JUDGMENT - R.J. KOCHAR, J.:---The petitioner in person has filed the person petition challenging various orders passed by the respondent No. 2 employer Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation") against the petitioner. Virtually the petitioner is praying for multiple reliefs in one petition which normally we would not have entertained but for the petitioner being a party in person who has himself filed the petition and who himself has argued his matter. It appears that during the passage of time he got Sanad from the Bar Council and admittedly he is practising law at Nagpur. We had therefore, asked him whether he would still like to go back as an employee of the Corporation. The petitioner candidly replied affirmatively that he was not doing well at the bar and therefore, he would like to go back as the Divisional Engineer in the Corporation. 2. The petitioner has challenged the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him by the Corporation by issuing three charge sheets for different alleged acts of misconducts committed by him. According to him all the three charge sheets were issued to him mala fide. They are charge-sheet No. 1 dated 31-5-1984, charge-sheet No. 2 26-8-85 and charge-sheet No. 3 dated 22-1-1987. As a result of the departmental enquiries in the first two charge sheets he was punished in the form of reversion i.e. reduction in rank an stoppage of increments for a period of 5 years. He has challenged the said orders of punishment dated 16-1-86 and 21-10-86 directly by filing present writ petition. The petitioner has all along given great emphasis on the mala fides of the Officers of the Corporation. According to him he had not committed any Act of misconduct but was made a escape goat by some of the Officers who had vested interest against the petitioner. According to him the departmental enquiries were in violation of the principles of natural justice as he was not furnished with the required important and relevant documents so that he could defend himself in the enquiry effectively. His other grievance against the enquiry appears to be that there was no material or evidence before the Enquiry Officer to have found him guilty of the misconducts alleged against him and therefore, he has termed the findings or report of the Enquiry Officer as baseless and perverse. His other grievance against the enquiry appears to be that there was no material or evidence before the Enquiry Officer to have found him guilty of the misconducts alleged against him and therefore, he has termed the findings or report of the Enquiry Officer as baseless and perverse. As a result of the aforesaid punishments inflicted on him his pay scale was reduced to Rs. 485/- with which meager amount he could not pull on and could not support his family. He has repeatedly made a grievance that he was cornered by the officers to such an extent that he was left with no alternative but to tender a resignation and leave the Corporation forever. Since he could not meet the two ends of his bare minimum necessities of the family, he did not attend the duties and remained absent or away from duty for which he received the third charge sheet. The fact that he had remained absent is an admitted one but he has offered his explanation for his absence with which we are not concerned in the present petition. 3. It is borne out from the record that earlier on 8-1-1986 he had prayed for premature retirement w.e.f. 1-2-86 or alternatively accept his resignation from employment during the pendency of the departmental proceedings. It appears that due to such pendency of the departmental proceedings, his resignation was not accepted. We may mention here that this first or initial request for premature retirement was absolutely voluntary and there is no allegation that he was forced by any of the officers of the Corporation to resign from the service. We have laid emphasis on this aspect as the petitioner has based his submissions on the allegation that he was forced to resign on 30-1-1987 when he was called in the Head Office of the Corporation at Mumbai, and was required to sign letter of resignation. In para 33 of his petition however he specifically avers that he had submitted letter dated 30-1-87 at Bombay. It is his case that he had no other option or alternative in the given circumstances but to sign the said letter of resignation which he did. We may also mention that there is no allegation of any physical force or violence or strong armed tactics use against him at the Head Office when he was told to sign the resignation letter. We may also mention that there is no allegation of any physical force or violence or strong armed tactics use against him at the Head Office when he was told to sign the resignation letter. The petitioner has tried to link the allegation of forcible resignation with the circumstances of 2/3 charge-sheets and reduction in pay packet etc. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner is not an illiterate or uneducated workman who could be forced or tricked to sign a letter of resignation. Had there been any real substance in his allegation of force of compulsion to sign such a letter he would not have waited for more than 3 months to communicate to the Corporation that he was forced to resign from the employment and that his resignation was not a voluntary resignation. By his notice dated 15-5-87 for the first time he placed this allegation on record that he was forced to resign from employment. By letter dated 2-2-87 his resignation dated 30-1-87 was accepted by the Corporation. It is also pertinent to note that after tendering his resignation he had accepted all his legal dues including gratuity without any protest or demur. He also did not soon after 2-2-87 writes to the Corporation that he was force to sign this resignation letter through, he was not willing to do so. In view of his belated allegations we are not prepared to accept the case of the petitioner that he was practically, forced to sign a resignation letter. It is also on record that as soon as he was issued a show cause notice dated 2-11-85 for the proposed punishment in the first charge sheet he sent a letter dated 8-1-86 praying for voluntary retirement/resignation which request was not admittedly accepted by the Corporation and he was punished by an order dated 16-1-1986. He had already prepared to join the legal profession and therefore, he had applied for Sanad on 20-2-86 soon after the first punishment. It appears that the Bar Council required a letter from the employer that he was relieved from employment and the petitioner was not in a position to get such a letter as he was already in employment. Even from these facts it is much clear that the petitioner had mentally on his own volition and physically prepared to quit the job to join the profession. Even from these facts it is much clear that the petitioner had mentally on his own volition and physically prepared to quit the job to join the profession. It may be that he became a victim of the circumstances. The Corporation however, cannot be blamed as the Corporation had to institute such disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for the allegations made against him. The Corporation being a statutory body could not be expected to keep quiet when there was complaints or allegations against any of their servants or employees. It was the bounden duty of the Corporation to take the things to their logical ends by investigating and by completing the disciplinary proceedings which culminated in the form of two punishments imposed on the petitioner. According to the Corporation it had taken rather a lenient view by not dismissing him from employment. May be out of frustration, the petitioner has argued that it would have been better had he been dismissed from employment instead of continuing him in service by reducing him in rank and by cutting his pay packet to a meager basic of Rs. 485/- per month. Again may be out of frustration and grievance against every one in the Corporation he did not even resort to the appeal provisions provided under the statutory rules governing the Corporation and its employees. The petitioner could have filed in fact, two appeals in each of the punishments and could have brought to the notice of the first appellate authority and also the second appellate authority that the findings were baseless and perverse and that there was no evidence or material before the Enquiry Officer to hold him guilty of the charges levelled against him. His explanation for not doing so at the Bar was that even the higher authorities were prejudiced against him and that they would not have decided in his favour. We are not prepared to accept this submission as we have still faith and trust in the Officers at the higher level. None the less, if the rules prescribed an appeal against an order or disciplinary authority, there is no option or alternative for the delinquent employee to short circuit the prescribed manner and to rush to this Court under extraordinary jurisdiction of Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. None the less, if the rules prescribed an appeal against an order or disciplinary authority, there is no option or alternative for the delinquent employee to short circuit the prescribed manner and to rush to this Court under extraordinary jurisdiction of Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. All the questions of facts would have been gone into by the two appellate authorities and the petitioner having failed to avail of such mandatory remedies, it is not possible for us to go into all the questions of facts which he tried to argue before us. According to us there was sufficient material before the Enquiry Officer to have come to his own conclusion in both the enquires. There is no serious grievance made by the petitioner that he was not given a reasonable and adequate opportunity of hearing by the Enquiry Officer. His grievance that only one witness was examined and that there was no sufficient evidence against him to record a finding of guilt cannot be accepted by us at this stage. It was for the two appellate forums provided under the statutory Rules to have scrutinised and examined the factual aspects of the matter. We cannot record a finding whether the material or evidence was sufficient to punish the petitioner. If the disciplinary authority has come to a certain conclusion on the basis of material before it, we cannot substitute our own findings or opinion in the place of that of the disciplinary authority. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the departmental enquiries are not criminal trials and that the Enquiry Officers are not trial Court Judges. The broad principles which are required to be observed in every departmental enquiry have been squarely followed in the enquiries against the petitioner. If he was aggrieved by any violation of the principles of natural justice by the Enquiry Officer, the only remedy open to him was to make such a grievance before the two appellate authorities provided under the Rules. The grievance of the petitioner that there was no evidence or material before the Enquiry Officers in both the proceedings and that findings were baseless and perverse cannot be accepted by us and we are not able to substitute our own findings in the place of the disciplinary authority. The grievance of the petitioner that there was no evidence or material before the Enquiry Officers in both the proceedings and that findings were baseless and perverse cannot be accepted by us and we are not able to substitute our own findings in the place of the disciplinary authority. On both the occasions in fact, a lenient view has been taken by the disciplinary authority by not dismissing or removing him from employment. Indeed the Corporation cannot be blamed for its good gesture of not inflicting an extreme punishment of dismissal or removal of the petitioner from employment. As a result of such punishment if his pay packet is reduced and if he has not made legitimate grievance before the appellate authorities, we are not in a position to help him in any manner. We cannot accept the contention of the petitioner that the Corporation had forced him to resign and therefore, such resignation should be treated as removal or dismissal by the Corporation from employment. Not only the initial act of resignation dated 8-1-86 betrays the petitioner's contention of forcible resignation dated 30-1-87, the other crucial facts and events preceding and subsequent to the resignation do indicate that his resignation was voluntary and the Corporation had not forced him to resign from employment. Giving of two charge sheets and two enquiries against the petitioner for his alleged acts of misconducts cannot be stretched to the extent of imputing the Corporation with the allegation of force used on the petitioner to resign. He could have continued in employment and he could have simultaneously fought for justice by filing two statutory appeals against the two orders of punishment. Decisions taken out of frustration and desperate situations are not known to the law. The questions of facts could have been scrutinised and examined only by the appellate authorities. While examining the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India we cannot certainly probe into the pure questions of disputed facts. We are also of the opinion that there is no infraction of any principles of natural justice at the hand of the Enquiry Officer who has given his findings on the basis of the available material on record. We also do not find any fault with the orders of punishment impugned in the present petition imposed by the disciplinary authority. We are also of the opinion that there is no infraction of any principles of natural justice at the hand of the Enquiry Officer who has given his findings on the basis of the available material on record. We also do not find any fault with the orders of punishment impugned in the present petition imposed by the disciplinary authority. According to us there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned orders of the punishment. We hold that the letter of resignation signed by the petitioner on 30-1-87 which was accepted on 2-2-87 is not obtained by use of any force or violence but the same was out of the petitioner's own free will and volition. The Corporation has rightly acted in refusing to accept his request for premature retirement or to accept his resignation on the earlier occasion on account of the pendency of the departmental proceedings and the Corporation has also rightly acted in accepting the resignation after completion of such proceedings. We do not find substance or merit in the contention of the petitioner that he was forced by his unfortunate circumstances to resign from employment as the whole Corporation was against him and that even the appellate authorities would have decided against him, had he filed appeals before them. As soon as he received a show cast notice on 2-11-1985 he applied for voluntary retirement or resignation on 8-1-1986. At that time there was no punishment of any nature imposed by the Corporation. At that time his pay scale was not reduced to Rs. 485/- per month. During that period itself he had applied for Sanad to the Bar Council and if he were to succeed its getting the Sanad he would have resigned from employment. It was his calculated decision to quit the employment and to join the Bar, may be out of his own compulsions. The fact however, remains that the resignation tendered by him was not forcible one but was voluntarily given by him. We are therefore, not in a position to grant the relief of reinstatement to the petitioner in the position which he held prior to the punishments. Having held that his resignation was voluntary and that his two punishments cannot be interfered with by us in this petition, we cannot restore his position which he held prior to the punishment. We are therefore, not in a position to grant the relief of reinstatement to the petitioner in the position which he held prior to the punishments. Having held that his resignation was voluntary and that his two punishments cannot be interfered with by us in this petition, we cannot restore his position which he held prior to the punishment. We do not find any force in the contention of the petitioner that the whole Corporation was actuated with malice and mala fides against them. We do not accept the contention of the petitioner that the decisions of the Corporation were actuated by malice or mala fides. 4. Before parting with this matter, we may mention here that the petitioner has a technical plea that the charge sheet was not issued by a competent authority. We have perused the rules and we have also perused the charge sheets. They are given by the Regional Manger, who is the higher authority and who is designated as competent authority to issue charge sheet and to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner who was of the rank of the Divisional Engineer. We do not find any substance in the said contention of the petitioner. According to us the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the competent and proper authority as per the rules. 5. Since the petitioner himself is a practising Advocate, he has cited before us a number of decisions or judgments from the Supreme Court, the High Court and Central Administrative Tribunal. We have gone through all the aforesaid rulings and considered the ratios laid down by the learned Judges. From the peculiar facts and circumstances in the present case we are however, not able to apply and follow any of the decisions. The factual matrix in all the cases are different from the one with which we are dealing. We have examined the disciplinary proceedings and we have found that there is hardly and infraction of any principles of natural justice by the disciplinary authority and we are not able to hold that the findings recorded by them are not based on the material before them and that the conclusions are not flowing from the records. We have examined the disciplinary proceedings and we have found that there is hardly and infraction of any principles of natural justice by the disciplinary authority and we are not able to hold that the findings recorded by them are not based on the material before them and that the conclusions are not flowing from the records. It is well settled that it is the prerogative of the employer to hold a particular view on the basis of the material on record and impose certain punishment considering all the facts and circumstances of a case. We are not able to take any different view or to substitute our own view in place of the decision of the employer unless the same is perverse and not based on any material on record and that no reasonable man would have come to such a conclusion. In our case the petitioner having resigned from employment has challenged the orders of punishments dated 16-1-86 and 21-10-86 directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by passing the statutory appeals provided under the rules by filing the present petition as late as on 14-12-87 and had amended the petition to include and add a number of additional new grounds on 30-3-95. The petitioner has sought a number of curious reliefs in this petition including the one that we should direct the State Government to hold an inquiry against the working of the Corporation and to punish it officers including the disciplinary authorities under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. We have therefore, at the outset mentioned that the petitioner is seeking multiple reliefs in one petition. "a. Medical leave salary from 2-12-85 to 31-1-86. b. Balance medical leave encashment for 3 months. c. Balance earned leave encashment for 130 days. d. L.T.A. demanded on 30-8-85 of Rs. 3000/-. e. T.A. Bills for the months of May and June 1985. f. Interest on delayed payments @ 18% per annum. g. Gratuity to be paid as per Payment of Gratuity Act on the basis of last pay drawn. h. Yearly increment. i. Difference in salary due to revision in pay scale exact amount not known claimed provisionally. The opponent No. 2 may be directed to give details. j. Reimbursement of House rent paid by the petitioner on behalf of the opponent No. 2. k. Compensation on account of loss of income from 1-2-86 to 2-2-87. h. Yearly increment. i. Difference in salary due to revision in pay scale exact amount not known claimed provisionally. The opponent No. 2 may be directed to give details. j. Reimbursement of House rent paid by the petitioner on behalf of the opponent No. 2. k. Compensation on account of loss of income from 1-2-86 to 2-2-87. l. Compensation on account of defamation". He has prayed for reinstatement and also for gratuity. 6. We find absolutely no substance in the petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged. 7. In fairness Shri Joshi, the learned Advocate for the corporation has assured this Court that the Corporation would compute the unpaid legal dues if any including the payment for leave period etc. and all such legal dues to which the petitioner was otherwise entitled to. Shri Joshi has also fairly made a statement to us that if the petitioner makes a required application claiming his legal dues, the same would be considered, decided and acted upon as expeditiously as possible within a period of two months from the receipt of such application from the petitioner. It would be open to the petitioner to avail of this opportunity if he so desired. 8. Issuance of certified copy of this judgment and order is expedited. Petition dismissed. -----