Per S.N. Jha, J. Record of Rights-It is were settled that although entry in the record of rights prepared under the respective tenancy law is conclusion proof of correctness of entry it has only presumption evidentiary value which can be rebutted in Civil Courts-It is also well settled that the entries in the record of rights do neither create nor extinguish one's right, title and interest in the land. (Para 27) Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956-Section 37-Suits based on title challenging the correctness of entry in the register of lands under the Consolidation Act are not barred in Civil Courts. (Para 42) 1997(1) All PLR 302-Appoved. AIR 1930 PC 54, AIR 1953 SC 244 , AIR 1958 SC 687 , AIR 1959 SC 352 , AIR 1962 SC 663 , AIR 1973 SC 457, 1985 PLJR 76, 1999 BBCJ 722, 1979 BBCJ 735 , 1950 BBCJ 191, 1986 BBCJ 343 , 1980 BBCJ 544 , 1979 BBCJ 566 -Ref. 1989 PLJR 1203 (FB); AIR 1960 SC 936 - Relied. Per Nagendra Rai, J. The consolidation authorities have power to decide the question of title and the decision rendered by them on the question of title is final and the same cannot be challenged in a Civil Court in view of specific provision contained in section 37 of the Act-It is clarified that such orders passed or recorded without complying with the provisions of the Act or against the fundamental principles of Judicial procedure or obtained by fraud is amenable to the jurisdiction of Civil Court. (Para 39) AIR 1979 Pat 250 , 1985 PLJR 86 (FB), (1859)6 CB (NS) 336, AIR 1940 PC 105, AIR 1960 SC 796 , AIR 1969 SC 78 , AIR 1977 SC 3082, AIR 1953 SC 244 , 1952 AC 109, AIR 1991 SC 672 , AIR 1990 SC 261 , AIR 1991 SC 249 -Relied. 1989 PLJR 1203 (FB)-1974 PLJR 27 (FB)-Dist. Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956-Section 37B-Consolidation authorities have been conferred with the power of Civil Court or the competent Court so that the judgment/ order rendered by them will have the same effect as the court of Competent Jurisdiction-Such proceeding in Civil Court will operate as resjudicata. 1989 PLJR 1203 (FB)-1974 PLJR 27 (FB)-Dist. Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956-Section 37B-Consolidation authorities have been conferred with the power of Civil Court or the competent Court so that the judgment/ order rendered by them will have the same effect as the court of Competent Jurisdiction-Such proceeding in Civil Court will operate as resjudicata. (Paras 15 & 27) Agreed with the reasonings of S.N. Jha, J. that the question of title cannot be decided by the consolidation court and as such a suit in Civil Court is maintainable. (Para 27) Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956-Section 37B-Consolidation authorities have been conferred with the status of "deemed Courts" -In the strict sense of the term it cannot be said to be court rather they are tribunals. (Paras 30, 35) Interpretation of Statutes-A statute is an edict of the legislature-The legislature enacts law with certain purpose-The purpose may be either to control certain public evil or to effect beneficial policies-While interpreting a provision, the Court has to see the effect of the plain meaning. (Para 26) Precedents-Judicial consistency is not the highest state of legal bliss Law must grow-It cannot afford to be '"static and therefore Judges ought to imply an intelligent technique in use of precedent-:-Precedents should be stepping stones and not halting places. (Para 31) AIR 1976 SC 1441 -Relied. Precedents-Certainty is the necessity of law, that would disappear if judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decision-In a multi-Judge Court, he Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. (Paras 32 & 33) JUDGMENT S.N. JHA, J.:- This civil revision by the plaintiff is directed against the order dated 27th September 1996 passed by the 4th Subordinate Judge, Sasaram, in title Suit NO.37 of 1995 by which the suit has been abated under section 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (in short 'the Consolidation Act'). 2. The plaintiff-petitioner filed the suit for declaration of his exclusive title over the suit land comprising of R.S. plot no. 1617 situate at Mokar in the district of Sasaram. 2. The plaintiff-petitioner filed the suit for declaration of his exclusive title over the suit land comprising of R.S. plot no. 1617 situate at Mokar in the district of Sasaram. His case is that the suit land along with other lands was settled with him by the ex-landlord, who at the time of vesting submitted the return in his (plaintiff's) name on the basis of which his name was recorded in register II and he has been paying rent. One Guru Narain Singh, descendant of the recorded tenant, initially got the land recorded in his name in the revisional survey records. However, his claim was finally rejected by the survey authorities. It was held that the property did not belong to Guru Narain Singh, rather it belonged to the plaintiff and defendants of the present suit. In the circumstances, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of his exclusive title over the suit land. 3. Defendant no.1 on appearance filed application for abatement of the suit under section 4(c) of the Consolidation Act on the ground that the area in question had been notified under section 3 of that Act and the consolidation operations were going on. The plaintiff submitted a rejoinder stating that the notification has been cancelled under section 4A of the Act and, therefore, the suit could proceed. The court below by its impugned order dated 27.6.96 apparently did not accept the plea and passed the order for abatement. 4. When this revision came up for hearing before one of us (Nagendra Rai, J.) on behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on a Bench decision of this Court in Hari Narayan Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1997(1) All PLR 302, in support of the contention that the consolidation operation comes to an end after final publication of the record of right under section 16 of the Consolidation Act, and, therefore, the suit would not abate. The learned Judge expressed doubts about the correctness of the aforesaid decision in view of the decision of the Special Bench in Ramkrit Singh & ors. Vs. State of Bihar, 1979 BBCJ 259 : AIR 1979 Patna 250: 1979 PLJR 161 (SB). Notice, however, was issued to the opposite party. The learned Judge expressed doubts about the correctness of the aforesaid decision in view of the decision of the Special Bench in Ramkrit Singh & ors. Vs. State of Bihar, 1979 BBCJ 259 : AIR 1979 Patna 250: 1979 PLJR 161 (SB). Notice, however, was issued to the opposite party. On appearance, after hearing the learned Judge vide his order dated 29th October 1997 came to the conclusion that in view of the conflicting Bench decisions on different points, it would be proper if the controversy is set at rest by a larger Bench.. Record of the case was accordingly ordered to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice, who constituted this Full Bench and the matter thus came up for hearing before us. 5. From the order under reference dated 29th October 1997 it appears that apart from the question as to when the consolidation operations come to an end, the learned Judge also expressed doubts about the correctness of the decision in Hari Narayan Singh's case (supra) on the point as to whether the bar created by section 10A, also precludes the Director of Consolidation from entertaining revision under section 35 of the Act to satisfy himself that the proceeding has been conducted in a regular manner and/or the order passed by a subordinate authority is correct, legal and proper, and pass an appropriate order in the case or proceeding as he thinks fit. The Division, Bench in Hari Narayan Singh's case (supra) has held that the bar created by section 10A was applicable to the exercise of power under section 35. Another point on which reference has been made is whether the suit challenging the correctness of any entry in the record of right/certificate of transfer on the basis of title is maintainable. In Hari Narayan Singh's case it has been held that section 37 bars only such suits to vary or set aside any decision or order under the Act, it does not preclude a party from filing suit challenging the correctness of the entries in the record of right on the basis of title. 6. It would, thus, appear that as per the order of reference three questions arise for consideration in this case: (1) Whether the consolidation operation comes to an end with the final publication of the record of right under section 16 of the Consolidation Act? 6. It would, thus, appear that as per the order of reference three questions arise for consideration in this case: (1) Whether the consolidation operation comes to an end with the final publication of the record of right under section 16 of the Consolidation Act? (2) Whether the bar of section 10A applies to the exercise of revisional power under section 35 of the Consolidation Act? and (3) Whether a suit based on title challenging the correctness of the entries in the record of right published under section 16 of the Consolidation Act is maintainable in the civil court? 7. Before answering the questions and referring to the particular provisions which fall for interpretation, it would be apt to briefly notice the scheme of the Consolidation Act. Section 3 of the Act provides that with the object of effecting consolidation of holdings for the purpose of better cultivation of lands in any area the State Government may by notification in the official gazette declare its intention to make a scheme for the consolidation of holdings in that area. Section 4 provides for the effects i.e. consequences of the notification under section 3. So far as relevant, clause (b) bars any suit or other legal proceeding in respect of any land within such area while clause (c) provides for abatement of every proceeding for correction of records any every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of right or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under the Act, pending before any court or authority-whether of the first instance or appeal, reference or revision. Section 4A provides for cancellation of the notification under section in respect of whole or part of the area covered by the notification. It lays down that where the notification is cancelled, the concerned area shall subject to the final orders relating to correction of land record, if any, passed on or before the date of such cancellation, cease to be under consolidation operations with effect from the date of the cancellation. 8. Section 7 provides for constitution of Village Advisory Committee. It lays down that where the notification is cancelled, the concerned area shall subject to the final orders relating to correction of land record, if any, passed on or before the date of such cancellation, cease to be under consolidation operations with effect from the date of the cancellation. 8. Section 7 provides for constitution of Village Advisory Committee. Section 8 provides for updating of the record of right in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, Sahthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872 or the Bihar Tenants Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973, whichever is applicable. Section 9A provides for preparation of register of lands in accordance with the record of right so updated under section 8. Section 9 provides for preparation of statement of principles to be followed in carrying out the consolidation operations. Section 10 provides for publication of register of lands prepared under section 9 and the statement of principles published under section 9A. Any person dissatisfied with the correctness of the entries or the statement of principles may file objection under sub-section (2) of section 10. Order passed on such objection is subject to appeal under sub-section (6). The provisions of section 10 have a (sic-bearing?) on Question No.2 formulated above and I shall refer to the same later in this judgment. 9. Sections 11 and 12 provides for preparation and publication of the draft consolidation scheme and objections etc. thereto. Any person feeling aggrieved by the draft scheme may file objection subject to the provisions of section 10A. It is this provision which falls for interpretation vide question no.2 (supra) and I shall, naturally, refer to it again in this judgment. Continuing with narration of the scheme, Section 12A provides for disposal of objections to draft consolidation scheme. Section 12B provides for publication of the revised draft consolidation scheme. Section 13 provides for submission of the scheme to the Director of Consolidation. Section 14 empowers the Consolidation Officer to fix a date with effect from which the final publication scheme is to come into force to be notified in the prescribed manner. Section 15 provides for grant of Certificate of transfer in respect of holdings which have been allotted to the raiyats in pursuance of the Consolidation scheme. Section 14 empowers the Consolidation Officer to fix a date with effect from which the final publication scheme is to come into force to be notified in the prescribed manner. Section 15 provides for grant of Certificate of transfer in respect of holdings which have been allotted to the raiyats in pursuance of the Consolidation scheme. Section 16 lays down that the scheme confirmed under section 13 shall be deemed to be finally published record of rights under the relevant provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act, Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or the Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulations, as the case may be Section 26A provides for the close of the consolidation operations. Section 37 provides for bar of civil court's jurisdiction in certain cases. I shall refer to some of these provisions again while discussing Question no.3. 10. Adverting to the questions formulated above, there is no difficulty in answering Question no.1. The answer lies in the express provisions of section 26A read with section 4 of the Consolidation Act. Section 4 so far as relevant runs as follows: "4. Effect of notification under section 3(1) of the Act.-Upon the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 in the official gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operation, ensue in the area to which the notification relates........ (underline by me) Section 26A so far as relevant is as follows: "26A. Close of the consolidation operations.-(1) As soon as may be, after fresh maps and records have been prepared and certificates of transfer have been issued to the raiyats under the scheme, the State Government shall issue notification in the Official Gazette, stating that the consolidation operations have been closed in the unit." (Underling by me) 11. The Special Bench in Ramkrit Singh vs. The State of Bihar (supra) held in no uncertain terms, "the consolidation operation closes by issue of notification envisaged in section 26A". A Division Bench of this Court in Chandrashekhar Singh vs. Ram lakhan Singh, 1981 BBCJ 188 : 1979 PLJR 547 while considering the duration of abatement of suit and/or appeal under section 4(c) of the Consolidation Act held that abatement operates from the date of notification under section 3 till the close of the consolidation operations under section 26A. A Division Bench of this Court in Chandrashekhar Singh vs. Ram lakhan Singh, 1981 BBCJ 188 : 1979 PLJR 547 while considering the duration of abatement of suit and/or appeal under section 4(c) of the Consolidation Act held that abatement operates from the date of notification under section 3 till the close of the consolidation operations under section 26A. If I may say so, this has been the consistent view of this Court. It is well settled that if a provision of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to the court to give its own interpretation. It may be that after register of lands and the consolidation scheme have been finally published and the certificate of transfer has been granted under section 15, for all practical purposes the consolidation operation comes to an end. As a matter of fact, under section 14 of the Act, the final consolidation scheme also comes into force with effect from the date notified in that behalf. However, coming into force of the consolidation scheme is one thing and close of the consolidation operation is another thing for the purpose of continuance of the effect and consequence of notification under section 3. As seen above, vide section 4, the consequence of notification ensues from the date it is published in the official gazette under section 3 and continues till the close of consolidation operation. The consolidation operations come to close only when a notification in that behalf is issued under section 26A. It may be pointed out that both section 14, as it presently stands, and section 26A were brought in the statute by the same amendment, namely, Bihar Act 27/75 in the year 1975. In view of the express provisions of the Act, there cannot be any doubt that although the consolidation scheme comes into force under section 14 from the date notified in that behalf, the consequence of the notification under section 3 continues until issuance of notification under section 26A. Abatement of suit under section 4(c) is a consequence of notification and if the consequence continues upto the issuance of notification under section 26A, when the consolidation operation statutorily comes to an end, it cannot be said that the consequence comes to an end with the grant of certificate of transfer under section 15 or coming into force of consolidation scheme under section 14. Question No. is answered accordingly. 12. Coming to question No.2 as to whether the bar of section 10A applies to exercise of revisional power under section 35 of the Act, it would be appropriate first to notice the provisions of the said two sections in extenso as hereunder: "10A. Bar to objection.-No question in respect of any entry made in the map or registers prepared under section 9 or the statement of principles prepared under section 9A relating to the consolidation area, which might or ought to have been raised under section 10 but has not been raised, shall not be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the Consolidation proceeding." 35. Revision and reference.- The Director of Consolidation may of his own motion or on the application of any part or an reference being made by any subordinate authority, call far and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by such authority far the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceeding, or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case of proceedings, and may after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit." 13. The Division Bench in Har Narayan Singh's case (supra) has held that the revisional power under section 35 is wide but not so wide as to authorise the revisional authority to act contrary to the express provisions of section 10A. The Bench relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Dular Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 198. It, however, appears that the aforesaid case was decided on facts and there is nothing in the judgment to suggest that section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (which corresponds to. section 10A of the Bihar Consolidation Act) also applies to. exercise of power by revisional authority under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (which corresponds to section 35 of the Bihar Act). In that case bath the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) (i.e. Appellate authority) had held that the appellant was in joint possession along with his cousin. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision under section 48 set aside the orders. He held that records of 1306 and 1308 Fs. In that case bath the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) (i.e. Appellate authority) had held that the appellant was in joint possession along with his cousin. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision under section 48 set aside the orders. He held that records of 1306 and 1308 Fs. were fabricated and could not be relied an, while in the revenue records of 1307 Fs. the name of only one co.-sharer was mentioned. he Supreme Court after considering the facts of the case noted that the Consolidation officer had found that the appellant was in possession of the lands continuously far 15 years from 1365 Fs and that finding had not been disturbed by the Deputy Director. The Supreme Court further noted that the genuineness of the record of 1308 Fs. in which the name of the appellant's ancestor was mentioned was not even disputed by the respondents. The court accordingly held that merely on the ground that the name of appellant's grand father was not mutated in 1306, the claim could not be rejected on the ground that revenue record was fabricated. In this connection the Court observed that although the Director (read Deputy director) had power to satisfy himself as to the legality or correctness of the proceeding or correctness/legality or propriety of any order passed by the authority under the Act, while considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or the proceeding or irregularity thereof, he cannot assume to himself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact finding authority by himself appreciating those facts de novo. It would, thus, appear that the case was decided on facts and the decision cannot be read as an authority that under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation Act (or section 35 of the Bihar Act), the Director or the Deputy Director cannot make any adjudication on facts, or that in view of the provisions of section 10A (or section 11 of the U.P. Act) he cannot entertain a case at all. 14. It may be mentioned that in a latter case, Pritam Singh vs. Assistant Director of Consolidation, (1996)2 SCC 270 , while considering the nature of revisional jurisdiction under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the supreme Court observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Assistant Director (Consolidation) could examine the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer. It may be mentioned that in a latter case, Pritam Singh vs. Assistant Director of Consolidation, (1996)2 SCC 270 , while considering the nature of revisional jurisdiction under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the supreme Court observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Assistant Director (Consolidation) could examine the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer. It may be noted that the Settlement Officer is the appellate authority. The point for consideration in that case was whether the validity of remand order passed in a separate proceeding earlier could be challenged before the revisional authority under section 48, when that order had not been challenged on the earlier occasion. The Supreme Court held that as a superior court the Assistant Director (Consolidation) had power to examine the correctness of the remand order passed by the Settlement Officer even if had not been specifically put to challenge in a separate and independent proceeding. In this connection the Court observed: "It is noteworthy that the court of the Assistant Director (Consolidation) is a court of revisional jurisdiction otherwise having suo motu power to correct any order of the Subordinate officer. In this situation the Assistant Director (Consolidation) should not have felt fettered in doing complete justice between the parties when the entire matter was before him. The war of legalistic fought in the High Court was of no material benefit to the appellant. A decision on merit covering the entire controversy was due from the Assistant Director (Consolidation)." 15. At this stage, in order to see the similarity between the provisions of section 35 of the Bihar Act and section 48 of the U.P. Act, it would be apt to quote section 48 as hereunder, (Section 35 of the Bihar Act has already been quoted above): "48. Revision and Reference.-(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than an interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned and opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit' 16. I have also stated above that the case of Ram Dular vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) was decided on facts. The observations of the Court, therefore, have to be understood as having been made in the context of the facts of the case. The question as to whether section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation Act (corresponding to section 10A of the Bihar Consolidation Act) applies to exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation Act (corresponding to section 10A of the Bihar Consolidation Act) applies to exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation Act (corresponding to section 35 of the Bihar Act) was not an issue in that case and, therefore, in any view of the matters, the decision in that case cannot be cited as an authority on the point. 17. From a conjoint reading of sections 10A and 35 of the Consolidation Act, there does not appear to be any conflict between the two provisions. There is nothing in section 10A to suggest that it over-rides the provisions of section 35. All that section 10A says is that where no objection in respect of the correctness of entry in the map or register or statement of principles which might or ought to have been raised under section 10, but has not been raised, shall be allowed to be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings. Section 35, on the other hand, confers a general power of superintendence and control. The power can be exercised suo motu or on application. In exercise of such power the revisional authority can call for the records for satisfying itself as to the irregularity or otherwise of the proceeding or the legality, correctness, propriety of any order passed by the subordinate authority, and pass such order as it thinks fit. The observation of the Supreme Court in Pritam Singh's case, (1996) 2 SCC 270 , that the revisional authority has jurisdiction to pass any suitable order for doing complete justice between the parties is very significant and leaves little room for doubt that power under section 35 is an independent power, unfettered or un-circumscribed by any other provision. It is to be kept in mind that there is no non-obstante clause in section 10A. 18. It is to be kept in mind that there is no non-obstante clause in section 10A. 18. It may be mentioned here that in an earlier case, Gafoora vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1716 the Supreme Court upheld the order of the Deputy Director under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation Act. It is true that by the said order the Deputy Director had set aside the appellate order holding that the application purportedly filed under section 12 of the said Act was barred by section 11 (corresponding to section 10A of the Bihar Act), but the Supreme Court did not observe that the Deputy Director was not competent to entertain the revision under section 48. May be that the Deputy Director had merely set at right the records by setting aside an illegal order but even doing so involved question of jurisdiction and only the court having jurisdiction could do so. If he could set aside the order he could also uphold the same. It may also be mentioned here that in the case of Sheo Kumar Thakur vs. State of Bihar, 1985 PLJR 986, this Court while considering the nature of jurisdiction under section 35 has held that the Director can examine the regularity of any consolidation proceeding and propriety of any order apart from its correctness and legality, in the interest of justice. In the case of Jagarnath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar, 1984 BBCJ 140 : 1984 PLJR 310 this Court did not go into the question as to whether section 10A precludes the exercise of revisional power under section 35 leaving the same open. It, however, observed that the power under section 35 is very wide and different from the power of the appellate authority. Later in the case of Shyam Bihari Upadhya Vs. State of Bihar, 1985 BBCJ 178 : 1985 PLJR 43 a Division Bench of this Court categorically held that Section 10A does not operate as a bar to exercise of power by the Director under section 35. 19. Before I conclude this topic, I consider it appropriate to make some observations regarding the true scope of section 10A of the Consolidation Act. 19. Before I conclude this topic, I consider it appropriate to make some observations regarding the true scope of section 10A of the Consolidation Act. The section in plain words prohibits a person from raising any objection which he should have raised in respect of any entry in the map or register prepared under section 9 or the statement of principles prepared under section 9A at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeding. According to me, the key words of the section are "subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeding". As is evident from the scheme of the Act, broadly speaking, there are two stages of the consolidation operation. At the first stage, register of lands, maps and statement of principles are prepared and published, and objections are invited. After objections are disposed of and registers are corrected and updated, the second stage is reached. At that stage, on the basis of the updated records the actual consolidation of lands is made. What section 10A bars is raising of objection at the second stage, that is to say, where objection ought to have been raised at the stage of section 10 but was not raised it cannot be permitted to be raised at the stage of actual consolidation of plots when the stage of consolidation operations has changed, because that would unnecessarily delay the finalisation of the entire scheme and make things topsy turvy. 20. In the case of Monaka Singh Vs. State of Bihar, 1998(2) PLJR 730, while considering this aspect of the matter, this court explained that simply because objection is not barred until the stage of consolidation has changed it does not mean that the raiyats have unfettered right to file objection till the change of the stage of consolidation operations. The Court referred to the provisions of section 10(2) which provides for period of 45 days for filing objection and observed that period of 45 days is like period of limitation. But it does not mean that on the 46th or 47th day, the objection becomes time barred in the sense that it cannot be entertained at all. Where a case is made out and cause is shown for not filing objection within the period of 45 days, it is open to the Consolidation Officer to entertain the same. But it does not mean that on the 46th or 47th day, the objection becomes time barred in the sense that it cannot be entertained at all. Where a case is made out and cause is shown for not filing objection within the period of 45 days, it is open to the Consolidation Officer to entertain the same. The court observed that there may be bonafide and genuine cases of default and it would be unjust and improper to refuse to entertain the objection merely on the ground of expiry of the period. What should be the reasonable period, after expiry of the statutory period, would depend on the facts of the particular case. However, once the stage of consolidation changes, the bar contained in section 10A comes into play. Thereafter, it is not open to the person to raise any such objection raised against entries in the register of lands or the map or the statement of principles. Summing up the court observed that while the provision of section 10(2) has to be interpreted as laying down period of limitation which can be condoned in proper cases, the provision of 'section 10A have to be interpreted as creating an absolute bar. When the stage of consolidation has changed, Consolidation Officer has no jurisdiction to entertain objection which could and ought to have been raised but not raised at the earlier stage. 21. I am aware of the fact that in some cases this Court has taken the view that after expiry of the period of 45 days, referred to in section 10(2) of the Act, the objection filed subsequently cannot be entertained in view of the provisions of section 10A. In view of what has been stated above, that interpretation does not appear to be correct. After expiry of the statutory period of 45 days the objection may become time barred and on that ground it may be dismissed. But it cannot be said to be barred by section 10A. 22. After having explained the scope of the provisions of section 10A I would conclude the discussion on this topic holding that the bar created by section 10A is not applicable to the exercise of revisional power under section 35 of the Consolidation Act and the finding of the Division Bench, In Hari Narayan Singh's case (supra), on he point is not correct in law. The answer to question no.2 is accordingly given in the negative. 23. I will now take up the third and the last question under reference relating to the maintainability of the suits based on title challenging the correctness of the entries in the record of right published under section 16 of the Consolidation Act in the civil courts. 24. It may be stated at the very out-set that it is settled legal position that as suits of civil nature are maintainable in the civil courts except suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by some law. This is what section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code also provides. It has, therefore, to be seen as to whether a suit based on title challenging the correctness of the entry in the record of right published under the Act is barred either expressly or impliedly-by the provisions of the Consolidation Act. The provision regarding bar of jurisdiction is contained in section 37 of the Act, which runs as follows: 37. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts.-No civil court shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." 25. It may at once be pointed out that section does not appear to have been happily drafted. While the first part of the section does not suffer from any ambiguity, the latter part extending the exclusionary provision to 'any other matter' for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act does not make sense unless the word "or" is inserted after the words "under this Act" and before the words "with respect to", or the word "other" is ignored. The latter option, if I may say so, appears to be more plausible and sensible. The section, as it stands, precludes the jurisdiction of the civil court from entertaining suits or applications seeking variation or setting aside of any decision or order with respect to any "other" matter for which proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act. The section, as it stands, precludes the jurisdiction of the civil court from entertaining suits or applications seeking variation or setting aside of any decision or order with respect to any "other" matter for which proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act. It may be pointed out that the section as it stood prior to amendment by Bihar Act 27 of 1975, barred the jurisdiction of the civil court to "entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act, unless such decision or order has decided a question relating to title to lands or to some interest in land as between the parties having conflicting claims thereto". Prima facie, thus, it may appear that bar contained in section 37 earlier did not apply to cases in which the dispute relating to title or interest in the land was involved. By substituting the latter part of the section the legislature perhaps, it could be argued, intended to apply the provision to even such suits or applications. However, while it may be relevant to take into account the erstwhile provision in order to gather the intention of the legislature in enacting a new, provision or amending the existing provision, the true effect and scope of the provision can be ascertained only by considering the provision as it stands in conjunction with the other relevant/cognate provisions of the Act. It would, thus, be appropriate to refer to those provisions at one place for the sake of convenience. Reference to those provisions is also necessary for the reason that section 37 refers to "matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act". The provisions are as follows : "4. Effect of notification under section 3(1) of the Act.-Upon the publication of the notification under Sub-section (1) of section 3 in the official gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operation, ensue in the area to which the notification relates, (a) ....... (b) no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of any land in such areas shall be entertained in any court, and in calculating period of limitation applicable to such suits and proceedings such period shall not be counted: (c) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated : Provided that........ xx xx xx 15. Certificate of transfer.- The consolidation Officer shall grant to every raiyat to whom a holding has been allotted in pursuance of a scheme of consolidation a certificate in the prescribed form containing the prescribed particulars. Such certificate shall be conclusive proof of the title of such raiyat to such holding and he shall be liable for payment of such rents as may be specified in the certificate. 16. Confirmed scheme to be treated as finally published record-of-rights.-When certificates of transfer have been granted to the raiyats and under-raiyats under section 15, the scheme confirmed under section 13 shall, in supersession of the upto-date record-of-right prepared under section 8, shall be deemed to be the record of rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (VII) of 1885), or as the case may be, Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Ben. Act VI of 1908), or the Santhal parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872 (Reg. III of 1872). 17. Rights of raiyats after consolidation to be same as before.-A raiyat shall have the same right in the land allotted to him in pursuance of the scheme of consolidation as he had in his original holding. xx xx xx 37A. Act VI of 1908), or the Santhal parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872 (Reg. III of 1872). 17. Rights of raiyats after consolidation to be same as before.-A raiyat shall have the same right in the land allotted to him in pursuance of the scheme of consolidation as he had in his original holding. xx xx xx 37A. Authorities under this Act to be deemed courts of competent jurisdiction.-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Director of Consolidation, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction while hearing objections or appeals or deciding disputes under this Act. 37B. Authorities under this Act to have powers and privileges as are vested in a civil court in certain matters.-(1) The Director of Consolidation, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall have all such powers, rights and privileges while hearing any matter in dispute as are vested in a civil court in respect of the following matters.- (a) the enforcing of the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise and issuing a commission to examine witnesses; (b) compelling any person guilty of contempt. (2) A summon signed by such officer may be substituted for and shall be equivalent to any formal process capable of being issued in any action by a civil court for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of any document." 26. The scheme of the Consolidation Act relating to preparation and publication of the register of lands and the consolidation scheme has already been indicated above. To recapitulate, the register of lands is to be prepared on the basis of updated records of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 or Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 or the Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872 or the Bihar Tenants Holding (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973, followed by objections to the entries in such records of rights and decision thereon. After the register of lands is so prepared a draft consolidation scheme is prepared and published followed by the revised scheme. After the register of lands is so prepared a draft consolidation scheme is prepared and published followed by the revised scheme. After the consolidation scheme is finalised and published a certificate in the prescribed form containing the particulars of the lands allotted in lieu of original holders is to be granted to every raiyat. Such a certificate is conclusive proof of the title of the raiyats and the aforesaid consolidation scheme is treated as record of rights for the purpose of the Bihar Tenancy Act or the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or the Santhal parganas Settlement Regulations, as the case may be. 27. It is well settled that although entry in record of rights prepared under the respective Tenancy law is conclusive proof of the correctness of the entry it has only presumptive evidentiary value which can be rebutted in the civil courts. It is also well settled that the entries in the record of rights do neither create nor extinguisn one's right, title and interest in the land. Section 15 of the Consolidation Act, no doubt, provides that the certificate in the prescribed form shall be conclusive proof of title of the raiyat with respect to holding mentioned in the certificate. But it should be kept in mind that this certificate is prepared on the basis of register of land and the register of land itself is prepared on the basis of the record of rights prepared under the concerned tenancy law i.e. Bihar Tenancy Act, Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or the Santhal parganas Settlement Regulations, as the case may be, intervened only by decisions of the consolidation authorities on objections to such entries in the record of rights. Under section 16 of the Consolidation Act such register of land is "deemed to be record of rights". Under section 16 of the Consolidation Act such register of land is "deemed to be record of rights" under the saids enactments. 'Deemed' always means "to be treated as if it were". In Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bombay Trust Corporation, AIR 1930 Privy Council, 54, the Judicial Committee observed. "When a person is 'deemed to be' something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the Act requires him to be treated as if he were" 28. I am also tempted to refer to the off-quoted passage from East End Dwellings Co. "When a person is 'deemed to be' something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the Act requires him to be treated as if he were" 28. I am also tempted to refer to the off-quoted passage from East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. vs. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 Appeal Cases 109, wherein at page 132 Lord Asquith stated the effect of deeming clause in these words: "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incident which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. When the statute says that you must imagine certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." The above passage has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Pandurang Vinayak, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 244, K. Kamraj Nadar vs. Kunju Thavar, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 687, Commissioner of Income Tax vs. S. Teja Singh., AIR 1959 Supreme Court 352, Additional Income Tax Officer vs. E. Alfred, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 663 and so on. 29. It is significant that section 37A of the Consolidation Act also contains the deeming clause to the effect that the authorities under the Act shall be "deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction", which again means that they are not really courts but bidden to be courts. In Industrial Supplies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1858, it was observed: "It is now axiomatic that where legal fiction is incorporated in a statute, the court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created. After ascertaining the purpose, full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion." 30. The purpose is not far off to seek. The consolidation authorities have been conferred with status of 'deemed courts' because they have been conferred with the powers to summon witnesses, take evidence etc., under section 37B of the Act. The purpose is not far off to seek. The consolidation authorities have been conferred with status of 'deemed courts' because they have been conferred with the powers to summon witnesses, take evidence etc., under section 37B of the Act. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines 'court' to include all Judges and Magistrates and all persons except Arbitrators, "legally authorised to take evidence". In Virendra Kumar Satyavadi vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 Supreme Court 56, the Apex Court observed that broadly speaking what distinguishes a court from quasi judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of the parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a court. 31. It is, thus, obvious that if the consolidation authorities were to be given the power to decide the disputes they had to be conferred with the power of summoning witnesses, taking evidence etc., and to be treated as courts. The provisions of section 37A and section 37B have to be understood accordingly. 32. From bare reading of section 37B it is evident that• the consolidation authorities do not have all the powers of the civil court as conferred upon it (civil court) by the, Code of civil Procedure. They have power to summon witnesses and examine them on oath, to issue commission for that purpose, compel production of any document and punish a person for contempt. They do not have the power to issue injunction or appoint Receiver, attach the subject matter of dispute, and so on. Besides having limited jurisdiction in matters of procedure, they have limited jurisdiction to decide the dispute itself. They do not have the power to issue injunction or appoint Receiver, attach the subject matter of dispute, and so on. Besides having limited jurisdiction in matters of procedure, they have limited jurisdiction to decide the dispute itself. For example, they have no power to set aside or cancel a deed, entertain suits for permanent injunction, redemption of mortgage and so on. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decisions reported in AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2451 and 1985 PLJR 76 (cases of cancellation of a deed), 1989 PLJR 579 (case of permanent injunction), 1979 BBCJ 722 and 1980 BBCJ 544 (redemption of mortgage) and 1985 PLJR 722 (easementary rights) 1979 BBCJ 566 (Specific Performance of Contract). 1979 BBCJ 738 and 1989 PLJR 536 (homestead land), 1980 BBCJ 191 (ejectment), 1986 BBCJ 343 (Action based on allegation of fraud), and so on. In all these cases the suits of nature mentioned within brackets have been held to be maintainable in the civil courts because consolidation authority have no jurisdiction to grant any relief in such cases. The point is well settled that all suits or proceedings do not abate under section 4(c) of the Act. I have therefore referred to only some of the cases above as illustrative cases. The law journals are replete with case law on the point and it is not necessary to refer to all of them in this judgment. 33. Considering the aforementioned attributes of the consolidation authorities. a Full Bench of this Court in Kalika Kuer Vs. State of Bihar, 1989 PLJR 1203 (at 1231) concluded that the consolidation authorities are deemed courts of limited jurisdiction and a Division Bench of this Court in Zunaid Khan vs. State of Bihar, 1995(2) PLJR 301, observed: "To put it differently, these two sections postulate that the consolidation authorities are not full-fleged courts but would be deemed to be courts for the purpose of deciding objections and appeals etc. In fact, section 37B of the Act qualifies the scope of section 37A. This section 37A of the Act is more comprehensive and general in nature. It postulates that all the consolidation authorities while deciding objections, appeals, or revisions, would be deemed to be courts. In fact, section 37B of the Act qualifies the scope of section 37A. This section 37A of the Act is more comprehensive and general in nature. It postulates that all the consolidation authorities while deciding objections, appeals, or revisions, would be deemed to be courts. What section 37B restricts is that the consolidation authorities would be treated to be courts, but only for enforcing the attendance of the witnesses and examining them on oath, compelling any person for production of any document etc. Section 37B of the Act is substantially added by the legislature to operate as a proviso. Keeping in view the duties to be performed by the consolidation authorities, and as they decide the rights of the parties and obtain documentary and oral evidence of the parties and also examine the witnesses on oath, they are to be assumed as courts of competent jurisdiction with the help of legal fiction created by legislature, but in fact, they are not courts." 34. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition, Vol. 10, Para 7.02) the law on the point has been stated in these words: "A Tribunal is not necessarily a court in the strict sense of exercising judicial power because (1) it gives a final decision, (2) it hears witnesses on oath, (3) two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide to gives decisions which affect the rights of subject; (4) there is an appeal to court and (5) it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. Many bodies are not courts even though they may have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality." 35. The Division Bench in Junaid Khan's case (supra) noticed the above statement and observed that, thus, even though a tribunal may exercise judicial function and decide the rights of the parties, it need not be a court. The consolidation authorities in the strict sense of the term cannot be said to be a court, rather they are tribunals. By legal fiction created by the legislature by employing the expression shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction the consolidation authorities have been described as courts, but they are at best courts of limited jurisdiction. 36. The consolidation authorities in the strict sense of the term cannot be said to be a court, rather they are tribunals. By legal fiction created by the legislature by employing the expression shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction the consolidation authorities have been described as courts, but they are at best courts of limited jurisdiction. 36. Adverting back to section 15 of the Act, I have already pointed out above that the certificate thereunder is granted on the basis of register of lands prepared by the consolidation authorities on the basis of record of rights under the concerned tenancy law. Such register of land being "deemed record of rights" as laid down under section 15, and the consolidation authorities being "deemed courts" of limited jurisdiction", I have grave doubts if the 'certificate' can be said to be conclusive proof of title in the strict sense of the term. 37. It is well known principle of Interpretation that in order to understand the true scope and effect of a particular provisions, statute has to be interpreted as a whole keeping in view, in particular, the context in which the provision appears. Reading the provisions of sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Act it appears to me that the certificate of transfer has been described a conclusive proof of title of the raiyat with respect to the holding to which it relates because as a result of the finalisation of the consolidation scheme there is change of hands amongst the different persons. They are made to part with possession over the land which earlier belonged to them in lieu of some other land belonging to other persons. Necessarily, therefore, he has to have the same rights in the land allotted to him in pursuance of the consolidation scheme as he had in the original holding. This is what section 17 provides and that is the reason, as it appears to him, why the 'certificates' have been described as conclusive proof of title of the person to such holding. I should not be understood to mean that the consolidation authorities cannot go into the questions of title. In fact, a decision on the question of title is implicit in disposal of objection, appeal or revision by them while preparing and finalising the register of land under the Act. I should not be understood to mean that the consolidation authorities cannot go into the questions of title. In fact, a decision on the question of title is implicit in disposal of objection, appeal or revision by them while preparing and finalising the register of land under the Act. Because if they do not decide title of the person, how a land belonging to one person can be allotted to another? The question, however, is whether having decided title while disposing of the appeal or revision under the Act, a suit based on title in the civil court is barred. 38. In Nand Kumar Rai Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 Patna 164: 1974 PLJR 27, a Full Bench of this Court had occasion to consider more or less similar question. The plaintiff instituted title suit in the civil court for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or in the alternative for recovery of possession in respect of the suit land, and also prayed for permanent injunction. His case was that the defendant had no sikmi right over any portion of the suit land but by bringing the survey staff in their collusion they got their names recorded as sikmidar in order to lay a false claim. During the pendency of the suit. Bihar Act 6 of 1970 was enacted replacing section 109 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, section 3 of which provided that all suits of the nature referred to in (sub-section 1) of section 109 would stand transferred to the Collector of the district, who would dispose of the same. The defendant filed a petition before the munsif for transfer of the suit to the Collector. The munsif rejected the objection. The matter came before this court. Untwalia, CJ, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court, referred to the following passage in Chatri Mehta vs. State of Bihar, 1967 BLJR 236 :- "It is well known that the entry in the record of rights neither creates title nor extinguishes title, and though as the law stood prior to 1964, a suit in the civil court for mere correction of an entry in the settlement records of rights was maintainable, such suit was not ordinarily instituted unless there was a cloud cast on the title of the plaintiff or apprehension of dispossession or interference with possession. In such instances, the main relief, as in this case, was always for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or recovery of possession. Such a suit was not barred by section 109 of the Act, as amended, and on the same line of reasoning, section 11 of the Amending Act 1964 would not possibly apply to such suits. It is also difficult to imagine how the legislature could have thought of transferring regular title suits from ordinary civil courts to revenue officers merely because one of the reliefs asked for in the suits was an entry in the settlement records of rights. It is well known that the civil courts are better qualified to decide question of title to immovable property than revenue officers." After referring to the above passage the learned Chief Justice observed:- "It is difficult to conceive how complicated title suits would be speedily and summarily disposed of by revenue courts and how the under raiyats would be benefited thereby. I can tare judicial notice of the fact that a large number of title suits have been filed throughout the State of Bihar wherever revisional survey operations have taken place. I am also aware that the number of the civil courts is too small to dispose of such large number of title suits. I am, however, also aware of the fact that the number of the revenue court is also not sufficient, rather too small to dispose of such large number of complicated title suits. They will be simply unable to decide them unless they technically choose to literally dispose of the suits by any means; no court by judicial approach will be able to dispose of such large number of suits. I am, however, not concerned with the wisdom behind the legislation. I am concerned merely with its constitutional validity. In procedural matter suits of lighter vein have been allowed to be brought to the High Courts and complicated suits are to be finally disposed of by the revenue authorities. I am, however, not concerned with the wisdom behind the legislation. I am concerned merely with its constitutional validity. In procedural matter suits of lighter vein have been allowed to be brought to the High Courts and complicated suits are to be finally disposed of by the revenue authorities. I also do not see any justification for making any distinction between title suits for declaration of title and possession and suits of other types, such as, partition or mortgage suits." While considering the question of bar of suits under section 109 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, the learned Chief Justice observed that the section bars only suits for title and possession but not the defence which can be taken challenging the correctness of the survey entry. It is worth quoting the observations as under: "Irrespective of the entry in the record of rights, the owner of the land remains the owner, the person in possession remain to be so unless ousted in due course of law. Will it then be reasonable to say that the person must go to the Revenue court if he wants to challenge the entry seeking declaration of title and possession when he is at liberty to challenge the entry in the civil court as a defendant? Many under-raiyats may be in the position of plaintiff or defendant. Is it, therefore, correct to say that there is rational nexus between the classification made and the avowed object of the impugned Act. The law of rebuttal of presumption incorporated in sub-section (3) of section 103B is still intact. Will it, therefore, be not discriminatory to the title-holders of the lands to ask them to go to the same Revenue' Court for rebutting the presumption of the correctness of the entry? Or is it not fair to allow them to establish their title and possession in civil courts? To my mind, the answers suggested in the question themselves are all against the validity of the impugned legislation." 39. In Kalika Kuer vs. State of Bihar, 1989 PLJR 1203, the Full Beach noticed the aforequoted observations and held as follows: "Nand Kumar Rai's case (supra), thus, given a clear vision of the consequence of the confirmed scheme to be treated as finally published record of rights. In Kalika Kuer vs. State of Bihar, 1989 PLJR 1203, the Full Beach noticed the aforequoted observations and held as follows: "Nand Kumar Rai's case (supra), thus, given a clear vision of the consequence of the confirmed scheme to be treated as finally published record of rights. Correctness or otherwise of the record of rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act or, as the case may be, Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or the Santhal parganas Settlement Regulations can always be a question in a duly constituted title suit before the civil court of competent jurisdiction. Section 37 of the Act in such a situation shall not inhibit the civil courts' jurisdiction to decide the issue of title and in that also whether survey entry in correct or not. All that is done or envisaged in course of the consolidation proceedings in view of the provision in section 16 of the Act finally merges into the record of rights, correctness or otherwise of which can always be questioned before a civil court of competent jurisdiction." 40. In Ramkrit Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 Patna 250, which is mother Full Bench decision of this Court on the point, after having held that on the close of the consolidation operation upon issuance of notification under section 26A of the Act suits which have abated by reason of the provisions of section 4(c) of the Act automatically revived. Sarwar Ali, Act. CJ., who delivered the leading judgment, observed, "But the revival of those suits would not create any problem as the suits would have to be decided in conformity with the decisions arrived at in the consolidation proceeding in so far as the rights and interest in any land covered by the consolidation proceeding is concerned". The above observations if I may say so with the respect, is too wide and made without going into the depth of the matter. As a matter of fact, issue for decision in that case related to vires of the Consolidation Act and the above observations appear to have been made to sustain the vires. It cannot be said to be the ratio of the decision nor integral part of the judgment. It is well settled that the judgment is an authority on the point it decides and not what follows from it. It cannot be said to be the ratio of the decision nor integral part of the judgment. It is well settled that the judgment is an authority on the point it decides and not what follows from it. In any view, the above observations stand substantially diluted by the subsequent judgments of this Court. Uday Sinha, J, who was a party to the decision in Ramkrit Singh's case (supra) stated the legal position in the case of Narendra Kumar Verma vs. State of Bihar, 1980 BBCJ 252 , in these words:- "It is now well established that abatement of the suit or appeal subsists only title the consolidation proceedings are in progress. The notification of the State Government in official gazette stating that the consolidation operations (sic) consolidation proceedings may be revived. In Ramkrit Singh and others v. State of Bihar & ors., a Full Bench of this Court to which I was a party, laid down that on the close of the consolidation operation in the village or area the abated suit would revive. It is, thus, obvious that the jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudicate questions of title remains in abeyance during the consolidation operations. It does not annihilate that power of civil courts for all times. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that after the consolidation proceedings have come to a close, the jurisdiction of the civil courts to adjudicate upon (sic) pure 38 of the Act. That is the position in law before the amendment of section 37 or after. The amendment, therefore, makes to adjudicate upon questions of title. The idea that the courts are not debarred from adjudicating question of title after close of consolidation proceeding is implicit in the words of section 37 (before amendment) itself the second part of the section quoted above lays down it the decision of the consolidation authorities has decided questions relating to title to land or to some interest in land as between the parties having conflicting claims. The jurisdiction of the civil courts will not be barred. It would be curious situation that while civil courts would not be barred if the consolidation authorities have decided the question relating to title but it would be barred if no question of title has been decided by them. The jurisdiction of the civil courts will not be barred. It would be curious situation that while civil courts would not be barred if the consolidation authorities have decided the question relating to title but it would be barred if no question of title has been decided by them. I see no warrant for this interpretation in regard to the content of section 37 of the Act before the amendment of 1975. If a question of title has not been decided by the consolidation authorities, a citizen must have same forum for decision in regard to his title. In my view, a pure suit for title is not barred by section 37 of the Act. The clause "Unless such decision or order has decided a question relating to land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto" is not to be found in section 37 after the amendment, but that makes no difference so far as the power of courts to adjudicate pure question of title is concerned. What will be the result of he suit is a different question and has no relevance to the maintainability of the suit." 41. The discussion on the point of bar of suits in the civil court will not be complete without making reference to the general principles which have been succinctly stated in the case of Saraswati Vs. Lachanna, (1994) 1 SCC 611 in the following words:- "Where a particular Act creates a right and also provides a forum for enforcement of such rights and bars the jurisdiction of the civil court then ouster of the civil court jurisdiction has to be upheld. But the situation will be different where the statute neither creates a right in question nor provides any remedy or having created any right or liability, no forum for adjudication of any dispute arising out of such right or liability is created. In such a situation the ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction is not to be easily inferred." 42. It is obvious that the right to property is not creature of the Consolidation Act, or, for that matter, any Act. It is the common law right, which is enforceable under the ordinary or general law of the land. In such a situation the ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction is not to be easily inferred." 42. It is obvious that the right to property is not creature of the Consolidation Act, or, for that matter, any Act. It is the common law right, which is enforceable under the ordinary or general law of the land. The Consolidation Act merely provides a machinery for consolidation of lands and determination of the rights for limited purpose: As stated above, subject to the ouster clause which a statute may contain-expressly or impliedly-suits of civil nature of all kinds are maintainable in the civil courts. In these premises, I am inclined to hold that the suit based on title challenging the correctness of the entry in the register of lands under the Consolidation Act are not bared in the civil courts. Thus, I am inclined to endorse the conclusions of the Division Bench in Hari Narayan Singh vs. State of Bihar (supra) on this point. 43. Having given answers to the three questions under reference, I now come to the merit of the case. The facts have already been stated at the outset. To recapitulate, the suit has been filed for declaration of title. The plaintiff laid claim to the suit land before the survey authorities which was rejected, where after he approached the civil court in the instant suit. A suit of this kind, in my opinion, lies well within the competence of the consolidation authorities and, therefore, does not appear to be maintainable. However, as noted above, there is controversy between the parties as to whether notification under section 3 of the Consolidation Act has been cancelled under section 4A of the Act. From the impugned order, it appears that the court below did not accept the plaintiff's contention in this regard and held that the suit has abated. This is a question of fact which I do not propose to go into. I would merely observe that assuming that the consolidation operations are still going on the suit would remain dormant, as a result of abatement until the close of the consolidation operation under section 26A of the Act whereafter it would revive and proceed in accordance with law. In the result, I do not find any merit in this civil revision, which is, accordingly, dismissed. No cost. In the result, I do not find any merit in this civil revision, which is, accordingly, dismissed. No cost. NAGENDRA RAI, J.:-I have had the privilege and advantage of perusing the judgment by my learned Brother S.N. Jha, J. I agree with his opinion with regard to points no.1 and 2 formulated for decision by the Full Bench. In my view also, the consolidation proceeding does not come to an end with the final publication of record of right under section 16 of the Act. On the other hand, it comes to an end upon the issuance of notification under section 26A of the Act. The revisional power under section 35 of the Act is not curtailed or taken away by the provision contained in section 10A of the Act. So far as the third point as to whether the suit based on title challenging the correctness of the entries in the record of right published under section 16 of the Act is maintainable or not is concerned, I regret my inability to agree with the opinion or view expressed by him. 2. Ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is right there is a remedy). There is inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature unless its cognizance is barred by the Statute. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no Statute bars the suit. Under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the court shall have jurisdiction to try all the suits of civil nature excepting the suits, cognizance of which is either expressly or impliedly barred. However, every presumption would be made of existence of right to remedy to be decided by the civil court. This exclusion is not to be readily inferred. 3. In course of time, the number and nature of litigation increased. The civil court was overburdened with the cases. There was delay in disposal of cases due to large number of cases and also due to hierarchical stages. The legislature, thereafter, provided alternative dispute redressal system by constituting forums and Tribunals for exclusive and expeditious disposal of certain type of cases. The civil court was overburdened with the cases. There was delay in disposal of cases due to large number of cases and also due to hierarchical stages. The legislature, thereafter, provided alternative dispute redressal system by constituting forums and Tribunals for exclusive and expeditious disposal of certain type of cases. It is now settled law that even the dispute of civil nature, which was earlier cognizable by the civil court only can also be entrusted to other authorities or the Tribunal by the legislature. 4. In the case of Wolverhamtos New Waterworks Co. vs. Hawkesford, (1859)6 CB (NS) 336, Wills, J. describes the categories of cases where the jurisdiction of the civil courts can be excluded in these words : "One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a Statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there, unless the Statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of case is, where the Statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed by action at .common law. But there is a third class, viz, where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the Statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to the cases of second class". 5. The Privy Council in the case of Secretary of State vs. Mask & Co., reported in 1940 PC 105, held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It was further held that even if jurisdiction to examine into the cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 6. It was further held that even if jurisdiction to examine into the cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 6. The said question fell for consideration before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Vindhya Pradesh (Now M.P.) vs. Moradhwaj Singh, reported in AIR 1960 Supreme Court 796. Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act was enacted with the object to resume the jagir lands. Section 37 of the said Act excluded the jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide the question, which was required to be decided by the authority under the said Act. It further provided that the decision given by the authority under the Act shall not be called in question in any court. Tile said provision was challenged on the ground that the same is repugnant to section 9 of the Code as it takes away the jurisdiction of the civil co rt, which was under that section. Dealing with the said matter, the Constitution Bench held that the provision of section 37 is an express bar to the matters dealt with in the Act being agitated in civil courts specifically held that "As a matter of fact section 9 recognises that if a competent legislature passes a law barring the jurisdiction of civil court. the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of such suit even though a civil nature, is ousted". It was further held that "The legislature has power to make a power like section 37 and once it did so. the last part of section 9 will apply and the jurisdiction of the civil courts will become barred by virtue of section 9 read with section 37 of the Act". 7. The question of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court with regard to matters cognizable by civil courts again fell for consideration before the Constitution Bench in the case of Dhulabhai VS. 7. The question of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court with regard to matters cognizable by civil courts again fell for consideration before the Constitution Bench in the case of Dhulabhai VS. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1969 Supreme Court 78 and in paragraph 32 the Apex Court laid down the following principles: "(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however does not excluce those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the Statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by •the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil court are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limit or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 8. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in catena of cases. Reference in this connection, may be made to the cases of V.V. Subba Rao Vs. Chatlapalli Seetharmaratna Ranganayakamma, reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 3082 (paragraphs 15 and 16) and Shankaranarayanan Potti vs. Sreedavi, reported in (1998)3 SCC 751 (Paragraph 10). 9. Thus, it is settled law that the jurisdiction of the civil courts with regard to dispute of civil nature can be excluded by the Statute either expressly or impliedly provided there is an adequate remedy under the Act to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. However, such jurisdiction in not to be inferred readily. The legislature is competent to make law barring jurisdiction of the court and the same does not affect or infringe the constitutional provisions. 10. Now the provisions of the Consolidation Act have to be considered to find out as to whether it has excluded the jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide the question of title during the pendency of the consolidation operation and whether the suit based on title is maintainable after close of the consolidation operation. 11. The Consolidation Act has been enacted for prevention of fragmentation and consolidation of holdings for the purposes of better cultivation of land. 11. The Consolidation Act has been enacted for prevention of fragmentation and consolidation of holdings for the purposes of better cultivation of land. The Act is a self contained Code and the Act, which was enacted in 1956, has gone structural changes by amendments from time to time. At this stage, I would like to mention that prior to the amendment of the Act by Act 27 of 1975, the consolidation authorities had no power to go into the question of title and the suit based on title was not barred during the consolidation proceeding or even after the close of the consolidation proceeding. Section 37 of the Act prior to amendment created a bar only for institution of a suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order passed under the Act unless such decision or order has decided the question of title to the land or some interest in the land. 12. It was felt by the legislature that such decision on the question of title in the civil court took longer time and that hampered the work of consolidation proceeding. Accordingly, it was decided that the consolidation court should be vested with the power to go into the question of title, right and interest in the land also so that the object of the Act is achieved and there would be no unnecessary delay in disposal of the consolidation proceeding. With that purpose, in my view, the Act was drastically amended by Act 27 of 1975. According to the scheme of the Consolidation Act, as amended, the declaration under section 3 of the Act is made disclosing intention to make a scheme for consolidation in area concerned. With that purpose, in my view, the Act was drastically amended by Act 27 of 1975. According to the scheme of the Consolidation Act, as amended, the declaration under section 3 of the Act is made disclosing intention to make a scheme for consolidation in area concerned. The effect of notification is stated in section 4 of the Act, according to which, during consolidation operation, it will be the duty of the consolidation authority to maintain the record of rights and the village map of each village and no suit or other legal proceedings, in respect of any land in such areas shall be entertained in any court and every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated. However, no such order of abatement can be passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties and after abatement, the affected parties have been given right to agitate the matter before the consolidation authorities under the Act. Section 4-A of the Act provides for cancellation of notification issued under section 3 of the Act. Section 7 contains the provision with regard to constitution of Village Advisory Committee. Section 8 contains the provision with regard to preparation of up-to-date record of rights before consolidation in accordance with the provision of Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, or the Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872 or the Bihar Tenants Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973, as the case may be and the map and record-of-rights shall be deemed to be up-to-date map and record of rights prepared under the Act. Thereafter, the register of land is prepared under section 9 of the Act containing several details including the name of the raiyat, the areas and the serial numbers of the plots of land held by the raiyat and other details. Thereafter, the register of land is prepared under section 9 of the Act containing several details including the name of the raiyat, the areas and the serial numbers of the plots of land held by the raiyat and other details. The Statement of Principles is prepared under section 9A of the Act and, thereafter, the register of land and the "Statement of Principles' are published under section 10 of the Act inviting objections from the affected parties, which shall be disposed of by the concerned consolidation authority and right of appeal is also provided against the disposal of the objection regarding the entry made in the register of land. Section 10A provides that if any objection has not been raised with regard to Statement of Principles, and the entry made in the register of land then the same shall not be raised at the subsequent stage of the proceeding. However, section 10B of the Act provides that all matters relating to changes and transfers affecting any rights or interests recorded in the register of land, for which cause of action has not arisen when proceedings under sections 8 and 9 were stated or were in progress may be raised before the Consolidation Officer within thirty days of cause of action, but not later than the date of notification under section 26-A closing the consolidation operation or under sub-section (1) of section 4A, cancelling the notification under section 3 of the Act. Once the register of lands and the Statement of Principles are prepared and right, title and interest of the raiyats are recorded, then steps are taken for preparation of the draft scheme under section 11 of the Act and, thereafter, the draft scheme is published and then any person whose right, title and interest is affected by the draft scheme, has right to file an objection under section 12(2) of the Act and the person aggrieved by the disposal of the objection has right to appeal under section 12A before the Assistant Director of Consolidation and after disposal of the objection, the scheme is submitted to the Director of Consolidation under section 13 of the Act and after confirmation of the Scheme, a raiyat or an under raiyat shall be entitled to possession of the plots allotted to him under section 14 of the Act, Section 15 contains the provision with regard to issuance of a certificate of transfer to a raiyat or an under-raiyat, which shall be conclusive proof of the title of such raiyat to the such holding and he shall be liable for payment of such rent as may be specified in the certificate. Section 16 of the Act provides the confirmed scheme to be treated as finally published record of rights and section 17 of the Act provides that the rights of raiyats after consolidation will be the same as he had in his original holding and section 17 A contains a provision with regard to right to possession of new holdings. Section 26A of the Act provides that after fresh maps and records have been prepared and certificates of transfer have been issued under section 15 of the Act, the State Government will issue a notification in the Official Gazette closing the consolidation operations in the area in question. Section 35 of the Act contains a provision empowering the Director of Consolidation to call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceeding taken by such authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceeding etc. Section 37 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts and section 37 A provides that the authority under the Act shall be deemed to be court of competent jurisdiction while hearing the objections or appeals or deciding disputes under the Act. Section 37 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts and section 37 A provides that the authority under the Act shall be deemed to be court of competent jurisdiction while hearing the objections or appeals or deciding disputes under the Act. Section 37B of the Act vests in the authorities under this Act the powers and privileges as are vested in a civil court with regard to examination of witnesses on oath; for production of documents and for punishing the persons guilty of contempt. 13. Thus, from the conspectus of the entire provisions of the Consolidation Act, it is clear that once notification is made under section 3 of the Act, no suit or proceeding can be filed with regard to right and interest in the land and any suit pending for declaration of right and interest in the land and other proceedings, which include determination of title of similar nature, shall abate. The record of right shall be either prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Act mentioned in section 8 or record of right, if prepared earlier within twenty years preceding the date of the publication of the notification shall be treated to be up to date record of rights prepared under the Act and, thereafter, the register of lands is prepared containing the details of the land including the name of the raiyat. In case of any dispute with regard to question of right and interest, which includes the question of title to the property, is raised, then it is decided and right of appeal or revision is provided against the said order and after the question of right and interest of the raiyat is decided, a draft scheme is prepared and even with regard to that, right of objection is provided and in case of an adverse order being passed, the remedy of appeal or revision is provided and after the scheme is confirmed by the Director, a certificate of transfer is issued, which is conclusive proof of title. After certificate of transfer is issued, the scheme confirmed under section 13 of the Consolidation Act shall be in supersession of the earlier records of right prepared under section 8 and it shall be deemed to be prepared under Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act or Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or the Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation, as the case may be. Thereafter, the consolidation operation will come to an end in terms of the provision of section 26A of the Consolidation Act. Section 37 of the Consolidation Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts to vary and set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act with respect to any matter, for which any proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. Thus, the Act contains a detailed provision for determination' of the right and interest, including the title over the land during the consolidation operation. 14. After having found that the Act contains a detailed provision for determination of the question of right and interest, including the question of title, now it has to be seen as to whether an adequate remedy is provided under the. Act for determination of the aforesaid question. Two sections are relevant in this connection i.e. section 37A and 37B. which are quoted below: "37A. Authorities under the Act to be deemed Courts of competent jurisdiction.-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Director of Consolidation, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Assistant Director of Consolidation, the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction while hearing objections or appeals or deciding disputes under the Act." "37B. Authorities under this Act to have powers and privileges as are vested in a civil court in certain matters.-(1) The Directors of Consolidation, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Assistant Director of Consolidation, the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall have all such powers, rights and privileges while hearing any matter in dispute as are vested in a civil court in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) the enforcing of the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise and issuing a commission to examine witnesses; (b) compelling any person for the production of any document; (c) punishing the person guilty of contempt. (2) A summon signed by such officer may be substituted for and shall be equivalent to any formal process capable of being issued in any action by a civil court for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of any document." 15. Section 37 A contains a non obstante clause and provides that the authorities shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction while deciding disputes, hearing objection or appeals etc. and section 37B vests power of the civil court in the authorities under the Act with regard to certain matters enumerated therein. From a reading of the aforesaid two provisions, in my view, it is clear that this power has been conferred in the authorities under the Act only with a view to clothe them with the power of the civil court of the competent court so that the judgment/order rendered by them will have the same effect as of the court of competent jurisdiction. 16. When a law contains a deeming provision, then the full effect should be given to the statutory function and it should be carried to its logical end. In a celebrated passage, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. vs. Finsury Borough Council, reported in 1952 A.C 109, said as follows:- "If you are bidden to treat an Imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it....." 17. The apex court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Pandurang, reported in AIR 1953 Supreme Court 244, while quoting with approval the aforesaid passage of Lord Asquith, held as follows :- "When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion". 18. The same principle has been reiterated with regard to a legal fiction in the case of M/s. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 672. 19. 18. The same principle has been reiterated with regard to a legal fiction in the case of M/s. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 672. 19. Thus, on reading of the provisions of the Act with reference to the deeming provision under section 37 A only logical conclusion that can be inferred is that the decision of a dispute under the Act will be treated as a decision given by a competent court i.e. the civil court with regard to the matter of a civil nature and for this purpose, the legislature has incorporated deeming provision under section 37 A and has given the consolidation authorities the power of civil court in the matter of taking evidence of the witnesses under section 37B. This view will only give full effect to the deeming provision contained in section 37 A. 20. The Act as stated above provides a right of objection, appeal and revision to the aggrieved parties. Thus, I am of the view that the consolidation court is competent to decide the question of right and interest in that land, including the question of title and there is adequate remedy provided under the Act and the judgment/order rendered by it has the binding effect and value, which is attached with the judgments/order of the civil court regarding determination of question of title concerning land. The intention of the legislature is evidenced from the provision contained in section 15 of the Act, which clearly provides that once the matter is decided and certificate with regard to holding has been allotted to the raiyat or under raiyat then such certificate can be conclusive proof of title to such holding. 21. Much emphasis has been laid on the provision of section 16 of the Act and it has been argued that as under section 16 the confirmed scheme is to be treated as record of rights finally published under the Bihar Tenancy Act or other local laws as the case may be and it is well-settled that the entry made in the record of rights does not create a title in favour of any person, the consolidation authorities have no power to decide the question of title or in alternative any such determination is not a final determination ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court. 22. The said submission is devoid of any substance. 22. The said submission is devoid of any substance. After consolidation operation is over, the consolidation authorities do not maintain records and they are maintained by other authorities Including survey authorities including survey authorities and for that limited purpose the confirmed scheme is treated as a record of right under the relevant local laws so that in future in case of death or any other subsequent event, the names of the persons other than those recorded, may be mutated. Thus, the confirmed scheme is treated as a record of right under the local Act only for the purpose of mutation with regard to matters arising out of the close of the consolidation proceeding. On the basis of that provision, it cannot be said that the consolidation authorities have no power to decide the question of title, on the other hand, they are competent to decide the question of title and order issued after determination of the dispute is a documentary proof of title. 23. The next question for consideration is as to whether the suit based on title is maintainable after close of the consolidation operation in spite of the bar created by section 37 of the Act? 24. It appears that section 37 of the Act has not been correctly translated into English from the Hindi version of the said section of the Act. The Hindi version of section 37 of the Act reads as follows : <span class="Hfont">^^dksbZ Hkh flfoy U;k;ky; bl vf/kfu;e ds v/khu fn, x, ;k ikfjr fdlh fofu’p; ;k vkns’k es gsj&Qsj ;k mls viLr djus ds fy, vFkok fdlh ,sls vU; fo”k; ds lEcU/k es ftlds fy, bl vf/kfu;e ds v/khu dk;Zokgh dh tk ldrh Fkh ;k dh tkuh pkfg, Fkh] dksbZ okn ;k vkns’k xzg.k ugh djsxkA ** The authentic English translation published by the Superintendent of Government Press. Bihar, is as follows: "No civil court shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." 25. It appears that the said English version of section 37 of the Act is not the correct translation of Hindi version of the said section of the Act as the word 'or' is missing therein between the words 'Act' and 'with'. It appears that the said English version of section 37 of the Act is not the correct translation of Hindi version of the said section of the Act as the word 'or' is missing therein between the words 'Act' and 'with'. A bare reading of the said provision shows that it is in two parts. The first part provides that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order passed under the Act and the second part provides that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit with regard to the matter which could or ought to have been taken under the Act, meaning thereby, that if any person aggrieved by any entry even with regard to the matter which could or ought to have been taken under the Act, meaning thereby, that it any person aggrieved by any entry even with regard to question of title has not raised if at the appropriate stage inspite of having a notice or knowledge of the proceeding, he cannot be allowed to agitate the matter in the civil court. In other words, it contains a principle of constructive res judicata. 26. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The legislature enacts law with certain purpose. The purpose may be either to control certain public evil or to effect beneficial policies. While interpreting a provision, the court has to see the effect of the plain meaning. However, in case of ambiguity, object, purpose, reason b hind he legislation and other relevant factors, such as the previous state of law, pari materia provisions, mischief intended to be remedied are the relevant considerations. 27. The Act has been enacted with the sole object of consolidation of holdings and prevention of fragmentation for the purpose of better cultivation of the land by the raiyats. The provision of the Act is @ self-contained Code and provides that the question of title has also to be decided by the authority under the Act so long as the consolidation operation is going on from beginning to end and even the matter in which the proceeding could or ought to have be taken but not taken also attains finality. The legislature, in my view, has intended that the questions, which are within the cognizance of the consolidation authorities, could or ought to have been decided before the authority and should not be reagitated before the civil court after close of the consolidation operation for the reason that if that would be allowed to be reopened, then there will be no end of the matter. If the matter settled after giving full opportunity to the authorities during consolidation operation has to be reopened/reagitated in civil court and that will not only cause inconvenience to the parties but the same will also result in frustrating the object of the Act. There is another reason to hold that the matters, which the consolidation authorities were competent to decide cannot be reagitated in the civil court even if it is taken that the consolidation court is a court of limited jurisdiction as it has jurisdiction to decide the question of right, title and interest in the land and such decision in a subsequent proceeding in the civil court will operate as res judicata in view of Explanation VIII of section 11 of the Code. 28. In the case of Ramprit Singh Vs. State, reported in A.I.R. 1979 Patna 250 : 1979 PLJR 161, the vires of the Act itself was challenged before a Full Bench. One of the grounds for challenge was that the consolidation authorities have been given power to decide even the question of title. The Full Bench, after considering the entire provisions of the Act did not accept the aforesaid contention and in paragraph 8 held as follows :- . "The view of the legislature appears to be that the scheme of consolidation would be inordinately delayed. if not set at naught. if ordinary Civil Courts are to decide the questions of title relating to lands which are subject matter of the consolidation proceeding, It cannot be said that this view is unreasonable. It is well known that civil litigation, at least in this State, usually takes such a long time and that the litigants feel completely desperate. In such a situation to invest authorities under the Act with the power to determine questions of title could not be said to be either unreasonable or having no nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, namely, speedy consolidation of agricultural lands". In such a situation to invest authorities under the Act with the power to determine questions of title could not be said to be either unreasonable or having no nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, namely, speedy consolidation of agricultural lands". It was further held tin paragraph 14 that on the close of consolidation operation in a village or area the abated suits would revive, but the revival of those suits would not create any problems as suits will have to be decided in conformity with the decisions arrived at in the consolidation proceedings in so far as the rights or interest in any land covered by the consolidation proceedings is concerned. Thus, this court held that in view of the provision contained in section 37, the civil court has to decide the matter in conformity with the decisions arrived at by the consolidation authorities with regard to the question of title and interest. 29. In a Full Bench case of Sheoratan (Chamar Vs. Ram Murat Singh, reported in 1985 PLJR 86 , while considering the import of meaning of section 4(c) of. the At, which' provided for abatement of the suit, this court considered the provision of section 37 of the Act and held that all decisions or orders, given or passed under this Act, or with regard to any matter, for which the proceedings has not been taken, the civil court is debarred from interfering with the matter. It is relevant to quote paragraph 8 of the said judgment, which runs as follows :- "The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act came into force in 1956. The statute has undergone structural change by a number of subsequent amendments, to which detailed reference is not necessary. As the exhaustive provision of the 40 sections of this Act would indicate, it was intended to be a self-contained Code for the purpose of consolidation of all agricultural lands within the State. The bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts under section 37 of the Act would show that the Legislature clearly requires that with respect to any matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, the same alone provides the forum, and further, all decisions or orders, given or passed under this Act, are immune from interference by the Civil Court." 30. In another Full Bench case of Kalika Kuar Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1989 PLJR 1203, the question for consideration was as to whether the consolidation authority has power to decide pure question of title and it was held that the authorities have power to decide the matter with regard to right and interest in the land but not the pure question of title and as such after consolidation operation is over inspite of the bar under' section 37, the suit is maintainable to decide the question of pure title. The Court took the aforesaid view after differing with the view taken in the case of Ramkrit Singh (supra). 31. Judicial consistency is not the highest state of legal bliss. Law must grow, it cannot afford to be static and, therefore, Judges ought to imply an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. Precedents should be "stepping stones and not halting places". But the weekly change in the composition of the court ought not to be accompanied by changes in its rulings (see Punjab University vs. Vijay Singh, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1441 ). 32. The certainty is the necessity of law. That would disappear it Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Bench of co ordinate jurisdiction holds that the view taken by the earlier Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction is wrong and takes a different view, the result would be chaos and confusion. Neither the Advocate will be in a position to advise to his clients nor the subordinate courts will be in a position to decide as to which dissentient judgment is to be followed. This will create uncertainty. I am tempted to quote from what was said by the Supreme Court as far back an n the year 1960 in the case of Mahadeolal Vs. Administrator General of W.B., reported in AIR 1960 Supreme Court 936. Paragraph 19 of the said judgment runs as follows:- "Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. Paragraph 19 of the said judgment runs as follows:- "Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view that result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another single Jude on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench. In such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all courts subordinate to the High Court would find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient Judgments of their own High Court". 33. Again in the case of Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija vs. Collector, Thane, reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 261, it was held that in a multi-judge court, the judges are bound by precedents and procedure. When a Bench does not agree with the decision of a co-ordinate Bench, the matter should be referred to a larger Bench. It is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure. 34. Once a Full Bench in Kalika Kuar's case (supra) found that the view taken in the earlier Full Bench case of Ramkrit Singh was either a per incurium and has not decided the law correctly, it should have referred the matter to a larger Bench and should not have taken upon itself to decide the correctness of the aforesaid decision and hold a contrary view. In my considered view, in Ramkrit Singh's case (supra) as well as in Sheoratan Chamara's case (supra), it has rightly been decided that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is barred and this Bench being a co-ordinate jurisdiction is bound by the law laid down in both the cases. I have been informed that the decision in Kalika Kuar's case (supra) has been stayed by the Supreme Court. 35. I have been informed that the decision in Kalika Kuar's case (supra) has been stayed by the Supreme Court. 35. In Uttar Pradesh also, there is an Act dealing with the consolidation of land known as Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954. The original Act provided that once notification has been issued and the question of title arises, which has not already been determined by the competent court, the said question shall be referred by the consolidation officer for determination to the Arbitrator and the suit or proceeding pending in the courts shall remain stayed and finality was given to the decision of the Arbitrator. Thus, the said provision provides that the question of title shall be decided by the Arbitrator so long as the consolidation proceeding is going on and the decision arrived at by the Arbitrator shall be final. In 1958 amendments were made in the Act and all questions including the question of title have to be determined by the consolidation authorities and not by the civil courts and any proceeding pending for declaration of rights and interests over land, or for possession of land or for partition, pending before any authority or court were to be stayed till such determination by the consolidation authorities and after such determination, the court shall proceed with such proceedings in the light of the finding of the consolidation authorities. The Act was further amended in 1966 and according to the provision of section 5 of the Act, the right of the courts to adjudicate in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, for which the notification has been issued under the Act or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to betaken under the Act, has been completely taken away and the adjudication of these rights is to be done by the consolidation authorities. Section 49 of the said Act, which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court with regard to the orders passed by the consolidation authorities regarding right and interest of the land, is similar to the provisions contained in section 37 of the Act and the same is reproduced hereunder:- "49. Section 49 of the said Act, which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court with regard to the orders passed by the consolidation authorities regarding right and interest of the land, is similar to the provisions contained in section 37 of the Act and the same is reproduced hereunder:- "49. Bar to civil jurisdiction.-Notwithstanding anything contained in other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued under sub-section (2) of section 4 or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." 36. The apex court considered the scope of section 49 as quoted above in the case of Sita Ram vs. Chhota Bhondey, reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 249. In that case, consolidation proceeding in he Village in question had commenced in 1969 and during that period the dispute arose with regard to title and parentage. Respondent no.1 to the appeal before the Supreme Court claimed interest in the land by asserting that he was son of one of the uncles of the appellant. His claim was accepted by the consolidation authorities and the decision was upheld up to High Court. The appellant before the Supreme Court, who had lost before the consolidation authorities, filed title suit challenging the decision of the consolidation authorities. The respondent no.1 challenged the maintainability of the suit in view of the provision of section 49 of the Act. The said objection was accepted by the trial court and upheld in appeal up to the High Court. The matter was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Apex Court having considered the provision of section 49 of the Act held that as the matter was falling within the scope of adjudicatory functions assigned to the consolidation authorities, the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain the suit was barred. The matter was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Apex Court having considered the provision of section 49 of the Act held that as the matter was falling within the scope of adjudicatory functions assigned to the consolidation authorities, the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain the suit was barred. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, it was held as follows:- "In the instant case respondent no.1 was claiming an interest in the land lying in the area covered by notification issued under S.4(2) on the basis that he is the son of Chhota, brother of Nanha and that the lands were recorded in the name of Nanha in a representative capacity on behalf of himself and his other brothers. This claim which fell within the ambit of section 5(2) had to be adjudicated by the consolidation authorities. Since it was a matter falling within the scope of adjudicatory functions assigned to the consolidation authorities under the Act the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit in respect of the said matter was expressly barred by section 49 of the Act and the suit of the appellant was rightly dismissed on that ground". 37. Similar view has been taken by the apex court in the case of Daya Chand Vs. Om Dutta Sharma reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1725, wherein it has been held that since the claim of the parties to the land in dispute had been adjudicated by the consolidation authorities and the gift deed was held to be invalid, no suit can legally be maintained by the affected parties for declaration of his title to the land in view of the bar created by section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation Act. 38. Much reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by a Full Bench of this court in the case of Nand Kumar Rai vs. State of Bihar reported in 1974 PLJR 27 in support of the submission that the suit is maintainable challenging the orders passed under the Act or the entries made under section 16 of the Act. In my view, the said judgment has no relevancy at all to decide the controversy in this case. In that case, vires of section 109 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, as amended by Act 6 of 1970 was challenged. In my view, the said judgment has no relevancy at all to decide the controversy in this case. In that case, vires of section 109 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, as amended by Act 6 of 1970 was challenged. This court declared the aforesaid provision ultra vires mainly on the ground that under the provision of the Bihar Tenancy Act, the only question that has to be gone into, is with regard to question of possession and not with regard to question of title and such conferment of a power to authorities to decide the question of title without providing any elaborate procedure was arbitrary. 39. Thus, after considering the matter from different angles, I am of the considered view that the consolidation authorities have power to decide the question of title and the decision rendered by them on the question of title is final and the same cannot be challenged in a civil court in view of the specific provisions contained in section 37 of the Act. Even with regard to the matters, which could or ought to have been raised under the provisions of the Act including the question of title, but if not raised, the suit is barred under section 37 of the Act. However, I may clarify that the judgment/order of the consolidation authorities or entries made by them in the records with regard to matter cognizable by it, passed or recorded without complying with the provisions of the Act or against the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or obtained by fraud is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 40. There is no merit in this application. The trial court has rightly held that the suit was not maingainable in the civil court in view of the specific provisions contained in the Act. RAVI NANDAN SAHAY, J.:-I have had the advantage to peruse the opinions of my learned brethren Nagendra Rai, J. and S.N. Jha, J. I fully concur with the view of my learned breathren that Section 10A of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 does not impose any bar in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Act and decision in Hari Narayan Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1997 (1) All P.L.R. 302 does not lay the correct law and should be overruled. I also agree that under the scheme of the Act the consolidation operation closes only after issue of notification under Section 26A of the Act. 2. The third question before the Full Bench is whether a suit based on title challenging the correctness in the record of right published under Section 16 of the Consolidation Act is maintainable in Civil Court. On this question there has been difference of opinion between Nagendra Rai, J. and S.N. Jha, J. Nagendra Rai, J. has held following Sheo Ratan vs. Ram Murat (1985, BBCJ 73 : 1985 PLJR 86 ) that Section 37 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court with respect to any matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. Brother S.N. Jha, J. differed with Nagendra Rai, J. and has held that the suit based on title challenging the correctness in the record of right under the Consolidation Act is not barred, relying on Full Bench decision in Kalika Kuar Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1989 PLJR 1203. Brother S.N. Jha, J. has not referred the earlier Full Bench in Sheo Ratan case (supra) followed by Negendra Rai, J. In Sheo Ratan's case, in my view, the scope and ambit of Section 37 of the Act was not considered. Some observations have been made in paragraph 8 of the judgment which in my opinion are obiter dicta. The question for decision before the Full Bench was whether a suit challenging the validity of the transfer deed would abate under Section 4(1) of the Act. I respectfully agree with the reasonings of Brother S.N. Jha, J. that the question of title cannot be decided by the Consolidation Court and as such a suit in Civil Court is maintainable which in Kalika's case the scope and ambit of Section 37 of the Act was squarely raised and it was held that a 'pure question of title could not be decided by consolidation authorities. Brother Nagendra Rai, J. has observed that operation of judgment in Kalika's case has been stayed by the Supreme Court. This in my opinion is of no consequence. I agree that Revision Application should be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.