D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) A notice under sub-section (2) of Section 192 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 was issued on 11th December, 1987 in respect of the premises concerned for amending the valuation with effect from 3rd quarter 1986-87. By an order dated 29th December, 1987 pursuant to the notice dated 11th December, 1987 valuation was assessed at Rs. 2,75,130/- against which an appeal was preferred. In the meantime by an order dated 30th September, 1999 the said proceeding was disposed of. The proposed valuation at Rs. 2,75,130/- was ultimately reduced to Rs. 1,85,490/- after hearing. Against this order a writ petition was filed which was disposed of by directing the petitioner to prefer an appeal. Accordingly an appeal was preferred. The appeal was disposed of by an order dated 17th February, 2000. The operative part of that order shows that the appeal was allowed on consent and the impugned order dated 29th December, 1987 was set aside with the observation that CMC will decide and dispose of the matter within three months from the date of communication of the order passed on appeal complying with all the formalities embedied in Section 192 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act. The order had repeated that the matter is to be disposed of by the Authority within three months from the date of communication of the appellate order positively giving proper opportunities to the parties involved in the matter. In the writ petition nowhere it was mentioned on which date the said order dated 17th February, 2000 was communicated to the Authority of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. On the other hand a notice was issued on 12th May, 2000 fixing 17th May, 2000 as the date for hearing in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal on 17th February, 2000. This writ petition was moved against the said notice. By an order dated 17th May, 2000 this Court directed the petitioner to appear in the matter of submitting its written statement taking all the points. Accordingly the petitioner had appeared and submitted its written submission. Thereafter the matter was adjourned to 20th June, 2000. On 20th June, 2000 it was found that proper notice was not served and as such a notice was directed to be served and accordingly a notice was issued on 6th July, 2000. Accordingly the petitioner had appeared and submitted its written submission. Thereafter the matter was adjourned to 20th June, 2000. On 20th June, 2000 it was found that proper notice was not served and as such a notice was directed to be served and accordingly a notice was issued on 6th July, 2000. It is alleged that the date was fixed on 10th July, 2000. But the petitioner wanted to move this High Court against the order dated 20th June, 2000 and therefore the petitioner sought for adjournment and prayed for a copy of the order dated 20th June, 2000. It is alleged that the same was never supplied to the petitioner. On the other hand the respondents are going to pass an order in the proceeding itself without attending through the written submission filed by the petitioner. ( 2 ) MR. Ghosh, ld. Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that since the appellate order was passed on consent and therein three months' time was stipulated, therefore, after the expiry of three months the Authority could not have proceeded with the matter without obtaining extension of time from the Tribunal. Therefore, the issue of notice of the proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction. He further contends that the proper course was to approach the Tribunal for extension of time by the Municipal Authority and if it is denied in that event it should have approached this Court for extension of time. Had there been any extension of time in that event there would not have been any difficulty. In these facts he prays that the proceedings should be quashed until an estension of time is obtained from the Tribunal. ( 3 ) MR. Barin Banerjee, ld. Counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand contends that the petitioner had appeared and submitted its written submission. Therefore, he had submitted to the jurisdiction. Now he cannot challenge the same. Secondly he contends that the question which is raised by Mr. Ghosh is purely technical and as such should not be given much importance. Since the Municipal Authority has jurisdiction to proceed with the matter in terms of the appellate order, therefore, the technicality should not stand in the way. ( 4 ) I have heard both the Counsel at length. Admittedly the order was obtained in appeal by Consent. Ghosh is purely technical and as such should not be given much importance. Since the Municipal Authority has jurisdiction to proceed with the matter in terms of the appellate order, therefore, the technicality should not stand in the way. ( 4 ) I have heard both the Counsel at length. Admittedly the order was obtained in appeal by Consent. The fact remains that before the said Appellate Order was passed after the order dated 30th September, 1999 by which the valuation was reduced to Rs. 1,85,490/-, it is contended that against this order the appeal was preferred on the ground that the notice was not properly served and the same did not conform to the Rules and as such by consent the impugned order was set aside directing the Authority to decide the matter within three months. But the said order did not contain any default clause nor did it provide as to what would happen if the order is not passed within three months. However, it had used an expression 'positively' and had repeated the time limit twice. Still then the time limit does not seem to be mandatory to the extent that if the Authority proceeds after the expiry of three months then the proceeding will be void ab initio or without jurisdiction. At the same time there being no material to show as to on which date the order dated 17th February, 2000 was served upon the Authority it cannot be said that the three months had expired on 12th May, 2000. Even if we take 17th February, 2000 as the date of communication of the order still then the three months would have expired on 18th May, 2000 whereas the date was fixed on 17th May, 2000. Thus also the notice was not issued beyond three months nor the date was fixed beyond three months. Since the petitioner has not come up with any statement as to on which date the order dated 17th February, 2000 was communicated on the Authority, therefore, it cannot be presumed in the absence of any such material that three months would be expiring on 18th May, 2000. In such circumstances the objection that has been taken by the petitioner appears to be absolutely frivolous. If it had proposed to take such an objection it should have mentioned the date of communication of this order to the Authority concerned. In such circumstances the objection that has been taken by the petitioner appears to be absolutely frivolous. If it had proposed to take such an objection it should have mentioned the date of communication of this order to the Authority concerned. The order dated 17th February, 2000 has made it clear that the time stipulated for three months would run from the date of communication of the order to the Authority concerned. Thus unless the petitioner comes up with a positive statement as to when the order was communicated there is no scope for this Court to determine and find out and conclude that the three months had expired. Then again the petitioner after having submitted the written objection to the jurisdiction and did not intend to participate in the proceeding. Thus it appears that wholly on a baseless and frivolous ground the objection to the jurisdiction was taken. The petitioner all along had been intending to delay the process and avoid its liability and fighting purely on technical grounds even without any basis or material in its favour. ( 5 ) THEN again the procedures are handmaids of justice. The technicality of procedure cannot everride justice. It is the substance that has to be adhered to. The main purpose of procedure is to afford proper opportunities to the parties against the tax proposed to be amended. It is only to be seen as to whether an opportunity has been given to the petitioner. If opportunity is given in that event the petitioner cannot duel upon the technicalities which is only to thwart the process of the determination. The petitioner having obtained the order on consent cannot go back on it. On the two grounds mentioned above I have found that there was no absence of jurisdiction on the authority concerned to proceed with the matter in terms of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. Despite all non-cooperation, the Authority appears to have not taken a serious view, as contended by the petitioner itself till this date. It is alleged that since the petitioner did not participate despite all opportunities being given to the petitioner, therefore, it is proposing to pass an order tomorrow which is being objected to by the petitioner by means of this petition and in course of the submissions made in Court through Counsel. It is alleged that since the petitioner did not participate despite all opportunities being given to the petitioner, therefore, it is proposing to pass an order tomorrow which is being objected to by the petitioner by means of this petition and in course of the submissions made in Court through Counsel. ( 6 ) SINCE I have observed earlier in this order that the petitioner having no ground to raise this jurisdictional point, therefore, the petitioner is supposed to appear in the proceeding and if he wants he may contest the same on merit, but, however, he will not be allowed to duel on technical and take unnecessary adjournments since they had already been long delayed the process for sufficiently long time. The amendment was sought to be made some time in 1987. Now in the meantime long thirteen years have elapsed. Therefore, the matter should be decided as early as possible. ( 7 ) ONE of the grounds taken by Mr. Ghosh was that the amendment was sought to be made retrospectively from 3rd quarter 1986-87 by a notice issued on 11th December, 1987 which is at the 3rd quarter 1987-88. Even if it could not have been amended retrospectively still then it should be amended with effect from 3rd quarter 1987-88 but then I do not propose to enter into the said question at this stage since the matter is pending before the Authority concerned which will decide the same in accordance with law. This question remains open for being so decided. ( 8 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case though it is apparent on the fact of the record that the conduct of the petitioner does not appear to be fair still, however, one more opportunity is to be given to the petitioner to appear before the Authority concerned tomorrow and the petitioner may submit its objection on merit or may participate in the hearing. If it is so done by the petitioner, in that event, the Authority will fix another date as early as possible preferably within a period of fortnight and determine the question on merit in accordance with law. The petitioner will not seek any adjournment and may take objection and appear in the proceeding and contest the same on merit. The Authority shall be free to decide the question in accordance with its wisdom and discretion as early as possible. The petitioner will not seek any adjournment and may take objection and appear in the proceeding and contest the same on merit. The Authority shall be free to decide the question in accordance with its wisdom and discretion as early as possible. ( 9 ) THE writ petition is thus disposed of. ( 10 ) ). There will be no order as to costs. ( 11 ) ). All the parties shall act on a xerox signed copy of this order on the usual undertaking. Order accordingly.