JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned Counsel. 2. This appeal is under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the judgment and award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhilwara dated 4.5.1991 in Claim Case No. 19 of 1983. The claim was filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 4 arising out of an accident which took place on 12.7.1983 on the highway between Bhilwara and Ajmer within the municipal limits of Bhilwara, which resulted in death of Radheshyam, whose dependents six in number were the claimants who included the widow of the deceased,three dependent children and both parents. Parents have died since the pendency of this case. A claim for a sum of र 7,15,000 was lodged against the present appellant, the insurer United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd., Madras with whom the vehicle involved in the accident has been insured, and Mathuralal, alleged to be the Driver of the vehicle. In the application it has been stated that the claimants do not know who the driver was but had said that the respondent No. 3 has been named on the basis of information available from the investigation in the criminal case arising out of the accident in which the respondent No. 3 was found to be driving the vehicle. All the respondents had filed separate reply to the claim of the claimants. Apart from denying the claim, the present appellant Rameshwarlal has denied that the vehicle was driven by respondent No. 3 Mathuralal but according to him the vehicle was being driven by the employee of the respondent Shri Ratan Singh who held a valid license to drive and duly authorised by the owner of the vehicle. The Insurance Co. in its reply has admitted the averments of the application about the ownership of the vehicle vesting in Rameshwarlal and Mathuralal being the driver of the vehicle andit was asserted that he was driving the vehicle without licence and he was not employee of the owner of the vehicle. Mathuralal in his reply denied having any connection with the accident. He denied to be the driver of the vehicle in question at the time of accident or that he was in the employment of the owner of the vehicle at any time. The claims Tribunal ultimately awarded the applicants a sum of र 3,45,600 as compensation and र 800 as cost of the litigation. He denied to be the driver of the vehicle in question at the time of accident or that he was in the employment of the owner of the vehicle at any time. The claims Tribunal ultimately awarded the applicants a sum of र 3,45,600 as compensation and र 800 as cost of the litigation. It also awarded interest at the rate of 6% from the date of application to the date of realisation in र 3,45,600. However, finding that the vehicle was being driven by Mathuralal respondent No. 3 and not by Ratan Singh or Vikram Singh who was claimed to be authorised by Ratan Singh on the date of accident and held that since the vehicle was driven by unauthorised person not in the employment of the owner of the vehicle, there was no liability of the Insurance Co. under the terms of policy to indemnify the insured. Thus, the award was passed only against owner, the appellant and the driver of the vehicle. 3. This appeal is by the owner of the vehicle. He has confined his challenge to the award to the question of absolving the Insurance Co. indemnifying the insured and challenged the finding about the person by whom the vehicle was driven. Mr. Samdariya, appearing for the claimants, respondents No. 1 to 4 invited my attention that the claimants have filed a cross objection for enhancement of the compensation as well as for increasing the rate of interest on the compensation awarded. 4. In the first instance it has been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the finding of the Tribunal that the appellant has failed to prove that the vehicle was driven by Ratan Singh or Vikram Singh is not well founded inasmuch as no evidence has been led to controvert the evidence led either by the claimants or the insurance company to establish that, Mathuralal, the unauthorised person was driving the vehicle and the finding of the tribunal is solely based on the finding given in the criminal case against Mathuralal by treating it to be a substantive piece of evidence in this case. Alternatively, it has also been urged that the plea of the appellant has been that vehicle has been given to Ratan Singh, an employee, who was duly authorised licensee for driving on the fateful day who was in his employment and if thereafter Ratan Singh has not discharged his obligation and handed over the vehicle to any third party, because of the unauthorised act of third party, the insurance company cannot be absolved from its liability to indemnify the owner inasmuch as the insured has done all he could do and there has been no willful violation or infringement of a promise by the insured, he places reliance on the ratio laid by the Supreme Court in Sohanlal Passi v. P. Sesh Reddy, 1996 (5) SCC 21 . 5. In the first instance, I may examine the first contention of the learned Counsel. From the-record it is apparent that the claimants had no personal knowledge about the person who was driving the vehicle. This fact they have made clear in their application also. No evidence was led by applicants to prove this assertion, though the owner of the vehicle and alleged driver both had denied the fact. The Insurance Company, which had admitted the facts alleged in the application too had no personal knowledge and it has also not led any evidence in support of its contention. The allegation that Mathuralal drove the vehicle remains not proved. At the time of making the application, the criminal trial against Mathuralal has not come to an end and the applicants allegations were solely on the basis of investigation, the Insurance Company though have asserted that Mathuralal was driving the vehicle at the time of accident and he was not authorised by the owner of the vehicle they are not responsible for the owner but they have not led any evidence in support of this assertion. The present appellant in his reply has clearly stated that the vehicle was driven by Ratan Singh who was duly authorised and holding the licence. Mathuralal had denied any connection with the vehicle and has clearly stated that he has been involved in a criminal case in order to save somebody else but he was not connected with the same. 6. PW 1 Motilal is the father of the deceased who has not made any statement about the driver of the vehicle. Mathuralal had denied any connection with the vehicle and has clearly stated that he has been involved in a criminal case in order to save somebody else but he was not connected with the same. 6. PW 1 Motilal is the father of the deceased who has not made any statement about the driver of the vehicle. Yogesh Kumar (PW 2) in his examination in chief as well as cross examination states that he does not know who was the driver of the vehicle. He is alleged to be an eye witness in the present case but has not been examined even during the course of investigation. PW 3 Radhey S/o Latulal Agarwal is a co employee of the deceased and he has been examined only for the purpose of proving the emoluments of the deceased. He is not an witness for establishing the identity of the driver of the vehicle. PW 4 Radhey Shyam is another eye witness of the accident. He in his examination in chief categorically states that he does not know who the driver was. This alleged eye witness has also not been examined by the police during investigation as per his statement. PW 5 is the Investigating Officer. This Investigating Officer is conspicuously silent about the identity of the driver in his statement. PW 6 is a photographer who has taken the photographs at the site of the accident and also not a relevant witness for the purpose and PW 7 is son of the deceased and one of the claimants. He is also not a person who establishes the identity of the driver. As against this evidence, the owner has examined himself as NAW 1. He, in his statement, has stated that on the day the accident took place his driver was Ratan Singh. But on that date Ratan Singh's mother being ill, he had sent another driver and disclosed the name of another driver to the owner later on. The said Vikram Singh was said to have died in another accident a year before the statement was recorded. Vikram Singh was also a driver and a licensed driver. In his cross examination he further stated that Vikram Singh was sent by Ratan Singh. Ratan Singh sent Vikram Singh, who was not known to him. The said Vikram Singh was said to have died in another accident a year before the statement was recorded. Vikram Singh was also a driver and a licensed driver. In his cross examination he further stated that Vikram Singh was sent by Ratan Singh. Ratan Singh sent Vikram Singh, who was not known to him. The fact about sending Vikram Singh by Ratan Singh was told to the owner after the accident and not before it. In cross examination, on behalf of the Insurance Co., he again asserted that he has not authorised Vikram Singh. NAW 2 Ratan Singh has been examined. He has stated that he has been the driver in the employment of the owner of the vehicle on the date of accident, he was asked by the owner to take the vehicle, however due to illness of his mother he stayed back at home and sent another driver, Vikram Singh. Vikram Singh was a licensed driver and he was a person in company with Ratan Singh. Vikram Singh has died in another accident near Bharatpur. The driving licence of Ratan Singh was produced. In cross examination, he reaffirmed that owner has authorised him to take the car. However, he has sent Vikram Singh and Vikram Singh has informed him the next day that an accident had taken place. NAW 3 Prem Swaroop has been examined to prove that Vikram Singh was a driver who had a driving licence and he has employed Vikram Singh a few times between 1982 to 1984. NAW 4 is a witness who is also alleged to be present at the time of accident near the site. He has tried to prove the contributory negligence of the deceased in the accident. From the evidence, which has been led by the parties, it is apparent that while no evidence has been led by the claimants as to who the driver of the vehicle was, the owner of the vehicle has led evidence to the effect that Ratan Singh having a driving license was the authorised person on the date of accident to take the vehicle but Ratan Singh instead of himself discharging the instructions to drive the vehicle has authorised another person namely Vikram Singh to take the vehicle because of his mother's illness. In the cross examination conducted on behalf of the Insurance Company as well as the claimants, nothing has been put to counter the identity of the driver Vikrarn Singh or the authorisation by Ratan Singh to Vikram Singh to drive the vehicle on the fateful day but the entire cross examination has been directed only to the aspect whether Vikram Singh who is alleged to have taken the vehicle was duly licensed or not. Even suggestion has not been made that not Vikram Singh but Mathuralal was driving the vehicle. Thus, from the evidence that has been placed on record by the parties, except assertions made in the applications and counters, no evidence has been led to establish the identity of the driver with the respondent No. 3 and the nonapplicant owner has led the evidence of himself and Ratan Singh to prove that the owner has duly authrosied Ratan Singh, a duly licensed person, in his employment to take the vehicle and thereafter said Ratan Singh has for the reason alleged by him abstained himself from his duty and authorised Vikram Singh to take the vehicle. An inference has been drawn by the Tribunal because said Vikram Singh was already dead and that the story of authorising Vikram Singh is not believable as the same was not put at the earliest in the reply to the claim. From this fact alone that the authorisation of Vikram Singh is not proved or is not believed by the Tribunal, cannot lead to any inference in the absence of any admissible material about the identity of the vehicle driver to be the respondent No. 3 who is alleged to be driving the vehicle without licence. To overcome this difficulty, the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal had relied on the judgment given in the criminal trial against Mathuralal record of which appears to have been summoned from the court where the trial was going on. A record of another case by itself does not became an evidence in the proceedings that are pending before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal or for that matter in any other proceedings unless the same are made part of the evidence by properly incorporating in the record of the case and opportunity is given to the other party to explain that evidence. It is to be noticed that criminal trial against Mathuralal was not in connection with his due authorisation to drive the car or his relationship with the owner of the vehicle but was pure and simple for the purpose of finding whether he was driving rash and negligently so as to have committed the offence of rash and negligently driving and can be appropriately dealth with in accordance with law. In those proceedings, the appellant or the claimant or the Insurance Company were not the parties. The findings which were given in the criminal trial are neither relevant nor binding on any of the parties in the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In my opinion, the Tribunal has seriously erred in considering the judgment of the trial Court convicing Mathuralal as guilty of rash and negligence driving of the vehicle in question as a substantive piece of evidence of the fact whether Mathuralal was the driver of the vehicle without evidence having been led to that effect by any of the parties. One important piece of evidence to be noticed is that even the Investigating Officer on whose findings about the driving of the vehicle by Mathuralal has been alleged, has been examined in this case as a witness and he has not referred to the identity of the driver of the vehicle as emanated from his record in his statement. The judgment of the criminal Court was neither produced by any party nor was made part of evidence by placing a copy of the same on record of this case. In his state of affairs, on the one hand burden of proving the fact of party respondent No. 3 as driver of the vehicle was on the applicant, which he has failed to discharge, the non-applicant owner, on the other hand, has led evidence which has not been rebutted that he has authorised Ratan Singh to drive the vehicle and that he held a valid driving license. In such circumstances in the absence of any other evidence, the only conclusion that can reasonably be reached is that applicants have failed to prove that respondent Mathuralal was driving the vehicle and that he was authorised whereas appellant has proved that he had authorised only Ratan Singh to drive the vehicle in question and that he had driving license. In such circumstances in the absence of any other evidence, the only conclusion that can reasonably be reached is that applicants have failed to prove that respondent Mathuralal was driving the vehicle and that he was authorised whereas appellant has proved that he had authorised only Ratan Singh to drive the vehicle in question and that he had driving license. There was no basis with the Tribunal except the order in the criminal trial to reject the statement that in fact Vikram Singh was driving the vehicle. As seen above, in the absence of taking the judgment of criminal court in trial on record as part of evidence the same could not be considered as evidence in this case. Moreover, statement has been made by Mr. Maheshwari, learned Counsel for the appellant that the judgment of trial court in criminal case has since been set aside on 13.11.1999 by the learned Addl. District & Sessions judge, Bhilwara in Criminal Appeal No. 8/96 and the finding based on trial Court can not provide any basis to hold that vehicle was being driven by Mathuralal, an unlicensed person, to absolve the Insurer from his obligation to indemnify the owner. 7. That apart, I find substance in the second contention of the appellant as well. Assuming that the story of driving the car by Vikram Singh unfolded in the statement of Rameshwarlal, appellant and Ratan Singh, the driver of the appellant, to be unreliable, it does not detract from the substratum of the evidence that Rameshwarlal, insured, had authorised Ratan Singh to drive the vehicle on the date of accident who was in his employment and was duly licensed to drive the vehicle. This fact has been specifically stated in the statement of Rameshwarlal as NAW 2 which has been averred in his cross examination without any hesitation. He has clearly stated that Vikram Singh was authorised by Ratan Singh. Ratan Singh is the driver as accepted in his statement as NAW 1. This fact has been specifically stated in the statement of Rameshwarlal as NAW 2 which has been averred in his cross examination without any hesitation. He has clearly stated that Vikram Singh was authorised by Ratan Singh. Ratan Singh is the driver as accepted in his statement as NAW 1. When he was asked to take the vehicle and thereafter he had not gone himself and sent Vikram Singh, does not detract from the fact that so far as the owner of the vehicle he had done all which he could do by authorising a duly licensed person to drive his vehicle and thereafter in dereliction of his duty he has further authorised someone else, it cannot be said to be an act of the insured and breach of conditions of his promise under the insurance policy, voluntarily or negligently. Once, he has duly authorised some person to take the vehicle, then he is not responsible for subsequent non-discharge of duties by such authorised person who further delegated his duty to someone else and if accident is caused by that delegate the insurance company cannot absolve itself from the liability of indemnifying insured in such circumstances. The principle has been clearly settled by the Apex Court in Sohanlal Passi's case (supra). It was a case in which the owner of the bus insured had appointed a duly authorised driver to drive the vehicle but thereafter the said driver allowed the cleaner/conductor of the bus to drive the vehicle without any authority from the owner. While the cleaner or conductor was driving the bus an accident took place which resulted in the death of a scooterist. It was contended on behalf of the insurer that when Section 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has provided that the insurer shall be entitled to defend the action on the ground that there has been breach of a specified condition to the policy i.e. the vehicle should not be driven by a person who is not duly licensed, then the insurance company cannot be held to be liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle. The Court rejecting the aforesaid contention held: "Section 96(2)(b)(ii) should not be interpreted in a technical manner. The Court rejecting the aforesaid contention held: "Section 96(2)(b)(ii) should not be interpreted in a technical manner. While interpreting the contract of insurance, the tribunals and courts have to be conscious of the fact that right of claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds, the bar under Section 96(2)(b)(ii) on the face of it operates on the person insured. If the person who has got the vehicle insured has allowed the vehicle to be driven by a person who is not duly licensed then only that clause shall be attracted. The expression 'breach' occurring in Section 92(2)(b) means infringement or violation of a promise of obligation. As such the insurance company will have to establish that the insured was guilty of an infringement or violation of a promise. The insurer has also to satisfy the Tribunal or the Court that such violation or infringement on the part of the insured was willful. Unless it is established on the material on record that it was the insured who had wilfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment-debtor in respect of the liability in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act. If the insured has taken all precautions by appointing a duly licensed driver to drive the vehicle in question and it has not been established that it was the insured who allowed the vehicle to be driven by a person not dully licensed, then the insurance company cannot repudiate its statutory liability under Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act." 8. In the present case, as discussed above, the insured has proved that he has appointed a duly licensed person namely Ratan Singh to drive his vehicle. He has taken all precautions of appointing a duly licensed driver to drive the vehicle in question. The Insurance Company has not led any evidence to establish that it was the insured who allowed the vehicle to be driven by Mathuralal or any other person, a person not duly licensed. In these circumstances, the insurance company cannot repudiate its statutory liability merely by relying on the judgment in the criminal case holding Mathuralal respondent No. 3 to be of negligently driving the vehicle. In these circumstances, the insurance company cannot repudiate its statutory liability merely by relying on the judgment in the criminal case holding Mathuralal respondent No. 3 to be of negligently driving the vehicle. Assuming that the person authorised by Ratan Singh was not Vikram Singh and was third persons, it does not detract from the fact that owner has not appointed Vikram Singh or that third person who drove the vehicle in place of Ratan Singh. He has only appointed Ratan Singh which has been proved unquestionably by the statements of appellant and Ratan Singh. Once, it is proved that he authorised a licensed drive to drive the vehicle on the date when the accident took place it was for the insurance company to lead any evidence to suggest that the third person was also authorised by or under the authority of the insured and not by Ratan Singh. Therefore, the present case squarely fall within the ratio laid in Sohanlal Passi's case that insurance company cannot absolve itself from his liability to indemnity in the present case. The Tribunal has seriously erred in not considering this aspect of the matter. 9. As a result, this appeal is allowed by holding that the insurance company shall be liable for the payment of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and modifying the award to that extent that it will be permissible to recover the amount of compensation from the insurance company, respondent No. 2, which is jointly and severally liable for the liability towards injured or his dependents, the claimants. 10. Coming to the cross objection filed by the respondent claimants. Two fold contentions have been raised by Mr. Samdariya. Firstly, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is too less against the claim of र 7,15,000 lodged by the claimants. In the totality of the circumstances, I find that no interference is called for in the quantum of compensation determined by the Tribunal. The claim was laid to a sum of र 4,15,000 on the basis of estimated earnings that the deceased would have made during his projected span of life in future, and in addition thereto a claim of र 3 lakhs has been made on the ground of estimated savings out of the income on the past experience. The claim itself speaks about its weakness. The claim itself speaks about its weakness. On the one hand, the compensation is to be measured on the potential net income of the deceased projected in future which necessarily includes the savings that could be made out of it and making an additional claim of the projected saving out of the same income is laying claim to the very same account once again. Claim to saving of र 3 lac would only come out of income estimated at र 4,15,000. If that claim is excluded as against the total claim of र 7,15,000, an award of र 3,45,000 amounts to substantial acceptance of the claim as claimed by the claimants. Therefore, no interference is called for in the quantum of the compensation awarded to the claimants. Moreover, the claim founded on periodical estimated savings from current income, its projected investments and income therefrom is too indirect and remote to qualify for a decree for such damages. 11. So far as the claim to increase in the rate of interest on the sum of compensation awarded is concerned, it appears to be reasonable. Looking to the prevalent trends of rate of interest during the period from 1983 to 2000 in the market and the practice adopted by various courts, the awarded rate of interest at the rate of 6% appears to he too low in the facts and circumstances and ends of justice would be met if the, rate of interest is enhanced from 6% to 12% from the date of application until the payment of amount to the claimants or depositing the same in the Tribunal whichever is earlier. In this connection, a decision of Apex Court in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, AIR 1992 SC 1261 may be noticed. In that case, the Tribunal has awarded interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing application till the date of realisation in a motor accident claims case. The Supreme Court referring to couple of its earlier decisions has enhanced the interest from 6% to 12%. 12. Cross objection is accordingly partly allowed as discussed above. No order as to costs.Appeal allowed and Cross objection partly allowed. *******