J. B. Goel, J. ( 1 ) TWO applications, I. A. 7928/95 and I. A. 180/98 by defendants No. 9 and 10 andthird application IA No. 5125/96 by defendant No. 8 have been filed under Order 23rule 3 Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the compromise-decree passed on 25. 8. 1993. Briefly the facts are that plaintiff Anand Deep Singh had Filed a suit for partitionof immovable and movable properties, declaration of fights in the property and forrendition of accounts thereof. The properties are alleged to be owned by late Sirdatar Singh. Sir Datar Singh died on 17. 5. 1973 leaving behind his widow, lady Satwantdatar Singh, two sons, Kanwar Mahinder Pal Singh and S. Maninder Singh and twodaughters, Smt. Arnleshwar Anand (defendant No. 8) and Smt. Kirpal Kaur (defendant No. 9 ). His widow died on 6. 6. 1979, Kanwar Mahinder Pal Singh, died on 4. 4. 198]defendants No. l to 5 are his widow and four daughters, S. Maninder Singh. also diedon 24. 9. 1987, leaving behind plaintiff, and defendant No. 7, two sons, defendant No. 6his widow and defendants No. 11and12 two daughters. Defendant No. 10 is the daughterof defendant No. 9. Plaintiff had claimed partition in respect of the following properties :-Schedule "b" (1) Agricultural land measuring 322 acres situated at village Pipal Kheria,distt. Raisen, M. P. (2) Agricultural land measuring 154 acres at Behragarh, Bhopal in villagesbheta and Laukheri, Tehsil Hazur, Distt. Bhopal. Schedule "c" (1) Agricultural land-at village Punjab Khore, Delhi measuring 1404 Bighas8 Biswas; (2) Rural land and 5 buildings in Abadi Die; (3) House No. 15 on Plot No. 63, Block "a", New Rohtak Road, measuring2485 sq. yds. ; (4) House No. B-68 Greater Kailash Part I. New Delhi measuring 1000 sq. yds; (5) Properties with Mountgumri Cooperative Joint Farming Society, Punjabkhore, Delhi of which Sir Datar Singh was the founder;schedule No. II (6) House known as Retreat, Lower Mall, Kasuali, H. P. Moveahic properties10 tractors, II cars and two trucks and other implements and farm machineries. Another sui"t No. 63/75 had earlier been filed by S. Maninder Singh, lather ofplaintiff for partition. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of these suits, defendants No. 7, 9 and 10 had filed 1. A. No. 1860/93 Ex. C-8 under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code entering into compromise as mentioned therein. This application was taken up by Court on 18. 3. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of these suits, defendants No. 7, 9 and 10 had filed 1. A. No. 1860/93 Ex. C-8 under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code entering into compromise as mentioned therein. This application was taken up by Court on 18. 3. 1993 when the counselfor defendants No. 7, 9 and 10 accepted its correctness and counsel for plaintiff andother defendants raising no objection. That application was allowed and taken onrecord on 18. 3. 1993. ( 3 ) ANOTHER similar application I. A. 4252/93 Ex. C-8 under Order 23 Rule 3 (. pc wasfiled on behalf of defendants 7 and 8, who also entered into compromise. This applicalion was taken up by the Court on 27. 5. 1993. Learned counsel for the applicants madestatement about its correctness in the presence of the counsel for plaintifl and otherdefendants, who had no objection. This was also accepted and taken or record. ( 4 ) ANOTHER joint I. A, No. 7382/93 Ex. C-6 was Filed on behalf of plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 12 signed by plaintiff, defendants 1 to 7, II and 12 and defendant No. 7signed as assignee of defendants 8 to 10 also under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code along with adocument, called Family Settlement (Ex. C-l) besides other annexures, seeking to passa decree in terms of the compromises Ex C-6, C-7 and C-8 and family settlement Exc-l (i. e. compromise IA 7382/93, I. A. No. l860/93. and I. A. No. 4252/93 ). This application was taken upon 25. 8. 1993 in the presence of counsel for plaintiff, counsel fordefendants No. I to 5 and defendants No. 6, 7, II and 12 and plaintiff, defendants No. 1,3 and 5 and were present in person. The statement of Virender Mohan Singh (defendant No. 7) and Mrs. Ranjil Kaur (defendant No. 1) were recorded. The Court accepted it and compromise decree was passed on 25. 8. 1993. ( 5 ) DECREE was drawn on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. l5,000. 00 with this familysettlement Ex. C-1 and compromises Ex. C -6, C -7 and C-8 as part of the decree. Thereafter, the aforesaid application I. A. No. 7928/95 by defendants No. 9 and 10 andi. A. No. 5125/96 by defendant No. 8 were filed for setting aside/recalling the aforesaidcompromise decree. Defendants No. 9 and 10 filed yet another application I. A. 180/98on 3. 1. C-1 and compromises Ex. C -6, C -7 and C-8 as part of the decree. Thereafter, the aforesaid application I. A. No. 7928/95 by defendants No. 9 and 10 andi. A. No. 5125/96 by defendant No. 8 were filed for setting aside/recalling the aforesaidcompromise decree. Defendants No. 9 and 10 filed yet another application I. A. 180/98on 3. 1. 1998 supplementing their objections with additional facts/grounds. Replies andrejoinders have been filed in these applications, ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Before considering thecase on merits, two legal objections raised by the parties are being taken up first. Objection has been taken on behalf of defendants 8 to 10 that the decree passed on thebasis of compromise affects immovable property, it required compulsory registrationunder Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and the decree not having beenregistered is void and unenforceable. This is disputed by the learned counsel for theother parties on the ground that the case falls under Section 17 (2) (vi) thereof as thedecree comprises of the properties which are the subject matter of the suit and it doesnot require registration. ( 7 ) SECTION 17 of the Indian Registration Act so for as relevant reads:- ( 8 ) DOCUMENTS of which registration is compulsory. The following documents shall be registered, if :-1. (a)X X X XXXXXXX XX X XXXXXXXXXXXXX XX (b) Other non-testamentary instruments which purport of operate to create,declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, andright, title or interest whether vested or contingent, or of the value of onehundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property. (e), (d) and (e) X XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX2. Nothing in Clauses (b) and (e) of sub-section (1) applies to :- (i) to (v) X XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X XXXX (vi) Any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed lobe made on a compromises and comprising immovable property other thanthat which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding; or (vii) to (xii) X X XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXThis means that a consent decree is exempted from registration if it does notcomprise immovable properly other than that which is the subject matter of the suit. The Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major (1995) 5 SCC 709 hasconsidered elaborately the circumstances in the Clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 which would come into play lor determining the question when a compromisedecree is compulsorily regislerable. It was held that this Clause (vi) engrafts an exception to the instruments covered by Clauses (b) and (e) of sub-section (1 ). It relates toany decree or order of a court including a decree or order expressed to be made on acompromise comprising immovable property which is the subject matter of the suit orother proceedings. It applies to those decrees which declare the pre-existing right anddoes not by ilself create new rights, title or interest in praesenti in immovable properlyof the value of Rs. 100 or upwards. Compromise decree should, however, be bona fideand not a device to evade payment of stamp duly and frustrate the law relating toregistration. A Division Bench of this Court in P. K. Nangia v. Land and Development Of-ficer, New Delhi and Another AIR 1988 Delhi 260 also has held that a decree of partitionaffecting partition of immovable property falls under Section 17 (1) (b) and if it doesnot comprise of immovable property other than that which is the subject matter of thesuit or proceedings does not require registration under the exception mentioned inclause (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17. In the present case the compromise onwhich decree has been passed comprises of only those properties which are subjectmatter of the suit, the dispute is bond fide in respect of property claiming pre-existingrights of the parties therein and does not create any new rights in the parties. It fallsunder exception in Clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 and thus the decree inquestion does not require registration. This objection thus has no merit. ( 9 ) AN objection has also been raised on behalf of the plaintiff and defendants I to 5,6, 7, 11 and 12 that these applications are not maintainable under Order 23 Rule 3cpc and the remedy, if at all any is available, lies under Order 43 Rule IA Civil Procedure Code or byway of appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code and these applications are not maintainable, whereas learned counsel for the applicants/defendants 8 to 10 have contended that these applications are proper and maintainable. They have relied onbanwari Lal v. Chandro Devi (through L. Rs.) and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 1139 . This aspect hasbeen considered by the Supreme Court in this judgment of Banwari Lal and it hasbeen held that in view of Amending Act introducing a proviso alongwith an Explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 Civil Procedure Code and also Rule l (m) of Order 43 having been deleted,the court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded suchcompromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction hasbeen arrived at on the basis of any lawful agreement or compromise in view of theproviso read with the Explanation thereof, the Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to decide whether the compromise was void or voidable underthe Contract Act. As such a challenge to the compromise or compromise decree couldbe made by a petition under Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 or by way of an appealunder Section 96 (1) of the Code in which the question of validity of compromise couldbechallenged in view of Rule I A of Order 43 of the Code. These applications thus aremaintainable. This objection also has no merit. ( 10 ) TO decide the controversy raised it will be relevant to refer to the scope and purpose of provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code and also the power of the court to interferein a decree passed as a result of compromise/settlement. Rule 3 of Order 23 reads asunder:- "where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writingand signed by parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff inrespect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Courtshall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, andahall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the partiesto the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromiseor satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. "providedxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxexplanation - An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable underthe Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within themeaning of this Rule. "providedxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxexplanation - An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable underthe Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within themeaning of this Rule. ( 11 ) BEFORE passing a decree on a compromise under this rule, the Court has to satisfyitself as to three aspects, first it must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that thesuit has been adjusted wholly or in part; secondly, the adjustment is by way of a lawfulagreement or compromise and thirdly, the agreement or compromise is in writing andthe same has been signed by the parties. Only on satisfaction of these conditions, thecourt is vested with the jurisdiction to pass a decree in accordance therewith. Thoughthe language used is "shall pass a decree in accordance with the compromise" which isof mandatory in nature, however the court is not obliged to pass a decree in accordance therewith, if it is of opinion that all or any of the terms of the compromise oragreement is opposed to public policy or is intended to defeat provision of any law orhas some doubt about the genuineness of the signatures of the party in the petition. The Court would also be justified in not passing a decree in the case of a compromiseof part of the subject matter of the suit which did not include a party whose interestcould not be separated. In the absence of any bar or restriction, there can also be aconsent decree between some of the parties at one stage and another decree between the rest of the parties later on. Once the Court is so satisfied and passed a decree oncompromise it is binding upon the parties thereto like a decree passed by invitum. Ajudgment by consent is intended to shorten litigation between the parties as much as ajudgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. Once the Court is so satisfied and passed a decree oncompromise it is binding upon the parties thereto like a decree passed by invitum. Ajudgment by consent is intended to shorten litigation between the parties as much as ajudgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. Acompromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment and has binding force like resjudicata, of course unless it is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or other likegrounds which renders the agreement or compromise void or voidable under the Contract Act, Once a decree is so passed the endeavour of the court should be to construeit insuch a way which tends to shorten litigation and to resist any attempt on the partof any of the parties to construe the decree in such a way as to multiply litigation (Bilasdevi v. Bansidhar Saha AIR 1951 Pat 459 and V. N. Sreedharan v. Bhaskaran AIR1986 K. erala49 ). ( 12 ) IN this case the parties to the suit and the compromise are not strangers but nearrelations who claim succession, right and interest in the properties through the same,not distant, common ancestor i. e. deceased Sir Datar Singh, defendants I to 5. . areheirs of his one son Kanwar Mahinder Pal Singh being widow and children, plaintiff,defendants 6, 7, II and 12 are the heirs i. e. wife and children of other son, Sardarmahinder Singh and defendants 8 and 9 are his daughters while defendant No. 10 is agrand daughter. Obviously the compromisesw in this case were by way of family settlement. The family settlements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselvesand would be enforced if honestly made. The objectof the arrangement is to protectthe family from long drawn litigation or perpetuating strifes which mar the unity andsoliquarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between various members ofthe family. The Courts have leaned in favour of upholding a family agreement insteadof disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the Courts find that thefamily arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect, the rule of estoppelis pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a partyto the family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and seeks to revoke family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. Family arrangements are governed by those principles which are not applicable to dealingsbetween strangers. The court when deciding the rights of the parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements considers what is best for the interest of families and have regard to considerations which in dealing with transactionsbetween persons not members of the same family would not be taken into account. ( 13 ) THE Courts have taken very liberal and broad view of the validity of the familysettlement and have always tried to uphold it and maintain it. The central idea in theapproach made by the Court is that if by consent of the partics a matter has been settled it could not be allowed to he reopened by the parties to the agreement onfrivolous and untenable grounds. The courts have laid down that a family arrangementclearly operates as an estoppel so as to prevent all the parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the same. This legal position has been noticed in Kale and Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others air 1976 SC 807 after considering the relevant English and Indian case law. ( 14 ) DEFENDANTS No. 9 and 1. 0 entered into compromise with defendant No. 7 andfiled in Court joint compromise petition under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code (IA 1860/93 Exc-7 ). Defendant No. 7 (V. M. Singh) is son of Maninder Singh and grandson of Sirdatar Singh while defendant No. 9 Smt. Kirpal Kaur is daughter of deceased Sir Dalarsingh and defendant No. 10 is daughter of defendant No. 9. In the compromise it isspecifically mentioned that because of intervention of common friends and relationsand on mutual discussions the parties have decided to settle and have settled all thedispules and differences with regard to "the subject mailer of the suit and even otherwise in relation to the properties on the terms and conditions mentioned therein". It isalso recorded in this application that this compromise has been arrived at by themutual consent, of free will and without any duress of pressure (paras 2, 3 and 4 ). Clause (d) in para 3 provided: ( 15 ) (D) That Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Km. It isalso recorded in this application that this compromise has been arrived at by themutual consent, of free will and without any duress of pressure (paras 2, 3 and 4 ). Clause (d) in para 3 provided: ( 15 ) (D) That Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Km. Guneeta have relinquished, released,given up, assigned all their rights, title and interest in all the moveable andimmovable properties which are the subject matter of the present suit orsuch properties which are the subject matter of the suit No. 63 of 1975. Allthese properties to the extent of the share of Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Km. Guneeta shall deem to vest, be the exclusive properties of Shri V. M. Singhsubject to the payments being made as specified. Shri V. M. Singh shall hethe owner of all interest, rights and benefits that have accrued or may accrue in favour of Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Km. Guneeta and shall deem to vestwith all the benefits accruing to Shri V. M. Singh and would deem to havebeen assigned in his favour and he shall be treated the exclusive owner lothe exient of share owned by these two defendants including the sharesdevolving on her from late Sir Datar Singh, late lady Satwant Dalar Singh,huf or otherwise Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Km. Guneeta also release, relinquish and assign their rights in 4, 3 acres of land situated in Kh. No. 128 ofvillage Behta, Bairagarh, Bhopal standing in the names of Smt. Kirpal Kaurand Km: Guneeta. " ( 16 ) IN consideration thereof defendant No. 7 was to pay to them Rs. 50 lakhs, out ofwhich Rs. 5 lakhs were given at the time of signing this agreement as mentioned thereinand for the balance amount of Rs. 45 lakhs 7 post dated cheques three of Rs. 5 lakhseach and four of Rs7. 5 lakhs each were given (para 3 (b) ). Defendant No. 7 had alsoagreed (in claim 3 (c) to relinquish his rights and title in house in Bhopal as under:-"that Shri V. M. Singh relinquishes and releases the share that woulddevolve upon him on partition in house in Bhopal known as Sir Datar Singhhouse with outhouse and appurtenant area to the said building approximately I Acre in favour of Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Kum. Guneeta. Shriv. M. Singh shall endeavour to obtain rights in the said properties completely in favour of Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Kum. Guneeta. Shriv. M. Singh shall endeavour to obtain rights in the said properties completely in favour of Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Kum. Guneeta at the time of final partition. In case of the same not being successful, Shri V. M. Singh shall pay anamount of Rs. 5 lakhs to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and Kum. Guneeta collectively atthe time of such final partition of suit properties for the shares of the otherparties. Apart from this house, outhouse and appurtenant land Smt, Kirpalkaur and Km. Guneeta will not have any right, title or interest in any otherproperty in Bhopal or otherwise. " all the liabilities, litigation etc in respect of the properties have been undertakenby defendant No. 7 (Clause (e) ). Defendants No. 9 and 10 had also admitted in clause 3 (c) that "apart from thishouse, outhouse and appurtenant land Smt. Kirpal Kour and Km. Guneeta will nothave any right, title or interest in any other property in Bhopal or otherwise. Withthese terms the parties made the following prayer in the compromise application tothe Court:-" (a) accept the present compromise arrived at between the present applicants. (b) pass such other and further orders as this Hon ble Court deems fit andproper in the facts and circumstances of the present case. "this compromise petition is signed by defendants No. 7, 9 and 10 and their advocales and is also supported by the affidavits of the parlies. Counsel for these defendants No. 7, 9 and 10 also appeared in Court on 18-3-93 and made statementsaccepting the laclum and correctness of this compromise (C-7) in the presence ofcounsel for the plaintiff, defendant Nos. I to 5, 6, 8, II and 12, the latter had raised noobjection. The compromise was accepted by the Court. By this compromise partieshad mutually relinquished rights in respect of the properties in favour of each otherand obviously resolved the disputes qua their share in suit property between defendantno. 7 on one hand and defendants No. 9 and 10 on the other. A decree possibly wasuoi passed as other parlies in the suit had yet not entered into the settlement and obviously passing of decree thereon was postponed till the other parties had also enteredinto similar compromise and if necessary they may also finally ratify it. Then defendantno. 7 on one hand and defendants No. 9 and 10 on the other. A decree possibly wasuoi passed as other parlies in the suit had yet not entered into the settlement and obviously passing of decree thereon was postponed till the other parties had also enteredinto similar compromise and if necessary they may also finally ratify it. Then defendantno. 8 (Smt. Arnteshwar Anand) entered into similar compromise with defendant No. 7and moved a joint application under Order 23 Rule 3 (IA No. 4252/93 Ex C-8 ). In thisapplication also it is mentioned that because of the intervention of the common friendsand relations and because of mutual discussions they have decided to settle their disputes and have settled all their disputes and differences with regard to the subjectmatter of the suit and even otherwise in relation to the properties on the terms andconditions mentioned therein, by. the mutual consent and of their own free will andwithout any duress and pressure (paras 2, 3 and 4 ). By this compromise defendant No. 8 in clause (f) of para 3 had stated as under :-" (f) That Smt. Amteshwat. Anand has relinquished, released, given up, assigned all her rights, title and. interest in all the moveable and immovableproperties which are the subject matter of the present suit or such properties which are the subject matter of the suit No. 63 of 1975, subject to clause (e) aforesaid. All these properties to the extent of the share of Smt. Aniteshwar Anand shall deem to vest, be the exclusive properties of the defendant Shri V. M. Singh subject to the payments being made as specifiedaforesaid. Shri V. M. Singh shall be the owner of all interests, rights andbenefits that have accrued or may accrue in favour of Smt. Amteshwaranand and shall be deem to have been assigned in his favour and he shallbe treated as the exclusive owner to the extent of share owned by Smt. Amteshwar Anand including the shares devolving on her from late Sir Datarsingh, late Lady Satwant Datar Singh, HUP or otherwise. "and in Clause (d) further stated :-" (d) That Smt. Amteshwar Anand hereby acknowledges that she has alreadyreceived consideration from Shri V. M. Singh in respect of her rights whichwould have accruea on partition in respect of the entire properties situatedat Villages Behta, Borban and Laukheri, Teh. and District Bhopal and alsovillage Pipal Kheria, Distt. "and in Clause (d) further stated :-" (d) That Smt. Amteshwar Anand hereby acknowledges that she has alreadyreceived consideration from Shri V. M. Singh in respect of her rights whichwould have accruea on partition in respect of the entire properties situatedat Villages Behta, Borban and Laukheri, Teh. and District Bhopal and alsovillage Pipal Kheria, Distt. Raisen (M. P.) and also 44 acres of land at village Pipal Kheria, Raisen standing in name of her son Virender Singhanand. "and in consideration defendant No. 7 had agreed :- (1) To pay Rs. l5 lakhs on or before 30. 6. 94 (para 3 (a ). (2) defendant No. 8will "have a lien" over 8 acres of land falling to the share of V. M, Singh atpunjab Khor, Delhi, which has devolved on him by succession; till the saidpayment of Rs. l5 lakhs is made by him to Smt. Arnteshwar Anand. (Clause3 (b ). (2) Defendant No. 7 had also undertaken the liability of litigation etc. inrespect of her properties. In this application, defendants No. 8 and 9 had made the prayer to thecourt as under :-" (a) accept the present compromise arrived at between the present applicants. b) pass such other and further orders as this Hon ble Court deems fit andproper in the facts and circumstances of the present case. "this application is also signed by defendants 7 and 8 and their advocates and issupported by affidavits of defendants 7 and 8. This compromise was recorded by thecourt on 27. 5. 93 in the presence of counsel for defendants 7 and 8, who had acceptedthe correctness of this compromise. ( 17 ) THE compromise Ex. C-7 and Ex. C-8 were obviously intended to be used for passing compromise decree. These were not withdrawn later ion. Thereafter IA No. 7382/93 under Order 23 Rule 3 (Ex C- 6) along with "family settlement" Ex C-l wasfiled in the Court, on behalf of all the parties, signed by plaintiff, defendants No. 1 to 5,6, 7, 11 and 12, but on behalf of defendants No. 8, 9, and 10, defendant No. 7 hassigned as assignee. This compromise petition was presented before the Court onaugust 25, 1993. in presence of counsel for the plaintiff, counsel for defendants No. 1to 5, counsel for defendants No. 6, 7, 11 and 12 and plaintiff, defendant No. 1, 3, 5, and7 were present in person. This compromise petition was presented before the Court onaugust 25, 1993. in presence of counsel for the plaintiff, counsel for defendants No. 1to 5, counsel for defendants No. 6, 7, 11 and 12 and plaintiff, defendant No. 1, 3, 5, and7 were present in person. The Court recorded the statements of Mr. Virender Mohan. Singh, defendant No. 7, who admitted the correctness of the compromise and thedocuments annexed thereto and also statement of Mrs. Ranjil Kaur, defendant No. 1,who had admitted the statement made by defendant No. 7 and also the compromisepetition. Parties had assured the Court to pass decree on their compromise petitions. The Court had passed the following order :-LA. 7382/93 ands. No 1495/89plaintiff and defendants 1, 3, 5 and 7 are present in Court today. Let statement ofnecessary parties i. e. plaintiff in S. No. 63/75 who is defendant No. 7 in S. No. 1495/89and defendant No. l in both these suits be recorded. ORDERStatements of plaintiff Mr. Virender Mohan Singh in S. No. 63/75, who isalso the defendant No. 7 in S. No. 1495/89 and Smt. Ranjeet Kaur who isdefendant No. l in both these suits have been recorded. I have heard thelearned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the parties submit thatboth the suits i. e. S. No. 1495/89 and S. No. 63/75 be decreed in terms of thesettlement Ex. C-1 and applications for compromise which are Exs. C-6, C-7and C-8. I am satisfied with the aforesaid compromise. Accordingly, I directthat both these suits be decreed in terms of settlement Ex. C-1 and applications for compromise Ex. C-6, Ex. C-7 and Ex. C-8. Parties are, however, leftto bear their own costs. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly. Subsequently non-judicial stamp of Rs. l5,000. 00 was also paid and a decree wasdrawn. ( 18 ) INTER alia two common objections have been raised in their applications on behalfof defendants No. 8,9 and 10, that Shri V. M. Singh had no authority to sign this compromise petition on their behalf as assignee nor to make statement on their behalf andthis compromise is not binding on them. ( 18 ) INTER alia two common objections have been raised in their applications on behalfof defendants No. 8,9 and 10, that Shri V. M. Singh had no authority to sign this compromise petition on their behalf as assignee nor to make statement on their behalf andthis compromise is not binding on them. Learned counsel for other parties have contended that defendants No. 8, 9, and 10 had already entered into compromise andtheir further statements were not required and other parties have accepted the compromises arrived at by defendants 8, 9,and 10 with defendant No. 7 in compromisepetitions Ex C-7 and C-8 to which the other parties had no objection or dispule, obviously accepting Ex C-7 and Ex C- 8. Whether defendants No. 8 to 10 were necessarily required to sign compromise Exc-6 and/or family settlement Ex C-l?as already noticed. defendant Nos. 9 and 10 and defendant No. 7 by virtue of settlement Ex C-7 and defendant No. 8 and defendant No. 7 by virtue of settlement Ex C- ( 19 ) HAD already compromised and mutually settled and adjusted their rights and claimsin the suit properties, which were presented before and recorded by Court and possibly a decree was not passed on the basis of those settlements on the dates when thesecompromises were recorded by the Court as the remaining subject matter of the suitwas yet to be compromised by others. These two compromises C-7 and C-8 completelyand fully contains the settlement/adjustment of the disputes between defendants No. 8,and 10 on the one side and defendant No. 7 on the other in respect of their claimsand rights in the suit properties. These contained mutual covenants transferring someof the properties inter sc. In the family settlement Ex C-l and the joint compromisepetition (IA No, 7382/93 Ex C-6) factum of compromises C-7 and C-8 has been incorporated without any objection and obviously accepting the same as correct and thereby bringing them without raising any dispute about, the rights in the properties claimedand settled by compromises Ex C-7 and Ex C-8. In the family settlement Ex C-l and the joint compromisepetition (IA No, 7382/93 Ex C-6) factum of compromises C-7 and C-8 has been incorporated without any objection and obviously accepting the same as correct and thereby bringing them without raising any dispute about, the rights in the properties claimedand settled by compromises Ex C-7 and Ex C-8. Rele\ ;inl recitals in family settlmentin this respect are made as under :-"and WHEREAS the said S. Virdender Mohan Singh has represented lothe First Party that on joint applications (copies whereof are annexedhereto) bearing IA No. 1860 of 1993 and IA No. 4252 of 1993 being madebefore the Delhi High Court in Suit No. 1495 of 1989, the Hon ble Court hasaccepted the assignments made in favour of S. Virender Mohan Singh bysmt. Kirpal Kaur, Kumari Guneeta and Smt. Amteshwar Anand on the 1 8/03/1993 and 27/05/1993. AND WHEREAS the said S. Virender Mohan Singh has also represented,assured and undertaken to the First Party that any present or future claimthat may be made by either Smt. Amteshwar Anand, Smt. Kirpal Kaur andkumari Guneela, and Kum. Guneeta, shall be the sole liability of the said S. Virender Mohan Singh and shall be satisfied and adjusted from the shareand/or properties of the said S. Virender Mohan Singh;" (Defendants I to 5are first Party whereas plaintiff, defendants 6, 7, 11 and 12 are Secondparty in this instrument.)Factum of the compromises C-7 and C-8 has also been recorded in jointpetition Ex C-6 in paras 2 and 3. In Ex C-l family Settlement has been arrived at as under :-L The lands situated at villages Pipal Kheria and Saidganj in Dist. Raisen (M. P.) and villages Behta Borban and Laukheri at Bairagarh, Bhopal (M. P.) shall be the exclusive property of the Second Party and the Firstparty shall have no right, title, interest or claim therein. The land and building situated at Abadi Delhi, Punjab Khor, Delhi, shallbe divided between the First Party and the Second Party in partition, shownas green and red in Schedule A annexed therewith. Second Party shall release and transfer land measuring 203 bighas and 16biswas out of 153. 8 acres of agricultural land at village Punjab Khor in possession of First Party. The house and land at 15, Guru Gobind Singh Marg, (New Rohtakroad), Delhi admeasuring 2485 Sq. yds. Second Party shall release and transfer land measuring 203 bighas and 16biswas out of 153. 8 acres of agricultural land at village Punjab Khor in possession of First Party. The house and land at 15, Guru Gobind Singh Marg, (New Rohtakroad), Delhi admeasuring 2485 Sq. yds. shall be divided equally betweenfirst and second parties as per decree passed by learned Sub Judge, Delhion 9th September, 1963 in S. No 5. No 554 of 1963 in two equal portions shown asred and blue in annexure Schedule C. The house at Kasauli known as THE RETREAT , was purchased bydeceased Kr. Mahinderpal Singh - the predecessor in interest of the Firstparty from the Montogomery. Cooperative Joint Farming Society Ltd vide aregistered Sale Deed dated 6/05/1965 along with assets of the saidsociety, if any, shall belong to First Party. House No. B-68, Greater Kailash, New Delhi on 1,000 sq. yd of land whichwas purchased in the name of Smt. Ranjit Kaur by means of registered saledeed dated 12/05/1965 shall belong to her (defendant No. l) or herfamily members,parlies have given up all claims in respect of moveable properties or anyother properties and claim for accounts also deemed to have been settled. ( 20 ) THIS compromise and family settlement have clearly accepted the factum andcorrectness of the settlements/ compromises entered into by defendant No. 7 on theone side and defendants No. 8,9, and 10 on the other in Ex C-7 and C-8. These do notaffect the claims and settlements mentioned in Ex C-7 and Ex C-8 and by these threesets of documents the parlies to the suit have compromised and settled the disputes inrespect of all the properties involved in the suits. In view of this separate consents ofdefendants No. 8, 9, and 10 were not required for their ratification of the family settlement Ex C-l and compromise Ex C-6. As such defendants No. 8, 9 and 10 not havingsigned the same is of no consequence and does not affect the validity of the settlements incorporated in Ex C-l, C-6, (. -7 and C-8. It is also not the case of defendantsno. 8 to 10 that settlement and compromise Ex C-l and Ex C-6 affect their rights orinterest as agreed in Exs. C-7 and C-8 in any way. These three sets of settlements makeit a complete settlement between the parlies. -7 and C-8. It is also not the case of defendantsno. 8 to 10 that settlement and compromise Ex C-l and Ex C-6 affect their rights orinterest as agreed in Exs. C-7 and C-8 in any way. These three sets of settlements makeit a complete settlement between the parlies. Defendants No. 8, 9, and 10 have notraised any disputes so far as settlement as contained in family settlement Ex C-l andc-6 are concerned. Hence their objection that compromise C-6 and family settlementc-l are not signed by them or they were not present, or their statements were notrecorded by the Court, have no merit and is of no consequence. Two suits, one Suit No. 63/75 filed by S. Manider Singh against other co-sharesand the other present suit were filed claiming partition, declaration and for reedition of accounts. First suit was pending for 18 years. During the period, three co- sharers,the widow and two sons of Sir Datar Singh had died. By virtue of compromises Ex C-l,c-6, C-7 and C-8 entered into between the parties which collectively constitute awhole family settlement amongst themselves, the parties had compromised and settledtheir all inter se claims and disputes bonafide in respect of the suit properties. They invited the Court to accept the same and pass decree thereon. These were so acceptedby the Court and a compromise decree was passed by the Court on 25. 8. 1993. Therights and claims of all the parties stood Finally settled and adjusted and perhaps alsoimplemented if not wholly substantially. The parties have thereby mutually derivedbenefits thereunder. If this compromise decree is set aside that would unsettle theirsettled claims/rights/interest resulting in further amending litigation among them. Thatwill not be in the interest of family peace and harmony, ( 21 ) IN pursuance of the settlement Ex. C-8, defendant No. 7 had relinquished andreleased his share in house at Bhopal known as Sir Datar Singh House with outhouseand appurtement area thereto approximately I Acre) in favour of Smt. Kirpal Kaurand Kum. Guneeta (defendants No. 9 and 10 ). No claim or objection to this has beenmade of raised by other co-sharers. It is not disputed that this part of the settlementstood implemented and thus is binding on the parties. Guneeta (defendants No. 9 and 10 ). No claim or objection to this has beenmade of raised by other co-sharers. It is not disputed that this part of the settlementstood implemented and thus is binding on the parties. Apart from this defendants No. 9 and 10 had relinquished, released, given up, assigned all their rights, title and interest in all the moveable and immovable properties comprised in the suit, in favour ofdefendant No. 7 as the exclusive owner to the extent of their share, for a considerationof Rs. 50 lakhs. Out of this a sum of Rs. 18 lakhs has admittedly already been paid. It isnot that the liability to pay the balance amount of Rs. 32 lakhs is being disputed ordenied. For payment of this balance amount defendant No. 7 insisted to have ageneral Power of Attorney from defendants 9 and 10 to implement the arrangementand to perfect his title in the properties transferred to him. This is not unreasonabledemand and from the very nature of the circumstances such a document was verymuch required to be given by them which they had also agreed to give. In any case it isnot that this amount could not be recovered from defendant No. 7 by execution of thecompromise decree passed in the suit or otherwise. The decree cannot be set aside forthis reason. The compromise/settlement has been at least partly implemented anddefendants 9 and 10 have derived benefit thereunder. Defendants No. 9 and 10 hadaccepted the settlement, received part consideration and also got released from defendant No. 7 his right of share in the family house at Bhopal. They cannot be allowed tochallenge the legality and validity of the settlement and also the compromise decreeand thereby to approbate and reprobate. Also the settlement Ex C-7 was recorded incourt on 18. 3. 93 and the compromise decree was passed on 25. 8. 93. The first application IA 7928/95 for setting aside the compromise decree was filed on 14/07/1995i. e. after about 2 years of the compromise decree was passed. If the intention of theparties Was to make the time for payment as of essence to be paid on the dates -forwhich post dated cheques were given, it would have been specifically so mentionedtherein. Moreover some of the cheques were dishonoured. e. after about 2 years of the compromise decree was passed. If the intention of theparties Was to make the time for payment as of essence to be paid on the dates -forwhich post dated cheques were given, it would have been specifically so mentionedtherein. Moreover some of the cheques were dishonoured. In that case it would havegiven right to repudiate the settlement forthwith, which they did not do and on theother hand accepted further payments against Mime of the dishonoured cheques whichis contrary to the lime beine. of the essence. In this application it is staled that some ofthe cheques were dishonoured and the prayer made is "that this Hon ble Court may bepleased to direct defendant No. 7 to remit the said amount under the cheques or in theahernative cancel the said compromise and decree passed by the Court. If their claimfor balance money is satisfied they will have no grievance. These circumstances do notjustify to set aside the decree. ( 22 ) ANOTHER application being I. A. No. 180/9m was filed l"y defendants 9 and 10 on1. . \199s under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code supplementing the grounds already taken in the earlier application. Firstly, the additional grounds could be taken by making amendmentol the first application which has not been done. Secondly even if it is taken as an application lor amendment. This application has been filed after a period of over fouryears and four months after the compromise decree was passed on 25. 8. 1993. Theseamendments could not be allowed claim being time barred when this application wasfiled In any case the additional grounds taken are (1) it was understood and agreedbetween the parties that in case any of the post dated cheques are not encashed ontheir due dates, the compromise decree would become null and void and as only a sumof Rs. 18 lakhs was paid and the balance amount of Rs. 32 lakhs has not been paid, thecompromise became void. (2) Neither of the applicants/defendants were parlies to thefamily settlement nor the same was signed by them or by their counsel and defendantno. 7 who has signed as their assignee was not so authorised and this is not binding onthem. 18 lakhs was paid and the balance amount of Rs. 32 lakhs has not been paid, thecompromise became void. (2) Neither of the applicants/defendants were parlies to thefamily settlement nor the same was signed by them or by their counsel and defendantno. 7 who has signed as their assignee was not so authorised and this is not binding onthem. (3) No decree was passed on the basis of their compromise petition (I. A. 1860/93), It was simply taken on record and disposed of without passing any decreepreliminary or final or order thereon and as such there is no executable decree passedon 18/03/1993. (4) The compromise/agreement/settlement was only an agreement to sell/transfer/relinquish the rights and interest of these defendants for a sum ofrs. 50 lakhs and as the defendant No. 7 did not fulfil the obligations the same stoodrescinded and became enforceable on account of gross breaches on the part of thedefendants, (5) No transfer/assignment deed was executed and registered and as suchno valid transfer/assignmeni look place. (6) The compromise settelment order dated 18/03/1993 was compulsorily regislerable and having not been so registered isvoid and unenforceable. (7) The defendant No. 7 defrauded the applicants by makingfalse representation and by infusing faith and confidence in them. It is also alleged thatthey came to know of this fraud only in September, f995 when the reply to the first application was filed by the defendant No. 7. ( 23 ) FOR the reasons already noticed none of the grounds are legally tenable and thecompromise decree is nol liable to be set aside on these grounds. These application1. As. 7928/95 and 180/98 thus have no merit and are dismissed. ( 24 ) IN I. A. 5125/96 Filed on behalf of defendant No. 8 for setting aside the decree thegrounds taken are that the compromise (Ex. C-8) was made in consideration of Rs. 15lakhs to be paid by defendant No. 7 on or before 30/06/1994 and for repayment ofthe same defendant No. 7 had created lien on his 8 acres of land situated at Punjabkhor, Delhi, that this land was already mortgaged with Punjab National Bank, Na/afgarh and was the subject matter of S. No. 425/84 in this Court which fact was not disclosed. by delendant No. 7 and thereby made fraudulent representations and commitled fraud, (2) that her son Shri Virender Anand was owner and in possession ol 44acres of land in village Pipal Kheria Raisen. For that the applicant was persuaded bydefendants No. 7 that the settlement arrived at was in the larger interest of the respective parlies and thereby acquired the said property when it was not the subject matleiof any of the two suits. (3) That the applicant had nol received any monetary benefit orotherwise under the settlement or compromise. ( 25 ) IN compromise petition (I. A. 4252/93 Ex. C-M) defendant No. 7 had nol represented that the aforesaid 8 acres of land on which lien was created was free from anysort of encumbrances. It is also nol stated in the application that the defendant No. 7had made any such representation at the lime the compromise was entered into. Moreover, if the payment of Rs. 15 lakhs was a condition precedent or was of the essence of the compromise, this fact would have been mentioned in the compromise. The compromise decree was passed on 25. 8. 1993 and this application has been fiedon 28/05/1996. According to the applicant the payment was to he made on or before30. 6. 1994. It is nol her case that she had written to the defendant No. 7 repudiating thecompromise when the payment was nol made on or before the due dale. In the absence of specific provision it cannot be said that the time was of the essence of the compromise. She has made wrong statement in the application lhal shehas derived no benefit lor entering into the compromise. In Clause 3 (d) of the compromise (I. A. 4252/93 Ex. C-8 ). She has acknowledged as under :-" (d) Thal Sml. Amteshwar Anand hereby acknowledges lhal she has alreadyreceived consideration from Shri V. M. Singh in respect of her rights whichwould have accrued on partition in respect of the entire properties situatedat Villages Behta, Borban and Laukheri. The. and District Bhopal and alsovillage Pipal Kheria. Distt. Raisen (M. P. ). She thus having derived material benefits is estopped from raising objectionagainst the validity of the compromise or the compromise decree. The. and District Bhopal and alsovillage Pipal Kheria. Distt. Raisen (M. P. ). She thus having derived material benefits is estopped from raising objectionagainst the validity of the compromise or the compromise decree. Also it cannot besaid thal the property thal stood in the name of his son was nol subject mailer of lhesuil and the same having been made as part of compromise she cannol lake a contraryplea now. In view of the above discussion this application has no merit and the same is alsodismissed. In the result all the three I. As. have no merit, are misconceived and misuse of theprocess of the Court and are dismissed with costs. Costs assessed at Rs. 5, (KM ). 00 againsteach set of defendants i. e. defendant No. 8 as one and defendants 9 and 10 as otherset. I. As. 7928/95,5125/96 and 180/98 thus stand disposed of.