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2000 DIGILAW 42 (KAR)

RITA MENEZES v. MANGALORE CORPORATION

2000-01-14

A.V.SRINIVASA REDDY, V.BHASKARA RAO

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SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition filed in public interest the petitioners, claiming to be public spirited citizens, pray for a writ in the nature of certiorari setting aside the resolution bearing No. C5. MA. NA. PA-321 dated 20-5-1998 on the ground that it is illegal and opposed to public interest. ( 2 ) ). The brief facts of the case are :respondents 3 and 4 obtained licence for construction of apartments in Ward No. 104 (4d) of Kadri, Mangalore vide Licence dated 1-11-1993 and 27-9-1994, respectively, to construct apartments. It is contended by the petitioners that they put up additional floors in violation of the licence granted. At the instance of one Sri. Melvyr Peris the respondent No. 1 issued notice dated 24-6-1997 to respondents 3 and 4 under S. 308 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976. As the respondents 3 and 4 did not give any explanation, the notice issued earlier was confirmed under S. 321 (3) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act and the respondents were informed that action would be taken under S. 436 of the Act to demolish the building at the cost of the respondents. In response to this notice the respondents 3 and 4 gave a reply on 10-2-1998 which was also rejected and the notice issued under S. 321 (3) of the Act was confirmed. The respondents 3 and 4 went in appeal to the Standing Committee against the said order. The Standing Committee set aside the notice and imposed penalty and directed issue of licence. Aggrieved by the said direction of the Standing Committee the petitioners have preferred this writ petition. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners. ( 4 ) THE resolution passed vide Annexure-B, was on a complaint made by one Sri Melvyr Peris. There was no complaint made against the unauthorised construction of the additional floor by either of the petitioners. The petitioners were not parties to the proceedings before the corporation or to the proceedings before the Standing Committee. The said Melvyr Peris at whose instance the proceedings were initiated by the corporation has not challenged the resolution of the Standing Committee. There was no complaint made against the unauthorised construction of the additional floor by either of the petitioners. The petitioners were not parties to the proceedings before the corporation or to the proceedings before the Standing Committee. The said Melvyr Peris at whose instance the proceedings were initiated by the corporation has not challenged the resolution of the Standing Committee. S. 444 (2) of the Act provides that where the Standing Committee reverses or substantially modifies any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him, he may, within sixty days of the date of such decision, refer the matter to the Corporation, and pending the decision of the Corporation on such reference, the Commissioner shall not be bound to give effect to the decision of the Standing Committee. From the records it is not clear whether the matter has been referred to the Corporation by the Commissioner. The matter relates to construction of apartments. The allegation of the petitioners is that respondents 3 and 4 have put up an additional floor without valid licence. If the petitioners were really serious about espousing the cause of public interest they should have resorted to the procedure laid down under the Act. Having not done so, it is not open to the petitioners to challenge in a public interest litigation the resolution vide Annexure-B which was passed in a proceedings to which the petitioners were not parties. The petitioners are also not in a position to clarify whether the matter has been referred to the corporation under S. 444 (2) or not. In this state of affairs it is not possible for this Court to exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction to quash Annexure-B. It is likely that the additional floors constructed may have been sold to third parties and since third party rights are involved it would not be proper to interfere in the matter at the behest of petitioners who were not at all parties to the proceedings before the corporation. Therefore, we find no merit in the writ petition and it is liable to be dismissed. In the result, for the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .