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2000 DIGILAW 42 (HP)

STATE OF H. P. v. RAJINDER KUMAR THAPAR

2000-03-15

M.R.VERMA

body2000
JUDGMENT M. R. Verma, J (oral):- The petitioner seeks admission of the present petition on the ground that the order dated 1.6.1999 passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla, dismissing the application of the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31.3.1997 of the learned Sub Judge (1), Shimla is contrary to the settled principles of law and is injudicious. 2. I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioner and the learned counsel for respondent and have also gone through the relevant records. 3. It is expedient to briefly refer to the facts leading to the presentation of the petition. The respondent instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 73,244.99 on account of damages caused to his land and apple trees by the Public Works Department during the construction of Pandli-Pungrish road in the year 1985. The suit was contested by the petitioner but was finally decreed by the learned trial Judge on 31.3.1997. The State filed an appeal against the said judgment and decree in the court of learned District Judge, Shimla on 18.2.1998 much after the expiry of the period of limitation, therefore, an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was also presented. The delay was sought to be explained on the grounds that the petitioner came to know about the passing of the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.3.1997 on 16.1.1998 when one R.S. Jhangta was deputed to procure the certified copies of the judgment and decree which were received on 17.1.1998. Thereafterthe matterwas processed at various levels and in the meanwhile the Court of District Judge was closed for winter vacations. Thereafter, on the opening day i.e. on 18.2.1998 the appeal was filed. The learned District Judge after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that there is no ground, leave alone a sufficient ground, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and accordingly dismissed the application for condonation of delay vide impugned order dated 1.6.1999. Hence, the present revision petition. 4. The learned District Judge after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that there is no ground, leave alone a sufficient ground, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and accordingly dismissed the application for condonation of delay vide impugned order dated 1.6.1999. Hence, the present revision petition. 4. It was contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that the condonation of delay in this case was sought by the Government, therefore, strict standard of proof in respect of sufficient cause for condonation of delay could not be insisted upon and the approach of the Court below should have been pragmatic and that the impugned order has led to grave mis-carriage of public justice. To support his contention the learned Additional Advocate General has relied on Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows :- "2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day-to-day delay. The transaction df the business of the Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages,they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the state and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skillful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every days delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned." 5. Under those circumstances, the subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every days delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned." 5. A bare perusal of the above proposition of law makes it abundantly clear that as and when delay in preferring a cause is sought to be condoned by the Government the court should not insist on seeking explanation of day to day delay for the reason that in the Government offices files remain pending at different levels of hierarchy for decision in such matter unattended for considerable time for want of evincing personal interest and taking personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. However, the above proposition of law by no stretch of imagination means that inaction on the part of the Government to prefer appeal, revision etc. within the period of limitation has not to be explained at all nor does it mean utter inaction or inefficiency at the concerned level must invariably be ignored so as to make the law of limitation virtually inapplicable to the Government. 6. In the instant case the judgment and decree was passed by the trial Court on 31st of March, 1997 and the judgment was admittedly pronounced in the presence of Assistant District Attorney representing the petitioner. The concerned Department of the state was the public works Department and one R.S. Jhangta working in the office of Executive Engineer, Jubbal admittedly used to appear in the Court in connection with the case in which the impugned judgment and decree had been passed. It is also the admitted case of the petitioner that application for supply of copies of the judgment and decree was moved on 17.1.1998. Thus, the petitioner was represented before the Court by one of its representative and by its agent i.e. Assistant District Attorney who was present when the judgment was announced. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why application for supply of copy was not made immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment announced in the presence of the Assistant District Attorney who has the authority as also the duty to apply for such copies immediately thereafter. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why application for supply of copy was not made immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment announced in the presence of the Assistant District Attorney who has the authority as also the duty to apply for such copies immediately thereafter. There is also no explanation as to why the petitioner did not apply for the certified copies for a period of more than 9 months. Thus, it is not a question of explaining day to day delay but is a case of utter inaction despite knowledge through agent for a period of more than 9 months, and condonation of this colossal delay which is the result of inaction will virtually mean perversion of the law of limitation. 7. As has been held in Special Tehsildars case supra, section 5 of a the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in matters of Limitation makes no distinction between the state and the citizen. Thus, unexplained delay by the state in filing the appeal cannot be condoned though at times it may have harsh results. The law of Limitation has to be applied with its rigour as prescribed in the statute and the Courts have no powers to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds much less on the ground of utter inaction by the public functionaries. 8. In a recent judgment in case P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and another, A.I.R.1998 SC 2276, wherein the State sought condonation of delay in filing the appeal, the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows: "6. Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained..." 9. In view of the above latest position in law and there being no reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay the learned District Judge was fully justified in dismissing the application. 10. Therefore, the present Revision petition is without any merit and substance and not worth being admitted and is accordingly dismissed.