Judgment :- RAMACHANDRAN, J. The above two appeals arise from the judgment in O.P. No. 2416 of 1998. W.A. No. 1080/98 is filed by the respondents, viz., State of Kerala, Director of Collegiate Education and the Departmental Promotion Committee of Higher Education Department. Mr. P. T. Govindan Nambiar, Principal, G.P.M. Government College, Manjeswar had impleaded in the appeal as second respondent. He had also filed a separate appeal as W.A. No. 1395 of 1999, after obtaining leave from the Court he being not party to the earlier proceedings. The Original Petition leading to the present appeals had been filed by Smt. K. Suseela George, while working as Principal of the Government College, Kanjiramkulam. She had been promoted provisionally as Principal and regularised by order dated 26-3-1996. Her complaint was that though steps were in progress for selection for promotion as Principal (Special Grade)/Deputy Director of Collegiate Education and the Departmental Promotion Committee was being convened, her claims were not being taken note of, whereas her juniors were included in the list. Intervention of the Court, therefore, had been sought for. It appears that during 1986 Smt. Suseela George had relinquished her claims for promotion as IInd Grade Professor and by Ext. P1 dated 10-7-1986 Government had granted such permission permanently and unconditionally. It was a provisional promotion that had been offered. Notwithstanding she had been given a placement based on her seniority as a lecturer (Selection Grade) effective from 1-8-1986 in view of introduction of U.G.C. Scheme and she was continuing as such. It had also been stated that in the final integrated seniority list as on 13-3-1990 of Lecturers (Selection Grade) she had been given a rank of 257, and on that basis she had secured promotion as Principal on 21-12-1995. She was therefore very much in the field of reckoning. She got alerted since her Confidential Records had not been called for by the Director. She was about to be so side lined in the preliminaries to the selection of Deputy Director. In almost identical circumstances, by judgment in O.P. No. 2463 of 1996, this Court had declared that relinquishment of promotion as Grade II Professor did not disentitle a lecturer from being promoted to the higher cadres. It had been pointed out that the introduction of U.G.C. Scheme had completely changed the structure of Collegiate Education Service. Mr. In almost identical circumstances, by judgment in O.P. No. 2463 of 1996, this Court had declared that relinquishment of promotion as Grade II Professor did not disentitle a lecturer from being promoted to the higher cadres. It had been pointed out that the introduction of U.G.C. Scheme had completely changed the structure of Collegiate Education Service. Mr. Justice C. S. Rajan in the above O.P. had observed as follows :"Ext. R1 is dated 22-11-1985. That was long before the U.G.C. Scheme was introduced in the State. As noted earlier, the whole format of the Collegiate Education Service undergone a change after the introduction of the U.G.C. Scheme. The post to which the petitioner was promoted in 1985 and which was relinquished by her ceased to exist. Moreover, the petitioner was promoted as Principal as per Ext. P4 order along with several others. Therefore Ext. R1 relinquishment order has lost its relevance and even the Government have not acted on Ext. R1 while promoting the petitioner as per Ext. P1. Therefore, the petitioner's seniority as recognised in Ext. P3 must hold good for further promotion to the cadre of Principal (Special Grade), Deputy Director and Additional Director." The petitioner in her Original Petition had sought for identical reliefs. Taking note of the position the learned Judge had allowed the Original Petition. And the Departmental Promotion Committee had been directed to include the name of the petitioner along with others already brought within the field of choice. Against the decision the State has filed the above appeal on the plea that on principle the judgment should not be allowed to stand. A stand is taken that the promotions given to the petitioner after relinquishment did not have the effect of 'waiving' the relinquishment which was already on records. It was further pointed out that in view of Rule 38 of the Kerala State and Sub-ordinate Services Rules, 1958, the petitioner's relinquishment was real and operated to make her slide from her position of seniority in favour of her juniors. It had been claimed that the promotions were awarded to her by mistake or by an oversight and therefore the claims urged had no merit in them. It had been claimed that the promotions were awarded to her by mistake or by an oversight and therefore the claims urged had no merit in them. Therefore, according to the appellant State, directions issued in the impugned judgment was illegal and unsupportable and the single Judge had committed an error in allowing the original petition.The challenge fielded by the appellant Sri P. T. Govindan Nambiar in W.A. No. 1395 of 1999 was also of the same nature. According to him, his position of seniority in the final seniority list of Selection Grade lecturers was 263, and that of the petitioner 257, but this was due to an omission to note the relinquishment submitted by her and accepted by the Government. He had highlighted the entries in Ext. P2 seniority list and stressed on the endorsement noted against a good number of teaching staff indicating their conduct of relinquishment. In fact the seniority list would show that officers who had submitted relinquishment letters were earmarked for easy identification. As against the petitioner, such entry was not there and the appellant forcefully urged that it was solely because of the clerical omission to note her relinquishment, that she was promoted from time to time. He also pointed out that promotion was not given to any of the persons among the list who had submitted letters of relinquishment, and the circumstance was pointed out as the consistent policy followed by the Government. The argument, therefore, was that the petitioner was ineligible to get her name included in the list of personnel, eligible to be promoted as Special Grade Principals/Deputy Directors, she being an usurper, and the learned single Judge therefore went wrong in allowing the claims. Even though there was an application for stay of the operation of the judgment, the Division Bench had disallowed the prayer and had issued positive orders, endorsing the direction of the learned single Judge. Consequently, the petitioner had been cleared by the DPC and had been awarded promotion. The appellant had retired as Principal during the pendency of the appeal. Notwithstanding, the appellant had pressed for a decision on merit, as according to him, if the ineligible promotion awarded to the petitioner is set aside, he would have advantage in the matter of his notional promotion and other benefits. The appellant had retired as Principal during the pendency of the appeal. Notwithstanding, the appellant had pressed for a decision on merit, as according to him, if the ineligible promotion awarded to the petitioner is set aside, he would have advantage in the matter of his notional promotion and other benefits. He, therefore, drew a distinction from another judgment where a Bench, noticing the retirement of the parties, had closed the matter without further probe (W.A. No. 635/98 from O.P. No. 2463/96). As the appellants pressed for a decision on merit, we had heard the parties at length.From an examination of the attendant facts, however, we are of the opinion that the judgment does not need interference. The impact of the relinquishment, according to the learned single Judge, had already stood relegated to the background. By the introduction of the U.G.C. Scheme, a complete change in the service had been brought about. Even the designations were no more available. We agree. The relinquishment had lost significance. Further, we had opportunity to examine the legal position that is involved in the case. It cannot be disputed that a provisional appointment does not confer any substantive right to the appointee. A promotion envisaged under Rule 31 of the K.S. & S.S.R. cannot confer any right on the incumbent a right for regular promotion or seniority. In such circumstances when there is an offer for a provisional promotion and the government servant declines to accept the post, it is difficult to lay down that he will forfeit his rights for all time to come. We can recapitulate that perhaps, due to personal reasons, when the petitioner had declined provisional promotion, a declaration was obtained from her which was presumably as envisaged under Rule 38 of the K.S. & S.S.R. The said Rule refers to relinquishment of rights or privilege to which a person is entitled, and it embodies a wholesome principle. Relinquishment can be accepted, if not opposed to public policy. A promotion also could be relinquished. But, it is reasonable to assume that the relinquishment of promotion referred to in the Explanation to the Rule, brought about by G.O. (P) 280/82 dated 16-9-1982, which entails loss of seniority is intended to be applied not in any promotions, but only pertaining to regular promotions. A promotion also could be relinquished. But, it is reasonable to assume that the relinquishment of promotion referred to in the Explanation to the Rule, brought about by G.O. (P) 280/82 dated 16-9-1982, which entails loss of seniority is intended to be applied not in any promotions, but only pertaining to regular promotions. We are fortified in our finding since it is noticeable that the Rule envisages relinquishment as a right or privilege and not as a disability. If what could be relinquished by an employee is only a right or privilege, the corollary is that it may not be possible to give away what he does not have in tangible terms as a right or privilege. It is not disputed that the petitioner had relinquished only a provisional or temporary promotion. On terms of the rule, such promotion is conferred by the Government to avoid excessive expenditure or travelling allowance or exceptional administrative inconvenience. Promotee is expressly disentitled to be recognised as a probationer; he is also not able to stake any preferential claims for future promotion to such higher category. Probation has to be commenced from the date of the regular promotion and in case the appointing authority decides to reckon the period from an earlier date, it should be without prejudice to the seniority. Note that it is not his seniority alone but seniority in rem. In short, the Rule bestows on a temporary promotee (known also as a provisional promotee) only the higher monetary benefits admissible to the post in accordance with the Rules. In such situation, it is difficult to agree to the proposition that he loses his seniority. He has no seniority to lose. And such an understanding of the Rule would be against service jurisprudence.The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the petitioner irrevocably lost her seniority by the relinquishment is a difficult proposition to be accepted. The appellants referred to a Bench decision in O.P. No. 2807/96, but the learned Judges had only made an observation that if there is a mistake it should be rectified. We see that no law as is canvassed has been laid down in the said decision. There was no finding that in the case of provisional promotion, a relinquishment adversely affected the Government servants seniority position. We see that no law as is canvassed has been laid down in the said decision. There was no finding that in the case of provisional promotion, a relinquishment adversely affected the Government servants seniority position. On the other hand, the learned Judge (Sreedharan, J as he then was), who was a party to the said ruling, had in explicit terms espoused the legal position in another judgment rendered by him in Bhanu Viswanathan v. State of Kerala (O.P. No. 12812 of 1991). In the matter of relinquishment and the procedure to be followed, Government had issued orders as G.O. (P) 8/89/P & ARD dated 12-4-1989. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted hereinbelow : "By Exhibit P2 order, petitioner, who was holding the post of Deputy Secretary in the office of Controller of Kerala House, New Delhi, was promoted to the cadre of Joint Secretary under Rule 31(a)(i) of the General Rules. Since her children were studying in New Delhi, she found it difficult to join the post of Joint Secretary in the Industries Department, Thiruvananthapuram. So, she approached the Government stating that the right for promotion for the period from 8-10-1990 and 31-7-1991 be relinquished. What can be the consequence of such a relinquishment ? Government laid down guidelines, among other things, for the proper guidance of the appointing authorities in the case of relinquishment of the right for promotion in G.O. (P) 8/89/P & ARD dated 12-4-1989. Clauses (ii) and (iv) of the guidelines are in the following terms :(ii) In the case of temporary appointment/promotion relinquishment can be accepted for specific period subject to the condition that the juniors temporarily promoted during the period of relinquishment of the seniors will have superior claims for continuance in the promoted post and for other benefits attached to the higher posts. (iv) In the case of regular promotion/appointment relinquishment can be accepted for a specific period or permanently. The seniority will be lost to the extent to which it has been so relinquished. Admittedly the promotion given to the petitioner under Exhibit P2 was under Rule 31(a)(i). On the relinquishment of that promotion, the juniors temporarily promoted during the period of relinquishment will have superior claims for continuance in the promoted post and for other benefits attached to the higher post. Admittedly the promotion given to the petitioner under Exhibit P2 was under Rule 31(a)(i). On the relinquishment of that promotion, the juniors temporarily promoted during the period of relinquishment will have superior claims for continuance in the promoted post and for other benefits attached to the higher post. It does not state that the senior, who has relinquished the temporary promotion, will lose the seniority when regular promotion is effected. As per clause (iv), quoted above, in the case of regular promotion alone can relinquishment affect the seniority. Petitioner having relinquished a temporary promotion under Rule 31(a)(i) of the General Rules, cannot be taken to have lost the seniority in the cadre of Deputy Secretary ........ This being the position, no junior to the petitioner in the cadre of Deputy Secretary, who got promotion to the cadre of Joint Secretary on account of the relinquishment made by the petitioner, can claim seniority in that cadre when regular promotion to that cadre is taken up." Of course in the case of the petitioner she had relinquished the temporary promotion in 1986 and before the G.O. But, as held by us earlier, the Rule admits of no ambiguity. The Bench decision Joseph v. State reported in 1987 2 Ker LT 579 had examined the issue from a different angle and has no relevance to the facts of the present case. We are of the view that the appellants are not at all on solid grounds when they attack the judgment under appeal.It may be that on an erroneous understanding, promotion might have been denied to several persons, on the assumption that they had irrevocably lost their seniority by relinquishing temporary promotions. That can be no yardstick, guidance, precedent or reason for denying the petitioner her rightful claims. The error has to be corrected at some point. It is also to be noted that Sri Govindan Nambiar had not objected the higher placement given to the petitioner in the seniority list. The provisional list and the final list had not been challenged. When the petitioner was promoted as Principal in 1995, on the basis of the seniority in the gradation list, there was no challenge posed. And nobody ever had made any direct challenge at any time. Without inviting her objections, the Government had attempted to short circuit her eligibility for selection by a Departmental Promotion Committee. When the petitioner was promoted as Principal in 1995, on the basis of the seniority in the gradation list, there was no challenge posed. And nobody ever had made any direct challenge at any time. Without inviting her objections, the Government had attempted to short circuit her eligibility for selection by a Departmental Promotion Committee. This was not only illegal but also unfair, irregular and without application of mind. It violated her fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was also in violation of principles of natural justice. The intervention of this Court, therefore, was amply justified. The judgment of the learned single Judge has only to be confirmed. The appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.