CEELO ENGINEERING AND SERVICES (I) PVT. LIMITED v. ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER, GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL
2000-08-30
BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ application, an employer has challenged an order dated July 6, 1998 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, West Bengal in exercise of his power under Section 4 (1) of the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969 ("act") and the consequent notice dated July 14, 2000 passed by the Certificate Officer for realisation of the unpaid amount of subsistence allowance payable to the private respondent No. 3. ( 2 ) ON June 28, 1997 the petitioner No. 1 on the ground of alleged misconduct of the respondent No. 3 placed her under suspension pending enquiry. Subsequently, a charge-sheet dated July 3, 1997 was served upon her and she was asked to answer those charges. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 3 filed a civil suit being Title Suit No. 1983 of 1997 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta challenging the action of the employer and took out an application for temporary injunction restraining the employer from proceeding with the enquiry. But no ad interim order was obtained. ( 4 ) IN the meantime, the employer paid 50% of the salary of the respondent No. 3 for the first three months as subsistence allowance but thereafter having reduced the same to 25% after ninety days from the date of the suspension, the said respondent No. 3 protested and claimed subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% of the salary. The employer turned down such demand contending that the enquiry against her having been commenced under the Bengal Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1946 ("standing Order") and in view of the fact that such enquiry was being prolonged for reason attributable to her for her wilful abstinence on the plea of pendency of the civil suit, the reduction of subsistence allowance to 25% was justified and was in tune with the provisions of the Standing Order. It may be mentioned here that the Bengal Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules are framed under Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 ("standing Order Act" ). ( 5 ) THE respondent No. 3 thereafter approached the respondent No. 1 under Section 4 of the Act claiming arrears of subsistence allowance.
It may be mentioned here that the Bengal Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules are framed under Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 ("standing Order Act" ). ( 5 ) THE respondent No. 3 thereafter approached the respondent No. 1 under Section 4 of the Act claiming arrears of subsistence allowance. By the order dated July 6, 1998 the respondent No. 1 directed the employer to pay subsistence allowance at the rate claimed by the respondent No. 3 after considering and rejecting the defences put forward by the employer expressed in the letters dated February 26, 1998 and April 16, 1998, By the said order, the employer was asked to report compliance of the said order within a fortnight from the date of receipt of the said order. ( 6 ) AFTER the passing of the aforesaid order, the employer instead of complying with the same, went on writing letters to the respondent No. 1 complaining inaction on the part of the respondent No. 3 to attend enquiry and disputing the authority of the respondent No. 1 to exercise power under Section 4 of the Act on the ground that the standing order should prevail over the Act. ( 7 ) BY a letter dated June 7,2000 the respondent No. 1 in clear terms overruled the contention of the employer maintaining that the provisions of the Act would prevail over the standing order. By the said letter the employer was asked to pay the dues of the respondent No. 3 within 15 days from the receipt of the said communication. ( 8 ) THE petitioner replied to the aforesaid letter dated June 7, 2000 disputing the authority of the respondent No. 1 to decide the question whether the provisions of the Act would prevail over the standing order. In the said letter, the petitioner further pointed out that in the absence of any affidavit declaring "no employment", the application of the respondent No. 3 was liable to be rejected. By the said letter the petitioner further relied upon an alleged report of one "detective Bureau" indicating that the respondent No. 3 was in service elsewhere. ( 9 ) THE employer having failed to honour the direction dated June 7, 2000, a certificate proceeding has been initiated and a notice thereof has been given to the petitioner.
By the said letter the petitioner further relied upon an alleged report of one "detective Bureau" indicating that the respondent No. 3 was in service elsewhere. ( 9 ) THE employer having failed to honour the direction dated June 7, 2000, a certificate proceeding has been initiated and a notice thereof has been given to the petitioner. Being dissatisfied, the employer has come up with the instant writ application. ( 10 ) MR. Mullick, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has advanced threefold submissions in support of this application. The first point taken by him is that the Assistant Labour Commissioner was incompetent to decide the dispute raised by the petitioner that the standing order had the overriding effect upon the Act. Mr. Mullick contends that the aforesaid dispute comes within the scope of item No. 6 of Schedule II of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such it is for the Labour Court to decide such question. Secondly, Mr. Mullick contends that the provisions contained in standing order prevails over the Act and as such his client was entitled to reduce the subsistence allowance to 25% of the salary after the expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension as the respondent No. 3 was solely responsible for the delay in concluding the enquiry. Lastly, Mr. Mullick contends that respondent No. 1 before passing the order impugned did not consider the allegation of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 is working elsewhere. ( 11 ) AS regards the first contention of Mr. Mullick, it appears from Section 4 of the Act that the State Government is vested with the power to decide if any money is due and payable to the employee as subsistence allowance. There is no dispute that the respondent No. 1 was acting in terms of Section 4 of the Act. It is now settled position of law that if a statute vests an authority with a power to grant any relief, that authority is supposed to be empowered to adjudicate any jurisdictional fact the existence of which is sine qua non for exercising such power. Therefore, in order to grant relief under Section 4 of the Act, it is for the respondent No. 1 to come to a conclusion that the Act applies to the applicant and that necessary ingredients of Section 4 are present.
Therefore, in order to grant relief under Section 4 of the Act, it is for the respondent No. 1 to come to a conclusion that the Act applies to the applicant and that necessary ingredients of Section 4 are present. Thus, the respondent No. 1 did not commit any illegality in holding that the provisions contained in the Act applies and that those contained in the standing order cannot stand in the way of granting relief to the respondent No. 3. The first point taken by Mr. Mullick is thus devoid of any substance. ( 12 ) THE second point taken by Mr. Mullick is equally devoid of any merit. There is no dispute that the petitioner No. 1 is an employer, the respondent No. 3 is an employee and the establishment concerned is also an establishment within the meaning of Sections 2 (a), 2 (b) and 2 (c) of the Act respectively and as such the provisions contained in the Act apply to the case of the petitioner as the establishment is in West Bengal. Section 10-A of the Standing Orders Act provides for payment of subsistence allowance and Sub-section (b) thereof prescribes grant of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% of such wages for the period beyond 90 days from the order of suspension provided the delay in the completion of disciplinary proceeding against the workman is not directly attributable to the conduct of such workman and according to Section 10-A (2), if any such dispute arises, the same will be decided by the Labour Court. ( 13 ) BUT Section 10-A (3) states that notwithstanding the provisions as aforesaid, where provisions relating to payment of subsistence allowance under any other law for the time being in force in any State are more beneficial than the provisions of Section 10-A, the provisions of those other laws would be applicable to the payment of subsistence allowance in that State. Therefore, the provisions of the Act being undoubtedly more beneficial to the workman, the Act will have overriding effect upon Section 10-A of the Standing Orders Act. ( 14 ) IN the case of P. L. Shah v. Union of India, upon which Mr. Mullick placed strong reliance, in my view, has no application to the fact of the present case. In that case, the employee was a Government servant.
( 14 ) IN the case of P. L. Shah v. Union of India, upon which Mr. Mullick placed strong reliance, in my view, has no application to the fact of the present case. In that case, the employee was a Government servant. The Act has no application to a case of Government servant as it appears from the definition of 'establishment' and as such the observation of the Apex Court in the case of P. L. Shah v. Union of India (supra) cannot have any application to a case governed by the Act. I, thus, find no substance in the second contention of Mr. Mullick. ( 15 ) I am not at all convinced by the third and last contention of Mr. Mullick. The allegation that the respondent No. 3 is now employed elsewhere has been made for the first time in the letter dated June 14, 2000 on the basis of an alleged report given by a detective. agency on June 8, 2000. Prior to that, in the letter dated May 16, 2000 it was only pointed out that in the absence of any affidavit declaring "no employment", no order of payment of subsistence allowance could be passed. Therefore, at the time of deciding the claim of the respondent No. 3 no allegation was made by the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 was working in any other establishment. If really the respondent No. 3, before termination of her service by the petitioner, joins any other establishment, the petitioner could give her subsequent charge-sheet alleging such fact, but till date no such charge has been levelled. The proviso to Section 3 of the Act makes an applicant disentitled to subsistence allowance if the applicant is employed elsewhere. But in the absence of any such allegation, no duty is cast upon the applicant to file affidavit stating that he is not employed elsewhere. ( 16 ) FORM A referred to in West Bengal Subsistence Allowance Rules, 1971 does not demand filing of any such affidavit. Therefore, in a given case, if the employer docs not raise allegation of taking new employment it is no part of the duty of the applicant to come up with an affidavit asserting that the applicant is not working in any other establishment.
Therefore, in a given case, if the employer docs not raise allegation of taking new employment it is no part of the duty of the applicant to come up with an affidavit asserting that the applicant is not working in any other establishment. Moreover, filing of a vague report given by a detective agency after passing of the order of payment of subsistence allowance cannot invalidate such order. ( 17 ) THEREFORE, I find no reason to interfere with the orders and notice of demand impugned herein. This order will however not preclude the petitioner from raising the allegation of subsequent employment of the respondent No. 3 and if such fact is proved the respondent No. 1 will be entitled to pass such order as it thinks fit at the time of disposal of the prayer for payment of subsistence allowance of any subsequent period. Writ application is thus dismissed with costs which I assess at 100 Gms.