earlier decision had been superseded. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by such action on the part of the appellants herein, the writ petitioner No. 1 filed a suit in this Court, being suit No. 794 of 1987, inter alia, for a mandatory injunction on the appellant No. 1 herein to pay the monthly rents at the rate of Rs. 8. 46p per square foot per month in respect of the areas under the occupation of the Income Tax Department from 1st September, 1982 and from 29th September, 1982 to 30th June, 1987. Thereafter, the appellants enhanced the rent of the said premises to Rs. 12. 10 square feet per month for a period of five years from 1st September, 1987. 46p per square foot per month in respect of the areas under the occupation of the Income Tax Department from 1st September, 1982 and from 29th September, 1982 to 30th June, 1987. Thereafter, the appellants enhanced the rent of the said premises to Rs. 12. 10 square feet per month for a period of five years from 1st September, 1987. According to the writ petitioners, on the basis of the above mentioned office memoranda and the orders passed thereupon, the writ petitioners became entitled to a further upward revision for a period of five years with effect from 1st September, 1992, but inspite of repeated reminders the appellants did not revise the rent with effect from 1st September, 1992. ( 7 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, by a letter dated 24th January, 1996, the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.) West Bengal, informed the writ petitioner that the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, had sanctioned revision of the rents to Rs. 15. 65 paise per square foot of carpet area per month, with effect from 1st September, 1992, subject to the writ petitioners paying the Municipal taxes and entering into a lease agreement in respect of the tenanted premises. The writ petitioners were also requested to submit an arrear bill in respect of the difference on account of such upward revision from Rs. 12. 10 paise per square foot to Rs. 15. 65 paise per square foot per month. ( 8 ) IN response to the aforesaid letter, the writ petitioners raised a bill for the arrear dues from 1st September, 1992, and also agreed to pay the Municipal taxes but requested the appellants to waive the condition relating to execution of a lease agreement since no such document had been executed from the inception of the tenancy. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, inspite of the said letter of 24th January, 1996, the respondents did not make payment against the said bill despite requests being made in that behalf. On or about 9th February, 1996, the writ petitioner No. 2 was served with a copy of a letter dated 9th February, 1996, written on behalf of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax stating that before the revised arrear rent bills at the enhanced rate of Rs. 15. On or about 9th February, 1996, the writ petitioner No. 2 was served with a copy of a letter dated 9th February, 1996, written on behalf of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax stating that before the revised arrear rent bills at the enhanced rate of Rs. 15. 65p per square foot of carpet area per month with effect from 1st September, 1992, could be considered for payment, a copy of the fresh lease agreement entered into between Poddar Udyog Ltd. and the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and a copy of the undertaking given by Poddar Udyog Ltd. regarding payment of Municipal tax or a "no Demand" certificate from the Calcutta Municipal Corporation in respect of the municipal taxes, would have to be furnished. ( 10 ) ON receipt of the copy of the aforesaid letter, the writ petitioners wrote back to the Commissioner of Income Tax on 12th March, 1996, undertaking to execute the lease agreement as approved by the law department and requesting payment of the arrears on the basis of such undertaking. ( 11 ) SINCE despite the said letter and several other letters written by the writ petitioners the appellants did not pay the arrear dues on the basis of the sanctioned revision of the rents from 1st September, 1992, the writ petitioners moved a writ petition being W. P. No. 1732 of 1998, inter alia, for a direction upon the appellants herein to act in accordance with office Memoranda dated 10th July, 1972, 1st December, 1982 and 22nd August, 1984 and to revise the rents on the expiry of five years from 1st September, 1992 and to desist from withholding payment of amounts due and payable in terms of the letter dated 24th January, 1996, issued by the appellants herein to the writ petitioner No. 1. ( 12 ) UPON considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the learned single Judge came to the finding that after every five years the rate of rent had been increased and acted upon and by the letter of 24th January, 1996, an appropriate official had in writing made a promise about enhancement of the rate of rent from 1st September, 1992, and the Government had also expressed its willingness to execute a formal lease agreement which had been accepted by the writ petitioners. The learned single Judge held that the writ petitioner had altered its position by acting upon the promise made on behalf of the Government and the Government was, therefore, estopped from acting contrary to the said promise. ( 13 ) ON the basis of his aforesaid finding the learned single Judge directed the appellant, Union of India, to pay rent and/or occupation charges for the premises in question at the rate of Rs. 15. 65 paise per square foot per month with effect from 1st September, 1992. The learned Judge went on to quantity a sum of Rs. 3,37,46,798. 40p as being due and payable from 1st September, 1992, to 30th October, 1998, and directed the appellant No. 1 to pay the said sum within 31st May, 1999. The learned single Judge also held that the prayer relating to execution of a lease agreement had been rendered infructuous as five years had elapsed from 1st September, 1992. ( 14 ) AS indicated hereinbefore, this appeal has been preferred by the Union of India and others against the aforesaid order of the learned single Judge. ( 15 ) APPEARING for the appellants, Mr. Dipak Shome, learned advocate, submitted that the directions given by the learned single Judge for payment was misconceived on account of the settled law that the writ Court cannot enforce a money claim arising out of non-statutory contracts. ( 16 ) IN support of his said submissions Mr. Shome referred to a Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Amorendra Kumar v. State of Bihar and Ors. (AIR 1993 Patna Page 112) wherein it was held that non-statutory contractual obligations in respect of contracts with the Government could not be enforced by issuance of a writ or direction in the nature of Mandamus. ( 17 ) REFERENCE was also made by Mr. Shome to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner and Ors. v. Issac Peter and Ors. ( 17 ) REFERENCE was also made by Mr. Shome to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner and Ors. v. Issac Peter and Ors. (1994 (4) SCC Page 104) wherein while considering the provisions of the Kerala Abkari Act regarding the obligations of the State to supply monthly quota or minimum guarantee quota, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that any promise or assurance held out by the authorities or Minister regarding supply of the entire additional quantity demanded by the licensee, beyond their competence, being not permissible under the Rules, could not confer a legally enforceable right on the licensee, and hence the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked. Mr. Shome urged that besides rejecting the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel or estoppel by conduct, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also rejected the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the matter of enforcement of non-statutory contracts. ( 18 ) IN this connection reference was also made to another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. and Ors. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd. , reported in 1996 (6) SCC page 22, wherein it was, inter alia, held that no writ of Mandamus could issue for enforcement of a non-statutory contract. ( 19 ) MR. Shome submitted that in the instant case there was no contract at all as the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution had not been complied with. According to Mr. Shome, the letter written by the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.), West Bengal, on 24th January, 1996, was at best an offer which was not warranted in law and such a procedure had been deprecated by a Division Bench of this Court in the unreported decision in the case of the Regional Director, E. R. , A. M. D. , Department of Atomic Energy and Ors. v. Rabindra Nath Nandi and Anr. (A. P. O. No. 243 of 1996 ). ( 20 ) MR. v. Rabindra Nath Nandi and Anr. (A. P. O. No. 243 of 1996 ). ( 20 ) MR. Shome submitted that in the said unreported decision the Division Bench had occasion to consider several office memoranda/circulars and the applicability of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, in matters relating to tenancies taken on rent by the Government and it was observed by Ruma Pal J. as follows :-"????the a appellants cannot be bound by the offer made by them either in the letter dated 28th November. 1989 and reiterated in their affidavit-in-opposition for the simple reason this was the very act which the circulars prevent a department from doing namely to reassess the rents on their own as already stated, in my opinion the only method in which the reassessment can take place is under the circulars and in no other manner. " ( 21 ) MR. Shome submitted that the Division Bench had also held that the adjudication of the Hiring Committee was also subject to challenge and was not always final between the parties. Mr. Shome submitted that since there was some disagreement between the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench on the cross-appeal filed and with regard to the nature of consequential directions to be given, the matter was referred to a third learned Judge, who agreed with the views expressed by Ruma Pal, J. ( 22 ) MR. Shome then contended that the letter dated 24th January, 1996, on which the writ petitioners had based their case, had been written by the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.), without any instruction from the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, and could not, therefore, be construed as a circular or an instruction from the said Board for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel even if the said doctrine was applicable to the facts of this case. Mr. Shome contended that the said letter could not be brought within the ambit of section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as the same was not a direction or order from the said Board to a sub-ordinate officer. It was further contended that under section 3 (1) of the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1963, the Central Board of Direct Taxes was not also empowered to issue such a letter as its jurisdiction and functions were circumscribed by various circulars issued periodically by the concerned authorities. It was further contended that under section 3 (1) of the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1963, the Central Board of Direct Taxes was not also empowered to issue such a letter as its jurisdiction and functions were circumscribed by various circulars issued periodically by the concerned authorities. ( 23 ) MR. Shome urged that the said letter could not be said to hold out a promise from the proper authorities and could not, therefore, form the basis of a case of promissory estoppel. ( 24 ) MR. Shome also contended that since a suit filed by the writ petitioners was pending and several interim orders had been passed therein, including an order for upward revision of rent, the writ petitioners had their remedy for further revision of the monthly rents in the suit itself and in view of such alternate remedy available to the writ petitioners, the writ petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. ( 25 ) IN support of his aforesaid contention Mr. Shome referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Court in the case of Jai Singh v. Union of India and Others, reported in 1977 (1) SCC page 1, wherein it was observed that a litigant could not simultaneously pursue parallel remedies and the High Court should not grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution when alternate remedy was available by way of a suit. ( 26 ) MR. Shome's next contention was that the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, provides for determination of fair rent and sections 8 to 12 of the said Act is a complete Code for the said purpose. Mr. Shome urged that under the said provisions it is the Rent Controller alone who had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the fair rent of a premises. Mr. Shome submitted that the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is a welfare legislation and that the parties could not contract out of statute or wriggle out of the procedure for determination of fair rent as contemplated in sections 8 to 12 of the said Act. It was urged that the adjudication of the Rent Controller was binding on both the landlord as also the tenant. ( 27 ) MR. It was urged that the adjudication of the Rent Controller was binding on both the landlord as also the tenant. ( 27 ) MR. Shome urged that the writ petition was not only liable to be dismissed on account of the existence of an alternate remedy by way of suit, but the same was also misconceived as a non-statutory contract could not be enforced in writ jurisdiction. Mr. Shome submitted that the learned single Judge had failed to appreciate the aforesaid stand of the appellants and had allowed himself to be persuaded by the contents of the letter dated 24th January, 1996, written by an officer who had no authority to hold out any promise on behalf of the Central Board of Direct Taxes. Mr. Shome submitted that the order of the learned single Judge almost amounted to a money decree without any proper basis for arriving at the figure indicated therein, and the same was liable to be set aside. ( 28 ) APPEARING for the writ petitioners/respondents, Mr. Samaraditya Pal submitted that between 10th July, 1972 and 13th June, 1985, various Office Memoranda were issued by the Central Public Works Department providing for enhancement and/or revision of the rents by the Central Government in respect of premises taken on rent by the Central Government with effect from 1st September, 1982 and every five years thereafter. Mr. Pal urged that in terms of the said office Memoranda the respondent No. 1 became entitled to enhancement of rent with effect from 1st September, 1982, and, in fact, in July, 1985, the appellants informed the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 that the Government had sanctioned an enhancement of rent at the rate of Rs. 8. 46 per square foot per month with effect from 1st September, 1982. Subsequently, however, by a letter dated 1st April, 1987, the appellants informed the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 that the said sanction had been withdrawn resulting in the filing of suit No. 794 of 1987 by the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1, inter alia, for a mandatory injunction on the appellant No. 1 herein to pay the monthly rents at the rate of Rs. 8. 46 per square foot per month, as offered. ( 29 ) MR. 8. 46 per square foot per month, as offered. ( 29 ) MR. Pal submitted that the relief in the suit was confined to the period from 1st September, 1982 to 30th June, 1987, but pursuant to various orders passed from time to time in the suit and the office Memoranda referred to above, the respondents began to payment at the rate of Rs. 12. 10 paise per square foot per month for the premises in question. It was urged that as per the said Office Memoranda the writ petitioners/respondents became entitled to a further enhancement of the rent for a further period of five years with effect from 1st September, 1992 to 30th August, 1997. ( 30 ) MR. Pal submitted that by his letter dated 24th January, 1996, the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.) informed the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 that the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, had accorded sanction to the revision of rent at the rate of Rs. 15. 65 paise per square foot per month, subject to certain conditions, but since the appellants did not pay the arrear rents at the enhanced rate as promised, the writ petitioners were compelled to file the writ petition which culminated in the order dated 26th November, 1998, passed by the learned single Judge allowing the claim of the writ petitioners and directing the appellant No. 1 to pay to the writ petitioners the sum of Rs. 3,27,46,789. 40 paise within 31st May, 1999. Mr. Pal submitted that the said amount was calculated on account of the difference in rent between Rs. 15. 65p, as promised to be paid, and Rs. 12. 10p as was being paid, per square foot per month from 1st September, 1992, till 30th October, 1998. ( 31 ) MR. Pal urged that there is no absolute proposition that the writ Court cannot enforce a money claim but normally the writ Court does not issue writs in the nature of Mandamus for directing payment of money where disputed questions of fact arising out of private contract are involved or where an efficacious remedy exists for adjudication of disputes either by arbitration or by filing a suit. ( 32 ) MR. Pal submitted that in appropriate cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to direct payment of money in writ proceedings. ( 33 ) IN this regard. Mr. ( 32 ) MR. Pal submitted that in appropriate cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to direct payment of money in writ proceedings. ( 33 ) IN this regard. Mr. Pal firstly referred to and relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1983 SC 848 ), wherein while considering the doctrine of promissory estoppel in respect of a promise held out by the Gujarat State Financial Corporation to advance a loan, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court was fully justified in issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus to disburse the loan. ( 34 ) MR. Pal submitted that in Amorendra Kumar's case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Shome, there was no element of promissory estoppel involved and the matter was considered purely from the view point of whether a writ Court could enforce a money claim arising out of a non-statutory contract. Mr. Pal urged that the distinguishing feature of this case is the promise held out by the appellants in the letter dated 24th January, 1996. ( 35 ) MR. Pal also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Hyderabad Commerce v. Indian Bank and Others (AIR 1991 SC Page 247) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to set aside an order of dismissal of a writ petition passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and directed the respondent bank to re-credit an amount of Rs. 12. 95 lakhs to the appellant's account which was found to have been unauthorisedly transferred by the respondent bank from the appellant's account to that of another customer. ( 36 ) MR. Pal submitted that in the case of Government of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Thillaivillalan, reported in 1991 SC page 1231, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the principal grievance of the appellants was not so much as to the correctness of the quantification but the very permissibility of relief in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. Pal urged that, in fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quantified a total sum of Rs. Mr. Pal urged that, in fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quantified a total sum of Rs. 1 lakh as, payable by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the writ petitioner and gave a direction to the Government of Tamil Nadu to pay the said sum to the writ petitioner within three weeks from the date of passing of the order. ( 37 ) MR. Pal submitted that in yet another case (Surendra Prasad Mishra v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission), reported in AIR 1987, Calcutta, page 1, a learned Judge of this Court while considering the principles of promissory estoppel observed that a Government Agency could not back out from obligations arising from promises made by it and went on to hold that in writ jurisdiction the High Court could enforce equity and give directions for payment. In fact, upon settling the claim of the petitioner at Rs. 10 lakhs, the learned Judge directed issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus upon the Oil and Natural Gas Commission for payment of the recommended amount of Rs. 10 lakhs to the writ petitioner. ( 38 ) REFERENCE was also made to another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kumari (Smt.) v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , wherein the State of Tamil Nadu was directed to pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 50,000/- by way of compensation for her son's death because of the negligence of the State authorities. ( 39 ) MR. Pal urged that having regard to the persistent view taken by the Supreme Court and the Calcutta High Court, it could by no means be contended that the learned single Judge had acted without jurisdiction in directing the appellant No. 1 herein to pay to the writ petitioners/respondents the sum of Rs. 3,37,46,798. 40p which had become due and payable from 1st September, 1992, to 30th October, 1998, on the basis of the promise held out in the letter dated 24th January, 1996, issued by the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (sldgs.) West Bengal, Calcutta. ( 40 ) MR. Pal then submitted that, although, it had been contended on behalf of the appellants that the promise contained in the letter of 24th January, 1996, could not be construed to be a direction and/or and order from the Central Board of Direct Taxes. ( 40 ) MR. Pal then submitted that, although, it had been contended on behalf of the appellants that the promise contained in the letter of 24th January, 1996, could not be construed to be a direction and/or and order from the Central Board of Direct Taxes. New Delhi, and that the same had been issued by the concerned Income Tax Officer without any authority whatsoever, such a submission was nothing but a desperate attempt on the part of the appellants to try and resile from the position indicated in the said letter of 24th January, 1996. ( 41 ) MR. Pal submitted that a glance at the said letter would show that the same had been issued by the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.) West Bengal, Calcutta, not on his own motion but upon a direction from the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, to inform the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 that sanction had been accorded to the revision of the rent in respect of the office accommodation at Poddar Court at the rate of 15. 65p per square foot of carpet area per month, with effect from 1st September, 1992. Mr. Pal submitted that it was an argument of desperation rather than one of conviction that the Income Tax Officer had acted on his own account in issuing the letter of 24th January, 1996 and that the same could not be construed to be a direction given by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi. ( 42 ) WITH regard to the appellant's contention that the Rent Controller under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, was the proper authority for fixation of fair rent, Mr. Pal urged that the said question was not germane to the facts of the present case since the appellants had been paying rent at a contractual rate of 12. 10p per square foot per month and that for the period of five years commencing from 1st September, 1992, the appellants had themselves promised to pay rent at the enhanced rate of 15. 65p per square foot per month, subject to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 agreeing to certain conditions. Mr. Pal urged that in terms of section 4 (1) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the appellants are bound to pay the rents at the rate of 15. 65p per square foot per month, subject to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 agreeing to certain conditions. Mr. Pal urged that in terms of section 4 (1) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the appellants are bound to pay the rents at the rate of 15. 65p per square foot per month as promised by the appellants themselves and there was, therefore, no further question of fixation of fair rent by the Rent Controller. ( 43 ) MR. Pal submitted that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devkaran Nenshi Tanna v. Manharlal Nenshi and Ors. (AIR 1994 SC, Page 2747) while considering the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rent Control Act, 1947, which had been relied upon by the appellants, had no application to the facts of the present case. Mr. Pal submitted that, although, it had been observed in the said case that it is settled law that the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was a piece of welfare legislation and that a party could not contract out of the statute, the said observation was made in the context of determination of (standard rent) under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. Mr. Pal submitted that, on the other hand, in the case of Juthika Mallick v. M. Y. Bal (AIR 1995 SC Page 1142) the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in view of the provisions of section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the parties have freedom to contract out of the section. ( 44 ) MR. Pal urged that the dispute in the present case relates to "contractual rent" as indicated in section 4 (1) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and or "fair rent" as provided for in section 4 (1) (a) thereof. ( 45 ) ON the question as to whether the recommendation of the Hiring Committee was binding upon the Income Tax Department, Mr. Pal submitted that the same was of no relevance to the facts of this case, since in the instant case such recommendation of the Hiring Committee had been accepted by the occupying department, which fact was conveyed to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 by the letter of 24th January, 1996. Mr. Pal submitted that the same was of no relevance to the facts of this case, since in the instant case such recommendation of the Hiring Committee had been accepted by the occupying department, which fact was conveyed to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 by the letter of 24th January, 1996. Mr. Pal submitted that the ratio of the unreported decision of the Division Bench in A. P. O. 243-244 of 1996 (The Regional Director, Eastern Region, Atomic Minerals Division, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India and Others v. Rabindra Nath Nandy and Another) relied upon by the appellants, was that the Hiring Department was not bound to accept the recommendation of the Hiring Committee, but could object to the same. Mr. Pal urged that since in this case the recommendation of the Hiring Committee had been accepted by the Hiring Authority, the decision in Rabindra Nath Nandy's case was of no assistance to the case of the appellants despite their futile attempt to establish that the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.), had acted on his own without the authority of the Central Board of Direct Taxes. ( 46 ) MR. Pal then referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter (supra) relied upon by Mr. Shome in support of his contention that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked to alter or amend the specific terms of a contract nor could the same be availed of against statutory provisions. It was submitted that in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where the contract between the parties was governed by the provisions of the Kerala Act and the Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974. In the facts of the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the writ petitioner had no right to enforce his claim for supply of additional quantity of attack which was within the absolute discretion of the concerned authority under the appropriate rules. Mr. Pal pointed out that in the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the contract between the parties was governed by Statutory provisions and the Rules, the conditions of licence and the counter-part of the agreement which were binding both upon the Government and the licencee. ( 47 ) MR. Mr. Pal pointed out that in the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the contract between the parties was governed by Statutory provisions and the Rules, the conditions of licence and the counter-part of the agreement which were binding both upon the Government and the licencee. ( 47 ) MR. Pal urged that in the instant case the relationship of landlord and tenant is governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and more particularly section 4 thereof and the tenant is, therefore, required to pay the monthly rents as agreed upon until the fair rent is fixed. Mr. Pal submitted that till the fair rent was fixed, the appellants were required to pay the rents at agreed rate of Rs. 15. 65 per square foot per month with effect from 1st September, 1992. Mr. Pal also urged that the offer contained in the letter of 24th January, 1996,for enhancement of the rent from Rs. 12. 10 per square foot per month to Rs. 15. 65 per square foot per month could not be said to be contrary to the provisions of section 4 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. ( 48 ) MR. Pal submitted that all the cases cited by Mr. Shome in this regard were distinguishable as no element of promissory estoppel was involved in those cases as in the instant case. Mr. Pal urged that, on the other hand, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Lotus Hotel case (supra) would be more apposite as the same was based on the concept of promissory estoppel. ( 49 ) MR. Pal urged that the appeal as misconceived and was liable to be dismissed. ( 50 ) ON consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made we are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that the learned single Judge had erred in allowing the writ petition. ( 51 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.) had no authority to issue the letter dated 24th January, 1996, and the respondents were not, therefore, bound by the contents thereof, having particular regard to the Bench decision of this court in Rabindra Nath Nandi's case (supra ). ( 51 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.) had no authority to issue the letter dated 24th January, 1996, and the respondents were not, therefore, bound by the contents thereof, having particular regard to the Bench decision of this court in Rabindra Nath Nandi's case (supra ). It has also been urged that the offer of enhancement of the rents contained in the said letter could not be construed to be a direction given by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, and could not, therefore, be brought within the ambit of section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. ( 52 ) A glance at the letter of 24th January, 1996, will reveal that the same had been issued by the Income Tax Officer, Headquarters (Bldgs.) not of his own accord, as urged on behalf of the appellants, but on the basis of directions received from the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, by the office of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta. As much as the respondents may try and disown responsibility for the offer contained in the said letter, there is nothing on record to show that the said offer was not genuinely made by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, and that the Income Tax Officer had acted on his own accord. There is nothing also on record to show as to what could have prompted the Income Tax Officer to write the said letter without the authority of the said Board at the risk of incurring the displeasure of the said Board and having to face possible disciplinary action. In our view, the provisions of section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which deals with instructions given by the Board to its subordinate authorities for the proper administration of the Act has no application in this case which merely involves payment of rent for a tenanted premises at an enhanced rate and has nothing to do with the proper administration of the Income Tax Act, 1961. ( 53 ) WE can, therefore, have no reason to disbelieve the contents of the said letter of 24th January, 1996, which clearly holds out a promise from the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, to enhance the rent for the premises in question to Rs. 15. ( 53 ) WE can, therefore, have no reason to disbelieve the contents of the said letter of 24th January, 1996, which clearly holds out a promise from the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, to enhance the rent for the premises in question to Rs. 15. 65p per square foot per month with effect from 1st September, 1992. The said position is strengthened by the subsequent letter dated 9th February, 1996, written by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax laying down the conditions for payment of the rents at the enhanced rate of Rs. 15. 65 paise per square foot per month and also by the fact that the rents at the enhanced rate of Rs. 15. 65 paise per square foot per month is being paid by the appellants from the month of November, 1998. ( 54 ) OF course it has been argued on behalf of the appellants that such payment could not be construed as acquiescence or waiver since the appellant had decided to pay at the enhanced rate of Rs. 15. 65 paise per square foot per month on and from the month of November, 1998, when the writ petitioner was disposed of and pending decision in the appeal. Such an argument does not really help the appellant's case but seems to indicate that the appellants had already taken a decision to enhance the rate of rent culminating in the letter of 24th January, 1996. ( 55 ) IT is the offer to increase the monthly rental which distinguishes this case from the several decisions cited by Mr. Shome in support of his submission that a writ could not issue to enforce a non-statutory contract. Furthermore, as pointed out by Mr. Pal, the Bench decision of this Court in Rabindra Nath Nandi's case is also not applicable in this case since the acceptance of the recommendation of the Hiring Committee is not germane to the facts of this case. What is of relevance is the offer made by the Hiring Department itself to raise the rents by a specified amount and making payment at such enhanced rate from the month of November, 1998. In our view, the Hiring Department cannot now contend that it was incompetent to make such an offer having regard to the observations made in Rabindra Nath Nandi's case. In our view, the Hiring Department cannot now contend that it was incompetent to make such an offer having regard to the observations made in Rabindra Nath Nandi's case. The facts of the said case were quite different from the facts of this case. In Rabindra Nath Nandi's case (supra) no offer was made by the Hiring Department to enhance the rent by a specific rate. In this case we are not concerned with the question as to whether the Hiring Department was bound by the recommendation made by the Hiring Committee, since the Hiring Department made an independent offer which was accepted by the appellants. ( 56 ) THIS brings us to the next contention of the appellants that the writ petition was not maintainable for enforcement of a money claim in the absence for a non-statutory contract and also in view of the fact that an alternate remedy was available to the writ petitioners/respondents by way of the pending suit. ( 57 ) THE writ Courts generally do not interfere where a money claim arising out of a non-statutory contract is involved, but that is not to say that they cannot do so in appropriate cases. In the instant case a promise was held out on behalf of a statutory authority but the same was not acted upon. The learned single Judge only directed the appellants to act on the basis of their promise and in the process quantified the amount that became due and payable to the writ petitioners/respondents on the basis of their offer. No disputed questions were involved in the matter of the calculation made by the learned single Judge on the basis of the enhanced rats of rent offered by the appellants. The offer made by the statutory authorities altered the complexion of the case making it amenable to writ jurisdiction. ( 58 ) AS pointed out earlier, in all the cases relied upon on behalf of the appellants, the element of promissory estoppel by a statutory authority was lacking. On the other hand, such an element was the basis of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. case (supra) and of this Court in the case of Surendra Prasad Mishra (supra) relied upon by Mr. Pal. The other judgments cited by Mr. Pal, namely, M/s. Hyderabad Commerce v. Indian Bank and Ors. On the other hand, such an element was the basis of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. case (supra) and of this Court in the case of Surendra Prasad Mishra (supra) relied upon by Mr. Pal. The other judgments cited by Mr. Pal, namely, M/s. Hyderabad Commerce v. Indian Bank and Ors. (supra) and Government of Tamil Nadu v. R. Thillaivillalan (supra) support his submission that in appropriate cases the writ Courts may interfere to enforce a money claim. ( 59 ) THE submissions made on behalf of the appellants as to the existence of an alternate remedy by way of the pending suit, are also without merit, inasmuch as, the claim in the suit was restricted to the period from 1st September, 1982 to 30th June, 1987, for payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 8. 46 paise per square foot per month while in the writ petitioners were seeking to enforce a claim based upon the offer of the appellants to enhance the rate of rent to Rs. 15. 65 paise pe square foot per month with effect from 1st September, 1987. ( 60 ) THE second contention of the appellants relating to the maintain- ability of the writ petition also fails. ( 61 ) WE are also unable to accept Mr. Shome's other submission that since the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, is a welfare legislation and the Rent Controller has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the fair rent payable in respect of a premises, the parties could not contract out of statute and agree to payment of a rent which had not been adjudicated as the fair rent by the Rent Controller. In the Instant case it is nobody's case that steps had been taken by either of the parties for determination of the fair rent of the premises in question by Rent Controller. The parties having agreed to the payment of the rents at a certain rate, the rents were and are being paid at such contractual rate. In the Instant case it is nobody's case that steps had been taken by either of the parties for determination of the fair rent of the premises in question by Rent Controller. The parties having agreed to the payment of the rents at a certain rate, the rents were and are being paid at such contractual rate. What is in dispute is the offer to enhance the contractual rate and not fixation of fair rent and the appellants, therefore, are bound to pay the rents at the contractual rate as per section 4 (1) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and the question of contracting out of statute cannot arise in the instant case. ( 62 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order of the learned single Judge and the appeal is, therefore, dismissed along with the stay application, without any order as to costs. ( 63 ) ALL parties are to Act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertakings. ( 64 ) HAVING regard to the observations made hereinbefore in the judgment, prayer for stay made on behalf of the Appellants is considered and refused. S. N. Bhattacharjee J. :-While I fully agree with the finding of my learned brother Altamas Kabir, J. , I like to add a few lines by citing a decision of the Supreme Court laying down the cases where the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be enforced against the State Authorities by issuing a writ. 66. In M/s. Git Rao Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1980 SC 1285 the apex Court after a detailed discussion of a cantena of decisions and authorities on the point has laid down :-"on a consideration of the decision of this Court it is clear that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power of the State. So also the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority and a person dealing with the agent of the Government must be held to have notice of the limitations of his authority. The Government would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority and a person dealing with the agent of the Government must be held to have notice of the limitations of his authority. The Court can enforce compliance by a public authority of the obligation laid on him if he arbitrarily or on his mere whims ignores the promise made by him on behalf of the Government. It would be open to the authority to plead and prove that there were special considerations which necessitated his not being able to comply with his obligations in public interest. " 67. In the instant case, there having no pleading proof that there was special consideration which necessitated the appellant's not being able to comply with the obligation arising out of the promise held out in the letter of the officer dated 24. 1. 96, the said promise is enforceable by issuing an appropriate writ. Appeal dismissed.