Judgment : Tenant in R.C.O.P.No.4 of 1998 on the file of Rent Controller at Erode is the revision petitioner. Parties herein will be referred as ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’. 2. Landlord filed eviction petition against tenant on the ground that scheduled building is required for bona fide own occupation of his son T.S.Nataraj, who is running a partnership business with one Jayaraman under the name and style “Integrity Enterprises” at door No.209, Vaibhav Complex, 1569,Trichy Road,Coimbatore and they are dealers in rigid P.V.C. pipes, electrical and domestic hardwares, printing chemicals, paper cartons and building materials. He is having godowns in Ramanathapuram, Coimbatore and also a branch at Saibaba Colony, Coimbatore. It is stated that the firm “Integrity Enterprises” has been appointed as one of the authorised dealers to market and promote the products like Trubore Brand Rigid P.V.C. pipes, Casings and Screens in Coimbatore, Dharmapuri, Erode, Nilgiris and Salem Districts by M/s.Polytrusions Private Limited, Chennai. It is also alleged that landlords son Nataraj is a shareholder in Coimbatore Capital Market Services Private Limited, which entitles M/s.Ganesh Investments to trade in National Stock Exchange. Nataraj is a partner in M/s.Ganesh Investments which carries business in shares, debentures, stocks, bonds etc. and acting as brokers in buying and selling the same. It is said that petitioners son bona fidely require schedule premises to open a branch to carry on the dealership business of M/s.Polytrusions Private Limited and also the Stock Exchange business which he is already carrying on. It is said that they are not having any other non-residential building of their own within the municipal limits of Erode for carrying the said businesses. 3. Stating above reasons demand was made to the tenant to vacate the premises and finally a notice was issued on 12. 1997 for which a reply was sent on 312. 1997. Tenant has refused to vacate the premises. Averments in the reply notice were denied by the landlord. It is further said that merely because petitioners son is residing in Coimbatore and petitioner is residing in Chennai, it cannot be said that the claim is not bona fide. Landlord also admitted that before institution of proceedings, tenant had moved the Civil Court in O.S.No.1066 of 1995 to restrain the landlord by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from forcibly dispossessing him. Landlord also admitted that before institution of proceedings, tenant had moved the Civil Court in O.S.No.1066 of 1995 to restrain the landlord by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from forcibly dispossessing him. Landlord stated that he has no intention of taking law into his own hands and that is why he did not even prefer appeal against the decision. For the above reasons landlord wanted eviction of tenant from the scheduled premises. 4. In the detailed counter statement filed by the tenant he admitted the rental arrangement and also the rate of rent. He denied that landlords son is a partner in Integrity Enterprises and he also denied the fact that the said firm has been the dealers of M/s.Polytrusions Private Limited, Chennai. He also denied the allegation that landlords son is a shareholder in M/s.Ganesh Investments. According to tenant, the claim of landlord is not bona fide. Main reason for taking such a contention is landlord is residing at Madras and son is permanently settled in Coimbatore and therefore they do not require scheduled premises at Erode. Even if they want to occupy the non-residential premises, they can occupy the underground floor underneath scheduled premises and the same is lying vacant. He also said that landlords son is owning non-residential premises just opposite to scheduled premises and for that reason also eviction petition is not maintainable. According to him, he was constrained to file O.S.No.1066 of 1995 for permanent prohibitory injunction since landlord tried to evict him forcibly. Only to wreck vengeance for having obtained injunction by tenant, present petition is filed. He prayed for dismissal of the eviction petition. 5. On the basis of above pleadings, parties went on trial. Exs.P-1 to P-18 were marked on, the side of landlord and Exs.R-1 to R-6 were marked on the side of tenant. Landlord and his son were examined as P.Ws.1 and 2 and tenant got examined himself as R.W.1 apart from one independent witness as R.W.2. 6. After considering entire evidence Rent Controller as per order dated 212. 1998 held that the claim of landlord is bona fide. It came to the conclusion that landlords son is not in possession of any non-residential premises of his own at Erode. Landlords son is carrying on business in partnership and are appointed as dealers by M/s.Polytruision Private Ltd. It also found that landlords sons is a shareholder in M/s.Ganesh Investments. 1998 held that the claim of landlord is bona fide. It came to the conclusion that landlords son is not in possession of any non-residential premises of his own at Erode. Landlords son is carrying on business in partnership and are appointed as dealers by M/s.Polytruision Private Ltd. It also found that landlords sons is a shareholder in M/s.Ganesh Investments. It further held that landlords son is doing business at Erode and only because they are not having any showroom or godown at Erode, they could not develop their business at Erode. The contention that landlords son got other buildings was also found against the tenant. Rent Controller held that even though landlords son got building on the basis of settlement deed executed by his grandfather, P.W.2 will be entitled to right only on the death of grandfather. As on date, P.W.2 is not having any right over the property. Ex.R-3 is settlement deed executed by grand father in favour of P.W.2. 7. Rent Controller further held that tenant is also having other buildings of his own and rented out the same for getting better income. The contention of tenant that scheduled premises is not suitable for doing business in P.V.C. pipes, printing chemicals, building materials were also found against tenant. It was held that if the claim is found to be bona fide suitability of premises is a matter for landlord alone to consider and not for tenant. Regarding the contention that underground floor is suitable for landlords business, Rent Controller held that even tenant has refused to take up that portion since the same is without air or light and in view of the nature of construction, it is not possible to do business in P.V.C. pipes in the underground floor. Eviction was ordered. 8. The matter was taken in appeal in R.C.A.No.3 of 1999 on the file of Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode. Before appellate authority, tenant wanted a commission to be issued to verify the suitability of underground floor to do business. The same was allowed. Exs.C-1 and C-2 are Commissioners report and plan. The Commissioner was also examined before the court. After considering additional evidence along with the evidence already let in, appellate authority also confirmed the finding of Rent Controller by dismissing the appeal. 9. It is against the said concurrent judgments, tenant has preferred this revision petition. 10. The same was allowed. Exs.C-1 and C-2 are Commissioners report and plan. The Commissioner was also examined before the court. After considering additional evidence along with the evidence already let in, appellate authority also confirmed the finding of Rent Controller by dismissing the appeal. 9. It is against the said concurrent judgments, tenant has preferred this revision petition. 10. Since caveat was entered by landlord, with consent of parties, I heard both sides at the stage of admission itself. 11. Before going into the merits of the case, this Court must remind itself about its jurisdiction especially when the decision of authorities below are concurrent. 12. In Ramdoss v. K.Thangavelu Ramdoss v. K.Thangavelu Ramdoss v. K.Thangavelu , (2000)2 S.C.C. 135 the Honourable Supreme Court considered the scope of revisional powers under Sec.25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In pargraph 2 of the Judgment, their Lordships held thus: “Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that in the present case it was not open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional power to reassess the evidence and record a finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below and, therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. However this was disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent. He submitted that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction can interfere with the incorrect finding of fact recorded by the courts below and, therefore, the judgment of the High Court has to be maintained. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Asram Motors v. Bina Kumari , (1995)4 S.C.C. (Supp.) 679 wherein this Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional power under Sec.25 of the Act, can examine the correctness of the findings of fact. There is no quarrel as regards this proposition, but the question that arises for consideration is whether, while examining the correctness of the findings of fact, is it open to the revisional court to reassess the evidence. It is not disputed before us that Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) confers revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court which is not an appellate power. It is not disputed before us that Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) confers revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court which is not an appellate power. The High Court under Sec.25 of the Act, can call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision of orders passed therein. In D.Sankaranarayanan (Dr) v. Punjab National Bank D.Sankaranarayanan (Dr) v. Punjab National Bank D.Sankaranarayanan (Dr) v. Punjab National Bank , (1995)4 S.C.C. (Supp.) 675, it was held as thus: (S.C.C. p. 676, para. 2) “We are of the view that learned counsel for the appellant is right when he contends that the revision petition was treated by the High Court as if it were a second appeal and, upon a reassessment of the evidence, the findings of facts of the first appellate court were reversed.” Thus, in our view, the revisional power of High Court under Secc.25 of the Act not being an appellate power, it is impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision petition filed under Sec.25 of the Act... “ [Italics supplied] 13. On the same lines the Honourable Supreme Court declared the law in the decisions reported in (1) Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai , (1991)1 S.C.C. 133 (2) Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani , (1999)1 S.C.C. 141 (3) Ubaiba v. Damodaran , (1999)5 S.C.C. 645 (4) Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta , (1999)6 S.C.C. 222 and in (5) C.Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan C.Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan C.Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan , (2000)1 S.C.C. 451 : (2000)2 MLJ. (S.C.) 1. 14. From the above law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court, it is clear that while exercising the powers of revisional jurisdiction, it cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings, unless the decision of the authorities below are perverse. This Court cannot sit as second court of first appeal while exercising the supervisory jurisdiction. (S.C.) 1. 14. From the above law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court, it is clear that while exercising the powers of revisional jurisdiction, it cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings, unless the decision of the authorities below are perverse. This Court cannot sit as second court of first appeal while exercising the supervisory jurisdiction. If the authorities below have not followed the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court, or of this Court, taking into consideration the facts of the case and also taken into consideration immaterial evidence and giving importance to the same out of proportion and ignored the relevant piece of evidence that also may be a ground for interference. If on the basis of available materials the finding of authorities below are reasonable and also possible, merely because another view could be taken by revisional authority after reappreciation of evidence, cannot be a ground for interference under the Act. It is true powers of revision under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act is larger than Sec.115 of Code of Civil Procedure. It can consider the evidence on record only to satisfy whether the authorities below have acted” in accordance with law.“ 15. Within the limits of this power, let us consider whether the revision petitioner has satisfied that any ground is made out for interference under Sec.25 of the Act, i.e., whether there is illegality, impropriety, or irregularity in the order. For the said purpose, this Court is also entitled to take into consideration the entire evidence produced before the authorities below. But, at the same time, this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence for the purpose of substituting the conclusion reached by the authorities below, unless the conclusion is found to be perverse. 16. First question to be considered in this case is whether landlord can file application for eviction for the requirement of his son, though landlord may be in possession of other buildings. 17. It is the case of tenant that landlord is in possession of other buildings within Erode and in the name of landlords son also there are buildings which are just opposite and close to the scheduled building. Finding of the authorities below is landlords son is not in possession of any non-residential building of his own. The only document produced by tenant is Ex.B-3 a settlement deed executed by grandfather of P.W.2 Nataraj. Finding of the authorities below is landlords son is not in possession of any non-residential building of his own. The only document produced by tenant is Ex.B-3 a settlement deed executed by grandfather of P.W.2 Nataraj. It is clear therefrom that P.W.2 is not getting any right during the life time of grandfather. It is admitted that grandfather is still alive. According to landlord also, he is not in possession of other builder except scheduled building. Even if landlord may be in possession of other buildings, that will not disqualify him from getting possession of scheduled premises if the son is not in possession of any other building. It is so declared in the decision reported in V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar , (1998)6 S.C.C. 431 : (1999)1 MLJ. (S.C.) 1 a case under our Act. The difference of opinion of various High Courts was taken into consideration by the Honourable Supreme Court and finally in paragraph 12 of the judgment it is held thus: ”On a plain reading of Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act it appears to us that the legislature intended that a landlord seeking eviction of the tenant could be disentitled from claiming possession of the nonresidential premises where he requires those premises for his own use, if he is occupying a nonresidential building of his own. Similarly, the landlord would also be disentitled from claiming possession of non-residential premises for the benefit of a member of his family, if that member of the family was in occupation of a non-residential building of his own. Any other interpretation of this section would not only be doing violence to the plain language of the section but would result in absurdity inasmuch as the benefit of the provision would stand denied to the family members of the landlord, who do not occupy any premises of their own and for whose benefit eviction is sought, if the landlord himself is in occupation of a non-residential premises of his own. The fact that the landlord who seeks eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, is himself occupying a building of his own, cannot operate as a bar to the landlord seeking eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his own. The fact that the landlord who seeks eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, is himself occupying a building of his own, cannot operate as a bar to the landlord seeking eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his own. Thus, it follows and we hold that the law laid down in Jagannatha Chettiar case, 97 L.W. 182, is not the correct law. The learned single Judge in Chettiar case did not notice, let alone consider the three earlier judgments in Indian Plywood, 99 L.W. 49 (Mad.); K.Chettiar, (1961)1 MLJ. 184 and Annamalai and Co., (1975)1 MLJ. 337 . In our opinion, the judgments in Kannan case, 100 L.W. 213 (Mad.), Indian Plywood Manufacturing Co. case, 99 L.W. 49 (Mad.), K.Chettiar case and Annamalai and Co. case lay down the correct law, which we hereby approve.” [Italics supplied] The eligibility of landlord on the basis of this decision to seek eviction for the requirement of his son cannot be disputed. 18. Further question arises is whether landlords son is carrying on business as provided under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. .19. Ex.P-6 is partnership deed between P.W.2 and Jayaraman dated 112. 1996. Partnership was formed for the purpose of dealing in P.V.C. rigid pipes, hardware and electrical goods. Ex.P-6 further says that the firm shall carry on its business at Room No.209, Vaibhav Royal, 1569, Trichy Road, Coimbatore and or such other place or places as the parties may decide from time to time. It is a registered partnership is clear from Ex.P-10. Firm is also registered under Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act is clear from Ex.P-11. It is also registered under Central Sales Tax Act is clear from Ex.P-13. Ex.P-14 is dealership certificate issued by M/s.Polytrusions Pvt. Ltd. in favour of M/s.Integrity Enterprises. From the document it is clear that the firm has been appointed for marketing and promoting products in Trubore brand rigid PVC pipes, casings and screens, in Coimbatore, Dharmapuri, Erode. Nilgiris and Salem Districts. The same is also registered as small scale industry is clear from Ex.P-15. The firm is dealing with Indian Bank is also clear from Ex.P-16. Ex.P-17 is the telephone bill in regard to telephone installed at Coimbatore at Vaibhav complex. Nilgiris and Salem Districts. The same is also registered as small scale industry is clear from Ex.P-15. The firm is dealing with Indian Bank is also clear from Ex.P-16. Ex.P-17 is the telephone bill in regard to telephone installed at Coimbatore at Vaibhav complex. From these exhibits it is clear that P.W.2 along with another partner Jayaraman is carrying on business, and landlords son is also an “active partner.” 20. An argument was taken that no arrangement has been made by P.W.2 to carry on business at Erode and therefore the claim is not bona fide.Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act only says that a landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, ‘in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is own. ‘The law does not insist that whenever landlord wants to do business in a particular area where a branch is sought to be opened. If landlord is already carrying on business in another district, there is no further requirement that he should take steps to satisfy the court that he is carrying on business or has taken steps for carrying on business, in other districts also. 21. For the said purpose, learned counsel for petitioner relied on the decision reported in Lalchand Vijayakumar v. Radha Krishnamoorthy Lalchand Vijayakumar v. Radha Krishnamoorthy Lalchand Vijayakumar v. Radha Krishnamoorthy , 1992 T.L.N.J. 62 rendered by Justice Srinivasan (as his Lordship then was). The said decision has no application to the facts of this case. In that case it was found that landlord was not carrying on business at all and has not taken any steps for the said purpose. In that case, learned Judge never held that whenever landlord wanted to open branch or sub office again steps will have to be taken to prove the bona fide of the claim. 22. Apart from the absence of such provision, evidence shows that landlord has dealing with concerns at Erode. Ex.P-18 series shows that M/s.Integrity Enterprises have sold goods to M/s.United Pipe Agencies, Erode. 22. Apart from the absence of such provision, evidence shows that landlord has dealing with concerns at Erode. Ex.P-18 series shows that M/s.Integrity Enterprises have sold goods to M/s.United Pipe Agencies, Erode. It is the case of landlord that since they belong to Erode if only they are allowed to open a branch, they can develop the business to vast extent. If we are to accept the argument of learned counsel for petitioner, it would mean that even if landlord satisfy the statutory requirements landlord must prove further requirement as dictated by tenant before getting possession. .23. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan , (1979)1 S.C.C. 273 their Lordships held that the language of statute should not be unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. Their Lordships further said that it appears to be the general scheme for all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country. .24. In Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar , (1987)1 S.C.C. 204 a case coming under Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, their Lordships held that Court cannot put further restrictions on the right of landlord. In para.15 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus: .“....It is well settled that though the Rent Act is a beneficial legislation, it must be read reasonably and justly. If more limitations are imposed upon the right to hold the property then it would expose itself to the vice of unconstitutionality. Such an approach in interpretation of beneficial statutes is not warranted. It is true that one should iron out the creases and should take a creative approach as to what was intended by a particular provision but there is always, unless rebutted, a presumption as to constitutionality and the Act should be so read as to prevent it from being exposed to the vice of unconstitutionality. State is also presumed to act fairly....” [Italics supplied] .25. State is also presumed to act fairly....” [Italics supplied] .25. Both the above decisions were relied on by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in Raghunath G.Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji Raghunath G.Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji Raghunath G.Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji , (1999)8 S.C.C. 1 wherein it is held that the language of the provision cannot be unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get possession. Their Lordships further held thus: .“...If more limitations are imposed upon the landlord holding property, it would expose itself to the vice of unconstitutionality. The construction of the relevant statutory provision must strike a just balance between the right of the landlord and the right of the tenant...” 26. Landlord has further proved that he has entered into partnership with one Karthik to do business in shares, stocks, debentures, etc. under the name and style M/s.Ganesh Investments. An argument was taken that this Partnership is not registered and even the witnesses ought to have signed the deed have not signed it. I do not think the said argument of learned counsel also could be accepted. In the name of Ganesh Investments, they have opened Bank accounts and bank transactions is also going on from 2. 1997 onwards. The entire bank dealings have been produced in this case as Ex.P-8 and partnership deed is Ex.P-9. An argument was taken that though M/s.Ganesh Investments can have dealings in Coimbatore, since they have registered with Coimbatore Stock Exchange, no such permission has been obtained from Erode. As stated earlier, in this case we are only concerned whether the claim of landlord is bona fide and whether P.W.2 is carrying on business. P.W.2 or Ganesh Investments cannot get licence at Erode unless they got office at Erode. It is for the said purpose, they sought eviction of tenant. If the argument of learned counsel for petitioner is to be accepted, it would mean that landlord should take rented building, start business and then alone seek eviction of tenant. I do not think that is the requirement under Rent Control Law. .27. Further argument was also taken by learned counsel that P.W.2 when he was examined, not stated as to which business he wants to carry on in the scheduled premises. I do not think that is the requirement under Rent Control Law. .27. Further argument was also taken by learned counsel that P.W.2 when he was examined, not stated as to which business he wants to carry on in the scheduled premises. The argument is P.W.2 must be definite about the business and he is going to start in the premises and he cannot have both the businesses simultaneously in the scheduled building. The argument is taken in view of the wordings in the section wherein it is said “a business”. According to learned counsel, it can only be one business and landlord will have to choose the “one” business which he want to conduct in the premises. 28. I do not find any merit in the said submission. In the Law Lexicon (1997 Edition) by P.Ramanatha Aiyar, the meaning of the word ‘a’ is given thus: “A” has sometimes the force of “ONE” Thus, the phrase “a years rent” was held to be equivalent to “one years rent”. A licence to fish “with a rod and line” does not justify more than one rod and lien.” But learned author further says: “A” is often used as equivalent to “ANY”. 29. In Blacks Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), it is said thus: “The word “a” has varying meanings and uses. “A” means “one” or “any”, but less emphatically than either. It may mean one where only one is intended, or it may mean any one of a great number. It is placed before nouns of the singular number, denoting an individual object or quality individualized.” 30. In the New Gem Dictionary, the meaning of the word “a” is said as “an, one, any.” 31. When the bona fides of landlord is proved, tenant has no say whether landlord is going to make use of the building for one business or other business. While dealing with the case of eviction for bona fide own use or additional accommodation, it is bona fides of the claim that is being considered. Once it is found that the claim is bona fideRent Control Act do not limit the right of landlord to make use of the building for any business of his choice. Here also I am of the view, that the words “carrying on a business” should mean any business which the landlord is carrying on. Once it is found that the claim is bona fideRent Control Act do not limit the right of landlord to make use of the building for any business of his choice. Here also I am of the view, that the words “carrying on a business” should mean any business which the landlord is carrying on. Landlord cannot be asked to limit his choice only for one business as was argued by the learned counsel for Petitioner. 32. In Davis v. Sebastian , (1996)6 S.C.C. 604 their Lordships considered the scope of Sec.11(8) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which enables the landlord to seek eviction for bona fide additional accommodation. The section says, “A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use.” An argument was taken before the Supreme Court that requirement of landlord should relate to the same purpose, namely, for expansion of his existing business of hotel-cum-bar and that if the landlord wants to start different business namely, jewellery and textile business, the same will not come under Sec.11(8) of the Act i.e., personal use. Setting aside the judgment of High Court, their Lordships in paragraphs 8 to 14 held thus: “8. Now, what is the meaning of the expression “personal use” in Sub-sec.(8). It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that words in a statute shall be given their natural, ordinary meaning; nothing should be added to them nor should any word be treated as otiose. Two comprehensive expressions “additional accommodation” and “personal use” are employed in Sub-sec.(8). The expression “additional accommodation” takes in both residential as well as non-residential buildings. “Personal use” is also an expression of wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-section which restricts the import of that expression. The said requirement of Sub-sec.(8) will be complied with on the satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide need of the additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To what use the additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the landlord. There is nothing in the sub-section which restricts the import of that expression. The said requirement of Sub-sec.(8) will be complied with on the satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide need of the additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To what use the additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the landlord. In the case of a non-residential building whether a new business should be set up in the additional accommodation or whether it should be used for expansion of the existing business, is left entirely to the option of the landlord. This, being the intendment of the legislature, the court cannot impose any restriction with regard to the use of the additional accommodation from which the eviction of the tenant is sought. 9. In Joseph v. Francis , 1965 K.L.T. 1113 a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court correctly construed Sec.11(8) of the Kerala Act when he held that it was the landlords choice to decide what business he would carry on and that a court would not be justified in saying that he required the building bona fide for his own use only if he required it for expanding his existing trade. 10. Thus, it follows that the phrase “additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord” may relate to residential purpose as well as to non-residential purpose. Where it relates to non-residential purpose there is no reason to restrict personal use of the landlord for the purpose of only expansion of the existing business. He can put the additional accommodation, so long as he bona fide needs it, to any business or purpose of his choice. 11. Here, it may be useful to refer to in pari materia enactments of other States. In the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Sec.10(3) (c) deals with granting order of eviction on the plea of additional accommodation. It provides that in the case of a nonresidential building the landlord has to show that he requires the additional accommodation for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on; thus under the Andhra Act additional accommodation can be sought for purposes of the business which the landlord is carrying on. It provides that in the case of a nonresidential building the landlord has to show that he requires the additional accommodation for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on; thus under the Andhra Act additional accommodation can be sought for purposes of the business which the landlord is carrying on. So also under Sec.10 (3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the additional accommodation for non-residential purposes can be claimed for purposes of the business which the landlord is carrying on. 12. In Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.Shanmugam Chetty Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.Shanmugam Chetty Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.Shanmugam Chetty , (1987)2 S.C.C. 707 : (1987)1 R.C.R. 586 while construing Sec.10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act, this Court held that once a landlord has satisfied the Controller that he was bona fide in need of additional accommodation for residential or non-residential purposes and that the advantage derived by him by an order of eviction will out weigh the hardship caused to the tenant, then the landlord is entitled to an order of eviction irrespective of any other consideration. 13. It may be pointed out here in contradictions to the other enactments that under Sec.11(8) of the Kerala Act claim for additional accommodation is not confined to expansion of the business which the landlord is carrying on. As pointed above, the landlord has a wide choice under Secc.11(8) of the Act. He can use it at his option in case of non-residential accommodation, either for expansion of existing business or for a new business. 14. The contention that if the expression “personal use” under Sub-sec.(8) is interpreted include “use for any business”, it will dilute the rigour of Sec.11(3), is devoid of merit...” [Italics supplied] 33. It is clear from the above law declared by the Supreme Court that the argument of learned counsel that P.W.2 will have to choose either dealership in PVC pipes or Stock exchange is without merit and hence rejected. 34. An argument was also taken by learned counsel that if P.W.2 was really serious in doing business, in PVC pipes, electrical goods and also dealing in shares, he could have occupied the underground floor. According to landlord, the underground floor cannot be stated as accommodation at all and could not be used for any purpose. 34. An argument was also taken by learned counsel that if P.W.2 was really serious in doing business, in PVC pipes, electrical goods and also dealing in shares, he could have occupied the underground floor. According to landlord, the underground floor cannot be stated as accommodation at all and could not be used for any purpose. Again when the claim of landlord is found to be bona fide which portion of building he has to occupy is the choice of landlord. Photographs of scheduled building was also brought to my notice. Appellate authority ordered a Commissioner to be appointed to inspect the underground floor. Exs.C-1 and C-2 are the report the plan filed by the Commissioner. It is said therein. Further down Commissioner has said thus: It is clear from the above statement of Commissioner that underground floor could not be used for the purpose of business. In fact, tenant was offered very same portion. Landlord also expressed his willingness to provide the underground portion to tenant. Tenant refused to accept the same on the ground that he cannot do business in that premises. A suggestion was also put to landlord whether underground portion was let out to third party for the purpose of doing business. The same was specifically denied by landlord. He said that it was all along used as dumping place and it could not be used for any purpose. P.W.2 has further said that PVC pipes are having length of 20 feet and it will be difficult for them to take PVC pipes to underground, in view of the nature of construction. Appellate authority has also held that underground portion cannot be used for business purposes. When underground floor cannot be used as accommodation, tenant cannot insist that landlord should occupy that portion. 35. It must be noted that tenant is also owner of two other buildings closely and he has let out the same for getting good income. 36. Finally learned counsel for petitioner submitted that landlord has filed eviction petition only to wreck vengeance on tenant by somehow or other evicting him. For the said purpose following circumstance has been relied on. Ex.B-2 is paper notification in ‘Dhina Thandhi’ dated 110. 1995 where landlord advertised that scheduled premises is available for rent. 36. Finally learned counsel for petitioner submitted that landlord has filed eviction petition only to wreck vengeance on tenant by somehow or other evicting him. For the said purpose following circumstance has been relied on. Ex.B-2 is paper notification in ‘Dhina Thandhi’ dated 110. 1995 where landlord advertised that scheduled premises is available for rent. The argument is when tenant is already in occupation, landlord attempted to induct another tenant and if landlord was really anxious to get possession for his own use, he would not have advertised that the shop is available for rent. Another circumstance relied on by learned counsel is that tenant was compelled to file O.S.No.1066 of 1995 before District Munsif Court, for permanent prohibitory injunction. On the basis of these circumstances an argument was placed that landlord wanted to evict tenant forcibly and when that effort failed, he had created documents. 37. The above argument was also put forth before authorities below. Regarding paper advertisement same was also produced in O.S.No.1066 of 1995. Ex.B-1 is the judgment in that case. Landlord had all along explained that tenant had agreed to vacate the premises at that time and only believing his statement the advertisement was given. While disposing of O.S.No.1066 of 1995, in para.6 of the judgment it is held that even though plaintiff has not proved entire cause of action, plaintiff being in possession, an injunction is granted. The actual wordings used by the civil court read thus: That means, even civil court did not believe that tenant was attempted to be forcibly dispossessed. 38. It is true in 1995, P.W.2 was not having dealership and only long thereafter even partnership was entered. On that date there was no requirement for landlords son. Law is well settled that when landlord says that he wants to provide accommodation for his son, there is nothing to doubt the bona fides of such claim. Law is also well settled that if landlord comes and prays before court that he has satisfied statutory requirements and is in need of non-residential building, court can presume that the claim is bona fide. Law is also well settled that if landlord comes and prays before court that he has satisfied statutory requirements and is in need of non-residential building, court can presume that the claim is bona fide. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde , (1999)4 S.C.C. 1 , in para 8 of the judgment it is held thus: “When a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation there is no doubt he has to prove it. But there is no warrant for presuming that his need is not bona fide. The statute enjoins that the court should be satisfied of his requirement. So the court would look into the broad aspects and if the court feels any doubt about the bona fides of the requirement it is for the landlord to clear such doubts. Even in a case where the tenant does not contest or dispute the claim of the landlord the court has to look into the claim independently albeit the landlords burden gets lessened by such non-dispute. In appropriate cases it is open to the court to presume that the landlords requirement is bona fide and put the contesting tenant to the burden to show how the requirement is not bona fide. [Italics supplied] That is also a case where landlord wanted to start a business in electrical goods. 39. Taking into consideration the limited jurisdiction of this Court and after having perused the entire evidence both oral and documentary, I do not think that authorities below have committed any illegality, impropriety or irregularity as was argued by learned counsel for petitioner. I do not find any ground for interference under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 40. In the result, the revision petition is without any merit and consequently the same is dismissed. No costs. C.M.P.No.4469 of 2000 is also dismissed.