S. R. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) FOCAL point of attack in the present petition is on the validity of incessant detention of the petitioner stemming from the order dated 17. 4. 1999, passed by the District Magistrate, Mirzapur, in exercise of power under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. 1980 (In short the act) in order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 2 ) SKIPPING the unnecessary details, the episodal facts are that the petitioner, who was arrested in case Crime No. 135 of 1999 under Sections 302, 307, 300b, 134 I. P. C. read with Section 3 (2) 7 of the SC/st Act was ordered to be preventively detained by means of the order dated 17. 4. 1999 with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public order. The detention order was accorded approval by the State Government on 21. 4. 1999, i. e. circumscribed in the statutory period of twelve days and the approval was conveyed to the detenu vide letter dated 23. 4. 1999. The detention order was lent affirmance by the State Government vide order dated 27. 5. 1999 under Section 12 of the Act inuring for a period of twelve months, The detenu had submitted his representation dated 26. 4. 1999 to the Jail authorities on 27. 4. 1999 which was received at the end of the District Magistrate on the same day. After obtaining comments from the sponsoring authority, the detaining authority sent the representation studded with his own comments thereon to the State Government as well as to the Central Government and the advisory Board on 29. 4. 1999. The representation was received by the State Government on 3. 5. 1999 and by the Central Government on 4. 5. 1999. The concerned section of the State government scanned the papers and prepared a report and the case was then scrutinised by the under Secretary and Joint Secretary on 5. 5. 1999 and thereafter by the Secretary. Home and confidential Department who examined the representation on 6. 5. 1999 and submitted for final orders before the competent authority in the Government who rejected the representation on 7. 5. 1999. 5. 1999 and thereafter by the Secretary. Home and confidential Department who examined the representation on 6. 5. 1999 and submitted for final orders before the competent authority in the Government who rejected the representation on 7. 5. 1999. So far as the Central Government is concerned, the Minister of State for Home Affairs reckoned the representation into consideration and rejected the same on 4. 6. 1999. ( 3 ) THE representation dated 26. 4. 1999 along with comments of the detaining authority was received by the Central Government on 4. 5. 1999 and it was reckoned into consideration and rejected by the Minister of State for Home Affairs on 4. 6. 1999. The delay in between is sought to be explained and justified on the premises that the representation received on 4. 5. 1999 was "immediately processed for consideration and it was found that certain vital information, i. e. . the opinion of the Advisory Board required for its further consideration, to be obtained from the state Government, and accordingly, through a crash wireless message dated 5. 5. 1999, the said information was desired. The required information, it is further stated in the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Sushil Kumar, Under Secretary, Minister of Home Affairs, Government of India, new Delhi, was received in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 2. 6. 1999 vide State Government fax dated 28. 5. 1999 and the matter was then placed before the Under Secretary. Ministry of home Affairs on 3. 6. 1999 who carefully considered the same and with her comments, put up the same before the Joint Secretary. Ministry of Home Affairs on 3. 6. 1999. The Joint Secretary, it is further stated in the counter-affidavit, considered the case and with his comments forwarded the same before the Minister of State for Home Affairs on 3. 6. 1999 and the latter considered the case of the detenu and rejected his representation on 4. 6. 1999. ( 4 ) WE have had heard Sri D. K. Srivastava, for the petitioner and Sri K. N. Pandey for the government of India and Sri Arvind Kumar Tripathi, learned Addl. Government Advocate representing the State. 6. 1999 and the latter considered the case of the detenu and rejected his representation on 4. 6. 1999. ( 4 ) WE have had heard Sri D. K. Srivastava, for the petitioner and Sri K. N. Pandey for the government of India and Sri Arvind Kumar Tripathi, learned Addl. Government Advocate representing the State. The continued detention of the detenu is sought to be struck down only on the ground of delay on the part of the Central Government in considering the representation of the detenu and it has been contended for him that his representation to the Central Government would be deemed to have been made in exercise of his right under Article 22 (5) of the constitution which casts an obligation on the Central Government to consider the representation with promptitude and independently of any opinion of the Advisory Board and, the exercise undertaken by the Central Government vide crash wireless message dated 5. 5. 1999 for obtaining information from the State Government as to the opinion of the Advisory Board was futile one predicating insouciance and supine attitude of the Central Government in discharge of its constitutional obligation in a matter concerning personal liberty of the detenu and such attitude, proceeds the submission, renders the continued detention illegal and trenches upon Article 22 (5)of the Constitution. For the respondents, it has been urged by Sri A. K. Tripathi, learned additional Government Advocate that a person detained under Section 3 (2) of the Act has no constitutional right to make representation to the Central Government in that the right of such detenu to make representation against his detention to the Central Government flows from section 14 of the Act and not from Article 22 (5) of the Constitution though his right to make representation to the State Government being the "appropriate Government" within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Act, emanates directly from Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, which finds specific recognition in Section 8 (1) of the Act and, therefore, the delay, if any, on the part of the central Government in considering the representation would not result in the infringement of any constitutional right of the detenu. Sri A. K. Tripathi, has further submitted that if the Central government had cogent reasons to fall back upon in calling and waiting for the information about the opinion of the Advisory Board, it could not be taxed with callousness in considering the representation of the detenu and the delay if any in obtaining the desired information would not result in vitiation of the detention. ( 5 ) WE have scanned the submissions made at the bar. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution enjoins an obligation on the detaining authority to communicate as soon as may be, the grounds of detention to the detenu and to afford him the earliest opportunity to make representation against the order of detention. The expressions as soon as may be and the earliest opportunity occurring in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution have been construed as casting an obligation on the competent authority to decide representation at the earliest because preventive detention impinges upon the liberty of the citizen. Though it is not possible to predicate any hard and fast rule as to the measure of time that may be taken by the appropriate authority for consideration of representation, judicial pronouncements are to the effect that any inexplicable delay could impair continued detention. In Venmathi Salvam (Mrs.) v. State of T. N. and another, JT 1998 (4) SC 393, it has been observed thus "though the delay by itself is not fatal, the delay, which remains unexplained, becomes unreasonable". In K. M. Abdullah Kunhi v. Union of India and others, 1991 (1) SCC. 479, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as under : "the words "as soon as may be" occurring in clause (5) of the Article 22 reflects the concern of the framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay. However, there is no hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement, however, is that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement, however, is that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation would be a breach of Constitution imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal". ( 6 ) FROM the decisions aforecited, it would emerge that if delay in considering the representation exhibits any supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude on the part of the authority concerned, the continued detention would be stigmatised as illegal. However, the vexed question involved is whether the Central Government, in the instant case, was vindicated in waiting till the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board. It has been "article 22. clause (5) provides, inter alia, that the authority making the order of detention shall afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. It does not say as to which is the authority to which the representation shall be made or which authority shall consider it. But Section 8, sub-section (1) of the Act lays down in the clearest terms which admit of no doubt that the opportunity which is to be afforded to the detenu is to make a representation against the order of detention to the appropriate Government. Therefore, it is indisputable on a plain reading of Section 8, subsection (1) that the representation that will be made by the detenu is to the appropriate Government and it is the appropriate government which has to consider the representation. " in RE--THE NATURE OF detenus RIGHT UNDER section 14 OF THE ACT ( 8 ) THE argument employed on behalf of the State is that right to make representation to the central Government has neither the savour of a fundamental right nor the complexion of constitutional right and hence the delay in disposal of the representation by the Central government would not occasion invalidation of the continued detention. The question, therefore, that begs consideration is whether a person detained under Section 3 (2) of the Act has any right to make representation against his detention to the Central Government and if yes, what is the nature of such right. The question, therefore, that begs consideration is whether a person detained under Section 3 (2) of the Act has any right to make representation against his detention to the Central Government and if yes, what is the nature of such right. The right of such person to represent against his detention to the State government is a constitutional right flowing directly from Article 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Section 8 (1) of the Act. Argument for the detenu is that he has a right to make representation to the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act and such right too is a constitutional right. In Shyam Ambalal v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 789 , the order of detention was passed under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. Section 11 of the said Act is in part materia with section 14 of the National Security Act. 1980. Both these provisions empower the Central government to revoke or modify an order of detention at any time. It was held that the detenu had a right impliit in Section 11 of COFEPOSA Act. 1974, to make a representation to the central Government for exercise of the power of revocation of an order of detention vested in the Central Government under Section 11 of the said Act. The Central Government was further held to be under a statutory duty" to apply its mind and either revoke the order of detention or dismiss the petition declining to order for revocation. The three-Judge Bench of the Supreme court in the said case held as under: "the power, conferred on the Central Government by Section 11 is wide enough to enable the central Government to revoke the detention order at any stage for the words used are an order may at any time be revoked or modified. Power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention implies that the detenu can make a representation for exercise of that power. Any petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expedition". ( 9 ) IN State of U. P. v. Zavad Zama Khan. Power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention implies that the detenu can make a representation for exercise of that power. Any petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expedition". ( 9 ) IN State of U. P. v. Zavad Zama Khan. AIR 1984 SC 1095 , a three-Judge Bench of the supreme Court which was called upon to decide the question as to whether a person detained pursuant to an order passed by the District Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the act had a right to simultaneously make a representation against the order of detention to the central Government under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, held as under : "the power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act is statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under subsection (5) of section 3. . . detenu in the form of petition. " ( 10 ) IN Raziya v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1751 , a case under COFEPOSA Act, the Supreme court held as under : "section 11 of the Act confers a constitutional right on the detenu to have his representation considered by the Central Government. It is true that the Central Government has a discretion to revoke or confirm the detention but the detenu has undoubtedly a right that his representation should be considered by the Central Government for whatever worth it is". ( 11 ) IN Prem Lata Sharma v. District Magistrate, Mathura. (1998) 4 SCC 260 , it was held that refusal on the part of the detaining authority to send the detenus representation to the Central government resulted in denial of the detenus right conferred on him under Article 22 (5) of the constitution to persuade the Central Government to revoke the order of detention under Section 14 of the Act and on that ground continued detention of the detenu was struck down as illegal. ( 12 ) IN Raziya and Prem Lata Sharma (supra), their lordships of the Supreme Court were not confronted with the question as to whether the right to make representation under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, 1977 and Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980, was a constitutional right guaranteed by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution or it was simply a statutory right. Having examined the decisions aforestated and the provisions of the Act, we are of the considered view that where State Government is the "appropriate Government", as respects a detention order or a person detained under such order, the detenu has a statutory right to approach the Central Government which is clothed with the statutory power under Section 14 of the Act to revoke or modify the detention order without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. 1897. The power of the Central Government under Section 14 is a public power coupled with the duty of to exercise the power in appropriate cases. It is this duty cast upon the Central Government that is correlative of the right in the detenu to approach the central Government by means of a representation for performance of the obligation cast upon it under Section 14 of the Act. In exercise of its power/duty under Section 14 of the Act, the central Government may either allow the representation or reject the same. Power under Section 14 being statutory in nature, the corresponding right of the detenu to, invoke it cannot acquire constitutional status. Conferral of such power in the Central Government is by way of an additional safeguard over and above the safeguard of making a representation to the "appropriate government" as visualized by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Section 8 (1) of the act. This clearly shows the anxiety of the Parliament to protect the personal liberty of a citizen enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution against any illegal or arbitrary detention order. This clearly shows the anxiety of the Parliament to protect the personal liberty of a citizen enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution against any illegal or arbitrary detention order. It is no doubt implicit in Section 14 of the Act that a detenu can approach the Central Government by means of a petition in the shape of a representation seeking revocation of the detention order but such right of the detenu is "statutory right" over and above his "constitutional right" to make representation against the detention order to the "appropriate Government" as visualized by article 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Section 8 (1) of the Act. Central Government can invoke the power vested in it under Section 14 not only on a petition by the detenu but also on the receipt of the report about the detention under sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act or in any manner whatsoever. It may be apposite to observe here that the detenus constitutional right to make representation is not incidental to Section 14 of the Act and would remain unshaken even if Section 14 is omitted from the Act. ( 13 ) UNDER the Act, no obligation is cast upon the Advisory Board to submit its report to the central Government in a case where the Central Government is not the "appropriate government" for Section 11 of the Act enjoins a duty upon the Advisory Board to submit its report to the "appropriate Government" within 7 weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned specifying therein its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. Again as provided under Section 12 of the Act the appropriate government "shall" revoke the detention order and direct the person concerned to be released forthwith" where the Advisory Board in its opinion have not given sufficient cause for detention. The power of the "appropriate Government" to confirm or set aside the order of detention is independent of its power to revoke the detention order notwithstanding that the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for detention of the concerned person. The power of the "appropriate Government" to confirm or set aside the order of detention is independent of its power to revoke the detention order notwithstanding that the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for detention of the concerned person. It would thus be clear that for the exercise of the supervisory power vested in the Central government under Section 14 of the Act, the report of Advisory Board is not ipso facto relevant inasmuch as where the Advisory Board has reported that there is no sufficient cause for detention the "appropriate Government" is bound to revoke the detention order and release the person concerned forthwith and in that eventuality, it would not be necessary at all for the central Government to call for the opinion of the Advisory Board in order to invoke its power of revocation or modification under Section 14 and any report of the Advisory Board that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person is not binding on the "appropriate Government" nor is it binding on the Central Government where the Central Government is not the appropriate government and is called upon to exercise its powers of revocation or modification of the detention order under Section 14 of the Act. IN RE--EFFECT OF DELAY ( 14 ) WE are, however, of the view that power conferred on the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act must be exercised with promptitude, i. e. . within a reasonable period. In R. P. F. Commissioner v. K. T. Rolling Mills Put. Ltd. , (1995) 1 SCC 181 , it has been held by the supreme Court that when a power is conferred by Statute without mentioning the period within which it could be invoked, the same has to be done within reasonable period, as all powers must be exercised reasonably, and exercise of the same within reasonable period would be a facet of reasonableness. In Shyam Ambalal (supra) it has been held that the petitioner for revocation of detention order must be dealt with "reasonable expedition". In Shyam Ambalal (supra) it has been held that the petitioner for revocation of detention order must be dealt with "reasonable expedition". That apart since Section 14 of the act provides a valuable safeguard/protection against any illegal and arbitrary detention order which impinges upon personal liberty of the detenu, it must be construed in a manner which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and the Act and will promote the objective enshrined in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution as regards the expeditious disposal of the representation against the detention order otherwise the very purpose of providing the additional safeguard and the power of superintendence in the Central Government against any arbitrary and illegal violation of fundamental right to personal liberty would be defeated. In other words, since Section 14 is, in a sense, an extension of constitutional safeguards envisaged by article 22 (5) of the Constitution and being an additional safeguard against any illegal order of detention, must be construed in such manner as may advance the object and purpose of the constitutional imperative flowing from the words "as soon as may be" occurring in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. ( 15 ) IN Tarachand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 SC 1361 , the detention order under challenge was again one made under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling activities Act, 1974 it was held therein that : "when once a representation is made to the Central Government, it is duty bound to consider the same in order to exercise its discretion either rejecting or accepting it. If there is inordinate delay in considering the representation that would clearly amount to violation of provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution so as to render the detention unconstitutional and void. " ( 16 ) IN Pappu alias Aushan Singh u. Adhikshak Janpad Karagar and others. 1999 Cr LJ 1885, a division Bench of this Court has held to the following effect : "the Central Government or the State Government has to decide representation of the detenu irrespective of the fact that as to whether the Advisory Board has already heard and decided the matter and has submitted its report or not. The authority concerned, namely, the State government or the Central Government has not to wait for the result of the hearing before the advisory Board. The authority concerned, namely, the State government or the Central Government has not to wait for the result of the hearing before the advisory Board. It must consider the representation on its own merits without waiting for advisory Board to decide the matter and wait for its report. The Central Government wrongly waited for the report of the Advisory Board to be furnished to it by the State Government. Thus, the reason which has been put forward to explain the delay is neither valid nor cogent. . . " ( 17 ) IT may be apt to observe here that in Pappus case (supra), the question as to whether the right of the detenu under Section 14 of the Act was constitutional, was although raised but the division Bench apart from noticing seemingly divergent views of the Supreme Court on the question, did not pronounce any concluded opinion of its own and decided the matter holding that even though the right of representation may be statutory, yet the representation is to be considered and disposed of with all promptitude more particularly when it involves liberty of a citizen as engrafted in Article 21 of the Constitution. ( 18 ) WE are, therefore, of the considered view that though right of the detenu to invoke the central Governments power of revocation or modification of the detention order under Section 14 of the Act is a statutory right as distinguished from the constitutional right of making a representation to the "appropriate Government", the Central Government while discharging its statutory duty under Section 14 of the Act is under the same obligation to consider and dispose of the representation expeditiously sans any avoidable delay as is cast upon the appropriate government under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Section 8 (1) of the Act. In the instant case, the Central Government has come a cropper to divulge any plausible reason indicative of the fact as to why was the opinion of the Advisory Board found to be vital for consideration of the representation. It brooks no dispute that the report submitted to the Central government under Section 3 (5) of the Act was considered by it on 3. 5,1999 as sequel thereto, the Central Government converged to the conclusion that It called for no interference with the order of detention to which approval was accorded by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. It brooks no dispute that the report submitted to the Central government under Section 3 (5) of the Act was considered by it on 3. 5,1999 as sequel thereto, the Central Government converged to the conclusion that It called for no interference with the order of detention to which approval was accorded by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. It baffles our mind that when the representation of the detenu was received at the end of the Home ministry on 4. 5. 1999 why the Central Government skirted deciding the representation on its own merits and decided to wait for the opinion of the Advisory Board. No valid reason has been disclosed in the counter-affidavit as to why it was "found" necessary to wait for the opinion of the Advisory Board. As stated supra in the counter-affidavit, Sri Sushil Kumar, Under-secretary. Ministry of Home Affairs Government of India, New Delhi, is conspicuously reticent on the point as to why was the opinion of the Advisory Board was found vital to consideration of the representation. The representation received on 4. 5. 1999 came to be rejected on 4. 6. 1999 and thus the tardiness of about 30 days remains unexplained. Therefore, the continued detention of the detenu is vitiated. ( 19 ) AS a result of foregoing discussion, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The continued detention of the petitioner is struck down and the respondents are directed to set him at liberty forthwith if he is not wanted in any other case.