Judgment B. S. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) THE instant writ petition has been filed challenging the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the petitioners land. ( 2 ) THE facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner had purchased the land on 17. 4. 1975 from respondents No. 4 to 6. measuring two Bighas and two Biswas. It appears that the mutation was not made in his name and in the meanwhile, a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the Act") dated 4. 2. 1997 was published in the official gazette dated 7. 2. 1997 and the substance thereof was also published in the local news paper on 25. 2. 1997. Petitioner initiated the legal proceedings for mutation and the same was allowed vide order dated 19. 4. 1997 and the land stood transferred in his name. Though petitioner had purchased the said land but he did not file any objection under Section 5-A of the act and Declaration under Section 6 of the act was made on 15. 6. 1998. Notices under section 9 (3) of the Act were served upon the persons whose names appeared in the revenue record on the date of publication of Section 4 notification i. e. respondents No. 4 to 6 and the Land Acquisition Collector drew the Award on 8. 3. 1999 and with the approval of the Collector, the same was made on 29. 4. 1999. Possession of the property had been taken on 25. 1. 1999 (Annx. 10 ). The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner on the grounds that he had not been given the notice as required under Section 9 (3), nor he had the opportunity to file objection under Section 5-a of the Act: Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was beyond statutory limitation and, therefore, ex-parte proceedings are bad and the same are liable to be quashed. . . ( 3 ) IN State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi, the Honble Apex Court has observed that where a large track of land is acquired and the land belong to large number of persons, challenging the entire acquisition at the instance of one or few persons should not be entertained, as it would hamper the development of the entire land and purpose, for which the land is sought to be acquired, would stood frustrated at the behest of few persons though the other affected persons have accepted the acquisition proceedings and accepted the award etc. ( 4 ) WHEN a person challenges Section 4 notification on any ground, it should be challenged within reasonable period and if the acquisition is challenged at a belated stage, the petition deserves to be dismissed only on this count, as explained by the Honble Supreme court in the case of Han Singh and Ors. v. State of U. P. , wherein it has been held that where a large area of land is acquired and the plots, which are subject to acquisition, belong to large number of persons, if other persons have not challenged the acquisition proceedings, it is difficult to believe that appellant was not aware of the initiation of the acquisition proceedings as the acquisition of the said land would be the talk of the town in a short time and if the person interested failed to approach the writ court within reasonable period, the petition should fail only on the ground of delay. ( 5 ) A Constitution Bench of the Honble supreme Court, in Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Gowernor, Delhi and Ors. , has observed as under:-". . . . to have sat in fence and allowed the government to complete the acquisition on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on the grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published, would be putting a premium of dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner. " ( 6 ) SAME view has been taken by the honble Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. V. K. Kangan, wherein it was observed that respondent was not entitled to challenge the validity of Section 4 Notification after an unreasonable lapse of time. If public notice, as required by Section 4 of the Act, was not given and that would per se vitiate the notification under Section 4, the person interested should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. ( 7 ) THE issue of delay in filing the writ petition was considered by the Honble Apex court in Smt. Sudama Devi v. Commissioner ors. , wherein the Apex Court has observed as under-"there is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is, in fact, doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event, one thing is clear and beyond doubt that no such period of limitation can be laid down either under the rules made by the High court or by practice. For every case, it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches arid that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner. "in State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnan, the Apex Court held that "the delay in challenging the notification was fatal and the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only" and exercise of power under Article 226, after the award had been made, was held to be unjustified. Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar7, and State of Orissa v. Dhobei sethi and Anr. , the Apex Court held that if the land acquisition proceedings stood finalised, interference by the writ court, quashing notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively, was unwarranted and uncalled for. Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar7, and State of Orissa v. Dhobei sethi and Anr. , the Apex Court held that if the land acquisition proceedings stood finalised, interference by the writ court, quashing notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively, was unwarranted and uncalled for. Exercise of jurisdiction in such a case cannot be said to be judicious and reasonable. Similar view has been reiterated in girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar; h. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra; Ram chand v. Union of India; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, and C. Padma v. Deputy secretary to Gout, of Tamil Nadu. In Municipal Corporation of Greater bombay v. I. D. I. Co. (Put.) Ltd. , the Honble supreme Court observed as under:-"if the interested person allows the grass to grow under his feet by allowing the acquisition proceedings to go on and reach its terminus in the award and possession is taken in. furtherance thereof and vest in the State free from all encumbrances, the slumbered interested person would be told off the gates of the Court that his grievance should not be entertained when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has no doubt, discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under section 4 (1) and Declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration, when the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not exercise its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. "similar view has been reiterated in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. D. R. Laxmi and Ors. , wherein the Apex Court has held that even the void proceedings need not be set at naught if the party has not approached the Court within reasonable time, as judicial review is not permissible at a belated stage. "similar view has been reiterated in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. D. R. Laxmi and Ors. , wherein the Apex Court has held that even the void proceedings need not be set at naught if the party has not approached the Court within reasonable time, as judicial review is not permissible at a belated stage. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Dolly Das, the Apex Court held as under-"so far as the contention regarding laches of the respondents in filing the writ petition is concerned, delay, by itself, may not defeat the claim for relief unless the position of payment had been so altered which cannot be retracted on account of lapse of time or inaction of the other party. This aspect, being dependent upon the examination of the facts of the case and such a contention not having been raised before the High court, it would not be appropriate to allow the appellants to raise such a contention for the first time before us. Besides, where the mode is that the period for which the option of renewal has been exercised, has not come to an end. During the subsistence of such a period, certainly the respondents could make a complaint that such exercise of option was not available to the appellants and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the High court could be invoked even at a later stage. Further, the appellants are not put to undue hardship in any manner by reason of this delay in approaching the High court for a relief. " ( 8 ) IN view of the above, as the petitioner has not approached the Court within reasonable time and allowed the completion of the acquisition proceedings, the petition is liable to be rejected only on the ground of delay. ( 9 ) MR. Shishodia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has urged that as the declaration under Section 6 was made after expiry of the statutory period of one year from the date of last publication of the substance of section 4 Notification, the proceedings cannot be held to be legal and petition must succeed only on this ground inspite of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. There is a complete fallacy in the said argument for the reason that in the instant case, the possession has already been taken and it is settled proposition of law that if the land vested in the State free from all encumbrances, there is no justification in interfering with the acquisition proceedings even if there had not been proper compliance of the mandatory provisions of the statute. (Vide Municipal Corporation of greater Bombay v. Industrial Development and Investment Co. (P) Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 286/1989, decided by the Honble Supreme court on 6. 9. 1996 and S. P. Jain v. State of u. P. ). ( 10 ) IN D. R Laxmi (supra), a Three Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court considered the earlier two judgments of the Honble two Judges Bench in M. P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shaft, and Nutakki Sesharatanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition, wherein it had been held that compliance of requirement of statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act was mandatory and non-compliance thereof would render all subsequent proceedings unexceptionally illegal. The Apex court held that those were the cases where the possession; had not been taken and the issue; whether violation of mandatory provisions render the result of action void or voidable, had not been considered in those cases. ( 11 ) THE Honble Supreme Court quoted and approved the passage from Administrative Law by h. W. R. Waid (7th Edn. , page 342- 43 ). Wherein it has been propounded that a court would invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and the circumstances, and the Court may refuse to quash the order if the party lacks of standing or he has waived his right or for some other reasons and in that situation, even a void order remains effective and is, in reality, valid, for the reason that for one purpose, an order may be void but valid for another. The Court further observed that the Court may, in appropriate case, decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void, as the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court may not be exercised in such circumstances. ( 12 ) MR. The Court further observed that the Court may, in appropriate case, decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void, as the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court may not be exercised in such circumstances. ( 12 ) MR. SHISHODIA has urged that the instant case is distinguishable as the respondents had taken the paper-possession and the petitioner is in actual physical possession of the land in dispute. ( 13 ) IN State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Ors. , the Supreme court held that possession of the acquired land is to be taken only by way of memorandum/panchanama, which is a legally accepted norm and it may not be possible for the-party to take actual physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, held by the erst-while owner is only illegal and unlawful possession which does not bind the Government, nor vested under Section 16, divested in the illegal occupant. ( 14 ) IF the case is examined from this perspective, no interference is warranted on this count also. ( 15 ) IT is next submitted by Mr. shishodia that the land acquisition proceedings stood vitiated as petitioner had not been served with a notice under Section 9 (3) of the Act. There is no force in this contention also. The Honble apex Court has taken a consistent view that the provisions of Section 9 (3) are not mandatory and if the compliance has not been made, the acquisition proceedings will not vitiate as it amounts to mere irregularity in service and is curable and on account thereof, the award does not become invalid (Vide State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Umashanker Rajabhau; and State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalakshmi Ammal (supra ). ( 16 ) IN view of the above, I find no force in the petition. Petitioner, at this stage, can claim compensation and if it had been withdrawn by respondents No. 4 to 6, the petitioner can recover the same from them and may approach the Appropriate Authority under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, as held by the Honble Supreme Court in Dr. Petitioner, at this stage, can claim compensation and if it had been withdrawn by respondents No. 4 to 6, the petitioner can recover the same from them and may approach the Appropriate Authority under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, as held by the Honble Supreme Court in Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of Bihar, wherein it has been held that the land-owner had a right to raise a dispute relating to apportionment from the person, to whom it is payable, and apply to the court for reference under Section 30 for determination of his right to compensation, which may have existed before the award, or which may have devolved upon him since the award under section 18, an application made to the collector has to be made within the period prescribed by Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of section 18. But no such period is prescribed under Section 30, whereas under Section 18, the Collector is bound to make a reference; he may relegate the person raising the dispute to agitate the same in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared by his award. The powers under Sections 18 and 30 are distinct and may be invoked in contingency, which did not over-lap. Thus, petitioner may resort to legal proceedings for compensation, as explained above. ( 17 ) IN the result, the petition is dismissed without notice to the other side. Petition dismissed.